Sanjay Kumar v. State of H.P. & Ors

A perusal of the writ petition shows that the order of rejection was passed on 4.9.2024, and the present petition was filed on 14.11.2025 after the lapse of more than one year from the 3 date of rejection of the application. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, that a person who sleeps over his right for a considerable time cannot be granted extraordinary relief by the writ Courts. It was observed. “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly, or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber, ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court, time and again, has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors that should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away, and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained, which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances that give rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction, and it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described 4 in a straitjacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

11. For filing a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether, within a reasonable time same has been invoked, and even submitting memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances, on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such an indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.

12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119 has held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras 56-58) “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of a fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors, and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that the power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing 5 reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke the jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450: 1964 SCC OnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261: AIR 1964 SC 1006, Moon Mills