Aman Kumar v. State of HP & anr.

affect the jurisdiction of the High Court because the High Court could have dealt with the application under Section 357 of Cr.P.C., even though the application was filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:-

3. Section 482 of the Code under which the heirs of the deceased filed the application for compensation corresponds to Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A provision that saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the statute which saves that power. This is put in another form by saying that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject matter, there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter. From this, it will be clear that the application made by the heirs of the deceased for compensation could not have been made under Section 482 since Section 357 expressly confers power on the court to pass an order for payment of compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein. That did not, however, affect the power of the High Court to deal with the application because, though the application was wrongly described as having been made under Section 482, the High Court could deal with it as if it were made under Section 357 of the Code. That, in fact, is what the High Court proceeded to do, for it passed the order of compensation not under Section 482 but under Section 357(1)(c) of the Code.

4. This is also in accordance with the principle that if the Court has power under some provision of law, this power is not taken away by mentioning a wrong provision. It was laid down by the State of Karnataka v. Muniyalla, (1985) 1 SCC 196, that an order purported to be made under some provision of law does not become invalid so long as there is some provision under which it could have been validly made. It was observed:-

4. Now it is obvious that the Judgment of the High Court is patently wrong and cannot be sustained, and in fact, Mr Kapil Sibal, appearing on behalf of the respondent, with his usual candour and frankness, stated that it was difficult for him to support the Judgment. We may proceed on the basis that the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge could try only such Sessions Cases as were made over to him by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 194 of the Criminal Procedure Code, though we are not at all sure that, even if the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge tried a Sessions Case which was not formally made over to him, the trial would be invalid, because in any event the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge would have inherent jurisdiction to try the Sessions Case. We need not, however, go into that question because we find that there was an order made by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge on January 30, 1981, making over Sessions Case No. 17 of 1979 to the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore. Undoubtedly, this order was purported to be made by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge in the exercise of the powers conferred under Section 409 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and this section did not confer power on the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge to make over Sessions Case No. 17 of 1979 to the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge. But it is now well-settled that merely because an order is purported to be made under a wrong provision of law, it does not become invalid so long as there is some other provision of law under which the order could be validly made. A mere recital of a wrong provision of law does not have the effect of invalidating an order which is otherwise within the power of the authority making it. Here, the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge had power under Section 194 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to make over Sessions Case No. 17 of 1979 to the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, and the order made by him on January 30, 1981, was clearly within his authority, and the only error was that he recited a wrong section of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order dated January 30, 1981, made by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge must be read as an order made under Section 194 of the Code of Criminal Procedure insofar as the direction making over Sessions Case No. 17 of 1979 to the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge is concerned. We are therefore of the view that Sessions Case No. 17 of 1979 was validly made over to the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, and he had jurisdiction to try that Sessions Case. The Judgment of the High Court setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the respondent on the ground that the Sixth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to try Sessions Case No. 17 of 1979, must consequently be held to be erroneous.

5. This position was reiterated in Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16, wherein it was observed:-

17. For the reasons stated above while we agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the stage for the exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code had not reached, inasmuch as the trial had not commenced and evidence was not led, since the Court of Session had the power under Section 193 of the Code to summon the appellants as their involvement in the commission of the crime prima facie appeared from the record of the case, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order as it is well settled that once it is found that the power exists the exercise of power under a wrong provision will not render the order illegal or invalid. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.

6. A similar view was taken in T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar, (2008) 5 SCC 633: (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 677, wherein it was observed:

13. Ms Suri, however, pointed out that the application of the appellant being one under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was rightly rejected. It is now a well-settled principle of law that non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of a provision of law would not be of any relevance if the court had the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order.

7. Therefore, mentioning the wrong provision will not take away the jurisdiction of the court.

8. It is undisputed that the Court has jurisdiction under Section 372 of the Cr.PC to entertain the appeal at the instance of the victim, and this jurisdiction will not be taken away by mentioning Section 374 of Cr.PC. Therefore, the present application is allowed, and the Section is ordered to be corrected to 372 Cr.P.C.

9. The application stands disposed of. Cr.MP(M) No. 90 of 2025

10. List for consideration after two weeks. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22nd June, 2026 (Chander)