South East Asian Study Foundation v. Vocational Education Foundation Trust

Arguments of the Counsel for the appellants:-

#3. Counsel the appellants-petitioners has vehemently argued that the appellants as such were not at fault and notice commencing the arbitration proceedings had been 3 sent on 23.07.2025. It is submitted that in such circumstances the dismissal as such of the application alongwith costs of Rs.5,00,000/- has gravely prejudiced the interests of the petitioners, since the commencement of the arbitration proceedings had already taken place on 23.07.2025. It is sought to be argued that under Section 9 sub-Clause 2 of the ‘Act’ there is an inherent powers as such that provides further time to be given as per the Courts determination, if an order for interim protection has been issued under Section 9(1) of the ‘Act’. Accordingly, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge was erred not extending the time. It is further submitted that the dispute as such having a reason regarding the running of respondent No.3-University which is located at Barotiwala would give jurisdiction to this Court and to entertain the petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ and therefore the objection which is being sought to be raised and highlighted before the learned Single Judge was not justified. Arguments on behalf of contesting respondents:-

#4. Counsel for the respondents No.1 & 2, on the other hand, has questioned the jurisdiction of filing the petition in this Court while submitting that only the Courts at Delhi had jurisdiction as per the terms agreed. Various issues were raised 4 regarding the act and conduct as such of appellants/petitioners to hold out that the learned Single Judge was well justified in imposing the costs of Rs.5,00,000/-.

#5. It is accordingly argued that the petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ filed by the petitioners before the learned Single Judge on 20.03.2025, was on account of the fact that an e-auction was to take place on the same date. It is contended that there was no urgency for the stay which was passed on

22.03.2025 on account of the fact that the e-auction was fixed for

20.03.2025. It is the contention as such that the respondents No.1 & 2 had paid a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- on 04.02.2025 and the respondent-Bank had asked for more outstanding amount on

03.03.2025. The respondent had written on 04.03.2025, that they were paying the amount and the auction should be cancelled. On 17.03.2025, they had paid Rs.3,50,00,000/- and the auction was accordingly cancelled on 18.03.2025.

#6. The petition had been filed without impleading the Bank as party and there was no effort to pay any outstanding amount and the dues had been cleared by the respondents No.1 & 2. The respondent No.3-IEC (India Education Centre) University through its Registrar had been proceeded against ex 5 parte in the proceedings, who now had filed application in the present appeal to muddy the waters.

#7. Accordingly, it is argued that application bearing CARAP No.92 of 2025 which has now been filed for seeking direction to defreeze the account with ICICI Bank in the name of applicant/respondent No.3-IEC (India Education Centre) University, at the instance of the Registrar namely, Prahlad Gupta was not competent It is submitted that Dr. Naveen Gupta-respondent No.2 herein was the President of the Vocational Education Foundation Trust-respondent No.1 and as per the Act of the University, namely, IEC (India Education Centre) University (Establishment and Regulation) Act, 2012 (Act No.11 of 2012) being the Chancellor appointed by the “sponsoring body” was to be the Head of the University. Section 2(p) provides that the “sponsoring body” means the Vocational Education Foundation. The Registrar was to be appointed by the Chancellor in such a manner and on such terms & conditions of service as may be specified by the statutes. It is specifically mentioned that there was no appointment and authorization of the said Registrar to file the application.

#8. Accordingly, it is contended that the petition filed under Section 9 of the Act by the applicants-petitioners-South 6 East Asian Study Foundation was through Ajay Kumar Sinha and the Registrar had never filed the petition.

#9. The accounts had been frozen allegedly on

20.06.2025, but the said fact had never been brought to the notice of the Single Bench. Reliance was placed upon Samir Narain Bhojwani Vs. Aurora Properties and Investments and Another (2018) 17 SCC 203, while referring to the order dated

25.06.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge, which reads as under:- “On the request of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, list on 21.07.2025. However, parties shall be at liberty to make a mention for the listing of the case, in case, an arbitrator stands appointed in the application preferred under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act by the petitioners. Interim order to continue.”

#10. It was mentioned that the impression given to the learned Single Judge was that the petition under Section 11 of the ‘Act’ had been filed and in such circumstances, it had been directed that the matter was being deferred, but no efforts having been made, the proceedings were never commenced/initiated under Section 21 of the ‘Act’ and the relevant date would be when the request that the dispute be referred for arbitration is received by the respondent. Thus, the notice had never been sent and only the matter was taken up on 23.07.2025. It was thus 7 alleged on that date that it had been done, whereas it would only commence when the request was received by the respondent. Therefore, the appellant had mislead the Court and therefore findings had been recorded by the learned Single Judge of this Court and the Appellate Court would not interfere as such. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another (1982) 2 SCC 463.

#11. It was held that right to file an Arbitration Petition would arise within 30 days from the date of receipt, while relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh Vs. Asap Fluids Private Limited and Another (2025) 1 SCC 502 to this extent.

#12. Accordingly, it is contended that the purpose of Section 9 (2) of the ‘Act’, which is incorporated is only for the purpose of interim relief before the Arbitrator is appointed and the stay would not continue forever and the arbitral proceedings had to be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date, the order had been passed as an interim measure or within such further time as the Court may determine. Thus, it is submitted that the purpose of Section 9 (3) of the ‘Act’ was not to 8 have a perpetutal injuction, which was the effort made in the present case.

#13. It is thus, accordingly argued that Bank had clarified on account of being put to notice by this Court that the respondent had paid the entire settlement amount in March, 2025 and the auction stood withdrawn and cancelled vide (Annexure R-4) and there was no need to pass the interim order dated

22.03.2025 without hearing the contesting parties.

#14. Reference was also made that the respondents No.1 & 2 had been informed on 29.03.2025 that no dues are outstanding against the various terms over Demand Drafts facilities and terms which had been granted to the respondent- Kotak Mahindra-Bank. The title deeds were also liable to be released and necessary certificate dated 03.04.2025 to be issued that the charge as such had been released on the property mentioned in the schedule, which was Plot No.7 and 10(P) owned by M/s Vocational Education Foundation.

#15. In such circumstances, it is contended that no case for stay was made out and there was concealment of facts right from date of filing of the petition.

#16. While referring to issue of jurisdiction, reliance was placed firstly upon the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 9 dated 23.11.2018 (Annexure P-2) signed between the (India Education Centre) IEC-University through Naveen Gupta respondents No.1 & 2 with Ajay Kumar Sinha and Associates regarding 40 acres of land, building and infrastructure. As per Clause 13 of the said MoU, the dispute was to be settled by way of arbitration and Clause 14 provided that only the Delhi Courts will have territorial jurisdiction.

#17. Even the second agreement dated 13.03.2019 as such, on the basis of which the petitioner was setting-up the claim was also signed between the petitioner-M/s South East Asian Study Foundation and the M/s Vocational Education Foundation, which also provided, as per Clause 7, that the Courts in the city of Delhi alone shall have jurisdiction. There was nothing on record to show that who had signed it and whether respondents No.1 & 2 were signatory to the same and neither there were any witnesses of the said agreement.

#18. The third Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 13.11.2019 was also signed being the Management and Operations Transfer Agreement and had been signed for Vocational Education Foundation Trust through Naveen Gupta and as per Clause 11 (i) also, the seat of the arbitration was to be at Delhi and the Courts at Delhi shall have sole and exclusive 10 jurisdiction and the Arbitration would be done by a three Member Arbitral Tribunal.

#19. In such circumstances, reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Swastik Gases Private Limited Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (2013) 9 SCC 32, B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another (2015) 12 SCC 225, State of West Bengal and Others Vs. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32 and Shri Sanjay Aggarwal Vs. BLCCO Lawrie Limited & another 2016 SCC OnLine HP363 : (2016) 1 Latest HLJ 534, a judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court to contend that the proceedings as such before the learned Single Judge were without jurisdiction and even otherwise, in view of the agreed stand between the parties, only the Courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction and therefore, for other reasons also, the present petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ was not maintainable. Reasons for dismissal of the appeal.

#20. It is pertinent to notice the order passed by the learned Single Judge at the first instance on 22.03.2025, reads as under:- “Let dasti notice be issued for service of the respondents, on taking steps by 24.03.2025, returnable for 21.04.2025. Dasti notice be handed 11 over to learned Counsel for the petitioners by 25.03.2025. Having heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in the integrum, it is ordered that respondents No.1 and 2 shall not disrupt the functioning of respondent No.3-University. No disruption shall be caused by the said respondents in the course of functioning/management of petitioner No.2 of the University as Chief Executive Officer, the petitioners may approach Kotak Mahindra Bank for liquidation of the entire outstanding liability of the bank without prejudice to the rights of respondents No.1 and 2. List on 21.4.2025.”

#21. Keeping in view this, we had directed that the Bank should also be made a party, before we would hear the matter on merits, vide order dated 31.07.2025, while noticing that there was a recovery amount of Rs. 38,90,00,107.20/-, which was due from the Vocational Education Foundation Trust-respondent No.1, since the securitization proceedings were being initiated. At that point of time we were informed for the first time the Bank had deferred the auction proceedings. The order dated 31.07.2025 passed by us, reads as under:- “Notice. Mr. Ishan Kashyap, Advocate accepts notice for respondents No. 1 & 2. Notice be issued to respondent No. 3, returnable by the next date of hearing, on taking steps within two days. Dasti notice permitted. 2. Perusal of the appeal would go on to show that the Secularization & proceedings under Reconstruction of Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) Act, were initiated and the property of respondent No. 3-University was put to auction. It is clear from e-Auction Notice (Annexure P-11) Financial 12 that the immovable assets were put to sale/auction by Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited for recovery of an amount of Rs. 38,90,00,107.20, which was due from respondent No.1, as on 16.08.2018. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that passing of any interim order inter-se the parties, will adversely affect the interest of the Bank, since the e-auction was fixed on 20.03.2025, as per the notice dated 11.02.2025. 3. We are informed that the Bank has deferred the auction proceedings, but in order to confirm the facts and also the outstanding dues of the Bank, we are of the considered opinion, that the said bank is a necessary party to the lis and it would be appropriate to implead it as party respondent in this appeal before any interim order is passed or hearing is conducted regarding the dispute. 4. Counsel for the appellants accordingly prays for time to implead the Bank as party respondent in the appeal and to supply a copy of paper book to the respondents. Record be called for. List on 07.08.2025.”

#22. Resultantly, the Bank was impleaded as respondent No.4 and counsel for respondent No.4 had placed on record the affidavit and mentioned that the payments were cleared by respondent No.1 in March, 2025 and the auction had been withdrawn by it/respondent No.4.

#23. The order passed by the learned Single Judge on

25.06.2025, goes to the root of the matter, since apparently an impression was given that the arbitration proceedings had already been commenced before 25.06.2025. As noticed, on

25.06.2025 an impression was given by the counsel which was recorded in the said order which reads as under:- 13 “On the request of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, list on 21.07.2025. However, parties shall be at liberty to make a mention for the listing of the case, in case, an arbitrator stands appointed in the application preferred under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act by the petitioners. Interim order to continue.”

#24. The provisions of Sections 9 and 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read as under:- “9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.- 1[(1)] A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court:- (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the preservation, inerim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject- matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid pruposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full inormation or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, 14 and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to any, proceedings before it. 2[(2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under sub- section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.] 10 to 20.....

#21. Commencement of arbitral proceedings.- Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. 22 to 41....... 42. Jurisdiction.- Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.”

#25. As noticed earlier the learned Single Judge had on first date itself had granted the interim order dated 22.03.2025, keeping in mind that the prayer as such in the petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ was also based on the ground that the dues of the Kotak Mahindra Bank for liquidation of the entire outstanding liability of the Bank were present and to prevent the 15 University being from taken and over. Strangely, the Bank had never been made a party though the petition as such was also based on the said fact that Dr. Naveen Gupta-respondent No.2 had failed to fulfill his obligation and had not depositing or clearing the liability to the Bank and the securitization proceedings have been initiated.

#26. While referring to notice under Rule 8 (6)/9(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 dated 11.02.2025 (Annexure P-11), it would be clear that the property was to be to sale on 20.03.2025 the recovery of Rs.38,90,00,107.20/- (Rupees Thirty Eight Crores Ninety Lakhs One Hundred Seven Rupees and Twenty Paise Only), due to KMBL from Vocational Education Foundation & Others and its guarantors. It is in such circumstances, an opportunity was given as such to approach the Bank for liquidation of the entire outstanding liability of the Bank by the learned Single Judge.

#27. On 04.09.2025, it was brought to our notice that the payments have been cleared by the Foundation Trust and the auction proceedings have been withdrawn by the Bank and that the needful had already been done prior in point of time before the order dated 22.03.2025 was passed which would be clear from the documents placed on record by respondents No.1 and 2 16 who were in constant touch with the Bank and had entered into One Time Settlement (OTS) of Rs.18,25,00,000/-, way-back on

01.07.2024. Vide letter dated 04.02.2025, it had been brought to the notice of the Bank that they had done so and Rs.10.25 Crore was outstanding. On 12.02.2025, notice had been issued by the Bank to the Vocational Education Foundation and to the guarantors as such that the re-payment had not been done and the property was being put to auction on 20.03.2025. Vide communication dated 03.03.2025, the Bank had held out to the Vocational Education Foundation that if they pay full and final settlement by 18.03.2025, the auction would be stopped and no action would be taken, in view of the earlier One Time Settlement (OTS) letter dated 01.07.2024. The Vocational Education Foundation had thereafter made the payment of Rs.2,00,00,000/- on 04.03.2025 and given two cheques of Rs.3,00,00,000/- each and Rs.2,25,00,000/- plus Rs.70,00,000/- vide letter dated

04.03.2025 and asked for issuance of ‘No Dues Certificate’. On

18.03.2025, they had given the details of the payments made on account of the fact that the settlement had been done and also asked for the return of Post-Dated Cheques on 18.03.2025. The Bank had confirmed the said payment on 18.03.2025. 17

#28. This fact had never been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge while filing the petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ and while obtaining the ex-parte stay order. On

22.03.2025, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the present appellants have withheld more than they have disclosed when the petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ was filed.

#29. To further compound the issue after having obtained the stay order they chose not to commence the arbitration proceedings which is mandatory under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ and there was a period as such fixed for 90 days to commence the said arbitration proceedings. The arguments as such raised that there is a further provision as the Court may determine and reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Apex Court in Epimoney Private Limited Vs. Manidhari Oils Private Limited and Others (2019) SCC OnLine Bom 4861. The said judgment would not be applicable since the conduct as such of the appellants does not show that there was any sincerity to commence the arbitration proceedings and an impression as such was given as noticed by the learned Single Judge that an Arbitrator would stand appointed, in view of the application preferred under Section 11 of the ‘Act’. In spite of a period of two months having expired till 25.06.2025 also and no effort was 18 made and therefore the learned Single Judge was constrained as such to give short dates and to ensure that the mandate of Section 9 of the ‘Act’ is adhered too and the matter was taken up on 21.07.2025 also and thereafter listed on 23.07.2025 and finally disposed off.

#30. Apparently on the opposition as such by the respondents No.1 & 2, since the interim order was operating against them and no commencement of the arbitration proceedings had been done by serving a notice for proposal and appointment of the Arbitrator under Section 21 of the ‘Act’.

#31. It is interesting to note that in the Section 9 proceedings, the Registrar of the University was arrayed as respondent No.3 but had chosen not to put in appearance and was ordered to be proceeded against ex-parte and continued to remains so till eventually, the matter was disposed off. The present set of proceedings whereby now the application had been filed at the instance of the said Registrar is trying to apparently only to confuse the issue that there is difficulty as such in running the University-respondent-No.3 and therefore, we are inclined to dismiss all the applications filed by the said respondent for defreezing the accounts with the ICICI Bank, as 19 serious objection has been raised to the locus standi of the said Registrar on non-appointment by the Chancellor.

#32. In State of Maharashtra case (supra), it was held that the Judges cannot be dragged into the arena of the dispute inter se litigation and the judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The relevant para of the said judgment read as under:- “4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri. A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.” We are bound to accept the statement of the judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. WE cannot allow the statement of other evidence. If the judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still 20 fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily and there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.”

#33. It is in such circumstances, once the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that there was an effort as such to overreach by depicting on the 23.07.2025 that the arbitration proceedings have been commenced by sending of the notice on the said date notwithstandig the earlier impression given on 25.06.2025, we do not wish to substitute the opinion of the learned Single Judge.

#34. In Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh case (supra), a three Judge Bench examined the issue regarding the arbitration notice sent on 23.01.2017 and received on 24.01.2017 and for appointment of the Arbitrator in terms of the relevant clause. Thus, it has been held that the period of limitation for three years for the purpose of under Section 11(6) of the ‘Act’ would run from

23.01.2017 as the delivery was made on 24.01.2017 and the 21 failure as such to comply with the requirements would give limitation.

#35. In Samir Narain Bhojwani case (supra), a three Judge Bench as such held that an interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted and is in excess of jurisdiction at an interlocutory stage and it had come to the conclusion that the High Court committed manifest error and exceeded its jurisdiction.

#36. It is in such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that in the absence of Bank having not impleaded, the directions which have been issued even by the learned Single on that stage without impleading the Bank as party and without calling for response was to be handled with caution and care. Keeping in view the averments made in the petition as noticed above had the learned Single Judge done so the injunction was not liable to be granted and we had followed that method while passing the order dated 31.07.2025 and the true facts subsequently came forth that respondents No.1 & 2 as such had paid the amounts and even the auction had been cancelled. Issue of Jurisdiction:

#37. Before the learned Single Judge Bench also there was an objection as such regarding the short reply filed on the 22 issue of forged Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated

13.03.2019 on the basis of which the proceedings had also been initiated and also the issue of jurisdiction of the Court, keeping in view the terms of the two admitted agreements and even the disputed agreement. It is another matter that the learned Single Judge did not deal with the issue and dismissed the petition on the other grounds. However, we are of the considered opinion that even the said objection as such is well justified on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2.

#38. The first agreement dated 23.11.2018 also provides that the Delhi Courts would have jurisdiction under Clause 13 & 14, which reads as under:- “13. That, Dispute, if any, arising out of this Memorandum of Understanding will be settled by the sole arbitrator, to be appointed by mutual consent and the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Parties. 14. jurisdiction to try any legal disputes, if any.” That, Delhi Courts will have territorial

#39. The second agreement dated 13.11.2019 also provides the similar jurisdiction to the Courts at Delhi and for the seat of the arbitration, which reads as under:- “(i) Governing Law and Dispute Resolution (a) This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted and enforced in accordance with the laws of India. (b) Any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration. The parties hereto shall 23 each choose an arbitrator, and the two arbitrators thus chosen shall select a third arbitrator. The findings and award of three arbitrators thus chosen shall be final and binding on the parties hereto. (c) The seat of the arbitration will be Delhi and the Courts at Delhi shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction.”

#40. The disputed agreement dated 13.03.2019, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) also provides that the Courts at Delhi would have jursidiction and provides for an Arbitration Clause 7 & 8. The same reads as under:- “7. The courts in the city of Delhi alone shall have jurisdiction to entertain any application or other proceedings in respect of any issues arising out of this MOU. 8. All disputes and/or claims arising out of or relating to this arrangement or any breach of this arrangement shall be referred to a Sole Arbitrator to be appointed by the parties mutually under provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”

#41. Merely because the property is situated as such even within the limits of this Court, in view of the express agreement between the parties, we have serious doubts regarding the maitainability of Section 9 of the ‘Act’ before this Court.

#42. In Associated Contractors case (supra), a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has held that Section 9 of the ‘Act’ would fall within the purview of Section 42 of the ‘Act’ which provides that any application thus made under this part that Court alone shall have jurisdiction of the arbitral proceedings and all 24 subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.

#43. In the said case, an application had been filed for interim orders in the High Court of Calcutta and thereafter under Section 11 of the ‘Act’ proceedings had been initiated and the award had been passed by the retired High Court Judge and the matter had been challenged under Section 34 of the ‘Act’ before the District Judge at Raipur since the work had been conducted in the said District of West Bengal. The Single Judge had accepted the objections, keeping in view the parties had submitted to the original jurisdiction of the High Court and the matter had been taken to the Apex Court in this context, wherein the said order was upheld that the jurisdiction would lie to the High Court in view of Section 2(1)(e), in view of the High Court having original jurisdiction in the said State.

#44. In B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal case (supra), it has been held that once the agreement between the parties restricted jurisdiction to only one particular court, that court alone would have jurisdiction and it would mean that applications preferred to courts outside the exclusive court 25 agreed to by parties would also be without jurisdiction. The relevant paragraph reads as under:- “11. In a very recent judgment delivered on 10-9- 2014 in State of W.B. V. Associated Contractors5, the three-Judge Bench (speaking through one of us, Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.), noticing the decisions of this Court in FCI V. A.M. Ahmed & Co.14 (SCC para 6); Neycer India Ltd. v. GNB Ceramics Ltd.15 (SCC para 3) with reference to Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the decisions of this Court in Jatinder Nath v. Chopra Land Developers (P) Ltd.16 (SCC para 9); Rajasthan SEB v. Universal Petrol Chemicals Ltd. 11 (SCC paras 33 to 36) and Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.4 (SCC para 32), held that where the agreement between the parties restricted jurisdiction to only one particular court, that court alone would have jurisdiction as neither Section 31(4) nor Section 42 (of the 1996 Act) contains a non obstante clause wiping out a contrary agreement between the parties. On the basis of the above decisions, it was further held that applications preferred to courts outside the exclusive court agreed to by parties would also be without jurisdiction.”

#45. It was accordingly held that once the Courts at a particular place had exclusive jurisdiction as per the agreement, the Section 9 application proceedings which the High Court had directed the District Judge to decide would not determine territorial jurisdiction without any basis and it would be a futile exercise and the Civil Appeal had been allowed.

#46. Reliance had been placed upon the earlier judgment in three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Swastik Gases Private Limited (supra) that the applications preferred to the 26 Courts outside the exclusive Courts by exclusion clause, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. The relevant para reads as under:- “32. For answer to the above question, we have to see the effect of the jurisdiction clause in the agreement which provides that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata. It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like “alone”, “only”, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties-by having Clause 18 in the agreement- is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an interference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor it is against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.”

#47. The separate judgment authored by the another learned Judge, namely, Madan B. Lokur also reiterated the said position while relying upon a plethora of judgments.

#48. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that even this Court as such would be denuded of the 27 jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Another learned Single Judge of this Court, namely, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol as he then was on the Bench of this Court in Shri Sanjay Aggarwal case (supra) held the same view that the parties had confined to the jurisdiction of the Court at Calcutta.

#49. The petition under Section 9 of the ‘Act’ as such was not maintainable and reliance can be placed upon A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Another Vs. A.P. Agencies, (1989) SCC (2) 163, apart from the other judgments.

#50. Resultanly, keeping in view the above, we are of the considered opinion that the order dated 23.07.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity which would warrant interference. Resultantly, the present appeal stands dismissed accordingly.

#51. Pending miscellaneous application(s) if any, shall also stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Ranjan Sharma) Judge 31st October, 2025 (munish thakur)