Tarsem Singh and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

background, that the Rejection order dated 16.01.2019 - 5 - [Annexure A-4], is assailed in the instant petition. STAND OF RESPONDENT-STATE AUTHORITIES IN REPLY-AFFIDAVIT:

#3. Pursuant to issuance of notice on 29.05.1999, the State Authorities have filed the Reply-Affidavit dated 04.07.2019 of Director Ayurveda, Himachal Pradesh. 3(i). Para 1 of Reply-Affidavit, specifically and vehemently denied that selection was initiated for making recruitment on regular basis. Reply-Affidavit indicates interview letters were issued specifically revealing that the selection was to be made on daily wage basis. Reply-Affidavit indicates that pursuant to the selection/interview held on 07.04.1999, the petitioners were selected/appointed as Class-IV employees on daily wage basis on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1] and they accepted their regular appointment without any protest at the relevant time. 3(ii). Para 2 of Reply-Affidavit indicates after having accepted the daily wage appointment as Class-IV on 05.05.1999, the petitioners continued - 6 - in service and were regularized as Class-IV in 2009 in accordance with the Government Policy. Para 6(ii) of the Reply-Affidavit vehemently states that the counselling/interview was held for daily wage Class-IV and was not for regular Class-IV. So far as the claim the petitioners regarding mid-wives, ward-boys and cooks, etc. are concerned, the respondents have stated that the post of mid-wives, ward-boys and cooks were created on regular basis and their selection- appointment was also made on regular basis whereas in case of the petitioners, the Government had created Class-IV daily wage posts against which the petitioners were appointed on daily wage basis. Operative part of the Reply-Affidavit reads as under:- 6(ii). That this para submitted that in the year 1999 posts of daily wage Class-IV were advertised by the department for filling up the posts on daily wage basis through Employment Exchange as per that point instructions prevailing at the candidates time. Accordingly, whose names were sponsored by the Employment Exchange were called for the interview which also including the applicants and were engaged as - 7 - Class-IV in the department on fixed wages of Rs.51/- per day which was as per the rules and instructions issued by the Government for daily wagers from time to time. The counselling/interview was held for daily wage Class-IV and not for any regular post of Class-IV hence the contention of the applicants for appointment against the regular post of Class-IV is not at all tenable. However, the posts of mid-wives, ward boys and cooks, etc. were created on regular basis whereas the posts of Class-IV were created on daily wage basis and as such they were appointed on daily wage basis. 6(ii). That in reply to this para it is submitted that the policy to regularize the services of daily wage Class-IV was introduced in the department in the year 2009 and accordingly the services of the eligible incumbents were regularized in the year 2009 itself. nature 6(v) & (vi). That in reply to these paras it is submitted appointments of the applicants has not been changed at any stage. The applicants are putting up forth false and frivolous contentions which are totally baseless to justify their claim. As a matter of fact, the appointment has been made purely on daily wage basis at fixed rate of Rs.51/- per day which is clearly mentioned in the appointment letters which the applicants accepted without any protest at that point of time. However, applicants has been regularized as per the policy of regularization which was the services of - 8 - introduced in the department in the the claim of year 2009. Hence, arrears, applicants consequential benefits is not at all sustainable in eyes of law. 6(vii). That following the contents of this para so record are not far pertaining denied. However, it is submitted that the representation of the applicant was devoid of any merits and hence was rejected. As a matter of the appointment of the applicants were made on daily wage basis as per the advertisement and the due procedure applicable at that point of interviews/counselling was time. The held for incumbents whose name were sponsored by the concerned Employment Exchanges on daily wage basis. It has never been mentioned at any stage that is being carried on the process against any regular post. This clearly finds mention in the appointment letter of the incumbents Annexure A-1 of the Q.A. the post of Class-IV In above background, the State Authorities have prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. NO REBUTTAL BY PETITIONERS:

#4. Petitioners chose not to file any rebuttal- rejoinder to the Reply-Affidavit filed by the State Authorities in instant proceedings. - 9 -

#5. Heard Mr. Adarsh K. Vashista, Learned Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Amit Kumar Chaudhary, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents- No. 1 to 5 [State]. ANALYSIS:

#6. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the Rejection Order dated 16.01.2019 [Annexure A-4], disallowing the claim of the petitioners for treating them as regular Class-IV employees from the date they were appointed as Class-IV on daily wage basis w.e.f. May, 1999 with all service benefits is not tenable, for the following reasons: PETITIONERS APPOINTED AGAINST SANCTIONED DAILY-WAGE POSTS: 6(i). In para 6(ii) of Reply-Affidavit, the categorical stand of the State Authorities is that the State Government created the Class-IV posts on daily wage basis. It is borne out that after the creation of these posts and the approval granted by - 10 - Government, the selection process was initiated and the Interviews were held on 07.04.1999 for filling up Class-IV posts on daily wage basis. Pursuant to interview, the petitioners were appointed as Class-IV employees, on daily wage basis, on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1]. 6(ii). The State Authorities have taken a specific stand in Reply-Affidavit that the State Authorities created Class-IV daily wage posts and the State Authorities accorded approval for filling these daily waged posts after due selection [Interviews held on

07.04.1999] and the petitioners were selected and appointed and they joined as such in May, 1999 also. Once the Class-IV posts against which the petitioners were selected/appointed were created for filled on daily wages at fixed daily wages as prescribed from time to time, therefore, this Court cannot accede to the prayer that the petitioners were erroneously appointed on daily wage basis. Petitioners have not controverted the stand of State Authorities the Reply-Affidavit. Learned - 11 - State Counsel from the records establishes that the State Government had issued a notification on

22.02.1999 creating 107 Class-IV Daily Waged Posts and after due approval these posts were filled up on daily wage basis. Nothing has been placed on record by the petitioners to show that the selection as Class- IV was not against daily wage posts but were against regular Class-IV posts in the department. Once the State Authorities have taken a conscious decision which is borne out from the Reply-Affidavit and the notification dated 22.02.1999 [supra] to create Class-IV Daily Waged Posts and to fill these daily waged posts, then this Court cannot accede to the prayer of the petitioners that they deserve to be appointed as Class-IV on regular basis instead of having been appointed as Class-IV on Daily Wage Basis. Even conscious policy decision taken by the State Authorities, for creating Class-IV Daily Waged Posts and in filling these on daily wage basis, as referred - 12 - to above, has not been assailed by the petitioners. Said decision of 1999 having attained finality cannot be permitted to be questioned or unsettled after 20 years in instant proceedings. ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AS CLASS-IV DAILY WAGE DISENTITLES PETITIONERS FOR CHANGE IN STATUS FOR CLAIMING REGULAR APPOINTMENT:

#7. Perusal of the material on record indicates that as per the Reply-Affidavit the respondents- State Authorities have created the Class-IV posts on daily wage basis. After creation of these posts, the State Authorities granted approval for filling up of these Class-IV daily wage posts, by calling for from Employment Exchanges, wherein the names of the petitioners and others were sponsored. Petitioners and others were made to undergo the interview for Class-IV daily wage posts on 07.04.1999. Based on the comparative assessment/ merit as per the norms the Selection Committee recommended and appointed the petitioners as daily wage Class-IV incumbents on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1]. Petitioners - 13 - joined their daily wage appointment on the basis of orders dated 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1] in the month of May, 1999 itself. At the time of joining their daily wage appointment in May, 1999 the petitioners accepted their appointment as Class-IV daily wage basis without any demur. Even, thereafter petitioners remained silent from May, 1999 till February 2009, for 10 years. Nothing has been placed on record to assert and establish that the petitioners had raised any claim for seeking change in appointment from daily wage Class-IV to regular Class-IV posts, either during the selection process or during their daily waged service. Having accepted the daily wage appointment from 1999 till February 2009, acquiescence on the part of the petitioners sufficient to draw inference of acceptability of their appointment. In view of principle of acquiescence, the petitioners have neither any locus nor any right to valid claim to seek change in appointment from daily wage Class-IV at this stage after 20 years. In - 14 - these circumstances, the claim of the petitioners for treating them as Class-IV on regular basis from the date of initial appointment as Class-IV on daily wage basis made in May, 1999 does not appeal to rationale and logic and is also not tenable in view of the principle of acquiescence, delay and laches. ACCEPTING REGULAR APPOINTMENT AS CLASS- IV WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT DISENTITLES PETITIONERS FOR RELIEF:

#8. Material on record indicates that petitioners were appointed as daily wage basis on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1] and they joined as such in May, 1999 and they worked in the capacity for 10 years till 16.02.2009. In accordance with the applicable regularization policy, the petitioners were regularized as Class-IV in the pay scale of Rs.2520-4140 with immediate effect and the petitioners accepted their regular prospective appointment. The petitioners having acquiescenced and accepted their regular appointment with immediate effect have neither any right nor any vested claim to seek the benefit - 15 - of retrospective regularization from May 1999 from the date they were appointed as Class-IV on daily wage basis. Nothing has been placed on record that after having accepted their prospective regular appointment on 16.02.2009, the petitioners had either submitted a claim seeking retrospective benefits or regular appointment till filing of a representation i.e. Annexure A-3. Even reading of Annexure A-3 and Annexure A-4 collectively suggest that representation so made belatedly vide Annexure A-3 was rejected by the State Authorities on 16.01.2019 [Annexure A-4]. Thus, the inaction, negligence and slackness on the part of petitioners in sleeping over the matter for 9 years and thereafter in submitting a representation belatedly which was responded rejected on

16.01.2019 [Annexure A-4], leads to an inference of acceptability of prospective regular appointment by the petitioners coupled with the acquiescence giving up their rights, disentitling the petitioners, for any relief. - 16 - DELAY AND LACHES:

#9. While dealing with the issue as to whether mere filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action and the restriction of limitation or delay and laches cannot be obliterated in service matters as outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others versus C.Girija and others, (2019) 15 SCC 633, in the following terms:

#17. This Court again in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, belated (2010) representation following, which is extracted below:- 59 laid down 2 SCC “15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and in compliance with a decided, direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or laches considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a consider a court’s direction without representation issued should - 17 - the merits, nor examining decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.” a

#18. Again, in State Court Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider question of delay in challenging further held that representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh following was laid down:- promotion. The Court directs tribunal “19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the representations consideration relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of competent representation authority does not arrest time.

#23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137, this Court, testing the equality clause on the laches bedrock pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p. 145, para 16) “16. … filing of representations alone the period of would not save limitation. Delay or is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant laches - 18 - laches on deserves consideration. Delay and/ the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.”

#19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 noticed that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph No. 26 and 28, following was laid down:- Bench “26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two- Judge in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152, wherein it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 154, para 2) decision “2. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a - 19 - length of time. But certain would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the to exercise refuse courts powers extraordinary under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” relief Remaining oblivious to the 28. factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled even would principles remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting benefits promotional definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.” circumstances where issued

#20. On the preposition as noticed above, it is clear that the claim of the applicant for inclusion of her name in the panel, which was 09.01.2001 and for the first time was filing representation on 25.09.2007, i.e., after more than 06 and half years. The claim of inclusion in the panel had become stale by that time and filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action. Thus, mere her, - 20 - selection further selection under fact that representation was replied by Railways on 27.12.2007, a stale claim shall not become a live claim. Both Tribunal and High Court did not advert to this important aspect of the matter. It is further to be noted the material on record after declaration of panel on 09.01.2001, there were 30% promotion by LDCE quota, in applicant In 2005 she participated and was declared unsuccessful. With non-inclusion selection, she also filed O.A. No. 629 of 2006 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. After participating in subsequent quota and being declared unsuccessful, by mere filing representation on 27.09.2007 with regard to selection made in 2001, the delay and laches shall not be wiped out. participated. selections under 30% to her in panel in 2005 regard 9(i). Belated service related claim where a remedy is sought by way of writ petition and in a case where remedy is sought by way of an application under the Administrative Tribunals Act is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay- laches or limitation [as the case may be] where a claim had become stale and the tacit or passive acceptance and consent to an act is borne out and - 21 - where a right though was not exercised by a long time leaving it to become non-existent and where inaction or negligence of a person had abandoned his right either expressly or by implication his conduct; virtually destroys the right of a person as mandated by Hon’ble Supreme Court Bichitrananda Behera versus State of Orissa and others (2023) 18 SCC 420, in the following terms:-

#26. On an overall circumspection, thus, in the present case the Respondent No.5 should have been non-suited on the laches, which ground of delay and especially in service matters, has been held consistently to be vital, juxtaposed with the sign of acquiescence. To the the State has mix, we add factual circumstances supported the concerning appellant, his continuance in service as also the Respondent No.5 having worked during the said period in another school viz. the Sri Thakur Nigamananda High School, Respondent No.5 does not, from the to have record before us, appear approached interregnum. the appointment of the authorities Terundia. Notably,

#27. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this - 22 - Court:

#28. Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: laches (where relating remedy (where remedy

#7. “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But exception. If the grievance is in respect administrative related several others also, and if the reopening settled third parties, claim will not be if the entertained. For example, refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would issue would affect rights of decision to or affected is an exception to payment relates - 23 - Insofar applied. the claim for a past period stale and render doctrine of laches/limitation will consequential relief of recovery of arrears concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts relief consequential arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” relating restrict (emphasis supplied)

#29. Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25: "Delay, laches and acquiescence acquiescence

#20. The principles governing delay, laches, overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. common perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of non- limitation consideration of condonation certain circumstances. They bound to be applied by way of principles principles, These create - 24 - practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches

#21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

#22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on facilitate - 25 - equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.

#23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The principle may not have application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the side. To determine difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. involving mere Acquiescence

#24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.

#25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive instead of therefore acceptance, place, - 26 - refusal action against to perform taking alleged original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead to continue by being allowed ignoring consciously further, proceeding thereafter acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” (emphasis supplied)

#30. State Bank of India v M J James, (2022) 2 SCC 301: "36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non- existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit approach authorities the court/appellate belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after litigants - 27 - reasonable unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. explanation Without satisfactory justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred time. a within Pertinently, challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed judgment. impugned highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the challenge. We would, delayed subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and judicial effect in the context of the present case. This could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an the statutory provisions and showing utter disregard legislature.” in violation of tantamounts

#14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, is crystal clear discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be if negligence, liberally inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. interpreted, (D) through his

5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy legal heir, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. - 35 -

#25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

#26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice to be preferred as against deserves considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of technical - 36 - condoning the delay.

#27. We are of the view that the question of limitation technical is not merely a consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants..........

#34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising jurisdiction its supervisory under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

#35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. reasonably diligent

#36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” to condone Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

#7. There is one another aspect of the matter - 37 - which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within limitation. What events that period of occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause appeal earlier, must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without to a cause arising within traced the period of (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733). the sufficient cause limitation expired the appeal being filing the filed must limitation. for not

#8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave Petition with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof. If the said amount, as directed, is not deposited by the State, the Registry shall take necessary steps for recovery of the same, in accordance with law. - 38 - 9(iii). While negating the claim relating to denial of service benefits which accrued in the year 2008 against which the remedy was invoked in the year 2017, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief Executive Officer and others versus S.Lalitha and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 916, held that unexplained delay in service disputes and inaction and negligence of a person in not ventilating his grievance within limitation of limitation disentitles the person- employee for relief, in the following terms:-

#21. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking coordinate Bench State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches would have availing remedies. The Court in that case was concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. Taking note of multiple precedents in the field on the subject of delay or laches disentitling a party to relief, it was held that a writ petition filed 46 publication was grossly belated and that no relief could have been made available to the respondents/ writ petitioners. (forty-six) years

#24. The self-imposed restrictions in the - 39 - laches factors which could assume exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial precedents of this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say, unexplained delay is considered one of significance when the discretionary writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate case, a writ court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers applicant’s negligence or omission to assert his right combined with undue delay or laches and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal. denying relief

#36. On such premise as explained above, upgradation immediately after her the respondent should have, if she felt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her benefits of financial instead of the ACP MACP Scheme Scheme, availed the remedy before the Tribunal rights were affected. She ought not to have waited ventilating her grievance through a belated representation. Filing of such belated representation, which was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing the cause of action and stretching the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed within time. for so 9(iv). While negating the belated claim in service matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in H. - 40 - Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since deceased by LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, in the following terms: “16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial to be preferred as against technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. justice deserves

#17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical - 41 - consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. In the above background, this Court has no hesitation to hold that petitioners were appointed as daily wage Class-IV on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1]. Had the petitioners been aggrieved, then, the petitioners were bound to assert their right and remedy at the relevant time. Pertinently, during the year 1999, State Administrative Tribunal was in existence and once statutory forum was available for the petitioners to assert their rights and remedies [within the outer limit of one year and a half year in view of conjoint reading of Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act] but the petitioners neither asserted their right nor availed available remedy from 05.05.1999 upto July 2008 [the date on which State Administrative Tribunal remained in existence] therefore, in these circumstances, the petitioners having not assailed - 42 - their right/remedy and had allowed the cause to become stale and dead then, the same cannot be permitted to be reopened after a lapse of 20 years, by way of the instant petition.

#10. Petitioners were regularized on 16.02.2009 prospectively, which was duly accepted by the them. In case of any grievance, the petitioners were bound to assert their right and avail the remedy, within a reasonable time. In service matters, an employee cannot be permitted to ventilate his grievances at whims and mercy at any point of time. Service related disputes [except in case of pension] are to be asserted by seeking appropriate remedy either under the Statutory Forums under Administrative Tribunal Act or under Industrial Disputes Act, as the case may be or even by seeking writ remedy within a reasonable period. In the instant case, even after regularization on 16.02.2009, the petitioners slept over rights/remedies for 10 years they made a representation [Annexure A-3] which was rejected - 43 - on 16.01.2019 [Annexure A-4]. Further a mere passing of a rejection order, can neither revive stale and dead claim nor revive the cause, by way of judicial intervention. In these circumstances, instant petition is devoid of any merit.

#11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners are poor persons, appointed on Class-IV on Daily Wage Basis on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1] and even though they stand regularized on

16.02.2009 yet, their claim may be considered for regularisation from 1999 as they belong to lower strata of the society. The above contention of the Learned Counsel appears to be attractive but on scanning of the material on record, this Court has no hesitation to hold that misplaced sympathies will not confer any right when State Authorities have taken a specific stand Reply-Affidavit, the State Authorities created Class-IV Daily Wage Posts and after due approval, selection process was initiated filling Class-IV - 44 - Daily Waged Posts; for which interviews were conducted in April, 1999 and selectees, alike petitioners were appointed as Class- IV on daily wages in May 1999, which was duly accepted by them. After accepting appointment as Class-IV Daily Wage Bases, petitioners slept over rights/remedies for 10 years till they were regularised in terms of the regularization policy on 16.02.2009, which was also accepted by them without any demur. Having accepted appointment as Class-IV on daily wages in May, 1999 and their prospective regularization after 10 years in February, 2009 and having slept over thereafter till making of representation belatedly will not survive a stale and dead cause after 20 years. Even the policy decision for creating Class-IV Daily Wage Posts and also to fill these posts on daily wages by holding Interviews in April 1999 which culminated in May 1999, leading to the appointment of petitioners and others as Class-IV on Daily Wage Basis, has not been assailed in instant proceedings. Not laying a challenge to the policy - 45 - decision taken during the years 1999, for creating Class-IV Posts on Daily Wages disentitles the petitioners for any relief(s). In these circumstances, the claim of the petitioners is devoid of any merit and is turned down. CONCLUSION:

#12. Based on the above discussions, this Court has no hesitation to hold that once the State Authorities have created Class-IV posts on daily wage basis in February, 1999 which is borne out from the records and also corroborated the Reply- Affidavit and the petitioners faced the selection process for Class-IV daily wage posts by participating in the interview and were appointed as Class-IV on daily wage basis in May, 1999 and continued to work as Class-IV on daily wage basis till their regularization in terms of the Government Policy after 10 years on 16.02.2009 [Annexure A-2 colly] and even thereafter the petitioners remained silent till filing of the writ petition in 2019 after a delay of about 20 years, - 46 - disentitles the petitioner for any relief. Moreover, the policy decision to create Class-IV posts on Daily Wage and also to fill created posts on daily wages remains un-assailed, instant proceedings. Even otherwise, the negligence, inaction and lack of bonafides on the part of the petitioner is writ large as they slept over their rights and remedies for about 20 years. The length of delay also disentitles the petitioner for relief. Moreover, no cogent and convincing explanation for the prolonged delay of 20 years has been given by petitioners. Further the plea that the petitioners are poor persons belonging to lower strata of the society cannot confer any rights on them, when the decision to create Class-IV Daily Waged Posts and to fill these Class- IV posts on Daily Wage Basis has not been assailed by the petitioners in instant case. Even the stale claims can neither be revived nor can the settled position can be unsettled after 20 years. In the above backdrop, the claim of the petitioners sans merit and the same is turned down. - 47 - DIRECTIONS:

#13. In view of above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition is dismissed, in the following terms:- (i). Rejection Order [Annexure P-4] needs no and is upheld;

16.01.2019 interference (ii). Claim of petitioners for treating them as Regular Class-IV Employees from the date of their initial appointment as Class- IV on daily wages on 05.05.1999 [Annexure A-1], being stale, dead and frivolous is disallowed; and otherwise not tenable; (iii). Selection held for newly created Class-IV Daily Wage Posts appointments of petitioners as Class-IV Daily Wagers based on policy decision does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity is upheld; leading (iv). Parties to bear their respective costs. In aforesaid terms, instant petition alongwith all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of, accordingly. (Ranjan Sharma) November 27, 2025 Judge ™