Vikram Singh v. The Managing Director, Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development

Mr. Nishant Khidtta, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Shivank Singh Panta, Advocate. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge dated 24.09.2019 passed in CWP No.1364 of 2017 titled Vikram Singh vs. The Managing Director, H.P Tourism Development Corporation and another, filed by the petitioner/appellant, whereby the award dated 28.04.2017 was upheld. The learned Single Judge has observed that a contractual employee as such cannot claim any right to the post after the expiry of the time and limit of the contract and thus dismissed the writ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 petition.

2. Resultantly, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that appointment(s) on 04.05.2012 to 31.07.2012 and thereafter on 10.09.2012 to 31.12.2012 and from 20.04.2013 to

15.07.2013 would not as such give any right to the writ petitioner to the post after the expiry of the time and limit of the contract.

3. Though reliance had been placed upon various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and another vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691; Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 and State of Haryana vs. Surinder Kumar and others reported in (1997) 3 Supreme Court Cases 633. The judgment passed in CWP No.2680 of 2015 titled Kunal Brahma vs. The Board of Trustees of IRMT & others decided on 09.07.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge was also referred to. However, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge did not take into consideration the fact that the challenge was to the award of the Labour Court dated 28.04.2017 and the principle which would cover the right of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is different from the right, which can be claimed by an employee, who approaches the Writ Court seeking extension of his 3 contractual appointment or seeking relief as such of regularization. Since it was a case where Tribunal as such had noticed that the workman is to be covered under the provisions of 2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore came to the conclusion that he had not been retrenched within the meaning of 2(oo) of the Act. The relevant findings of the Labour Court reads as under: “In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner was engaged purely on contractual basis for a specific period to do the seasonal work and on the expiry of period of contract, his services stood automatically came to an end. Thus, on the basis of the above cited rulings and also having regard to the entire evidence on record, it can safely be concluded that the petitioner had been engaged purely on contractual basis, who was not retrenched within the meaning of section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case of the petitioner falls within the exception as provided under Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act as such the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act would not apply. Consequently, the petitioner has failed to prove that his services were terminated by the respondents in violation of the provisions of the Act and the issue is decided in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner.”

4. The issue regarding rights under the Industrial Disputes Act has been discussed by the Apex Court in Municipal Council, Samrala vs. Raj Kumar reported in (2006) 3 SCC 81, wherein the issue of appointment is stated to be short-lived and would be covered under second part of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act. The Apex Court 4 had thus keeping in view the said principle allowed the SLP and set aside the reinstatement directed by the Labour Court with 25% back wages and upheld the order of High Court.

5. Similarly in Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board vs. Subhash Chand and Another reported in (2006) 2 SCC 794, similar relief was granted to the employer by setting aside the award of the Labour Court, which had gone on to hold that the termination as such was in violation of Section 25-G of the Act and the management had taken recourse to Unfair Labour Policy, which order had been upheld by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

6. The said provisions have not been consideration and the principle as noticed above has not been decided by the case law, which does not pertain to Labour laws.

7. The judgment in Kaushal Kishore Shukla’s case (supra) was a case where the Apex Court was dealing with the order passed by the High Court whereby temporary employee as such has been directed to be reinstated by quashing order of termination on the principle of ‘last come first go’. Resultantly, there was a passing reference as such that order of termination in the said case could not be rendered illegal or unjustified on the ground of junior being retained in services and principle of ‘last come first go’ would be 5 applicable where the services on account of retrenchment and not where the services of temporary employee were terminated.

8. Similarly, in the case of Pushpa Srivastava (supra), the issue was regarding the fact that contractual appointment has come to an end after the requisite period. It was held that there was no right to remain on the post and therefore interference was done by the Apex Court, whereby, direction has been given that the employee be put back on duty and further to regularize his service within three months.

9. In Surinder Kumar’s case (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ and regularization of services and the said employees had been appointed on contract basis. Resultantly, the interference was done with the order of the High Court, which had directed payment of wages on the said principle by noting that merely because employees had interchanged their position, would not as such give them benefit against the post on which they were not duly selected and appointed.

10. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment as such cannot be sustained, as the workman has a right under the writ jurisdiction as such to challenge the order of the Labour Court which would have to be scrutinized by looking to the 6 evidence on record more so in the context of the Industrial Disputes Act which exercise has not been conducted by the learned Single Judge.

11. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is liable to be allowed and accordingly the judgment dated 24.09.2014 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Single Judge for consideration afresh. Resultantly, the matter is restored to its original position and be listed for regular hearing as per roster.

12. All pending applications shall stand disposed of accordingly. ( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice 23rd June, 2025 (priti) ( Ranjan Sharma ) Judge