State of H.P & Anr. v. Hanso

“Whether the time to time termination of services/giving fictional breaks in the services of Shri Hanso S/o Late Shri Shambhu R/o Village Kihar (Trigluni), P.O. Kihar, Tehsil Salooni, District Chamba, H.P. by the Divisional Forest Offier, Churah Forest Division, Salooni, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 1994-1995 to year, 2018 without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged by the workman, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?” Under the award, the claim preferred by the respondent- workman was partly allowed. The breaks given by the petitioner-State 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) 2 to the workman from time to time between 1995 to 2018 were condoned. He was held entitled to seniority and continuity in service along with consequential benefits from the year 1995. He was also allowed compensation in the sum of Rs.50,000/- in lieu of back wages.

2. Heard learned Additional Advocate General & considered the case file.

3. The award was passed on 16.12.2024. This writ petition assailing the aforesaid award was filed on 25.02.2026. Objections raised in the writ petition were removed and the petition was re-filed on

11.06.2026. There has been undue long delay on part of the petitioner in assailing the award dated 16.12.2024. The explanation for the delay has been furnished in para-11 of the writ petition. The summary thereof is as under:- (i) A copy of the award dated 16.12.2024 was sent by the learned Deputy District Attorney, Labour Court, Dharamshala, on

18.01.2025. The petition does not disclose as to when the copy of the award was ready for delivery and/or obtained by the learned Deputy District Attorney Labour Court, Dharamshala. (ii) Copy of the award was received in the office of the petitioner on 11.02.2025. Thus, according to the petitioner-State, it took almost one month for the award to reach the office of the petitioner at Salooni, ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) 3 Chamba, from the office of the learned Deputy District Attorney, Labour Court, Dharamshala. (iii) The matter had already been sent to the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, on 27.01.2025 for seeking legal opinion as to whether the award was to be implemented or assailed. The Conservator of Forests forwarded the matter to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Head of Forest Force), [Pr. CCF (HoFF)], H.P., Shimla, vide letter dated 07.03.2025. The period of more than one month taken by the Conservator of Forests, merely to forward the matter to the Pr. CCF (HoFF) has not been explained. (iv) The Pr. CCF (HoFF), vide letter dated 31.03.2025, returned the case file to the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, with certain observations for compliance. Thus, the Pr. CCF (HoFF) also consumed almost three weeks in returning the case file to the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, for complying some undisclosed observations. (v) The Conservator of Forests, Chamba, in order to comply with the observations, sent the case file to the office of the petitioner vide letter dated 01.04.2025. The same was received in the office of the petitioner on 18.04.2025. The requisite information was collected by the petitioner from the field offices, and the matter was again ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) 4 forwarded to the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, on

23.09.2025. Thus, almost five months were consumed by the field offices in collecting the requisite information and complying with the observations raised by the office of the Pr. CCF (HoFF), all this when the entire matter had already been adjudicated by the learned Labour Court. (vi) The office of the Pr. CCF (HoFF) further forwarded the matter to the Government on 17.10.2025 for obtaining legal advice in the matter. Thus, almost one month was consumed in the office of the Pr. CCF (HoFF) in forwarding the file to the Government for obtaining legal advice. (vii) The Pr. CCF (HoFF) also forwarded the case to the ACS (Forest) on 22.11.2025 for examination of the matter in consultation with the Law Department, i.e., almost two months after receiving the file back from the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba. The paragraph further states that thereafter the file, along with the requisite documents, was collected and, on the basis of the legal advice received, further time was consumed in preparing and filing the writ petition for assailing the award. In view of the above process, the writ petition could be filed only on 25.02.2026. The objections raised therein were removed on 11.06.2026. ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) 5 As is apparent from the above, at each and every stage of the processing of the case, the respondents dealt with the matter in a casual & negligent manner and consumed an unduly long period of time. No cogent reasons are discernable from the writ petition as to what prevented the petitioner-State from assailing the awarded within a reasonable period. In Mrinmoy Maity versus Chhanda Koley and others2, the Hon’ble Apex Court inter alia re-iterated that for filing of a writ petition though no fixed period of limitation is prescribed, however, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the case of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the applicant ought to be non-suited. The writ courts are not to indulge in permitting indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. Though there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. Relevant paras from the decision are as under: - “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has 2 (2024) 15 SCC 215 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) 6 been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of In such action which has had a natural death. circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. 12. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B .3, has held to the following effect: (SCCp.784,paras 56-58) “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai4 , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court5 and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India6. This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right the Court at 3 4 5 6