Sanjay Kumar v. State of H.P.

(Ext. PW-2/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext. PW-9/B) was registered. An application was filed for the medical examinations of the injured. Doctor G.D. Gupta (PW3) and Dr. Dineshwar Singh (PW-6) examined Indra Devi, Kanta Devi and Mangat Ram. They found that Indra Devi had sustained simple and grievous injuries, whereas Kanta Devi and Mangat Ram had sustained simple injuries. They issued MLCs (Ext. PW-3/A, Ext. PW- 3/B and Ext. PW-6/A). The police seized the vehicles bearing the registration numbers HP-54A-1227, HP-68-0651, and HP-40-6042 along with documents vide memos (Ext. PW-8/A, Ext. PW-2/A and -3- Ext. PW-10/A). Durga Dass (PW6-A) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext. PW-6/A to Ext. PW-6/C). Dinesh Kumar (PW-11) issued a certificate (Ext. PW- 11/A) stating that the accused was driving the bus at the time of the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per the versions, and after completion of the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet before the Court.

3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Som Raj (PW-1) proved the entry in the Daily Diary Report. Ravi Sharda (PW-2) is the informant/eyewitness. Doctor G.D. Gupta (PW- 3) and Dr. Dineshwar Singh (PW-6) conducted the medical examinations of the injured. Indira Devi (PW-4), Jagdish Chand (PW- 5), Kanta Devi (PW-7) and Jodhamal (PW-8) are eyewitnesses. Durga Dass (PW6-A) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Inspector Shanker Singh (PW-9) signed the FIR. HC Karamjit Singh (PW-10) witnessed the seizure memo. Dinesh Kumar (PW-11) is the owner of the bus. -4-

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. admitted that he was driving the bus bearing Registration No. HP-40-6042 on the date of the accident, the police had seized the bus, the mechanical examination of the bus was conducted, and the owner had issued a certificate stating that he (the accused) was driving the bus at the time of the accident. He stated that the accident occurred because of the breakdown of the Patta, leading to the drifting of the vehicle towards the wrong side and causing the accident. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held the statements of prosecution witnesses proved that the accused was driving the bus at the time of the accident. The accused also admitted this fact in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C). The defence taken by the accused that the accident occurred because of the breakdown of Patta was not proved by any evidence on record. The statement of the Medical Officer proved that Kanta Devi, Indira Devi and Mangat Ram had sustained injuries in the accident. The non-examination of other occupants of the vehicle was not material. Therefore, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code Simple imprisonment for a period of three months and a fine of Rs. 500.Non-payment of shall invite default imprisonment Under Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code. -5- of a period of seven days. Simple imprisonment for a period of three months and a fine of Rs. 500.Non-payment of shall invite default imprisonment of a period of seven days. Simple imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 1000.Non-payment of the shall invite default imprisonment of a period of ten days.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra, at Dharamshala, District Kangra (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court that the accused was driving the bus at the time of the accident. The bus had left its side and went to another part of the road. The defence taken by the accused that the accident occurred because of a mechanical defect in the vehicle was not proved by any material on record. Durga Dass (PW6-A) specifically denied that the accident was caused by the mechanical defect. The accident had caused injuries to Indira Devi, Kanta Devi and Mangat Ram. The learned trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence awarded by the learned trial Court was adequate, and no interference was required with the -6- judgment and the order passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the appeal preferred by the accused was dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The essential ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC were not satisfied. The negligence of a person cannot be inferred from the mere accident. The prosecution had failed to prove the precise negligence attributable to the petitioner. Ravi Sharda admitted in his cross-examination that he had heard a loud noise from the bus, and the bus started moving in a zigzag manner. This admission showed that the defence taken by the accused was highly probable. Durga Dass (PW-6A) admitted that he was illiterate and had not prepared the reports (Ext. PW-6/A to Ext. PW-6/C). His technical competence and qualifications were not proved by the prosecution. The statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Indira Devi (PW-4) and Kanta Devi (PW-7) were declared hostile and had not proved the prosecution's case. Learned trial Court erred in relying upon the statements of these witnesses. Many persons were present on the spot, but the prosecution had not examined them, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. Learned Appellate Court had not independently -7- appreciated the evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr. A. S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

10. Mr. A. S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Durga Dass admitted in his cross-examination that he was illiterate and had not prepared the reports shown to him. Therefore, the mechanical reports were not proved as per the law. Ravi Sharda admitted that there was a loud noise in the bus and the bus started moving in a zigzag manner, which proved the defence version that the accident had occurred due to a mechanical defect. Indira Devi and Kanta Devi had not supported the prosecution's case, and the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The accused is a first offender, and no previous conviction was proved against him. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been extended to him. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. -8-

11. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence. The accused has not disputed that he was driving the bus at the time of the accident. Ravi Sharda has categorically stated that the bus had left its side and hit the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road. The explanation provided by the accused that there was a mechanical defect was not established on record. There is no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the learned Courts below, and this Court should not re- appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision petition. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction -9- to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings”.

14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court 15. in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance -10- with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing in the of the charge proceedings under CrPC.” is a much-advanced stage

15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by In other words, -11- the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” the High Court exceeded jurisdiction

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the -12- decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” ignored or where the

16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

17. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. -13-

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court”.

18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. Dinesh Kumar (PW-11) is the owner of the vehicle. He specifically stated that the accused was driving the bus bearing Registration No. HP-40-6042. The accused also admitted in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., in reply to question No.2, that he was driving the bus bearing Registration No. HP-40- 6042 on 08.06.2010 at about 4.45 p.m. at Mattour. Therefore, the prosecution's version that the accused was driving the bus at the time of the accident was admitted by the accused.

20. Ravi Sharda (PW-2) stated that the driver of the bus bearing Registration No. HP-40-6042 could not control it, and the bus hit the vehicle at Baghi Morh on 08.06.2010 at about 4.30- 4.45 p.m. He (Ravi Sharda) and Mangat Ram sustained injuries. The accident had occurred because of the driver's fault. He stated in his cross- examination that the accused was driving the vehicle towards the correct side of the road. He heard a loud noise from the bus, and the bus hit another vehicle. He identified the accused as the driver of the bus. -14-

21. The accused did not dispute that the bus had hit another vehicle. He stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that the bus drifted towards the wrong side due to the breakdown of the Patta, leading to the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such a statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both -15- these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied)

22. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes advantage of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports -16- the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”

23. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: - “24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if from the evidence of various the accused admits that, witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub- section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him.

25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) -17- “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions would statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. indicate

26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.”

24. Therefore, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lead to the corroboration of the prosecution's version, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the bus which went towards the wrong side of the road and hit another vehicle.

25. Indra Devi (PW-4) stated that she was travelling in a bus with her sister-in-law. The bus met with an accident near Mattour on a curve. The bus hit the Jeep coming from the opposite side, and the -18- accident occurred because of the driver's fault. She had sustained injuries, and her teeth were broken. She could not recollect the registration number of the Jeep or the bus. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She admitted that the name of the bus was Nirmal, and the accused was driving the bus at high speed. She admitted that the driver lost control of the bus because of the high speed, and the accident occurred because of the driver's fault. She stated in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that she was not aware of the number of passengers travelling in the bus. She denied that the bus was being driven at a normal speed.

26. It was submitted that this witness was declared hostile, which means that the prosecution does not consider her worthy of credence. Therefore, her testimony should be taken off the record. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Selvamani v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837, that the testimony of a hostile witness is not effaced from the record and the version which is as per the prosecution evidence or the defence version can be accepted if corroborated by other evidence on record. It was observed: “9. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 627: 1991 INSC 153, relying on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389: 1975 INSC 306, Sri Rabindra Kuamr Dey v. State of Orissa(1976) 4 SCC 233: 1976 INSC 204, Syad Akbar v. -19- State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30: 1979 INSC 126, has held that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. It was further held that the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a scrutiny thereof.

10. This Court, in the case of C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567: 2010 INSC 553, has observed thus: “81. It is a settled legal proposition that (Khujji case, SCC p. 635, para 6) ‘6..… the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a scrutiny thereof.’

82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, (1996) 10 SCC 360, this Court held that (at SCC p. 363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543, Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516, Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450, Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462.

83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof, which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.” -20-

27. Therefore, the statement of Indra Devi cannot be discarded simply because she was declared hostile by the prosecution.

28. Kanta Devi (PW-7) stated that she was going to Kangra with her sister-in-law in a bus. The bus met with an accident. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She stated that she was not aware that she was taken to the hospital, where her signature was obtained. She denied the accident, but this will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful because the accused has admitted the accident in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

29. Jodhamal (PW-8) stated that he was travelling in a car bearing Registration HP-54A-1227 from Chamba to Manali on

08.06.2010. A pickup bearing Registration HP-68-0651 was moving ahead of his vehicle. The pickup stopped on its side after seeing a bus coming from the opposite side. He also stopped his car behind the pickup. The bus hit the pickup. Pickup moved and hit his car. The accident occurred because of the high speed of the bus. He stated in his cross-examination that many people had gathered on the spot. His family members were also travelling with him, but the police had not recorded their statements. The mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted in his presence. He denied that he had seen the bus coming from the opposite side. He could not say that the accident occurred because of the breaking of the Patta of the bus. -21-

30. The statement of this witness also corroborates the prosecution's version. He categorically stated that the driver of the pickup had stopped it after seeing the bus coming from the opposite side, and he had also stopped his vehicle behind the pickup. Therefore, his testimony proves that the bus had hit the stationary vehicles.

31. It was submitted that he had used the term high speed to say that the bus was being driven at a high speed. He has not mentioned the approximate speed of the bus, and the mere use of the high speed is not sufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. This submission will not help the defence. The precise negligence against the accused is that his bus had left its side, went towards the right side and hit the parked vehicles. The speed is irrelevant, and even if his testimony that the bus was being driven at a high speed is taken out, his testimony establishes the fact that the bus had left its side and hit the pickup and his car.

32. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 -22- Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.”

33. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.”

34. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was -23- walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.”

35. In the present case, the accused had failed to adhere to the Rules of the Road Regulations, which was the proximate cause of the accident.

36. The accused claimed that the patta of the vehicle was damaged and the vehicle drifted towards the other side. There is no evidence in support of this fact. Durga Dass (PW-6A) specifically stated that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle that could have led to the accident. Therefore, the statement of the mechanic does not prove the plea taken by the accused. The accused did not produce any evidence to prove that the vehicle had a mechanical defect, and the learned Trial Court had rightly rejected the plea taken by the accused.

37. It was submitted that Ravi Sharda admitted in his cross- examination that he had heard a noise from the bus after which the bus came to his side. The mere statement that there was a loud noise -24- is not sufficient to infer that the vehicle suffered from a mechanical defect; hence, the statement of Ravi Sharda will not establish the defence taken by the accused.

38. Durga Dass (PW6-A) admitted that he was illiterate and had not prepared the report himself. He volunteered to say that the reports were prepared as per his direction. It was submitted that the statement of Durga Dass cannot be relied upon because he does not possess any degree/diploma in Mechanical Engineering, and he was not competent to issue the report regarding the mechanical status of the bus. The submission cannot be accepted. Durga Dass specifically stated that he had the experience of 40 years. The learned courts below had rightly held that a person having sufficient experience in a field will make him an expert. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Jai Lal, (1999) 7 SCC 280: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1184: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 885 that a person having skill and adequate knowledge of the subject will make him an expert. It was observed at page 285: “17. Section 45 of the Evidence Act which makes opinion of experts admissible lays down that when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting, or finger impressions are relevant facts. Therefore, in order to bring the evidence of a witness as that of an expert, it has to be shown that he has made a special study of the subject or -25- acquired a special experience therein or in other words, that he is skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject”.

39. Delhi High Court followed this judgment in State v. Sushil Sharma, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 255and held that Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act does not lay down any qualification of an expert. In the present case, Durga Dass (PW-6A) had 40 years of experience, which would make him an expert within the meaning of Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the learned Courts below had rightly placed reliance upon the report of Durga Dass.

40. Even if the report of Durga Dass is excluded, there is no evidence to show that the accident occurred because of a mechanical defect in the vehicle. No expert was examined by the defence to show that the Patta of the bus was damaged and the bus would have been dragged to the side because of the damage to the Patta. The accused had taken this plea, and the burden was upon him to establish this plea.

41. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the bus by leaving his side and going towards the other side. This was the proximate cause of the accident. The accused had failed to prove the plea taken by him that the accident had occurred because of a mechanical defect, and there is no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the learned Courts below. -26-

42. Doctor G.D. Gupta (PW-3) examined Indra Devi and found that she had sustained grievous and simple injuries. He also examined Kanta Devi and found that she had sustained simple injuries. Dr. Dineshwar (PW-6) proved that Mangat Ram had sustained simple injuries. All these injuries could have been caused in an accident, and the learned trial Court had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC.

43. It was submitted that the learned Courts below erred in denying the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused, and such a benefit should have been extended to him. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted I.P.C., road accidents have person under S. 304-A of proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accident toll was not even half of what it is today. So, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: -27- "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."

12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C., to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. to have a single moment of

13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he laxity or cannot afford inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” -28-

44. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208, wherein it was observed: - “6.Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana [(2000) 5 SCC 82] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in the death of human beings.”

45. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13.It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].”

46. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to a person convicted of driving a vehicle in a rash and negligent manner.

47. Learned trial Court had imposed the maximum sentence of six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of the IPC. The rest of the sentences were for three months each. Considering that Indira Devi had sustained grievous -29- injury, the sentence of six months and a fine of Rs. 1000/- cannot be said to be excessive, requiring interference from this Court.

49. No other point was urged. In view of the above, the present revision petition fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 4th June, 2026. (kck)