Meena Devi & others v. State of H.P.

the FIR and filed an application for the medical examination. Man Chand (PW10) and Mast Ram (PW11) did not support the prosecution's case. Sarwan Singh (PW12) and Mulak Raj (PW13) investigated the matter. 5

5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. They did not produce any evidence in their defence.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. Medical evidence also showed that the witnesses had sustained injuries. This established their presence on the spot. The relationship between the parties was strained, but that was no reason to discard the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The defence propounded by the accused was contradictory, and the accused did not produce any evidence to prove their defence. Any defect in the investigation will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. The names of Anup, Anish and Parvesh, etc., were mentioned in the FIR, but they were not charge sheeted by the Court. However, this will not make the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses doubtful regarding the other accused. All the accused came together and gave beatings to the informant party, which showed that they were acting in furtherance of their common object. The witnesses had not specified the exact words 6 used by the accused to threaten the members of the informant party, and the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC was not made out. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows: Sections Sentences 147 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code 325 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each, pay a fine of ₹500/- each and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year each, pay a fine of ₹1000/- each and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each, pay a fine of ₹500/- each and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused were acting together, which established that they were acting in furtherance of their common object. The witnesses had sustained injuries, and their presence on the spot could not be doubted. A mere strained relationship or the dispute over the passage was not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's version. The medical evidence corroborated the statements of the witnesses. The defence taken by the accused was contradictory, and they failed to produce any evidence to support their defence. Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was proportionate, and no interference was required with it. Hence, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused have filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to 8 appreciate the material on record. The ingredients of the commission of offences alleged by the prosecution were not satisfied. The prosecution relied upon the statements of interested witnesses, and no independent witness was associated. The witnesses admitted that civil litigation was going on between the parties, and the statements of the informant party should have been seen with due care and caution. The statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, and this made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms Tamanna Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

10. Mr Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The relationship between the parties was strained, and civil litigation was going on 9 between the parties. The witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, which made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. The defence version that a function was being organised in the house of the informant party, and the informant misbehaved with the accused in a state of intoxication, was highly probable. The learned Courts below erred in discarding the defence version. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen vs. State of Rajasthan (2011) 11 SCC 724 and Kuldip Yadav and others vs. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324 in support of his submissions.

11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that both the Courts have concurrently held that the accused had assaulted the informant party without any reason. The enmity is a double-edged weapon: while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. In the present case, the enmity was a motive for the commission of the crime. This Court 10 should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the present revision. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. Mr Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, took this Court through the evidence and highlighted the discrepancies in the prosecution's case. In this regard, it is to be noted that the jurisdiction of the Court deciding the revision petition is quite limited. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law and it is impermissible to dwell at length upon the facts and evidence. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal 11 Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction 12 or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: 13 “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- 14 consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 15

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”

18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. The informant Sewa Dass (PW7) stated that he was returning to his home on 30.03.2004. He found that wood, stone etc were kept on the passage. He asked the accused Brij Lal why he 16 had blocked the passage. Bimla Devi and Brij Lal attacked him. He sustained injuries to the arm and the leg. Brij Lal, Baldev, etc. came to the spot and gave him beatings with the stick. He sustained an injury to the head. Dina Nath and Kanta had also quarrelled with him. He fell, but the accused continued to beat him. He shouted for help, and Bimla Devi (PW1), Bimla Devi (PW8), Vidya Devi (PW6) and Kishori Lal (PW2) came to the spot. The accused also gave them beatings. Kishori Lal (PW2) sustained injuries to his head. He had reported the matter to the Panchayat, and the Panchayat had asked the accused to clear the road. Sub Divisional Magistrate had also directed the accused to open the road. He was medically examined.

20. Bimla Devi (PW8) stated that she had a dispute with the accused over the road. The accused used to throw stones, wood, etc., on the road, which made movement on the road difficult. The informant was returning to his home on

30.04.2004, when he saw that stones were thrown on the road. He tried to remove them, but the accused gave him beatings. She heard the noise and went to the spot with her sister-in-law. She saw that her husband (the informant) was bleeding. She tried to 17 rescue him, but the accused also gave her beatings. The informant sustained injuries on his head, arm and legs. The matter was reported to the police.

21. Bimla Devi (PW1) stated that she heard the noise and went to the spot after Kishori Lal and Bimla Devi. She was at a distance of about 100 meters from the spot when Brij Lal inflicted a blow by means of a stick on her leg. She fell. The accused Brij Lal and his family members gave beatings to the informant Sewa Dass. Sewa Dass had sustained multiple injuries, and he was taken to the hospital.

22. Kishori Lal (PW2) also supported the prosecution's version. He stated that he had heard the noise on 30.04.2004 at about 7-8 PM. He went to the spot and saw that informant Sewa Dass was shouting for help. The accused were beating the informant with sticks and a bat. Sewa Dass had sustained bleeding injuries. He tried to intervene. Brij Lal and Meena gave him beatings with a bat and sticks. Bimla Devi, Vidya Devi, Pawan Kumar, etc., also reached the spot. Bimla Devi was also beaten. She had also sustained a bleeding injury on her head. 18

23. Pawana Kumari (PW5) stated that she was present in her home on 30.04.2004. She heard some noise at about 7 p.m. She rushed to the spot. Vidya Devi and Bimla Devi had accompanied her. She saw that the informant was lying in a pool of blood. He was taken to the home. The incident had occurred over the passage.

24. Vidya Devi (PW6) stated that she heard the noise and went to the spot. She saw that the informant was beaten and thrown on the spot. The accused had given beatings with sticks and a bat. She had seen the bleeding injury on the informant’s head.

25. Bimla Devi (PW1) stated that Kishori Lal and Bimla Devi (PW8) had gone to the spot first, and she had gone afterwards. Kishori Lal (PW2) stated that he had reached the spot first. Bimla Devi (PW1), Vidya Devi, Pawan Kumar, etc. came afterwards. Bimla Devi (PW8) stated that she and her sister-in- law, Bimla Devi (PW1), went to the spot together. It was submitted that these are material contradictions that make the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The incident had occurred on 30.04.2004. The 19 statement of Bimla Devi (PW1) was recorded on 28.06.2007, and the statement of Bimla Devi (PW8) was recorded on 19.09.2007. Therefore, more than three years had elapsed between the incident and the date of deposition. It was difficult for a person to remember the incident in photographic detail. The memories fail with time, and it is unrealistic to expect a parrot-like version from the witnesses. The incident involved multiple persons and occurred suddenly. The witnesses would be overawed by the sudden incident, and the minor discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case.

26. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as follows: 20 “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two 21 statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, 22 mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”

27. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of 23 Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.”

39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies.

40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct 24 would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961].

31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].

32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute- by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and 25 more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all their attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide them with medical aid and inform the police. The statements that are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].”

41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. ***

49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational 26 conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.”

42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue contradictions and importance to omissions, discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.”

28. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed 27 by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as follows: "42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness."

29. The statements of these witnesses corroborate each other on material aspects. They were cross-examined at length, but there is nothing in their statements that made them doubtful. The testimonies of the witnesses are corroborated by the medical evidence. Dr Bharti Ranaot (PW3) examined Sewa Dass (PW7), 28 Kishori Lal (PW2), Bimla Devi (PW1) and Bimla Devi (PW8). She found that they had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused to them by the weapons shown to her in the Court. She admitted in her cross-examination that the injuries are possible from a fall during the course of a struggle between the two parties. It was submitted that the admission made by the Medical Officer in the cross-examination that the injuries can be caused by a fall will make the prosecution's case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The possibility of sustaining injury by fall is an alternative hypothesis and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their 29 credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”

30. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt such a statement. It was observed: “22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial.

23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) “26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: 30

26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.

26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.

26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions.

26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence.

26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded.” (emphasis supplied)

31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and 31 whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three 32 respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied)

32. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed: “33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: “(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” In assessing the value of the evidence of the 34. eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their 33 presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra: (2023) 13 SCC 365).

33. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed: “The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a 34 full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them.”

34. Therefore, the testimonies of the injured witnesses are entitled to a great weight and cannot be discarded without any cogent reasons.

35. It was submitted that the relationship between the parties is strained. The witnesses admitted that civil litigation was pending between the parties. Therefore, the testimonies of the witnesses cannot be relied upon. This submission cannot be accepted. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the enmity is a double-edged weapon: while it furnishes a motive for a false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime. Therefore, not much advantage can be derived from the enmity and the pendency of the civil litigation between the parties. However, the testimony of the witnesses is to be seen with due care and caution, considering the possibilities suggested by the accused.

36. It was suggested to Kishori Lal (PW2) that the stones were kept for the protection of the house and the courtyard. It 35 was suggested to Vidya Devi in her cross-examination that the accused quarrelled because the stone and wood were kept in the land. It was suggested to Sewa Dass (PW7) that the stones were kept near the wall of Brij Lal. A similar suggestion was given to Bimla Devi (PW8). Therefore, the accused have not disputed the fact that the stones were kept on the spot. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 383: - “38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross- examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client.

39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner. **** 36

42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.”

37. Thus, the reason for the incident that the stones and woods were kept on the road was never disputed by the accused.

38. The informant Sewa Dass (PW7) admitted in his cross-examination that a function was being held in the house of his brother on the date of the incident. He was not aware who had attended the function because he was not present at home. He denied that he and the other persons were taking away the accused Meena, who shouted for help. A similar suggestion was given to Kishori Lal (PW2), who also denied the suggestion. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and the accused cannot take advantage of the denied suggestion. The accused have not stated in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that the informant party was trying to take away Meena and the accused were acting in their right of private defence. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly discarded the defence that the accused were acting in the exercise of their right to private defence. 37

39. It was submitted that Bimla Devi (PW1) stated that she was at a distance of 100 meters from the place of the incident; hence she could not witness the incident. This submission will not help the accused. She stated that she was at a distance of 100 meters when she was beaten. There is nothing in her statement to show that she had not reached the spot. Her presence is established by the injuries sustained by her, which could have been caused by means of the weapons of offence recovered by the police. Therefore, the testimony of Bimla Devi cannot be discarded because she claimed to be at a distance of 100 meters from the place of the incident.

40. It was suggested to Bimla Devi (PW1) that the accused had taken an injunction order regarding the passage, which was denied by her. The copy of the injunction order so issued by the Court was not produced before the Court to establish this fact; rather, a certified copy of the order, Mark F, was produced, in which it was agreed that the status quo would be maintained and the passage would not be blocked. The statements of Brij Lal and Sewa Dass were recorded, in which the accused had agreed to maintain the status quo and not to obstruct the passage. These 38 documents falsify the defence version that the Court had issued an injunction order against the informant party.

41. It was submitted that the prosecution witnesses claimed that the informant had sustained bleeding injuries. However, the blood-stained clothes of the informant were not taken in possession, and the Medical Officer had also not noticed any blood-stained clothes. This submission will not help the accused. Dr Bharti Ranout (PW3) specifically stated that she had noticed lacerated wounds which were freshly bleeding. The site plan (Ext.PW13/A) also mentions that the blood stains were found on the spot. Therefore, there is ample corroboration of the testimonies of the witnesses that the informant had sustained blood-stained injury during the incident. The failure to collect the blood-stained clothes will be a case of defective investigation. It was held in Karnel Singh vs. State 1995 (5) SCC 518 that the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted due to the defective investigation because the investigating officer is not under the control of the complainant, and the complainant cannot be penalised for the negligence of the investigating officer. It was held: 39 “4. We have very carefully scrutinised the evidence, having regard to the fact that (PW 6) the Investigation Officer had not taken the care expected of him. He did not record the statements of the two witnesses, nor did he refer to the attachment of the 'Chaddi' in his oral evidence. That was a very vital piece of evidence to which little or no attention was paid. If the seizure of that article was properly proved, the article with semen stains would have lent strong corroboration to the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no doubt that the investigation was casual and defective. But despite these deficiencies, both the Courts below have recorded a conviction. The question is: are they right?

5. Notwithstanding our unhappiness regarding the nature of the investigation, we have to consider whether the evidence on record, even on strict scrutiny, establishes the guilt. In cases of defective investigation, the Court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence, but it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect; to do so would be tantamount to playing into the hands of the Investigating Officer if the investigation is designedly defective. Any Investigating Officer, in fairness to the prosecutrix as well as the accused, would have recorded the statements of the two witnesses and would have drawn up a proper seizure memo regarding the 'Chaddi'. That is the reason why we have said that the investigation was slipshod and defective.

6. We must admit that the defective investigation gave us some anxious moments, and we were at first blush inclined to think that the accused was prejudiced. But on closer scrutiny, we have reason to think that the loopholes in the investigation were left to help the accused at the cost of the poor prosecutrix, a labourer. To acquit solely on that ground would be adding insult to injury.” 40

42. This position was reiterated in Sachin Kumar Singhraha v. State of M.P. (2019) 8 SCC 371: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 363, and it was held: “At this juncture, we would like to recall that it is well- settled that criminal justice should not become a casualty because of the minor mistakes committed by the Investigating Officer. We may hasten to add here that if the Investigation Officer suppresses the real incident by creating certain records to make a new case altogether, the Court would definitely strongly come against such action of the Investigation Officer. There cannot be any dispute that the benefit of doubt arising out of major flaws in the investigation would create suspicion in the mind of the Court, and consequently, such an inefficient investigation would accrue to the benefit of the accused. As observed by this Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) (1) SCC 247, a criminal trial cannot be equated with a mock scene from a stunt film. Such a trial is conducted to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned, and in arriving at a conclusion about the truth, the courts are required to adopt a rational approach and judge the evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of the witnesses. The courts are not obliged to make efforts either to give latitude to the prosecution or loosely construe the law in favour of the accused. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and genuine approach for administering justice in a criminal trial.”

43. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Srichand K. Khetwani v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 32: (1967) 1 SCR 595: AIR 1967 SC 450: 1967 Cri LJ 414: (1967) 2 SCJ 41 178 that no adverse inference can be drawn for failure to collect the evidence. It was observed:

8. Further, an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. When no such evidence has been obtained, it cannot be said what that evidence could have been and therefore, no question of presuming that that evidence would have been against the prosecution, under Section 114, illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, can arise.

44. This position was reiterated in Chand Khan v. State of U.P., (1995) 5 SCC 448: 1995 SCC (Cri) 915, wherein it was observed: “In the FIR, which was lodged within two hours of the incident, the substratum of the entire prosecution case finds place, including a statement that during the incident, Sm. Naeema Parveen had, in defending herself, given a blow to one of the accused with a vegetable- cutting knife. In view of the above statement recorded in the FIR, the Investigation Officer (PW 16) ought to have taken steps to seize the knife even if PW 5 had not produced it for, one of the essential requisites of a proper investigation is the collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence and that necessarily includes, in a case of assault, seizure of the weapon of offence, but then failure to collect evidence and failure to produce evidence collected during investigation at the trial carry two different connotations and consequences. While the former may entitle the court to hold the investigation to be perfunctory or tainted, affecting the entire trial, in the case of the latter, the court may legitimately draw a presumption in accordance with Section 114(g) of the 42 Evidence Act. As the case presented before us comes under the first category of failures, we have to find out whether we will be justified in discarding the prosecution case solely for the remissness of the Investigating Officer in seizing the knife. The consistent and reliable evidence of the eyewitnesses, coupled with the nature of injuries sustained by some of them and Chand Khan, and the fact that in the FIR it has clearly been stated that one of the miscreants had been assaulted by a vegetable cutting knife, do not persuade us to answer the question in the affirmative.”

45. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because blood-stained clothes were not seized by the police.

46. It was submitted that, as per the FIR, the accused were armed with sticks. The prosecution recovered one stick and one bat, and was unable to recover the other sticks, which would make the prosecution's case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the testimony of the witnesses cannot be discarded because the Investigating Officer had failed to recover the weapon of the offence. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anwarul Haq v. State of U.P., (2005) 10 SCC 581: 2005 SCC OnLine SC 865 that the failure to recover the weapon of offence will not be fatal to the prosecution. It was observed at page 585: 43 “15. Eyewitnesses in the present case have described the knife, and merely because the knife has not been recovered during the investigation, the same cannot be a factor to discard the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. Wounds noticed by the doctor (PW 3) also throw considerable light on this aspect. The doctor's opinion about the weapon, though theoretical, cannot be totally wiped out. In that view of the matter, the appellant has been rightly convicted under Section 324 IPC.”

47. Thus, the prosecution's case cannot be discarded because the sticks were not recovered from all the accused.

48. It was submitted that FIR had mentioned the names of Brij Lal, Baldev, Dina Nath, Ramesh Chand, Anup, Anish, Kanta Devi and Bimla. The police filed the chargesheet against Brij Lal, Meena, Dina Nath, Baldev Raj, Kanta Devi and Kanta. Therefore, the initial version recorded in the FIR regarding the involvement of Anup, Anish Kumar, Ramesh Chand, etc., was not found to be correct, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The prosecution’s case cannot be called false because some witnesses had made false statements regarding some persons. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annaporna Dutt v. State of U.P., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 44 246: 1993 SCC (Cri) 502 that the testimony of a witness cannot be rejected because of the land dispute. It was observed at page 253: “6…… The existence of a dispute over landed property appears to be the cause for bad relations between the parties, but simply because there is a dispute in respect of a landed property, the prosecution’s story is not required to be discarded outright on the footing that the witnesses for the prosecution were all partisan witnesses and had deposed falsely to implicate the accused persons….”

49. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab versus Hari Singh, AIR 1974 SC 1168, that it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely and unqualifiedly accepted. The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, does not apply in India, and the Court has to separate the grain from the chaff. It was observed: “As human testimony resulting from widely different powers of observation and description is necessarily faulty and even truthful witnesses not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or tell half-truths, the Courts must try to extract and separate the hard core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is meant by the proverbial saying that Courts must separate "the chaff from the grain''. If, after considering the whole mass of evidence, a residue of acceptable truth is established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt, the Courts are bound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not throw it overboard on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds. Insofar as the 45 grounds given for rejecting the evidence of Zora Singh appear to us to be patently unreasonable and highly conjectural, we think that the case before us calls for interference by this Court. That evidence, as we have already pointed out, is corroborated by medical evidence as well as by the statements of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh. Hence, although, the statements of Bachan Singh and Surjit Singh, taken by themselves, may not have been enough to warrant the conviction of the respondents, yet, when the evidence of Zora Singh, strongly corroborated by medical evidence is there, we think that the statement of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh could be used to support the conclusion thus reached without going to the extent of holding that Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh must be wholly believed before their evidence could serve any useful purpose at all as the High Court seems to have erroneously thought. Indeed, it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely, and unqualifiedly accepted. We think that the High Court had, without saying so, ignored the principle repeatedly laid down by this Court in appraising evidence, that Courts do not, in this country, act on the maxim: "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus''. In considering the effect of each allegation proved to be incorrect or the likelihood of its being true or untrue, we have to view it in the light of a whole setting or concatenation of facts in each particular case.

50. This position was reiterated in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Pullagunmi Kasireddy 2018(7) SCC 623, and it was held that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus had not been accepted in our country. It was observed: “The principle of 'Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' has not been accepted in our country. See Bhagwan Jagannath 46 Markad v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 (10) SCC 537. Even if some accused are acquitted on the ground that the evidence of a witness is unreliable, the other accused can still be convicted by relying on the evidence of the same witness. See Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, 2002 (8) SCC 381. Minor contradictions and omissions in the evidence of a witness are to be ignored if there is a ring of truth in the testimony of a witness. See State of U.P. v. Dan Singh, 1997 (3) SCC 747. The High Court was oblivious to this settled position of law.”

51. Similar is the judgment in Menoka Malik v. State of W.B., (2019) 18 SCC 721: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 658: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1196, wherein it was observed at page 729:

14. It is a well-settled position of law that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded in toto merely due to the presence of embellishments or exaggerations. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, which means “false in one thing, false in everything”, has been held to be inapplicable in the Indian scenario, where the tendency to exaggerate is common. This Court has endorsed the inapplicability of the doctrine in several decisions, such as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366: 1957 Cri LJ 550], Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar [Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 256], Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1697], Narain v. State of M.P. [Narain v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 455: 2004 SCC (Cri) 569] and Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar [Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2018) 6 SCC 433 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 113]. In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar [Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220], this Court highlighted the dangers of applying the doctrine in the Indian scenario: (Krishna Mochi case [Krishna Mochi v. 47 State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220], SCC pp. 113-14, para 51)

51. … The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India, and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) has not received general acceptance, nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of the weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366: 1957 Cri LJ 550] )… The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India, for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because the witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help but give embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or, at any rate, exaggeration, embroidery, or embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. [Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751: 1972 SCC (Cri) 819] and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar [Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 256].) An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of 48 felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood.” 15 [Ed.: Para 15 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./93/2018 dated 30-1-2019. It is not uncommon for witnesses to make exaggerations during the course of But merely because there are certain evidence. exaggerations, improvements and embellishments, the entire prosecution story should not be doubted. In Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 16 SCC 752: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 439], this Court observed: (SCC p. 762, para 26) “26. It is trite that even when exaggerations and embellishments are galore, the courts can and indeed are expected to undertake a forensic exercise aimed at discovering the truth. The very fact that a large number of people were implicated in the incident in question who now stand acquitted by the High Court [Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 3268] need not have deterred the High Court from appreciating the evidence on record and discarding what was not credible while accepting and relying upon what inspired confidence. That exercise was legitimate, for otherwise the Court would be seen as abdicating and surrendering to distortions and/or embellishments, whether made out of bitterness or any other reason, including shoddy investigation by the agencies concerned. The ultimate quest for the court at all times remains “discovery of the truth”, and unless the court is so disappointed with the difficulty besetting that exercise in a given case as to make it impossible for it to pursue that object, it must make an endeavour in that direction.”

16. This Court in State of Punjab v. Hari Singh [State of Punjab v. Hari Singh, (1974) 4 SCC 552: 1974 SCC (Cri) 588], observed as follows: (SCC p. 559, para 16) “16. As human testimony, resulting from widely different powers of observation and description, is 49 necessarily faulty and even truthful witnesses not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or tell half-truths, the courts must try to extract and separate the hard core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is meant by the proverbial saying that courts must separate “the chaff from the grain”. If, after considering the whole mass of evidence, a residue of acceptable truth is established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt, the courts are bound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not throw it overboard on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds.”

17. Thus, it cannot be doubted that it is the duty of the court to separate the chaff from the grain. Moreover, minor variations in the evidence will not affect the root of the matter, inasmuch as such minor variations need not be given major importance, inasmuch as they would not materially alter the evidence/credibility of the eyewitnesses as a whole.

52. It was submitted that the independent witnesses were not associated, which made the prosecution's case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. There is no evidence that any independent witness was present. The name of any such person was not suggested to any of the witnesses. Therefore, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because the independent witness was not associated with the prosecution.

53. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had visited the spot together. They were armed with sticks and gave beatings to the informant. Therefore, an inference 50 can be drawn that the accused were acting in furtherance of their common object. It was laid down by the Supreme Court in Kuldip Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 324, that the prosecution is required to prove that the incriminating Act was done to accomplish the common object of the assembly, and it must be within the knowledge of other members of the assembly. It was observed:

38. In Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar [(1989) 3 SCC 5: 1989 SCC (Cri) 490] this Court held: (SCC pp. 16-17, para 8) “8. … Therefore, in order to fasten vicarious responsibility on any member of an unlawful assembly, the prosecution must prove that the act constituting an offence was done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or the act done is such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. Under this section, therefore, every member of an unlawful assembly renders himself liable for the criminal act or acts of any other member or members of that assembly, provided the same is/are done in prosecution of the common object or is/are such as every member of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. This section creates a specific offence and makes every member of the unlawful assembly liable for the offence or offences committed in the course of the occurrence, provided the same was/were committed in prosecution of the common object or was/were such as the members of that assembly knew to be 51 likely to be committed. Since this section imposes a constructive penal liability, it must be strictly construed as it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the offence or offences committed by their associate or associates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed, and if it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object, every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of any one or more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 will render his companions constituting the unlawful assembly liable for that offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC.”

39. It is not the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every member of an unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every offence committed by one or more of its members. In order to attract Section 149, it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of unlawful assembly, and it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. If the members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common object, they would be liable for the same under Section 149 IPC.

40. In Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 2 SCC 257: 2003 SCC (Cri) 506], this Court has once 52 again explained Section 149 and held as under: (SCC pp. 263-64, para 14) “14. Section 149 of the Penal Code provides that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly is guilty of that offence. The two clauses of Section 149 vary in degree of certainty. The first clause contemplates the commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly, which can be held to have been committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. The second clause embraces within its fold the commission of an act which may not necessarily be the common object of the assembly; nevertheless, the members of the assembly had knowledge of the likelihood of the commission of that offence in prosecution of the common object. The common object may be the commission of one offence, while there may be a likelihood of the commission of yet another offence, the knowledge whereof is capable of being safely attributable to the members of the unlawful assembly. In either case, every member of the assembly would be vicariously liable for the offence actually committed by any other member of the assembly. A mere possibility of the commission of the offence would not necessarily enable the court to draw an inference that the likelihood of the commission of such an offence was within the knowledge of every member of the unlawful assembly. It is difficult indeed, though not impossible, to collect direct evidence of such 53 knowledge. An inference may be drawn from circumstances such as the background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime. Unless the applicability of Section 149—either clause—is attracted and the court is convinced, on facts and in law, both, of liability capable of being fastened vicariously by reference to either clause of Section 149 IPC, merely because a criminal act was committed by a member of the assembly, every other member thereof would not necessarily become liable for such criminal act. The inference as to the likelihood of the commission of the given criminal act must be capable of being held to be within the knowledge of another member of the assembly who is sought to be held vicariously liable for the said criminal act.” The same principles have been reiterated in State of Punjab v. Sanjiv Kumar [(2007) 9 SCC 791: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 578].

54. In the present case, the accused were armed with sticks, and it was known to every member of the assembly that the sticks would be used to cause simple or grievous hurt to the informant party upon whom the blows were directed. Therefore, all the members of the assembly shared the common object of causing hurt and grievous hurt to the informant party. The members of the assembly had caused rioting, and thus they were 54 rightly held guilty of committing the offences punishable under Section 147, 323, 325 of the IPC, read with Section 149 of the IPC.

55. The learned Trial Court had awarded a maximum imprisonment of one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 read with Section 149 of the IPC. The rest of the sentences were less than one year. The manner in which the accused had caused simple and grievous hurt to the informant party because of the dispute over the land shows that the act was premeditated and was done to teach a lesson to the informant party. Such an act cannot be easily condoned. Hence, the sentence of one year cannot be said to be excessive and requiring any interference from the Court.

56. Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen (supra) deals with circumstantial evidence and will not help the defence.

58. No other point was urged. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed.

59. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 55

60. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. 1st June, 2026 (Nikita) (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge