State of H.P. v. Kamlesh Kumar

Magistrate First Class-I, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Vinod Singh (PW3), his sister Babita (PW2) and Peeyush Sipahiya, son of Babita, were going to Mount Caramel School on 23.10.2007, at about 8.30 a.m. A truck bearing registration No. HP-37-4976 came from Parour at high speed and hit Peeyush, who fell and sustained injuries. The driver stopped the truck and went away from the spot. Peeyush was brought to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and the police recorded an entry (Ex.PW5/A) in the daily diary. ASI Brahm Dass (PW6) went to the hospital for verification. Vinod Singh (PW3) made a statement (Ex.PW3/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/A) was registered. An application (Ex.PC) was filed for the medical examination of Peeyush (Ex.PW6/C), and MLC (Ex.PC) was obtained. Peeyush succumbed to his injury. An inquest on the dead body was conducted. The post-mortem examination of 3 Peeyush was conducted, and the cause of death was found to be haemorrhagic shock produced by trauma to the left lung by multiple fractured ribs. Report (Ex.PB) was issued. Brahm Dass visited the spot and prepared the spot map (Ex.PW6/D). He took the photographs (Ex.PW6/E Ex.PW6/H). He seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-37-4976 vide memo (Ex.PA) The mechanical examination of the truck was conducted, and no defect was found in it that could have led to the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per the version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicle Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Isha Sood (PW1) and Nirmal Arora (PW4) did not support the prosecution's case. Babita (PW2) is the mother of Peeyush, 4 and Vinod Singh (PW3) is the informant and uncle of the deceased Peeyush. Rajinder Chand (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Brahm Dass (PW6) investigated the matter.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-37-4976 on

23.10.2007. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He stated that Master Peeyush himself hit the rear side of the truck when he fell from the culvert. He admitted that the matter was reported to the police, and the police had investigated the matter. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that Peeyush had died in an accident involving the truck being driven by the accused. The plea taken by the accused that Peeyush had fallen from the culvert was falsified by the suggestion given to Vinod Singh. The accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving by the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows. Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo rigorous 5 imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. undergo rigorous To imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of ₹2,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. To pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 07 days. Section 304-A of IPC Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that Vinod Singh admitted in his cross-examination that he had reached the spot after the accident. Witnesses admitted that Peeyush was standing on the parapet. The informant admitted that the truck was not driven towards the parapet located on the side of the culvert. The site plan made the prosecution’s case suspect. The prosecution had failed to prove the exact manner of 6 the accident, and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved that the truck had hit Peeyush at high speed. The defence of the accused that Peeyush was standing on the parapet and fell by himself was falsified by the suggestion made to Vinod Singh. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

9. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State and Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The statements of prosecution 7 witnesses proved that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed and hit Peeyush. The defence taken by the accused that Peeyush fell from the culvert was not proved on record. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

11. Ms Anjali Soni Verma, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence. The informant admitted that he had reached the place of the accident after the accident, and he cannot be called an eyewitness. The defence taken by the accused that Peeyush was standing on the culvert and fell from the culvert was highly probable. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 8 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. that the same

14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:

21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the 9