State of H.P. v. Virender Singh

(The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. It was asserted that informant Sanjay Kumar (PW1) had served as a Chemist in Zeon Life Sciences Ltd. w.e.f. August 2007 to 30.7.2008. Management had promised to pay the bonus during Diwali. The informant went to the Factory on 25.10.2008 to take the bonus. Earlier, he had visited the factory thrice for this purpose. The informant reached the Factory on 25.10.2008 at about 10.30 a.m. Virender Singh (accused) was present in the factory. He told the informant that no bonus would be paid to him, and he was wasting his time. The informant replied that he was entitled to the bonus and why it would not be paid to him. The accused became infuriated and started pushing the informant. The informant objected and accused inflicted a fist blow on the informant’s face. The informant’s tooth was broken from the blow. The Security Guard rescued the informant from the accused. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ex.PW1/A) was recorded in the Police Station. An application (Ex.PW5/A) was filed for the informant’s medical examination. 3 Dr. Amita Goyal (PW4) examined the informant and found that the informant had one tooth missing and the nature of the injury was grievous. She issued the MLC (Ex.PW4/A). An entry (Ex.PW3/A) was recorded in the Police Station, and FIR (Ex.PW5/B) was registered. ASI Dev Raj (PW5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW5/C). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to charge the accused with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Sanjay Kumar (PW1) is the informant. Bahadur Singh (PW2) is an eyewitness. Kamlesh Kumar (PW3) proved the entries in the daily diary. Amita Goyal (PW4) examined the informant. ASI Dev Raj (PW5) investigated the matter.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), denied the 4 prosecution’s case in its entirety. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had examined Bahadur Singh, who was known to the informant. The informant had asserted in the FIR that he was rescued by the security guard. The informant stated on oath that Mohseen and Madan Lal Dogra had rescued him from the accused. However, none of these persons was examined. The incident had taken place in a factory, and the possibility of the presence of independent persons could not be ruled out. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by Bahadur Singh. The statement of the Dental Surgeon also corroborated the informant’s version. The learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5

8. I have heard Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel respondent/complainant.

9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the testimony of Bahadur Singh and the medical evidence. The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the name of Bahadur Singh was not mentioned in the FIR. He was known to the informant and was a chance witness. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution was required to prove his presence on the spot. The evidence to prove his presence was not satisfactory. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken on the material placed on record, and no interference is required with the judgment of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 6

11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 7

21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv.State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581andRajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471.

14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial 8 reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

16. An entry in the daily diary (Ex.PW1/A) and the FIR (Ex.PW5/B) specifically mentions that the informant was rescued by the Security Guard. The name of Bahadur Singh was not mentioned in the entry in the daily diary. This was the earliest version, and failure to name Bahadur Singh as a witness in the entry in the daily diary would make his presence doubtful.

17. The informant stated that a security guard had rescued him. Mohsin and Bahadur Singh had also visited the spot. He clarified in the cross-examination that the incident was 9 over before the arrival of Bahadur Singh. This admission in the cross-examination makes it highly doubtful that Bahadur Singh was present on the spot at the time of the incident.

18. Bahadur Singh (PW2) stated that the informant had sent a message to him that he (the informant) had reached the factory. He (Bahadur Singh) went to the spot and saw the accused and the informant quarrelling with each other. The informant never claimed that he had messaged Bahadur Singh, and this part of his statement cannot be believed. The informant stated in his cross-examination that he had known Bahadur Singh since his childhood, and Bahadur Singh is a resident of the neighbouring village. This shows that Bahadur Singh was known to the informant and learned Trial Court had rightly held that he was a chance witness. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that a chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of the incident by chance and not by course. His testimony is to be seen with due care and caution. It was observed: 10 Chance witness

29. A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed, though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect that is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13) “12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9, who are independent witnesses, by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence, and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same.

13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial, by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses”, it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If a murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be 11 witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter explaining their presence.”

30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23) “21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105], this Court, while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer- by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under: If the offence is committed in a street, only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there. The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country like India, where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.

22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must 12 adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ).

23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident, may also be taken into consideration, particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284]). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR, and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue, has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution's case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.”

19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 13 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly at the place of the incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427:

23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence.

24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429, this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR have been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107 are authorities for the proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded.

20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the evidence of a chance witness requires a cautious and careful scrutiny. It was observed: 14 “26. As regards the testimony of PW-5 (Mahender Khurana), he too is a chance witness. As to when testimony of a chance witness could be relied upon, the law is settled, which is that the evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence. Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (See: Rajesh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 12 SCC 200; and, Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 9 SCC 719.

21. In the present case, Bahadur Singh was known to the informant; his name was not mentioned in the earliest version made to the police, and the informant stated that the incident was over before the arrival of Bahadur Singh. All these circumstances made it difficult to rely upon his testimony, and the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while discarding his testimony.

22. Bahadur Singh stated in his cross-examination that the Diwali bonus is paid after Diwali and not before Diwali. The informant claimed that he had visited the factory on 25.10.2008 to seek the Diwali bonus, and he had earlier visited the factory thrice to take the bonus. Diwali in the year 2008 was on

28.10.2008; thus, no bonus was due to the informant till 28th, and his version that he had gone to the factory to take Diwali bonus was inherently improbable. 15

23. It was submitted that Dr. Amita Goyal found the tooth missing, which corroborates the informant’s version. This submission will not help the prosecution. Dr. Amita Goyal admitted in her cross-examination that injuries can be caused by self-infliction and by falling on the chair. The accused claimed that the informant had fallen on the chair, and this is duly corroborated by the statement of the Dental Surgeon. Therefore, the testimony of the Medical Officer does not provide unequivocal corroboration to the informant’s testimony.

24. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

26. No other point was urged. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail 16 bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

28. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. 19th June, 2026 (Chander) (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge