National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Bimla

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, J. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant: Mr. Ashwani K. Sharma, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. B.M. Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent No. 1. Mr. G.S. Rathore, Advocate, for respondent No. 2. Deepak Gupta, J. (Oral) The question which arises for decision in this case is whether the legal representatives of a person, who himself was driving the vehicle, can claim compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, which reads as follows: “163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the 1 Whether the reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes. -: 2 :- Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.”

2. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Kokla Devi versus Chet Ram and another, 2002 (1) Shim. L.C. 204, held that a petition under Section 163-A is maintainable by the dependents of the deceased person, who himself is responsible for causing the accident resulting in his death. The validity of this decision was referred to a larger Bench and a Division Bench of this Court in Sohan Singh and another versus National Insurance Company IV (2009) ACC 163 relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Rajni Devi, (2008) 5 SCC 736, held that since one of the claimants was the owner of the vehicle and the deceased himself was responsible for causing the accident, the Insurance Company was not responsible.

3. On behalf of the claimants, it is contended that this judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case because in the present case neither the deceased nor the claimants were the owners of the vehicles. -: 3 :-

4. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the car bearing registration No. HP-09-1039, which was driven by Shri Mohinder Kainthla met with an accident resulting in his death and another occupant of the car was seriously injured. The wife of the deceased filed a claim petition and in this claim petition, the learned Tribunal held the Insurance Company liable to pay the compensation and assessed the compensation at ` 2,16,000/-.

5. It would be pertinent to refer to a judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Appaji (since deceased) and another versus M. Krishna and another, 2004 ACJ 1289, in which T.S.Thakur, J. speaking for the Bench has very succinctly laid down the following principles. “16. It is evident from the above that Section 163-A was never intended to provide relief to those who suffered in a road accident not because of the negligence of another person making use of a motor vehicle, but only on account of their own rash, negligent or imprudent act resulting in death or personal injury to them. The recommendations of the Law Commission were concerned more with the victims of hit-and-run accident cases where the particulars of offenders could not be ascertained. It also expressed concern about the security of victims of road accidents and recommended dispensing with proof of fault on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle. The recommendations, it is clear, were made from the point of view of victim of accidents on the roads more than those who are responsible for the same. The Review Committee too had viewed the situation from the point of view of such victims and expressed concern about the time it took for disposal of ordinary cases before the Tribunals. The objects and reasons underlying the introduction of the provision also envisaged adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into what was described as long- drawn procedure. The decision of the Apex Court in Kodala’s case, 2001 ACJ 827 (SC) elucidated the purpose underlying the introduction of section 163- A in the light of the recommendations of the Law Commission and the Review Committee. There is nothing in any one of the above to suggest that -: 4 :- section 163-A was intended to be available even in a situation where the accident in question had caused death or physical injury to none except the person who was rash and negligent in using the motor vehicle. The universal concern was for the safety and the social security of an innocent user of the road and not for a person who had because of his own imprudence, rashness or negligence met with an accident and suffered an injury or death.

17. It is truism to say that legislative history of a provision including the aims and objects which the bill sets out before the legislature are only aids for interpretation of the provision eventually enacted for enforcement. A statutory provision cannot be understood or interpreted only on the touchstone of its historical background or aids like the subject heading or the aims and objects stated in the bill preceding the legislation. While the object of any exercise aimed at interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it, the golden rule among numerous other rules of interpretation that have been judicially evolved is that the intention of the legislature is to be primarily gathered from the language used in the provision. A statute is an edict of the legislature and the language employed in the same is the determinative factor for understanding the true legislative intent. “Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid” said learned Judge Hand, “but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them”. [See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. vs Yensavage, 218 FR 547; Union of India v. Eilip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Casco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, AIR 1998 SC 74 and Shiv Shakti Co- op. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, 2003 AIR SCW 2445].

18. Let us then turn to section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It envisages payment of compensation for death or permanent disablement due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle to the victim or his legal heirs as the case may be. The term ‘victim’ has not been defined in the Act. The literal meaning of the word as given in Chambers 20th Century Dictionary is: “a living being offered as a sacrifice; one subjected to death, suffering or ill- treatment; a prey; a sufferer”. Black’s Law Dictionary explains the term thus: “The person who is the object of a crime or tort, as the victim of a robbery is the person robbed”. Person whom court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of defendant’s criminal activities; that person may be individual, public or private corporation, government, or unincorporated association. partnership, -: 5 :-

19. The right to receive compensation under section 163-A presupposes that the person who makes a claim is a victim or the legal heirs of a victim. The provision on the plain language employed in the same does not entitle a person who is neither a victim nor his/her legal heir to claim any compensation. In other words, one who is the victim of his own actions of rash or negligent driving cannot invoke section 163-A for making a claim. The concern of the legislature and the jurists is understandably for the victim in contradistinction to the victimiser or one who falls a victim to his own action. While road accidents generally affect innocent third parties or those making use of public transport, cases where the owner or driver of the vehicle alone suffers on account of his rash and negligent driving are not uncommon. Drunken driving, speeding in what are high performance new generation of automobiles including two- wheelers are accounting for a large number of accidents every day. Quite often these accidents kill or wound even the person who is driving the vehicle. Parliament did not in our opinion intend to provide for compensation to the person responsible for the accident on structured formula basis in such cases. Neither the provisions of section 163-A nor the background in which the same were introduced disclose any such intention. The argument that section 163-A is a panacea for all ills concerning the accidents regardless of whether the person who is killed or injured is or is not a victim must therefore be rejected.”

6. The judgment given by the Division Bench of this Court in Kokla Devi’s case (supra) was dissented from. The matter did not end here. The Apex Court has settled this dispute also in Ningamma and another versus United India Insurance Company, (2009) 13 SCC 710. The Apex Court was dealing with a case where the deceased who was driving a motorcycle which was borrowed from its real owner met with an accident expired. A petition was filed under Section 163-A by the legal representatives of the deceased. The Apex Court held that a petition under Section 163-A would not be maintainable. The Apex -: 6 :- Court after discussing the entire law on the subject following the judgment in Rajni Devi’s case (supra) held as follows:- “21. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2008) 5 SCC 736 case is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in question. He borrowed the said motorbike from its real owner. The deceased cannot be held to be an employee of the owner of the motorbike although he was authorized to drive the said vehicle by its owner and therefore, he could step into the shoes of the owner of the motorbike. We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would make it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle.

22. In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under Section 163-A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability to pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA.

23. When we apply the said principle into the facts of the present case we are of the view that the claimants were not entitled to claim compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA and to that extent the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the said provision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.”

7. In the present case, the claimant has led no evidence to show that negligence was of any other person. Therefore, in view of the judgments of the Apex Court and the judgment delivered by this Court in New India Insurance Company Ltd. versus Smt. Sarita Devi and others, 2011 (3) Him L.R. 1149, -: 7 :- the claim petition itself was not maintainable and the Insurance Company could not have held liable to pay the compensation. The claim petition had to be rejected. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Insurance Company is allowed and the award of the learned Tribunal is set-aside. No order as to costs. (Deepak Gupta) Judge October 17, 2011 (rajni)