Rajinder Kumar v. State of H.P

presented before the learned Trial Court.

The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4

The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. HC Ravinder Kumar (PW1) witnessed the recovery. Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) were travelling in the vehicle. HC Sukhdev Singh (PW4) went to the spot after coming to know of the accident. Surjit Rana (PW5) witnessed the recovery. HHC Sarup Lal (PW6) mechanically examined the vehicle. HC Ravinder Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. Balbir Singh (PW8) witnessed the recovery. HC Ashok Kumar (PW9) took the photographs. Constable Rajesh Kumar (PW10) proved the entries in the daily diary. Dr Rachpal Singh (PW11) treated Raghubir Singh. Dr V.K. Raizada (PW12) examined the injured and the accused.

The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. PB-07G-7202 on

10.05.2007. He admitted that the police had seized the van and the documents. He stated that he was not negligent and a false FIR was registered against him. The witnesses also deposed against him falsely. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses proved that the accused was driving the van 5 in a rash or negligent manner. He had put the vehicle into neutral gear. The speed of the vehicle increased, and the accused could not control it, which led to the accident. Dilbag Singh and Raghubir Singh had sustained injuries in the accident. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and sentenced him as under: Sections Sentence Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹300/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. undergo rigorous To imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge(I), Una, District 6 Una (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle by putting it in neutral gear. He was asked repeatedly not to do so, but he did not heed the advice. The speed of the vehicle increased, and the accused could not control it. Dilbag Singh and Raghubir Singh had sustained injuries in the accident. The sentence imposed by learned Trial Court was adequate. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) could not identify the accused as the driver of the vehicle. The mechanical report also did not show that the vehicle was in a neutral gear, which falsifies the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 7

I have heard Mr A.S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr A.S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the identity of the accused as driver of the vehicle was not established. The occupants of the vehicle could not identify him in the Court. The occupants of the vehicle were not experts, and their testimonies that the accused had put the vehicle in neutral gear were not believable. Driving the vehicle at a high speed does not constitute any negligence, and learned Courts below erred in holding the accused negligent. The statement of Dr Rachpal Singh (PW11) was not believable because he had initially stated that there was no fracture. The fracture of both bones of the left leg did not correspond to the injuries noticed by Dr V. K. Raizada (PW12). The learned Trial Court had imposed an excessive sentence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the statements of the occupants of the vehicle clearly proved that the accused had put the 8 vehicle in a neutral gear, which is a violation of Rule 172 of Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999. This was the proximate cause of the accident, and the learned Courts below have rightly held that the accused was negligent. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts while deciding the revision. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: - “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local 9 jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.

7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re- examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts.

7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following:

5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court 11 to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …

7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the 12 Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”

7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.

The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Dilbag Singh (PW2) stated that he had hired a vehicle for ₹450/-. He could not identify the accused because of lapse of time. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he admitted that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Raghubir Singh (PW3) stated that he had hired a taxi for ₹450/-. The accused present in the Court was driving the vehicle. He could 13 identify the accused because he was travelling with him. The accused admitted in reply to question No. 2 that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration number PB-07G-7202 which was going downhill towards Pandoga on 10.05.2007 at about 09.30 p.m. The statement made by the accused corroborates the testimonies of Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 742: “51.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:

The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of 16