G.Vimala v. The Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Ors.

1BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURTDATED:16.12.2011CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.N.BASHAandTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPALWrit Appeal (MD)No.52 of 2011G.Vimala :Appellant-Vs-1.The Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 800, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 002.2.The Superintending Engineer, Trichy Electricity Distribution Circle, Tiruchirappalli-20.3.The Superintending Engineer, Perambalur Electricity Distribution Circle, Perambalur. :RespondentsWrit Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order passedby this Court in W.P.(MD)No.4318 of 2010 dated 13.09.2010.WP(MD)No.4318/2010:Writ Petitionfiled under article 226 of the Constitutionof India praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for therecords pertaining to the orders passed by the third respondent vide letterNo.571/NiP.1/Ni U.4/Ko.Va.Ve/08 dated 15.9.2008 and consequential order inKa.No.853/Pi.P.2/Ni.U4)Ko.Va.Ve/2010-E dated 12.2.10 and quash the same andconsequently direct the respondents to provide suitable employmentopportunity to the petitioner on compassionate ground under the jurisdictionof second respondent.For Appellant :Mr.D.Shanmugaraja SethupathiFor Respondents:Mr.C.SelvarajJUDGMENT(Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.N.BASHA, J.)The appellant has preferred this writ appeal against the order of thewrit Court dated 13.09.2010 dismissing the writ petition filed by theappellant in W.P.(MD)No.4318 of 2010, challenging the impugned order ofrejection seeking the relief of compassionate appointment.2.The case of the appellant is that the appellant is the daughter ofone Mr.Ganesan who was working as Wireman in the Tamil Nadu ElectricityBoard under the second respondent and while he was in service, he died on02.02.1998. The father of the appellant was working with unblemished recordof service. At the time of the death of her father, the appellant was aminor and there was no other source of income for the mother of theappellant to take care of the children. Thereafter, the mother of theappellant submitted an application in the year 1999, (i.e.) within threeyears from the date of death of the appellant's father, seeking any suitablejob on compassionate ground. But the said application was rejected as perthe order dated 17.06.1999, on the ground that she does not have therequired qualification. Subsequently, she has sent a representation to thesecond and third respondents on 12.05.2001 seeking to provide anyappointment to her daughter, the appellant herein, on compassionate ground,considering the conditions of the family. But the mother of the appellantreceived a letter from the second respondent dated 22.05.2001, rejecting therequest for compassionate appointment to the appellant on the ground that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2the appellant was only a minor, and that she has not attained the age ofmajority at the time of making the application. 3.The Tahsildar, Thuraiyur has also issued a certificate dated19.12.2007 to the effect that the family of the appellant has been inindigent condition and no body was working in the family to take care of thefamily. The appellant in the mean time, attained the age of majority on23.04.2008, and within a period of three years, i.e. on 17.07.2008 itself,the appellant preferred an application seeking for the appointment oncompassionate ground. However, the same was rejected on 15.09.2008, by thethird respondent. Being aggrieved against the said order, the appellantpreferred a writ petition in W.P.(MD)No.4318 of 2010, but the writ petitionwas rejected by the writ Court by order 13.09.2010. As against the same, thepresent writ appeal has been filed by the appellant herein.4.Mr.Shanmugaraja Sethupathi, the learned counsel for the appellant,would vehemently contend that the writ Court failed to take note of theadmitted fact that the appellant, soon after attaining the age of majorityon 23.04.2008, preferred an application as early as on 17.07.2008, which iswell within the stipulated period of three years and as such, theapplication is not barred by limitation. Hence, according to the learnedcounsel for the appellant, the application should have been very wellentertained by the Electricity Board. It is contended that the writ Courtmainly placed reliance on the decisions relating to other generalprinciples. He further submitted that a catena of decisions rendered by theHon'ble Supreme Court as the judgments of the learned Single Judges andDivision Benches of this Court, held that the period of limitation, i.e. 3years, has to be reckoned only from the date of attaining the age ofmajority. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant thatadmittedly, the appellant was a minor at the time of the death of her fatherand as such, her mother applied and her application was dismissed on theground that she is not having the required minimum educationalqualification. It is pointed out that all these factors have been overlookedby the writ Court, and as such, the appellant herein has been constrained tofile the present writ appeal.5.The learned counsel for the appellant would place reliance on thefollowing decisions:-1)Syed Khadim Hussain vs. State of Bihar, [(2006) 9 SCC 195].2)Division Bench judgments of this Court in P.Rajamani vs. The Chairman,Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (2007 Writ L.R. 306), and in The ChiefEngineer/Personnel, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board & Others vs. P.Venkatesan(CDJ 2009 MHC 2679).3)M.Uma vs. Chief Engineer (Personnel), T.N.E.B. [(2010) 7 MLJ 644)] (Mad.)6.Heard Mr.C.Selvaraj, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for therespondents herein on the submissions made by the learned counsel for theappellant. 7.It is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for therespondents that the appellant was a minor at the time of death of herfather, who was working as Wireman in the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, andthe appellant has preferred the application within a period of three yearsfrom the date of attaining the age of majority. It is submitted that herapplication would be considered in the manner known to law. 8.We have given our careful and anxious consideration to the rivalcontentions put forward by either side and perused the impugned order dated15.09.2008 as well as the order passed by the writ Court dated 13.09.2010. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

39.At the outset, it is to be stated that the appellant was a minorwhile her father died during his employment as Wireman. It is seen that thefather of the appellant died on 02.02.1998. The appellant attained the ageof majority on 23.04.2008, and she has preferred an application dated17.07.2008 seeking for the relief of compassionate appointment, which iswithin the period of three years from the date of attaining the age ofmajority. The fact remains that she has also enclosed the necessarycertificates, particularly, the Certificate issued by the Tahsildar,Thuraiyur which would disclose her claim that her family is in indigentcondition and no one in the family was earning to meet the day to dayexpenses of the family. In spite of all these documents produced by theappellant, the third respondent rejected the application of the appellant bythe impugned order dated 15.09.2008. A perusal of the impugned order dated15.09.2008 makes it crystal clear that the third respondent has assignedwrong reasons to the effect that as if the appellant has not completed XIIIStandard. But she has completed the Higher Secondary Course. It is furtherheld in the impugned order dated 15.09.2008 that the application was notpreferred within a period of three years from the date of attaining the ageof majority. Both the reasons assigned by the third respondent in theimpugned order dated 15.09.2008 are incorrect, as it has been alreadypointed out by us that the application for compassionate ground waspreferred by the appellant as early as on 17.07.2008 and that she has alsoenclosed the “No Objection Letter” given by the other legal heirs as well asthe Certificate issued by the Tahsildar. The impugned order is liable to bequashed on the above said ground itself.10.Now, coming to the order of the writ Court, it is to be stated thatthe writ Court has failed to take note of the admitted fact that theappellant, after attaining the age of majority, preferred an applicationseeking for the relief of compassionate appointment well within the periodof three years. The date on which the appellant attained the age of majorityis to be reckoned for computing the period of three years as per the settledposition of law laid down by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court aswell as a catena of decisions of this Court including the Division Benches.It is relevant to refer to the following decisions as hereunder:-1)In Syed Khadim Hussain v. State of Bihar [(2006) 9 SCC 195], theHon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraphs-5 and 6 of the judgment asunder:-“5.We are unable to accept the contention of the counsel forthe State. In the instant case, the widow had applied forappointment within the prescribed period and without assigning anyreasons the same was rejected. When the appellant submitted theapplication he was 13 years' old and the application was rejectedafter a period of six years and that too without giving any reasonand the reason given by the authorities was incorrect as at thetime of rejection of the application he must have crossed 18years and he could have been very well considered for appointment.Of course, in the rules framed by the State there is no specificprovision as to what should be done in case the dependents areminors and there would be any relaxation of age in case they didnot attain majority within the prescribed period for submittingapplication.6.As the widow had submitted the application in time theauthorities should have considered her application. As eleven https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 4years have passed she would not be in a position to join thegovernment service. In our opinion, this is a fit case where theappellant should have been considered in her place forappointment. Counsel for the State could not point out any othercircumstance for which the appellant would be disentitled to beconsidered for appointment. In the peculiar facts andcircumstances of this case, we direct the respondent authoritiesto consider the application of the appellant and give himappropriate appointment within a reasonable time at least within aperiod of three months. The appeal is disposed of in the aboveterms. No costs.”2)The learned single Judge of this Court, in M.Uma v. Chief Engineer(Personnel), T.N.E.B. [(2010) 7 MLJ 644], placing reliance on the above saiddecision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has held as under:-“5.The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision Syed KhadimHussain v. State of Bihar and Others (2006) 9 SCC 195 considered asimilar issue as to whether a minor claimant seeking compassionateappointment can apply for a post on compassionate grounds afterattaining majority. In paragraph-5 of the judgment it is held asfollows:“5....When the appellant submitted the applicationhe was 13 years' old and the application was rejectedafter a period of six years and that too without givingany reason and the reason given by the authorities wasincorrect as at the time of rejection of the applicationhe must have crossed 18 years and he could have beenvery well considered for appointment. Of course, in therules framed by the State there is no specific provisionas to what should be done in case the dependents areminors and there would be any relaxation of age in casethey did not attain majority within the prescribedperiod for submitting application.”6.Identical issue was considered by a Division Bench of thisCourt in P.Rajamani v. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board,Chennai (2007) 8 MLJ 665: 2006 LAB.I.C. 4163. In paragraph-6 of thejudgment, it is held as follows at p.668 of MLJ:“6.Having heard the submission made by the learnedcounsel for the respondents, we are not able toappreciate and accept the stand of the respondents. Wehasten to state that the very purport of extending ahelping hand to a destitute on the death of her husbandby way of compassionate appointment would get defeatedif such claims are turned down on such hyper-technicalground. In the case on hand, as noted earlier, after thedeath of the appellant's husband on 15.11.1996, anapplication was made on 7.4.1997 for compassionateappointment for her elder son. Therefore, there was anapplication for compassionate appointment within fivemonths from the date of the death of her husband. It wasunfortunate that the said application came to berejected on the ground that her elder son was over aged.Such rejection was made only on 5.12.1998. Therefore,the appellant had to necessarily wait for some more time https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 5in order to renew her claim for appointment of heryounger son who was running 18 years as on 11.11.1999.The said younger son completed his 18 years on15.3.2000. Nevertheless, the appellant wanted to ensurethat an application was made on 11.11.1999 itself forthat son in order to confirm that an application forcompassionate appointment was made well within timei.e., before 14.11.1999 by which time the three yearsperiod from the date of death of her husband would cometo an end. Subsequently, on 1.4.2000, her younger sonhimself renewed the application preferred by theappellant on 11.11.1999 by making another applicationalong with the no objection letters of his otherbrothers. Therefore, all the above steps taken by theappellant go to show that she was diligently pursuingher claim for compassionate appointment over the deathof her husband right from the year 1997 till 1.4.2000.In such circumstances, when the appellant being a widowand since she had no other source of livelihood, therespondents should have been much more sympathetic andpractical in considering the claim of the appellant forcompassionate appointment to her younger son based onthe application dated 11.11.1999 and 1.4.2000. In thiscontext, the decision relied upon by the learned counselfor the appellant in (2004) 4 MLJ 238 and 2002 (4) LLN1132 as well as the decision of the Division Bench in2005 W.L.R. 256, cited supra, fully supports the claimof the appellant.”7.In the above said judgment, the rejection order was setaside by the Division Bench of this Court and the respondents weredirected to entertain the application of the appellant in the writappeal and pass appropriate orders for granting compassionateappointment to the claimant within a period of three months. InW.A.No.3050 of 2003, the Division Bench of this Court (HonourableP.SATHASIVAM, J., and S.K.KRISHNAN, J.) considered a similar issueand granted relief to a person, who was a minor when his fatherdied while on duty and the application was submitted after 3 yearsof the death of his father due to the rejection of earlierapplication. In paragraphs-8 to 16, the Division Bench held asfollows:“8.... No doubt, as per that proceedings, anapplication for appointment on compassionate groundshould be made within three years from the date of deathof an employee. The second application being 13.1.2003and the date of death of her husband being 15.7.1996,the second respondent by applying the said B.P.,rejected her request. 9.We have already referred to the letter of thesecond respondent dated 14.7.1999, which finds a placeat page 11 of the typed set, wherein the secondrespondent, who is the competent officer whileconsidering her application dated 10.7.1999 forappointment on compassionate ground has requested her to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 6apply afresh after her son attaining majority (18years). As said earlier, immediately on attainingmajority, i.e., on 11.1.2003, the petitioner has madeanother application on 13.1.2003. In such acircumstance, particularly in the light of the statementmade by the second respondent in his letter dated14.7.1999 and of the fact that the petitioner has made afurther representation on 13.1.2003, i.e., within aperiod of two days on her son attaining majority, asdirected by the second respondent, we are of the viewthat the rejection of her representation based onBP.No.46 dated 13.10.1995 on the ground that herapplication is beyond the period of three years from thedate of death of her husband cannot be sustained.... ... ...14.In the case of D.Ramadoss v. Chief Engineer,T.N.E.B., (2001) WLR 601, the learned single Judge(D.MURUGESAN, J.) in an identical circumstance, relyingon a very same Board Proceedings No.46 dated 13.10.1995,after noting the fact that the petitioner has made arequest within the period of three years, as per theCircular, though there was enormous delay, directed theElectricity Board to consider the request of thepetitioner therein for appointment on compassionateground.15.In W.P.No.24225 of 2001 dated 1.2.2002, thelearned single Judge (K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM), had anoccasion to consider similar claim against Tamil NaduElectricity Board. Before the learned Judge, the fatherof the petitioner, who was employed in the ElectricityBoard died on 19.10.1996. On behalf of his legal heirs,an application dated 1.12.1997 was forwarded by themother of the petitioner for seeking appointment oncompassionate ground. The said application was alsoendorsed by the Superintending Engineer by his letterdated 7.1.1998 and the mother of the petitioner wasdirected to apply for appointment in due course afterfiling a formal application. Thereafter, the mother ofthe petitioner complied with the direction. However, thesaid application was returned by the respondents with anobservation that the petitioner's son was a minor as onthat date and to submit an application after he attainsmajority. The petitioner, after attainment of majorityof his son, by letter dated 8.6.2001, applied forappointment on compassionate grounds. However, by orderdated 17.8.2001, the request of the petitioner wasrejected on two grounds, namely, that the applicationhas not been submitted within three years after thedeath of his father and the petitioner did not complete18 years within three years. Rejecting both the grounds,the learned Judge has concluded that the limitation ofthree years from the date of the Board's Proceedingsdated 13.10.1995 was contemplated only as a result of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 7the said Circular having been issued afresh in thecontext of regulating appointments on compassionateground. It is further held that the mention of theperiod of limitation cannot have any relevance to thecase of the petitioner, who has been specificallydirected to apply after completion of 18 years of hisson. According to the learned Judge, Clause (3) ofB.P.46 dated 13.10.1995 cannot apply to the facts of thepresent case. The learned Judge has also observed thatthe Department itself permitted the mother of thepetitioner to renew her application after her sonattains majority, which has been complied with. In sucha circumstance, the learned Judge concluded that thereis no justifiable reason to reject the application forappointment on compassionate ground and directed theDepartment to consider the application on merits. It isstated that the Department has accepted the saiddirection. Inasmuch as in the case before the learnedJudge as well as before us, the initial application wasmade within time, because of the fact that the son ofthe deceased was a minor, mother was asked to applyafter her son attains majority and in both the cases theapplication was made immediately after attainingmajority, in such a circumstance, as rightly said, thesecond application cannot be rejected on the ground ofdelay. We are also satisfied that similar scheme in theform of Board Proceedings and conditions are notavailable in the cases of the Supreme Court relied on bythe learned counsel for respondents. It is also broughtto our notice that almost in similar circumstance,another learned single Judge of this Court (F.M.IBRAHIMKALIFULLA, J.) in the case of T.Meer Ismail Ali v.T.N.E.B., 2004(3) CTC 120 directed the Tamil NaduElectricity Board to consider the claim of thepetitioner therein.16.Though we are conscious of the directions of theSupreme Court which we have already referred to in theearlier part of our order, in view of the Board'sProceedings referred to above and of the fact that thepetitioner has made an application within three yearsfrom the date of death of her husband i.e., within theprescribed period and also made subsequent applicationas directed by the second respondent and also takingnote of the assertion of the petitioner that after herhusband's death, in the absence of any income, she isliving in poverty, her claim has to be considered. Inthis regard it is worthwhile to refer the case of theSupreme Court in the case of Balbir Kaur v. SteelAuthority of India Ltd., (2000) 6 SCC 493, wherein theirLordships have held that in the case of appointmentconsidering the social and economic justice as enshrinedin the Constitution, denial of deserving cases areliable to be set aside. Further, the purpose of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 8providing compassionate ground to a son or daughter or anear relative of the deceased government servant is torender assistance to the family, which is found inindigent circumstances. Hence in considering the casefor compassionate appointments, the authorities aresupposed to adopt a humane outlook. We do not find anydelay or laches on the part of the petitioner, we areunable to accept the conclusion arrived at by thelearned single Judge in our case and we are satisfiedthat the petitioner has made out a case forconsideration of her claim. Accordingly, the order ofthe learned single Judge as well as the order impugnedin the writ petition, viz., W.P.No.21512 of 2003 are setaside and the respondents are directed to consider thepetitioner's application dated 13.1.2003 on merits andprovide necessary relief. Consequently, the writ appealis allowed.””The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as the learnedsingle Judge of this Court in the judgments cited supra, and also thedecisions of the Division Benches of this Court as pointed out earlier(cited supra), are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case, asin this case also, admittedly, the appellant preferred an applicationseeking for the relief of compassionate appointment within the period ofthree years from the date of attaining the age of majority. 11.In view of the aforesaid reasons, we are constrained to set asidethe impugned order dated 15.09.2008 and the consequential order dated12.02.2010, passed by the third respondent and also the order dated13.09.2010 passed by the writ Court. Consequently, the third respondent ishereby directed to consider the appointment of the appellant in any one ofthe suitable job on the basis of the qualification of the appellant, oncompassionate ground. It is made clear that such exercise shall be completedwithin a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of thisorder. 12.The writ appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs.Sd/-Assistant Registrar (T&P)/ TRUE COPY /Sub Assistant RegistrarTo:1.The Chief Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 800,Anna Salai, Chennai-600 002. 2.The Superintending Engineer, Trichy Electricity Distribution Circle, Tiruchirappalli-20. 3.The Superintending Engineer, Perambalur Electricity Distribution Circle, Perambalur. +1CC to Mr.C.Selvaraj, Advocate. SR.No.44769.+1CC to Mr.D.Shanmugarajasethupathi, Advocate. SR.No.44284.RP/03.01.2012/8P/6C.Writ Appeal (MD)No.52 of 2011,16.12.2011