N.Srinivasan v. The District Educational Officer (General)Cherry RoadSalem2.The General ManagerTamil Nadu State Transport Corporation(Salem

5.N.Srinivasan.. Petitioner in WP 29550 of 20046.A.Thangavel.. Petitioner in WP 29551 of 20047.K.Rajagopal.. Petitioner in WP 30231 of 20048.A.M.Ammasi.. Petitioner in WP 30232 of 20049.K.Kannan.. Petitioner in WP 30233 of 200410.C.Manickam.. Petitioner in WP 35796 of 200411.G.Kennedy.. Petitioner in WP 39735 of 200412.C.Palanisamy.. Petitioner in 4904 of 200513.P.Elango.. Petitioner in 19610 of 200514.N.Kandasamy.. Petitioner in WP 1456 of 200715.P.Palanivel.. Petitioner in WP 9992 of 2007vs.1.The District Educational Officer (General)Cherry RoadSalem2.The General ManagerTamil Nadu State Transport Corporation(Salem Division I) Ltd.Ramakrishna RoadSalem.. RespondentsThe General Manager/Managing Director,Tamil Nadu State Transport,Corporation (Salem Division I)Ramakrishna Road,Salem ...Respondent in WP's.35596/2003, 19958/04, 29028/04, 29029/04, 29550/04, 29551/04, 30231/04, 30232/04, 30233/04, 35796/04, 39735/04, 4904/05, 19610/05, 1456/07 and 9992/07 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The Asst Primary Education Officer,KadaiyampathiSalem District.The District Primary Education Officer,Behind district Elementary,Salem...Respondents in WP.19958/04The District Educational Officer,Krishnagiri Dharmapuri District. ..Respondent in WP.29028/04The District Educational Officer,Namakkal, Namakkal District....Respondent in WP.29029/04 29551/04The District Educational Officer,Salem District Salem....Respondent in WP.29550/04The Chief Educational Officer,Salem District....Respondents in WP.30231/04, 30232/04, 30233/04, 35796/04The District Educational Officer,Villupuram, VillupuramDist....Respondent in WP.No.39735 of 2004The Secretary,Board of Secretary EducationDepartment Govt. Exam,College Road, Chennai....Respondent in WP.19610/05The District Educational Officer,Salem District near Govt Arts College,SalemThe Head Master,Nellambal SubramaniamHigher Secondary School,Suramangalam, Salem ...Respondent in WP.1456/07Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiaseeking for issuance of writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling forthe records from the 1st respondent relating to the order in Ref.No. Na. Ka. No. 01162/B4/03 dated 16.7.2003 and direct the secondrespondent to cancel the charge memo in Ref. K.V. 412 / 19804 /D3 / TSTC / 2003 dated 12.8.2003. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ WP.35596 of 2003 : Issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for therecords from the respondent relating to the Order inKu.No.497/24332/D3/TSTC/2003 dated 29.11.2003WP.19958 of 2004: to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for therecords from the 1st respondent relating to the order inNa.Ka.116/A.1/2003 dated 19.1.2004.WP.29028 of 2004: to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamuscalling for the records from the 1st respondent relating to hisorder O.Mu.No.2954/03 dated 3.6.2003 and quash the said order dated3.6.2003 and direct the 2nd respondent to cancel the Charge Memobearing No.277/15330/D.3/TNSTC/2003-2004 dated 23.9.2004.WP.No.29029 of 2004: to issue a Writ of Certiorarified mandamuscalling for the records from the 1st respondent relating to theorder bearing No.Na.Ka.No.1659/AA2/2003 dated 7.3.2003 and quashthe Said order dated 07.03.2003 and direct the 2nd respondent tocancel the charge memo Ku.No.218/7745/D4/TSTC/2003-2004 dated23.09.2004.WP.29550 of 2004A Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records fromthe 1st respondent relating to his order Na.Ka.No.01162/B4/03 dated25.09.2003 and quash the said order dated 25.09.2003 and direct the2nd respondent to cancel the order made in A19-D1/581,D3/TNSTC/2004dated 25.09.2004 confirming the order of dismissal bearingPa.Mu.No.581/26201/D3/TSTC/2003-3 dated 22.5.2004 and reinstate thepetitioner in service with all the benefit.WP.29551 of 2004A writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the recordstransfer 1st respondent relating to his order Na.Ka.No.3620/AA2/2003dated 16.09.2003 and quash the said order dated 16.09.2003 anddirect the 2nd respondent to cancel the order made in A-18-D1/675-D4/TNSTC/2004 dt 25.09.2004 confirming the order of dismissalbearing Pa.Mu.No.675/24734/D4/TNSTC/2003-3 Dated 26.6.2004 andreinstate in petitioner in service with all benefits award costs.WP 30231/04, 30322 of 2004 and 30323 of 2004to issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records relatingto the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent inNa.Ka.No.3177/B3/2003, dated 08.04.2003 and the consequentialcharge memo issued by the 2nd respondent in Ku.No.197,198 and 200/11350/D3/TNSTC/2003-04 dated 24.09.2004 and quash the same,respectively. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ WP 35796 of 2004to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for therecords of the 1st respondent in his proceedings inref.No.Pa.Mu.No.99/11350/D1/TSTC/2003 dated 18.8.2003 and quash thesame as illegal improper against the principles of natural justiceand direct the 1st respondent to reinstate the petitioner in servicewith all the service benefits.WP 39735 of 2004To issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records fromthe 1st respondent relating to the order Na.Ka.No.1432/B5/2003dt.10.11.2004 and quash the said order dated 10.11.2004 awardcosts.W.P.4904 of 2005To issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of therespondent culminated in and by his proceedings inK.No.199/11350/T3/TNSTC/2004 dt.29.1.05 and quash the same.W.P.19610 of 2005To issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records from the1st respondent relating to the order bearingNo.Na.Ka.No.338440/D2/.2 2004 dt.23.2.2005 and quash the said orderdated 23.2.2005 and award costs.W.P.No.1456 of 2007To issue a Writ of Certiorarified mandamus calling for therecords from the 1st Respondent relating to the order inKa.No.3488/B.3/2006 dt.24.08.2006 and quash the said orderdt.24.08.2006 and direct the 3rd respondent to cancel the chargememo No.Ku.No.615 33556 – D4 – TSTC-2006 dt.6.10.2006 and awardcosts.WP 9992 OF 2007: to issue a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus callingfor the records connected with the order of dismissal dated13.11.2003 passed by the 1st respondent as confirmed by theDy.Commissioner of Labour (Concillation) in AP No.465 of 2003 dt.5.8.2005 dated 13.11.2003 quash the order and also direct therespondents Managementto reinstate the petitioner.For Petitioner: Mr. S. AyyathuraiFor Respondent 1: Mr. Pa. Kadirvel, GAFor Respondent 2 : Mr. C. Kanakaraj https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ C O M M O N O R D E RHeard the arguments of M/s. S. Ayyathurai, M.M. Sundaresh,V.Chandrasekar, S. Girija, V. Thiruppathi, learned counselsappearing for the petitioners, Mr. Pa. Kadirvel, learned GovernmentAdvocate representing the officials of the Department of Education,Mr. C. Kanakaraj, learned counsel appearing for the respondentTransport Corporations and M/s Sarvabhauman Associates appearingfor the second respondent in W.P. No. 1456 of 2007 and haveperused the records.1.1.The arguments were heard in respect of these writpetitions on three different dates. Since the subject matter ofall the writ petitions are similar, they are disposed of by acommon order.2.Backdrop:-2.1.All the 16 writ petitioners are working as Drivers in theState Transport Corporation. They have joined the services onvarious dates and many of them were confirmed in their services andhave also put in more than ten years of service. 2.2.The respondent State Transport Corporation is aGovernment company registered under Section 617 of the CompaniesAct. The service conditions of the workmen employed in thesetransport Undertakings are governed by the certified StandingOrders framed in respect of each of the Corporation. However, dueto re-organisation, many of the District level Corporations havebeen disbanded and merged with zonal Corporations. The Board ofDirectors of the erstwhile Corporations have framed Service Rulesand they have also prescribed, by Board Resolution, the minimumeducational qualification for various posts under the Corporations.For the post of Driver, it is essential that an aspirant shouldhave passed VIII Standard with Heavy Vehicle Licence and a PublicDriver Badge. 2.3.The petitioners herein submitted certificates regardingtheir educational qualifications either at the time of joiningservice or at the time of confirmation of their service. In mostof the cases, they have registered their names with the EmploymentExchanges and their names were also sponsored for employment withthe respondent Corporation. It is not clear as to why theCorporations did not verify the educational certificates producedby the petitioners soon after their joining in the duty. May beafter sometime, on some complaints, the educational certificatesproduced by the petitioners were forwarded to the appropriateEducation Department officials, depending upon the certificateissuing authority. Almost in 15 cases, the petitioners haveproduced certificates from Schools in Salem District. Therefore,they were sent for verification either by the District Educational https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Officer, Salem or Assistant Educational Officer of the respectiveunits. 2.4.In W.P. 39735 of 2004, it was sent for verification bythe District Educational Officer, Villupuram as the school in whichthe petitioner in that writ petition (G. Kennedy) claims to havestudied in Kallakurichi. In W.P. 19610 of 2005, as the petitioner(P.Elango) had produced a S.S.L.C. Certificate got as a privatecandidate, it was sent for verification by the Secretary of theBoard of Government Examinations.2.5.In all these cases, the concerned authorities haveinformed the respondent Corporations that the School Certificatesand the Record Sheets produced by them were bogus. They were alsoinformed that the petitioners neither studied in those schools northey were promoted to the standards in which they had made claims.2.6.Immediately upon receipt of these communications, theCorporations issued show cause notices on the basis of the reportsobtained from the respective Schools / Department officials andcalled upon the petitioners to show cause as to why action shouldnot be taken against them for having obtained employment onproduction of false certificates. In some cases, the petitionersdemanded proof for the allegation. When a final show cause noticewas given without conducting enquiries, some of them approachedthis Court with the following writ petitions.3.Previous Litigations:-3.1.S. Govindaraju (Petitioner in W.P. No. 29028 of 2004)filed W.P. No. 29389 of 2003 and S. Selvam (Petitioner in W.P.No.29029 of 2004) filed W.P. No. 29390 of 2003 challenging theshow cause notices. This Court, by an order dated 08.9.2003, setaside the said order and gave liberty to proceed in accordance withlaw.3.2.M. Srinivasan (Petitioner in W.P. No. 29550 of 2004)filed W.P. No. 22618 of 2004 and A. Thangavel (Petitioner in W.P.No. 29551 of 2004) filed W.P. No. 22617 of 2004 challenging thedismissal orders passed against them. Both the writ petitionswere dismissed by this Court vide order dated 06.8.2004 and theywere directed to file appeals before the Managing Director as perthe Service Rules. After filing the appeals, which were alsodismissed, the two petitioners have once again moved this Courtwith the present writ petitions and have also obtained interimorders against the termination and are continuing in service.3.3.Rajagopal (Petitioner in W.P. No. 30231 of 2004) earlierfiled a writ petition being W.P. No. 25346 of 2003; Mr.A.M.Ammasi(Petitioner in W.P. No. 30232 of 2004) filed W.P. No. 25344 of 2003and K.Kannan (Petitioner in W.P. No. 30233 of 2004) filed W.P. No. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 25345 of 2003 challenging the show cause notices given to them.This Court, by an order dated 29.7.2004, allowed the writ petitionsand permitted the Transport Corporation to proceed with the enquiryin accordance with law. Subsequently, the Corporation issuedcharge-memos dated 24.9.2004 against the three petitioners and theyhave once again come forward with the present writ petitions andhave obtained stay order.3.4.Mr. C. Palanisamy (W.P. No. 4904 of 2005) has earlierfiled the following three writ petitions:-(a)W.P. No. 16976 of 2003 [Disposed on 23.6.2003](b)W.P. No. 23543 of 2003 [Disposed on 29.10.2003](c)W.P. No. 14749 of 2004 [Disposed on 25.01.2005]After all these exercises, when he was given a fresh enquiry noticedated 29.01.2005, he has, once again, filed the present writpetition and had also obtained an interim stay order.3.5.Mr. C. Manickam (W.P. No. 35796 of 2004) was dismissedfrom service by an order dated 18.8.2003. As against the saiddismissal, he had raised an industrial dispute under Section 2 A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short, 'I.D. Act'].Since the conciliation proceedings failed, he had moved the LabourCourt with a claim petition and his dispute was taken on file bythe Labour Court, Salem, as I.D. No. 34 of 2004 and it is pendingadjudication. Notwithstanding the said fact, he has come forwardto file the present writ petition and made an unsuccessful attemptto get an interim order. 3.6.Mr. P. Palanivel (W.P. No. 9992 of 2007) was dismissedfrom service by an order dated 13.11.2003. Since an industrialdispute was pending conciliation before the Deputy Commissioner ofLabour (Conciliation), approval for his dismissal was sought for bythe respondent Transport Corporation by filing petition underSection 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. The said Conciliation Officer,by his order dated 05.8.2005, granted approval in A.P. No. 465 of2003. Thereafter, the petitioner raised an industrial disputebefore the Labour Officer, Salem and that conciliation ended infailure. On the strength of the same, instead of filing a claimstatement before the Labour Court, the petitioner has come beforethis Court challenging the dismissal order dated 13.11.2003 in theyear 2007 and has also obtained an interim stay.4.Contentions raised by the petitioners:-The learned counsels for the petitioners contended that therewas an enormous delay in framing the charges and hence, the charge-memos to be quashed. They also submitted that filing writpetitions at the stage of show cause notices is maintainable as thebasis for such notices were on the basis of unsubstantiatedallegations. They contended that there is no minimum educationalqualification prescribed under the Standing Orders and hence, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ proceedings are vitiated. The further contention was that noelaborate enquiry was conducted and the material produced are notproved in the manner known to law. They also sought for lenienttreatment in case the enquiry goes against them. They alsosubmitted that there is no need to avail other alternate remediesas they are not efficacious. It is, therefore, necessary to dealwith each of the issues raised herein.5.Whether the proceedings are liable to be quashed ongrounds of delay?5.1.Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that therewas a long delay in initiating disciplinary action and, therefore,on that ground, the show cause notices / charge-memos should bequashed.5.2.In the decision reported in 1995 (3) SCC 134 [DeputyRegistrar, Co-operative Societies, Faizabad v. Sachindra NathPandey and others], the Supreme Court held that the delay inframing charge cannot be a ground to interfere with the charge memoand the relevant passage found in paragraph 7 of the said judgmentis extracted below:Para 7: "On a perusal of charges, we find that the chargesare very serious. We are, therefore, not inclinedto close the matter only on the ground that about 16years have elapsed since the date of commencement ofdisciplinary proceedings, more particularly when theappellant alone cannot be held responsible for thisdelay...." 5.3.Further, in the decision reported in 1996 (3) SCC 157[Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department v.L.Srinivasan], the Supreme Court has held that the charge cannot bequashed only on the ground of delay and any finding recorded by theCourt will prejudice the enquiry. The Supreme Court has alsopulled up the member of the Administrative Tribunal for havinginterfered with the charge memo as if the Tribunal is the appellateauthority. The following passage found in paragraph 3 of the saidjudgment makes the position very clear.Para 3: "We are informed that charge-sheet was laid forprosecution for the offences of embezzlement andfabrication of false records etc. and that theoffences and the trial of the case is pending. TheTribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry andquashed the charge on the ground of delay ininitiation of disciplinary proceedings. In thenature of the charges, it would take a long time todetect embezzlement and fabrication of falserecords which should be done in secrecy. It https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is not necessary to go into the merits and recordany finding on the charge levelled against thecharged officer since any finding recorded bythis Court would gravely prejudice the case of theparties at the enquiry and also at the trial.Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion onmerit or recording any of the contentions raised bythe counsel on either side. Suffice it to state thatthe Administrative Tribunal has committed grossesterror in its exercise of the judicial review. Themember of the administrative Tribunal appears tohave no knowledge of the jurisprudence of theservice law and exercised power as if he is anappellate forum dehors the limitation of judicialreview. This is one such instance where a member hadexceeded his power of judicial review in quashingthe suspension order and charges even at thethreshold. We are coming across such ordersfrequently putting heavy pressure on this Court toexamine each case in detail. It is high time thatit is remedied." [Emphasis added]5.4.Very recently, the Supreme Court in its decision reportedin 2007 AIR SCW 1639 [Government of A.P. And others v. V. AppalaSwamy] has held the parameters of interfering with a charge sheeton the ground of delay in paragraphs 10, 12, 13, which read asfollows:Para 10: "So far as the question of delay in concluding thedepartmental proceedings as against a delinquentofficer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard andfast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case mustbe determined on its own facts. The principles uponwhich a proceeding can be directed to be quashed onthe ground of delay are: (1) Where by reason of the delay, the employercondoned the lapses on the part of the employee. (2) Where the delay cause prejudice to theemployee.Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made outby the employee before the Inquiry Officer." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Para 12: "Learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespondent, however, placed strong reliance on adecision of this Court in M.V.Bijlani vs. Union ofIndia & Others (2006 (5) SCC 88). That case wasdecided on its peculiar facts. In that case, eventhe basic material on which a departmentalproceedings could be initiated was absent. Thedepartmental proceedings was initiated after 6 yearsand continued for period of 7 years. In that factsituation, it was held that the appellant thereinwas prejudiced.Para 13: "Bijlani (Supra), therefore, is not an authorityand, in fact, as would appear from the decision inP.D.Agarwal (Supra), for the proposition that onlyon the ground of delay the entire proceedings can bequashed without considering the other relevantfactors therefor." Therefore, in the light of the above, the contentions of thelearned counsel for the petitioners must fail.6.Whether a writ at the stage of show cause notice orcharge-memo is maintainable:-6.1.Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in asmuch as the respondent Corporation had relied upon the reportreceived from the authorities of the Education Department andblindly based their final conclusions upon the said report, theshow cause notices should be quashed. When a show cause noticesuffers from material irregularity, the Courts have power to quashsuch an order and, therefore, this Court should come to the rescueof the petitioners. 6.2.They also relied upon an unreported decision of aDivision Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 3713 of 2003, disposed on11.11.2003. In that case, the Division Bench quashed the orderpassed by the education departmental authorities on the ground thatno opportunity was given to the aggrieved person before cancellingthe mark list. In the present case, it was not a case ofcancellation and it was merely a communication informing therespondent Corporation about the true nature of the certificatesproduced by the petitioners. It is pursuant to the same, theCorporations have issued show cause notices / charge-memos. Insome cases, they have appointed Enquiry Officers also. In someother cases, final dismissal orders have been issued.6.3.In the present batch of cases itself, the Court in theearlier round of litigations (set out in paragraph 4 above) granted https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ liberty to the Corporation to proceed with the enquiries. Theconduct of the petitioners in once again coming with a second roundof litigation even at the stage of show cause notice is highlyreprehensible and it is nothing but a raid on the Court.6.4.Further, the Supreme Court in its decision reported in1987 (2) SCC 179 [State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma and another]dealt with the power of the Court in dealing with a charge memo atthe show-cause stage and the following passage found in paragraph 9will make the position clear.Para 9: "The High Court was not justified in quashing theshow cause notice. When a show cause notice isissued to a government servant under a statutoryprovision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarilythe government servant must place his case beforethe authority concerned by showing cause and thecourts should be reluctant to interfere with thenotice at that stage unless the notice is shown tohave been issued palpably without any authority oflaw. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is toafford opportunity of hearing to the governmentservant and once cause is shown it is open to theGovernment to consider the matter in the light ofthe facts and submissions placed by the governmentservant and only thereafter a final decision in thematter could be taken. Interference by the courtbefore that stage would be premature, the High Courtin our opinion ought not have interfered with theshow cause notice." 6.5.The Supreme Court vide its judgment reported in (2004) 3SCC 440 [Special Director and another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse andanother], in paragraph 5 observed as follows:Para 5: "This Court in a large number of cases has deprecatedthe practice of the High Courts entertaining writpetitions questioning legality of the show causenotices stalling enquiries as proposed and retardinginvestigative process to find actual facts with theparticipation and in the presence of parties.Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non-est in the eye of thelaw for absolute want of jurisdiction of theauthority to even investigate into facts, writpetitions should not be entertained for the mereasking and as a matter of routine, and the writpetitioners should invariably be directed to respondto the show-cause notice and take all standshighlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by therecipient of the notice and such issues also can beadjudicated by the authority issuing the very noticeinitially, before the aggrieved could approach thecourt. Further, when the court passes an interimorder it should be careful to see that the statutoryfunctionaries specially and specifically constitutedfor the purpose are not denuded of powers andauthority to initially decide the matter and ensurethat ultimate relief which may or may not be finallygranted in the writ petition is not accorded to thewrit petitioner even at the threshold by the interimprotection granted." 6.6.Further, the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in(2006) 12 Supreme Court Cases 28 [Union of India and another vs.Kunisetty Satyanarayana] in paragraphs 13 to 16 held as follows:Para 13: "It is well settled by a series of decisions of thisCourt that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer,Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh(1996) 1 SCC 327, Special Director v. Mohd. GhulamGhouse (2004) 3 SCC 440, Ulagappa v. DivisionalCommissioner Mysore (2001) 10 SCC 639, State of U.P.V. Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179, etc. Para 14: The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should notbe entertained against a mere show-cause notice orcharge-sheet is; that at that stage the writpetition may be held to be premature. A merecharge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give riseto any cause of action, because it does not amountto an adverse order which affects the rights of anyparty unless the same has been issued by a personhaving no jurisdiction to do so. It is quitepossible that after considering the reply to theshow-cause notice or after holding an enquiry theauthority concerned may drop the proceedings and/orhold that the charges are not established. It iswell settled that a writ petition lies when someright of any party is infringed. A mere show-causenotice or charge sheet does not infringe the rightof any one. It is only when a final order imposingsome punishment or otherwise adversely affecting aparty is passed, that the said party can be said tohave any grievance. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Para 15: Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction andhence such a discretion under Article 226 should notordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-causenotice or charge-sheet.Para 16: No doubt, in some very rate and exceptional casesthe High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly withoutjurisdiction or for some other reason if it iswholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Courtshould not interfere in such a matter." Therefore, the writ petitions must fail on the ground that thepetitioners have come forward to challenge their disciplinaryactions at the stage of show cause notice.7.Whether the minimum educational qualification prescribedis authorised by law?7.1.The learned counsel for the petitioners thereaftercontended that having passed in the VIII Standard is not aqualification prescribed under the Standing Orders and undoubtedly,all the petitioners are in possession of a Driving Licence whichalone is an essential qualification for a Driver. They have alsogained sufficient experience over the last few years. 7.2.It is not for this Court to go into as to what is theessential qualification. In fact, it is for the employer toprescribe qualification for any post for which they requirecandidates. In the present case, the Board of Directors have madeService Rules and also Board Resolutions prescribing VIII Standardas the minimum qualification. Even when requisitions were sentto the respective Employment Exchanges, these qualifications wereindicated and it is only because the petitioners have claimed tohave such qualification, their names were sponsored. It is onlybecause of that educational qualification, the petitioners haveallegedly produced bogus educational certificates.7.3.The Supreme Court vide its decision in J. Ranga Swamyv. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1990 (1) SCC 288] has held thatit is not for the Court to consider the relevance of qualificationsprescribed for various posts.7.4.In fact, more or less, in an identical circumstance, theSupreme Court had dealt with the case of recruitment of Drivers bythe State of Punjab vide its decision in Bashir Ahmed v. State ofPunjab [(1996) 8 SCC 697]. The relevant passage found inparagraph 3 of the said judgment may be usefully extracted:Para 3:"The learned counsel for the appellants hasstrenuously contended that this Court in B.N. Saxenav. New Delhi Municipal Committee read down the ruleholding that after the initial appointments https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ experience gained for a considerable length of timeis itself a qualification for promotion and,therefore, requirement of further qualification wasbad in law. He also relied upon another judgment inState of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia. Relying thereon, itis contended that the rule prescribing educationalqualifications as one of the qualifications fordirect recruitment must be read down. So read down,since the appellants have the necessary experience,it must be construed to be a qualification forrecruitment. The view taken by the High Court andrecruitment authority is bad in law. We find noforce in that contention. It is seen that for directrecruitment as a driver, the rules prescribe twoqualifications, namely, light vehicle drivinglicence and knowledge of Punjabi language up tomiddle standard. The Rules also prescribe promotionof 10% drivers from the lower rank of cleaner.Therein, it is provided that apart from thequalifications prescribed for direct recruitment,the cleaner also must have an experience of aminimum period of 4 years. We are not concerned withregard to the promotion from the cadre of cleanersto the post of driver within the quota of 10%.Therefore, the question of reading down the ruledoes not arise. We are concerned with the directrecruitment only. The Government in the Rule haveprescribed driving licence and also knowledge ofPunjabi language up to middle standard to be thequalifications. Therefore, anyone who possessesthose qualifications has to be considered forrecruitment. Since, admittedly, the appellants arenot fulfilling the said criteria, the dismissal ofthe writ petition cannot be said to be illegal."[Emphasis added]7.5.Therefore, it is too late for the petitioners to contendthat there was no qualification of producing a certificate forhaving passed in VIII Standard prescribed under the Standing Ordersor that they have put in number of years of service and hence, theyshould be allowed to continue in service.8.What is the procedural requirement of conducting anenquiry in a case of this nature?8.1.The learned counsel for the petitioners contended thatthe educational authorities, before informing the Department,should have heard the petitioners and, therefore, reliance placedupon the communication sent to the Department should be eschewedfor being considered for any further action.8.2.In this context, the Supreme Court vide its decision in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Educationv. K.S. Gandhi and others [(1991) 2 SCC 716] has held that theprinciples of natural justice will depend on the nature of inquiryand the peculiar circumstances of each case. The relevant passagesfound in paragraphs 17, 20 & 21 may be usefully extracted below :-Para 17:"The students involved at the examination ofsecondary education are by and large minors but thatby itself would not be a factor to hold that thestudents were unfairly treated at an inquiryconducted during the domestic inquiry. Assistanceof an advocate to the delinquent at a domesticenquiry is not a part of the principles of naturaljustice. It depend on the nature of the inquiry andthe peculiar circumstances and facts of a particularcase. The regulations and the rules of enquiryspecifically excluded the assistance of an advocateat the inquiry. Therefore, the omission to providethe assistance of a counsel at the inquiry is notviolative of the principles of natural justice. Theshow cause notice furnished wealth of materialparticulars on which the tampering was alleged to befounded and gave the opportunity to each student tosubmit the explanation and also to adduce evidence,oral or documentary at the inquiry. Each studentsubmitted the explanation denying theallegation...."Para 20:"Unless the rule expressly or by necessaryimplications excludes recording of reasons, it isimplicit that the principles of natural justice orfair play does require recording of reasons as apart of fair procedure. In an administrativedecision, its order/decision itself may not containreasons. It may not be the requirement of therules, but at the least, the record should disclosereasons. It may not be like a judgment. But thereasons may be precise. . . . The extent andnature of the reasons would depend on particularfacts and circumstances. What is necessary is thatthe reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicatethat the authority has given due consideration tothe points in controversy. The need for recordingof reasons is greater in a case where the order ispassed at the original stage. The appellate orrevisional authority, if it affirms such anorder,need not give separate reasons. If theappellate or revisional authority disagrees, thereasons must be contained in the order underchallenge."Para 21:"Thus it is settled law that the reasons areharbinger between the mind of the maker of the order https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to the controversy in question and the decision orconclusion arrived at. It also excludes the chancesto reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious decisionor conclusion. The reasons assure an inbuiltsupport to the conclusion/decision reached. Theorder when it affects the right of a citizen or aperson, irrespective of the fact, whether it isquasi-judicial or administrative fair play requiresrecording of germane and relevant precise reasons.The recording of reasons is also an assurance thatthe authority concerned consciously applied its mindto the facts on record. It also aids the appellateor revisional authority or the supervisoryjurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 orthe appellate jurisdiction of this Court underArticle 136 to see whether the authority concernedacted fairly and justly to mete out justice to theaggrieved person."8.3.Further, in identical circumstances, a Division Bench ofthis Court in W.P. No. 19063 of 2004 [P. Sekar v. The Registrar,Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai and others], disposedon 16.02.2008, has held as follows:-Para 5:"Therefore, the contention of the petitioner thatthe enquiry report and the order of punishment arebased on no evidence is not acceptable. In adepartmental enquiry, technical rules of theEvidence Act are not strictly applicable. On behalfof the Department, the letter of the Director ofGovernment Examinations dated 7.11.2001 had beenproduced indicating that the marks reflected in themark sheet submitted by the petitioner did not tallywith the marks available from the original records.The petitioner himself was examined during thedepartmental enquiry and the questions put and theanswers given are available on record. Exceptbaldly stating that the petitioner has got marksheet from the school, there is no other acceptablematerial or detail has been given. It is not eventhe case of the petitioner that he had actuallypassed and the report given by the Director of theGovernment Examinations is incorrect. Since thepetitioner had submitted a mark sheet, which wasfound to be incorrect, it was within the subjectknowledge of the petitioner as to the source ofobtaining such mark sheet and it was for him toexplain such aspect by adducing proper evidence. Tothat extent, the Tribunal was correct in coming tothe conclusion that the charge has been foundagainst him." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9.Whether leniency can be shown by Courts for havingsubmitted fake forged educational certificates at the time ofappointment?9.1.The Supreme Court had answered this issue in many of itsdecisions relating to employments being secured by fraud or deceit.Some of the decisions were also rendered in the context of personsgaining entry with false Community Certificates. 9.2.In Bank of India v. Avinash D. Mandivikar [(2005) 7 SCC690], the Supreme has held in paragraphs 11 and 12 as follows:Para 11:".... Fraud and collusion vitiate even the mostsolemn proceedings in any civilised system ofjurisprudence. This Court in Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkarv. State of Maharashtra dealt with the effect offraud. It was held as follows in the said judgment:(2005 (7) SCC pp. 613-14, paras 12-16)“12. … ‘Fraud is proved when it is shownthat a false representation has been made (i)knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth,or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it betrue or false.’***13. This aspect of the matter has beenconsidered by this Court in Roshan Deen v.Preeti Lal (2002 (1) SCC 100), Ram Preeti Yadavv. U.P. Board of High School and IntermediateEducation (2003 (8) SCC 311), Ram Chandra Singhcase (2003 (8) SCC 319) and Ashok Leyland Ltd.v. State of T.N. (2004 (3) SCC 1).14. Suppression of a material documentwould also amount to a fraud on the court. (SeeGowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust(1996 (3) SCC 1) and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naiducase (1994 (1) SCC 1).)15. ‘Fraud’ is a conduct either by letteror words, which induces the other person orauthority to take a definite determinativestand as a response to the conduct of theformer either by words or letter. Althoughnegligence is not fraud but it can be evidenceon fraud; as observed in Ram Preeti Yadav case.16. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. BeasleyLord Denning observed at QB pp. 712 and 713 :(All ER p. 345-C) (1956) 1 QB 702).‘No judgment of a court, no order ofa minister, can be allowed to stand if ithas been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravelseverything.’ https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ In the same judgment Lord Parker, L.J.observed that fraud vitiates all transactionsknown to the law of however high a degree ofsolemnity. (p. 722)[19]. These aspects were recentlyhighlighted in State of A.P. v. T. SuryachandraRao (2005 (6) SCC 149).”Therefore, mere delayed reference when thefoundation for the same is alleged fraud does not inany way affect the legality of the reference.Para 12:"Looked at from any angle the High Court’s judgmentholding that Respondent 1 employee was to bereinstated in the same post as originally held isclearly untenable. The order of termination does notsuffer from any infirmity and the High Court shouldnot have interfered with it. By giving protectionfor even a limited period, the result would be thata person who has a legitimate claim shall bedeprived the benefits. On the other hand, a personwho has obtained it by illegitimate means wouldcontinue to enjoy it notwithstanding the clearfinding that he does not even have a shadow of righteven to be considered for appointment." 9.3.The Supreme Court in the decision in Ram Saran v. IG ofPolice, CRPF [(2006) 2 SCC 541] observed in paragraphs 9 to 11 asfollows:Para 9: "In R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala it wasobserved as follows: (SCC pp. 116-17, para 19)“19. It was then contended by Shri RanjitKumar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellantthat since the appellant has rendered about 27years of service, the order of dismissal besubstituted by an order of compulsoryretirement or removal from service to protectthe pensionary benefits of the appellant. We donot find any substance in this submission aswell. The rights to salary, pension and otherservice benefits are entirely statutory innature in public service. The appellantobtained the appointment against a post meantfor a reserved candidate by producing a falsecaste certificate and by playing a fraud. Hisappointment to the post was void and non est inthe eye of the law. The right to salary orpension after retirement flows from a valid and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ legal appointment. The consequential right ofpension and monetary benefits can be given onlyif the appointment was valid and legal. Suchbenefits cannot be given in a case where theappointment was found to have been obtainedfraudulently and rested on a false castecertificate. A person who entered the serviceby producing a false caste certificate andobtained appointment for the post meant for aScheduled Caste, thus depriving a genuineScheduled Caste candidate of appointment tothat post, does not deserve any sympathy orindulgence of this Court. A person who seeksequity must come with clean hands. He, whocomes to the court with false claims, cannotplead equity nor would the court be justifiedto exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour.A person who seeks equity must act in a fairand equitable manner. Equity jurisdictioncannot be exercised in the case of a person whogot the appointment on the basis of a falsecaste certificate by playing a fraud. Nosympathy and equitable consideration can cometo his rescue. We are of the view that equityor compassion cannot be allowed to bend thearms of law in a case where an individualacquired a status by practising fraud.”Para 10:Though the case related to a false [caste]certificate, the logic indicated clearly applies tothe present case.Para 11:This is a case which does not deserve any leniencyotherwise it would be giving premium to a person whoadmittedly committed forgery. In the instruction (GONo. 29 of 1993), it has been provided that wheneverit is found that a government servant who was notqualified or eligible in terms of the recruitmentrules, etc. for initial recruitment in service orhad furnished false information or produced a falsecertificate in order to secure appointment shouldnot be retained in service. After inquiry asprovided in Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 ifthe charges are proved, the government servantshould be removed or dismissed from service andunder no circumstances any other penalty should beimposed." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9.4.Further, the Supreme Court in the decision inSuperintendent of Post Offices v. R. Valasina Babu [(2007) 2 SCC335] observed in paragraphs 14 and 15 as follows:Para 14:"The question in regard to the effect of obtainingappointment by producing false certificate came upfor consideration in State of Maharashtra v. RaviPrakash Babulalsing Parmar wherein this Court opinedthat the authorities concerned would havejurisdiction to go into the said question and passan appropriate order. The effect of cancellation ofsuch caste certificate had also been noticed in thelight of a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court inBank of India v. Avinash D. Mandivikar wherein itwas held that if the employee concerned had playedfraud in obtaining an appointment, he should not beallowed to get the benefits thereof, as thefoundation of appointment collapses.Para 15:In this view of the matter, we are of the opinionthat in a case of this nature, it might not havebeen necessary to initiate any disciplinaryproceeding against the respondent."9.5.In Additional General Manager – Human Resource, BharatHeavy Electricals Limited v. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde [(2007) 5SCC 336] once again reiterated the principles laid down in R.Viswanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala [(2007) 5 SCC 336] and thefollowing passage found in paragraph 10 may be usefully extracted: Para 10:"An identical controversy was again examined in R.Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala which is adecision rendered by a Bench of three learnedJudges. The employee in the aforesaid case had gotan appointment in the year 1973 against a postreserved for Scheduled Caste. On complaint, thematter was enquired into and the Scrutiny Committeevide its order dated 18-11-1995 held that he did notbelong to Scheduled Caste and the challenge raisedto the said order was rejected by the High Court andthe special leave petition filed against the saidorder was also dismissed by this Court. He thenfiled a petition before the Administrative Tribunalpraying for a direction not to terminate hisservices which was allowed, but the order wasreversed by the High Court in a writ petition. Theemployee then filed an appeal in this Court. After adetailed consideration of the matter this Courtdismissed the appeal and para 15 of the Report,which is relevant for the decision of the presentcase, is reproduced below: (SCC p. 115) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “15. This apart, the appellant obtainedthe appointment in the service on the basisthat he belonged to a Scheduled Castecommunity. When it was found by the ScrutinyCommittee that he did not belong to theScheduled Caste community, then the very basisof his appointment was taken away. Hisappointment was no appointment in the eye ofthe law. He cannot claim a right to the post ashe had usurped the post meant for a reservedcandidate by playing a fraud and producing afalse caste certificate. Unless the appellantcan lay a claim to the post on the basis of hisappointment he cannot claim the constitutionalguarantee given under Article 311 of theConstitution. As he had obtained theappointment on the basis of a false castecertificate he cannot be considered to be aperson who holds a post within the meaning ofArticle 311 of the Constitution of India.Finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee thatthe appellant got the appointment on the basisof a false caste certificate has become final.The position, therefore, is that the appellanthas usurped the post which should have gone toa member of the Scheduled Castes. In view ofthe finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committeeand upheld up to this Court, he hasdisqualified himself to hold the post. Theappointment was void from its inception.”In the light of the above discussion, the contentions made by thelearned counsel for the petitioners that they should be dealt withleniently must be rejected.10.Alternative remedy must be exhausted:-Even if the enquiries proposed by the respondent Corporationsare conducted in the manner unknown to law, it is for thepetitioners to participate in the same and if any adverse ordersare passed, they cannot move this Court on the basis of any defector irregularity in the enquiry proceedings. The petitioners mustnecessarily raise an industrial dispute against their removal, ifany made, and get their case adjudicated before the Labour Court.This is in view of the fact that the Labour Court, in case, holdsthat the enquiry is vitiated, has got power to summon records fromthe appropriate authorities under Section 11 of the IndustrialDisputes Act and also to examine any person on oath. In thatprocess, the truth or otherwise of the petitioners' educationalqualification will come out and in genuine cases, the petitionerscan get proper relief. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

11.What relief?11.1. In W.P. Nos. 35796 of 2004 and W.P. No. 9992 of2007, the petitioners have already raised an industrial disputewith reference to their non-employment. Therefore, they mustpursue that remedy and both the writ petitions seeking for reliefin parallel forums cannot be countenanced and they are liable to bedismissed.11.2. In respect of other writ petitions, as set out already,the petitioners cannot seek to challenge the charge memo / enquirynotice / second show cause notice and it is for them to givesatisfactory explanation and participate in the enquiry so as toprove their innocence. Hence, those writ petitions are alsoliable to be dismissed.11.3. In that view of the matter, all the writ petitions aredismissed. The petitioners cannot have any interim relief whenthe final relief itself is denied to them. In cases oftermination, there cannot be any relief pending final adjudication.Hence, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed.However, there will be no order as to costs. sd/-Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrargriTo1)The District Educational Officer (General)Cherry RoadSalem2. The Assistant Primary Education Officer,Kadaiyampati, Salem District.3. The Primary Education Officer,Behind District Library,Salem.4. The District Education Officer,Krishnagiri, Dharmapuri District. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5. The District Educational Officer,Namakkal, Namakkal District.6. The District Educational Officer,Salem District.7. The Chief Educational Officer,Salem District.8. The District Educational Officer,Villupuram, Villupuram District.9. The Secretary,Board of Secondary Education,College Road, Chennai.10. The District Educational Officer,Salem District (Near Government Arts College for men)Salem.+1 cc To Mr.C.Kanagaraj, Advocate, SR.26660+1 cc To M.M.Sundresh, Advocate, SR.26681+10 ccs To Mr.S.Ayyathurai, Advocate,SR.26678,26679,26677,26676,26675,26674,26673,26671,26672 and 26680+1 cc To Mr.Sarvabhavman Associates, Advocate, SR.26739W.P. No. 27426 of 2003, etc. batchasm [co]gkg,jjm,sr,rvl,gp km,sra,krd & rvr /14.5