THE HONOURABLE MR v. G.Durai2. The Registrar

the acquittal by the High Court was only by giving "benefit ofdoubt" and inasmuch as the degree of proof in the criminal caseand the domestic enquiry varies to a very large extent, at thethreshold, namely at the stage of issuance of the charge memo, theTribunal ought not to have interfered with the said disciplinaryproceedings. The learned Additional Advocate General relied uponAIR 1976 SC 394 (Delhi Municipality vs. Kacheroo Mal), AIR 1980 SC360 (Delhi Municipality vs. Tek Chand), AIR 1999 SC 1416 (M.PaulAnthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.), AIR 2004 SC 4647 (Management,K.Tea Estates vs. A.B.C.Mazdoor Sangh), 2006 (5) SCC 446 (G.M.Tank vs. State of Gujarat) and 2007 (3) CTC 211 (SC) (NOIDAEnterprises Assn. vs. NOIDA) in support of his submissions.3. As against the above submissions, Mr.Srinivasaraghavan,learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, by relyingupon the decisions reported in 2006 (1) MLJ 146 (Ramasamy,P. vs.Govt. of Tamil Nadu) and 2005 Writ L.R. 314 (State of Tamil Naduand another vs. M.Jayapal and two others), contended that theissue as to whether the departmental proceedings can be proceededwith after the acquittal in the criminal case, has to be examinedstill more elaborately by referring to the matter to a largerBench. The learned counsel, by making reference to the allegationscontained in the charge memo and the criminal Court judgment,contended that the facts being one and the same, the disciplinaryaction cannot be proceeded with. As regards Rule 5(b)(i) of the1955 Rules, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondentcontended that when once the Government took a conscious decisionto file a criminal complaint and the said criminal proceedingsended in the acquittal of the first respondent, it cannot proceedagainst the first respondent by way of disciplinary action.Learned counsel relied upon 1996 (5) SCC 334 (Secretary to Govt.of T.N. vs. D.Subramanyan Rajadevan) in support of his submission.Learned counsel for the first respondent then contended that thefirst respondent was allowed to retire on attaining the age ofsuperannuation on the afternoon of 31.12.2000 by the order dated1.6.2001 by specifically stating that no charges were pendingagainst him on the date of superannuation, and therefore, it isnot now open for the petitioner to invoke Rule 9(2)(a) of theTamil Nadu Pension Rules to proceed against the first respondent.According to the learned counsel, as the conditions contained inRule 9(2)(b) of the Tami Nadu Pension Rules are not specified, thepresent charge memo cannot be proceeded with. 4. The learned counsel for the first respondent alsocontended that there is a statutory bar other than Rule 5(b)(i) ofthe 1955 Rules, in G.O.Ms.No.228, Personnel and AdministrativeReforms (Personnel.J) Department, dated 13.4.1989 read along withG.O.Ms.No.544, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (F.R.III)Department, dated 19.6.1987, wherein an amendment to Rule 54 ofthe Fundamental Rules by way of Ruling No.9 was inserted, whichspecifically provided that a Government servant who issubsequently reinstated in service on his acquittal by the Courteither on merits or on the ground that the charge has not beenproved against him or by giving the benefit of doubt or any other https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ technically ground, he should be paid full pay and allowances bydeeming as not placed under suspension or dismissal or removal orcompulsory retirement from service.5. Yet another contention of the learned counsel appearingfor the first respondent was that under the provision to Rule 17(1)(e)(4) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal)Rules, 1955, there is a statutory bar in proceeding with thedisciplinary action. That apart, according to the learned counsel,by applying the principles of "res-judicata" and "promissoryestoppel" also, the issuance of charge memo cannot be allowed tostand by invoking Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules.6. Learned counsel for the first respondent relied upon thefollowing decisions:Mode of citationName of the parties2005 Writ L.R. 314(Madras High Court)State of Tamil Nadu and another vs.M.Jayapal and 2 othersAIR 1965 Madras 502Shaik Kasim vs. Supdt., Post Offices1971 SLR 743 (Gujarat High Court)Ramsinhji Viraji vs.State of Gujarat1972 SLR 44 (Supreme Court)State of Assam vs. Raghava Rajagopalachari1984 Maharashtra LawJournal 406 (Bombay HighCourt)Dattatraya vs. Director of Agriculture2006 (1) MLJ 146 (Madras High Court) Ramasamy.P. vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu7. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties,at the outset, we wish to deal with the first objection raised onbehalf of the first respondent based on the Division Benchdecisions of this Court reported in 2006 (1) MLJ 146 and 2005 WritL.R. 314 (both cited supra). In the decision reported in 2005 WritL.R. 314, the Division Bench of this Court took the view that thejudgment of criminal Court acquitting the accused by giving thebenefit of doubt cannot be equated to the judgment of acquittal ontechnical grounds, namely for want of sanction or the sanctionaccorded did not fulfil the requirement of law or the prosecutionwas barred by limitation and it cannot be said that the criminalCourt's verdict was on technical grounds and therefore, the chargememo can be proceeded with. The Division Bench held that only insuch cases, where acquittal was on technical grounds, theauthorities are entitled to conduct the departmental enquiry onthe self-same allegations and even in the case of acquittal bygiving the benefit of doubt based on suspicious circumstancesbrought out in evidence, such acquittal cannot be held to be ontechnical ground and therefore, the departmental proceedingscannot be proceeded with. On the other hand, in the decisionreported in 2006 (1) MLJ 146, another Division Bench of this Courtheld that unless the acquittal in the criminal proceedings is an https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ honourable one, it is always open for the department to proceedwith the disciplinary proceedings even after the acquittal by thecriminal Court. In the latter decision (2006 (1) MLJ 146), theDivision Bench went on to hold that the honourable acquittal wouldonly mean acquittal which is free from any doubt.8. In the above context, we wish to be guided by the decisionof the Supreme Court reported in 2006 (5) SCC 446 (cited supra),wherein the only distinction now drawn by the Supreme Court asbetween a departmental action and criminal Court proceedings isthat the departmental action would not lie only if there washonourable acquittal of an employee by the criminal Court. Inother words, if the facts and evidence in the departmental actionas well as criminal proceedings are one and the same, and thecriminal proceedings ended in a clear-cut acquittal, leaving noscope for any doubt, then and then only the departmental actioncannot be proceeded with. In fact, in that decision, a referencehas been made to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reportedin 2005 (7) SCC 764 (Ajit Kumar Nag vs. GM (PJ), Indian OilCorporation Limited), wherein the Supreme Court has clearly setout the distinction between criminal proceedings and thedepartmental action by stating as under in paragraph 11 :" .... The two proceedings, criminal anddepartmental, are entirely different. Theyoperate in different fields and have differentobjectives. Whereas the object of criminaltrial is to inflict appropriate punishment onthe offender, the purpose of enquiryproceedings is to deal with the delinquentdepartmentally and to impose penalty inaccordance with the service rules. In acriminal trial, incriminating statement made bythe accused in certain circumstances or beforecertain officers is totally inadmissible inevidence. Such strict rule of evidence andprocedure would not apply to departmentalproceedings. The degree of proof which isnecessary to order a conviction is differentfrom the degree of proof necessary to recordthe commission of delinquency. The rulerelating to appreciation of evidence in the twoproceedings is also not similar. In criminallaw, burden of proof is on the prosecution andunless the prosecution is able to prove theguilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt',he cannot be convicted by a court of Law. In adepartmental enquiry, on the other hand,penalty can be imposed on the delinquentofficer on a finding recorded on the basis of'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal ofthe appellant by a Judicial Magistrate,therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him fromthe liability under the disciplinaryjurisdiction of the Corporation. We are https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ therefore unable to uphold the contention ofthe appellant that since he was acquitted by acriminal Court, the impugned order dismissinghim from service deserves to be quashed and setaside."In fact, in the above said decision reported in 2006 (5) SCC 446,the Supreme Court framed two questions of law, which reads under:"1. Whether in the case of no evidence,the employee can be dismissed from service?2. Whether acquittal, absolutely onmerits amounting to clear exoneration of theappellant by the Special Court under the PCAct does ipso facto absolve the appellant fromthe liability under the disciplinaryjurisdiction when the charges levelled againstthe appellant in the departmental proceedingsand the criminal proceedings are grounded onthe same set of facts, charges, circumstancesand evidence." (emphasis added)In fact, the Supreme Court went into the evidence at length andultimately held in paragraph 20 of its judgment that, that was acase of no evidence in the criminal case as well as in thedepartmental action. In that decision, the Supreme Court alsoreferred to other decisions reported in AIR 1964 SC 787 (R.P.Kapurvs. Union of India), 1981 (2) SCC 714 (Corpn. Of the City ofNagpur vs. Ramachandra) and 2004 (8) SCC 200 (Krishnakali TeaEstate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh), wherein theSupreme Court reiterated the principle that only in a case wherethere was an honourable acquittal, the departmental proceedings onthe very same set of charges cannot be allowed to go on.9. In the case on hand, the basic allegation against thefirst respondent was that while he was functioning as PersonalAssistant to the Regional Transport Officer, Nagapattinam, on6.7.1989 at about 11.30 a.m., he demanded a sum of Rs.50/- by wayof bribe from one Thiru.Rajaraman and that he accepted the saidsum on 7.7.1989 between 12.15 p.m. and 12.30 p.m. at the RTOOffice, Nagapattinam for releasing an impounded tractor-trailerbelonging to him. According to the petitioner, by virtue of thesaid conduct, the first respondent failed to maintain absoluteintegrity and devotion to duty and thereby contravened theprovisions of Rule 20 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants'Conduct Rules, 1973. The charge memo issued to the firstrespondent was stated to be on 2.6.1999. In the criminal Court, itwas alleged that the above conduct of the first respondent was anoffence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988 and that he indulged in corrupt and illegal means,abusing his official position as a public servant by havingpecuniary advantage and thereby also committed an offence underSection 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, punishable https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ under Section 13(2) of the said Act. In the criminal Court, alongwith the first respondent, the Regional Transport Officer and theOffice Assistant were also tried together in S.C.No.22 of 1990.The trial Court convicted the R.T.O. as well as the firstrespondent herein by imposing punishment of two years' rigorousimprisonment, apart from a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default, toundergo six months' rigorous imprisonment. The Office Assistantwas also convicted and imposed punishment of six months' rigorousimprisonment, apart from a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default toundergo one month rigorous imprisonment. In the appeal preferredby the first respondent in Crl.A.No.634 of 1992, which wasdisposed of along with the appeal preferred by the RTO and theOffice Assistant in Crl.A.No.633 of 1992, a learned single Judgeof this Court has held as under in paragraph 21 of the judgment: "21. .... Taking into consideration of allthe above said facts, I come to theconclusion that the Prosecution has notproved its case against Accused No.2 beyondall reasonable doubt and hence he has got tobe acquitted against the charges levelledagainst him."Again, in paragraph 23, the learned single Judge has held asunder: "23. In view of the discussions madeabove I come to the conclusion that thecharges levelled against the appellants werenot proved beyond reasonable doubts and thefindings of the Trial court are notsatisfactory to punish the accused and thattherefore, I set aside the order passed bythe trial Court."The said judgment of the learned single Judge in Crl.A.Nos.633 and634 of 1992, was rendered on 20.11.1997.10. A perusal of the appellate judgment of this Court inCrl.A.Nos.633 and 634 of 1992 discloses that the learned Judgewanted to give the benefit of doubt in favour of the firstrespondent, as according to the learned Judge, the chargeslevelled against him were not proved to the hilt, in spite of theevidence placed before the Court. The learned Judge has notconcluded in the judgment to the effect that the evidence did notsupport the charges levelled against the first respondent. It wasonly held that in spite of the evidence available on record, itwill have to be held that the benefit of doubt should be extendedto the first respondent and he be held not guilty of the charges.Therefore, the case on hand does not fall under the category of"honourable acquittal", as has been laid down by the Supreme Courtin the recent decisions.11. In the above context, our attention was drawn to anearliest decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported inAIR 1960 Madras 325 (Union of India vs. Jayaram), wherein, His https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Lordship Chief Justice P.V.Rajamannar, speaking for the Bench,while interpreting Article 193(b) of the Civil ServiceRegulations, which used the expression "honourable acquittal", waspleased to observe as under in paragraph 3 of the judgment: "3. ... It is only in this sense thatit was urged that he was not honourablyacquitted. In the first place, we areunable to understand the legalsignificance of an expression like"Honourably acquitted". Certainly, theCode of Criminal Procedure does notsupport this conception. The onus ofestablishing the guilt of accused is onthe prosecution, and, if it failed toestablish the guilt beyond reasonabledoubt, the accused is entitled to beacquitted."12. The above said Division Bench judgment (AIR 1960 Madras325) of this Court was followed by a Division Bench of the GujaratHigh Court in the decision reported in 1971 SLR 743, wherein thelearned Judges of the Gujarat High Court have reiterated inparagraph 7 as under:"7. ... With respect we are in agreementwith the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and inour opinion, it is not open to the authoritiesconcerned to bring in the concept of'honourable acquittal' or full exoneration sofar as the judgment of the Criminal Court isconcerned. In a criminal trial the accused isonly called upon to meet the charge levelledagainst him and he may meet the charge--(a) byshowing that the prosecution case against himis not true or (b) that it is not provedbeyond reasonable doubt; or (c) byestablishing positively that his defenceversion is the correct version and theprosecution version is not correct. In any oneof these three cases, if the Court comes tothe conclusion that the prosecution has failedto establish its case beyond reasonable doubtor that the prosecution case is not true orthat the defence version is correct and is tobe preferred as against the prosecutionversion, the Criminal Court is bound to acquitthe accused. The accused is not called upon inevery case to establish his complete innocenceand it is sufficient for the purposes ofcriminal trial that he satisfies the Courtthat the prosecution has not established itscase beyond reasonable doubt. Since he is notcalled upon to prove a positive case, theconcept of honourable acquittal or full https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ exoneration can have no place in a criminaltrial and it is because of this reasoning thatwe agree with the observations of Rajamannar,C.J., in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad 325." 13. In 1972 SLR 44 (SC) (cited supra), the Supreme Court hadoccasion to consider Fundamental Rule 54 as it stood then, whereinthe expression "honourably acquitted" has been used. While dealingwith F.R.54(a), the Supreme Court has held as under in paragraph8:"8. ... The Note and the AdministrativeInstructions appearing under the Rule seem toshow that the words 'honourably acquitted'mean 'acquitted' of blame or that theGovernment servant has been fully exonerated.This also seem to be the meaning which hasbeen ascribed to this expression in somereported cases. In Robert Stuart Wauchope v.Emperor (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168, Lord Williams,J, observed:- "The expression "honourablyacquitted" is one which is unknown tocourts of justice. Apparently it is aform of order used in courts martialand other extra judicial tribunals.We said in our judgment that weaccepted the explanation given by theappellant believed it to be true andconsidered that it ought to have beenaccepted by the Governmentauthorities and by the magistrate.Further we decided that the appellanthad not misappropriated the moniesreferred to in the charge. It is thusclear that the effect of ourjudgement was that the appellant wasacquitted as fully and completely asit was possible for him to beacquitted. Presumably, this isequivalent to what Governmentauthorities term "honourablyacquitted".In R.P.Kapur V. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC787, Wanchoo,J. as he then was, used theexpression thus:-"Even in case of acquittal,proceedings may follow where theacquittal is other than honourable.""14. Again, in the decision reported in 1984 Maharashtra LawJournal, page 406 (cited supra), the Division Bench of the BombayHigh Court, observed that the concept of "honourable acquittal" or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "full exoneration" may be inappropriate qua the result of acriminal prosecution.15. In yet another decision of this Court reported in AIR1965 Madras 502 (cited supra), His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JusticeM.Anantanarayanan, Officiating Chief Justice, has held as under inparagraph 8: "8. ... Secondly there could be no rigid orinflexible rule that the finding of a criminalcourt is conclusive, in every sense, uponAdministrative Authorities. If the finding ispurely a technical acquittal, theAdministrative Authority may conceivablypunish, on the same facts. It can certainlypunish where the acquittal is solely based onlack of sanction or some technical defect inprocedure. It could punish, on the same facts,for some lesser charge, which may not amountto a criminal offence, but may well amount tograve dereliction of duty, entitlingdisciplinary action. For instance, a school-master may be acquitted of a charge of rapealleged to have been committed against a girl-student in his care. But that cannot precludethe departmental authority, upon those veryfacts, from punishing him for graveimpropriety in his relationships with thegirl-students, which disentitles him to thatoffice. .... "16. Learned counsel for the first respondent also contendedthat the Black's Law Dictionary (abridged Fifth Edition) meaningof "acquittal", is "judicial discharge of an accused from theaccusation". Similarly, the extract of the Law Lexicon byRamanatha Iyer as to the expression "reasonable doubt" states thatsuch doubt would justify and require an acquittal, must be as tothe guilt of the accused when the whole of the evidence isconsidered, and not as to any particular fact in the case.17. Learned counsel for the first respondent submitted thatapplying the above principles, it should be held that when thefirst respondent was acquitted by this Court in the CriminalAppeal, by holding that the guilt was not proved beyond allreasonable doubt, it would only mean a full-fledged acquittal,free from any doubt. Learned counsel therefore contended thatafter such acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner cannotbe permitted to proceed against the first respondent by way ofdisciplinary action.18. When we consider the above submissions of the learnedcounsel for the first respondent, in the first instance, in theearlier decision of this Court reported in AIR 1960 Madras 325 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (cited supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that there isno legal significance of the expression "honourable acquittal",which principle was applied and re-stated by the various HighCourts and the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in 1971 SLR743 (Gujarat High Court), 1972 SLR 44 (Supreme Court) and 1984Maharashtra Law Journal page 406 (Bombay High Court). Since evenin the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2006 (5)SCC 446 (cited supra), the Supreme Court itself has chosen to usethe expression "honourable acquittal" and bound as we are by thedecision of the Supreme Court, we feel that a distinction has tobe necessarily drawn as between the case where the acquittal wasdue to insufficient or no evidence, whereby the competent Courtdecides to order acquittal by granting the benefit of doubt infavour of the accused and a case where inspite of the evidencebeing let in to the full extent, but yet no guilt is made out andthereby the accused is to be let off or comes out unscathed fromthe charges levelled against him.19. In fact, in certain decisions of the Supreme Courtreferred to above reported in 2006 (5) SCC 446, AIR 1964 SC 787,1981 (2) SCC 714, 2004 (8) SCC 200 and 2005 (7) SCC 764, theSupreme Court has consciously referred to the above distinction byusing the expression "honourable acquittal", which results incomplete exoneration of the charges, where and where alone itwould not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on thevery same charges or grounds or evidence. 20. We also wish to make a reference to the recent decisionof the Supreme Court reported in 2007 (3) CTC 211 (SC), whereinthe Supreme Court has explained as to how a criminal prosecutionand the departmental enquiry travel on two different planes.Paragraph 16 of that judgment is relevant for our present purpose,which reads as under: "16. The purpose of Departmental Enquiry andof prosecution is two different and distinctaspects. The Criminal prosecution is launchedfor an offence for violation of a duty theoffender owes to the society, or for breach ofwhich law has provided that the offender shallmake satisfaction to the public. So crime isan act of commission in violation of law or ofomission of public duty. The Departmentalenquiry is to maintain discipline in theservice and efficiency of public service. Itwould, therefore, be expedient that theDisciplinary proceedings are conducted andcompleted as expeditiously as possible. It isnot, therefore, desirable to lay down anyguidelines as inflexible rules in which theDepartmental proceedings may or may not bestayed pending trial in Criminal case againstthe delinquent officer. Each case requires tobe considered in the backdrop of its own factsand circumstances. There would be no bar to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ proceed simultaneously with Departmentalenquiry and trial of a Criminal case unlessthe charge in the Criminal Trial is of gravenature involving complicated questions of factand law. Offence generally impliesinfringement of public duty, as distinguishedfrom mere private rights punishable underCriminal law. When trial for criminal offenceis conducted it should be in accordance withproof of the offence as per the evidencedefined under the provisions of the IndianEvidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'EvidenceAct'). Converse is the case of Departmentalenquiry. The enquiry in a Departmentalproceedings relates to conduct or breach ofduty of the delinquent officer to punish himfor his misconduct defined under the relevantstatutory rules or law. That the strictstandard of proof or applicability of theEvidence Act stands excluded is a settledlegal position. Under these circumstances,what is required to be seen is whether theDepartment enquiry would seriously prejudicethe delinquent in his defence at the trial ina Criminal case. It is always a question offact to be considered in each case dependingon its own facts and circumstances." 21. Apart from the above decisions cited before us, inrespect of the RTO who was also proceeded against along with thefirst respondent and another Office Assistant in the criminalcase, the Tribunal interfered with the charge memo issued to theRTO. The Writ Petition was preferred by the State Governmentchallenging the order of the Tribunal, which was decided by theDivision Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 2002(III) L.L.J. 66 (State of T.N. vs. H.A.Munaff) and the saiddecision was challenged by the RTO before the Supreme Court inCivil Appeal Nos.2674-2676 of 2004, which was disposed of by theSupreme Court by order dated 26.9.2006 after notice to the Stateof Tamil Nadu. At this juncture, we only refer and rely on thesaid decision to hold that the departmental action as against thefirst respondent can be proceeded with and the same does not callfor any interference. We propose to deal with the said order indetail at the appropriate place where we consider the contentionbased on Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules. 22. Having regard to the dicta of the Supreme Court in thevarious decisions, where stress has been laid on the expression"honourable acquittal", which according to the Supreme Court, isthe total exoneration of the charges, we hold that such adistinction has necessarily to be maintained while dealing withthe cases where the Courts have to examine whether after acquittalof the delinquent in the criminal proceedings, the employer can bepermitted to proceed with the departmental action based on such https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ acquittal.23. Therefore, in the light of the said consistent rulings ofthe Supreme Court, we prefer to apply the said principles set outin the various decisions of the Supreme Court, which propositionhas been stressed in the various decisions of this Court and otherHigh Courts, and hold that unless there is honourable acquittal orcomplete exoneration of charges, the departmental proceedingscannot be stultified and that since in the case on hand, theacquittal by this Court in Crl.A.No.634 of 1992 was on the footingthat the prosecution has not proved its case beyond all reasonabledoubt, we hold that such acquittal cannot be equated to a case ofhonourable acquittal, as held in the various decisions of theSupreme Court and therefore, merely based on the said acquittalordered by this Court in Crl.A.NO.634 of 1992, the departmentalaction cannot be stopped. 24. With this, when we consider the next submission of thelearned counsel for the first respondent, according to the learnedcounsel for the first respondent, there is a statutory embargo forthe petitioner-State to proceed against the first respondent inthe light of the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu CivilServices (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1955. Learnedcounsel contended that under Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules, it isfor the Government after examining the records and afterconsulting the Head of the Department concerned to decide whetherthe case should be tried in a Court of law or by the Tribunal orby the departmental authority concerned. By referring to Rule 4(1)and (2) of the 1955 Rules, learned counsel for the firstrespondent contended that the reference to be made to the Tribunalwas always subject to the provisions of Rule 5 of the 1955 Rulesand since under Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules, the Governmentshould decide whether the case should be referred to a Court oflaw or the Tribunal or the departmental authority concerned, andthe Government having chosen to try the first respondent in aCourt of Law by launching a criminal prosecution, which has endedin acquittal, it is not open for the petitioner-State to takerecourse by way of disciplinary action.25. In fact, the above said contention of the learned counselfor the first respondent has found favour with the Tribunal,which has countenanced the said plea by holding that recourse todepartmental proceedings after acquittal by the Criminal court,cannot be permitted. In the first blush, though the contention ofthe learned counsel for the first respondent really appears to besound, but when we heard learned Additional Advocate General, wefind that such a contention of the first respondent cannot beaccepted for more than one reason. Learned Additional AdvocateGeneral in his contentions, submitted that invocation of Rule 4 orRule 5 of the 1955 Rules itself would come into play only if theState Government chooses to make a reference to Tribunal underRule 4 of the 1955 Rules. According to the learned AdditionalAdvocate General, application of Rule 5 itself would not getattracted. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

26. In the case on hand, the impugned charge sheet dated2.6.1999 has been issued under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu CivilServices (Discipline and Appeal) Rules on the allegation that thefirst respondent failed to maintain absolute integrity anddevotion to duty and thereby, contravened the provisions of Rule20 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1973. Forinitiation of such proceedings under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil NaduCivil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, read along withRule 20 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants' Conduct Rules,1973, the invocation of the 1955 Rules is not required. To put itdifferently, it will have to be held that the 1955 Rules wouldoperate independently vis-a-vis the Tamil Nadu Civil Services(Discipline and Appeal) Rules read along with the Tamil NaduGovernment Servants' Conduct Rules, 1973. When such an approach ismade, while referring to Rule 5 of the 1955 Rules, as rightlycontended by the learned Additional Advocate General, it cansafely be held that the embargo as propounded by the learnedcounsel for the first respondent by relying upon Rule 5(b)(i) ofthe 1955 Rules, will never come into play.27. The above said conclusion of ours is fortified by thefact that for the purpose of invoking Rule 5 of the 1955 Rules,the first step has to be necessarily made by invoking Rule 4 ofthe 1955 Rules. Therefore, unless the Government wants to make areference to the Tribunal under the 1955 Rules, as provided underRule 4, the question of invoking Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rulesdoes not arise.28. The next submission of the learned Additional AdvocateGeneral is that the expression "or" used in Rule 5(b)(i) of the1955 Rules, as between the expression "Court of law" and theexpression "by the Tribunal" is only an enabling provision and nota disjunctive prohibitive provision. According to the learnedAdditional Advocate General, any other contention would renderRule 5 of the 1955 Rules, itself unconstitutional. Elaborating hissubmissions, the learned Additional Advocate General pointed outthat if the expression "or" as between "Court of law" and theexpression "by the Tribunal" are given their literal meaning, andin the event of the State having chosen to make a reference to theTribunal, even in extreme cases where the criminal prosecution iswarranted, having regard to the nature of conduct indulged in bythe delinquent, such a prosecution cannot be launched, havingregard to the prohibitive nature of the construction of theexpression "or" contained in Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules.29. We find force in the said submission of the learnedAdditional Advocate General and we do visualise in a case where aGovernment servant indulging in serious criminal offence ofcausing grievous injury by using a weapon inside the work placeand if the disciplinary authority decided to refer the issue tothe Tribunal, the delinquent concerned can contend that havingregard to the reference made, the prosecution itself cannot belaid before the Court of law by strict application of Rule 5(b)(i) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the 1955 Rules. Such a far reaching consequence would havenever been contemplated by the Rule makers while framing Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules as that would be against public interest anddestructive one. Moreover, such a prohibitive provision fromlaunching of prosecution in a Court of law can never be approvedof under a Rule as against the statutory provision contained inthe criminal law system. 30. We are therefore in full agreement with the contention ofthe learned Additional Advocate General that the disjunctiveexpression "or" can only be read by this Court as "and" as between"Court of law" and "by the Tribunal" to give life and make theprovision real and meaningful one. In this context, the decisionrelied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General reported inAIR 1976 SC 394 (cited supra) and AIR 1980 SC 360 (cited supra)can be usefully referred to.31. In the former case (AIR 1976 SC 394), the Supreme Court,while dealing with Section 2(i)(f) of the Prevention of FoodAdulteration Act, held as under in paragraphs 6(A) and 7:"6.A. The relevant part of Section 2 readsas under:"(i) "adulterated"--an article of foodshall be deemed to be adulterated--(a) to (e) .... .... ....(f) if the article consists wholly or inpart of any filthy, putrid, disgusting, rotten,decomposed or diseased animal or vegetablesubstance or is insect infested or is otherwiseunfit for human consumption".7. The phrase "or is otherwise unfit forhuman consumption" can be read conjunctively aswell as disjunctively. If it is readconjunctively, that is, in association withwhat precedes it, sub-clause(f) with slightconsequent rearrangement and parenthesis wouldread like this: "If the article is unfit forhuman consumption on account of (a) itsconsisting wholly or in part of any filthy,putrid, disgusting, rotten, decomposed ordiseased animal or vegetable substance or beinginsect infested, (b) or on account of any othercause." In this view of the sub-clause proof of'unfitness of the article for humanconsumption', is a must for bringing the casewithin its purview." 32. However, the said decision (AIR 1976 SC 394) wassubsequently distinguished by the Supreme Court in the decisionreported in AIR 1980 SC 360. The Supreme Court however made itclear that the statement of law as laid down in AIR 1976 SC 394should be confined to particular facts of that case in the light https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of Rule 48-B of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, whichcame to be introduced subsequently after the Act came into force.33. In the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 2328 (Union ofIndia vs. Sankalchand), the Constitution Bench of the SupremeCourt has made it clear in paragraph 55 as under: "55. .... The literal construction shouldnot obsess the Court, because it has onlyprima facie preference, the real object ofinterpretation being to find out the trueintent of the law maker and that can be doneonly by reading the statute as an organicwhole, with each part throwing light on theother and bearing in mind the rule inHeydon's case (1854) 76 ER 637 which requiresfour things to be "discerned and considered"in arriving at the real meaning: (1) what wasthe law before the Act was passed; (2) whatwas the mischief or defect for which the lawhad not provided; (3) what remedy Parliamenthas appointed; and (4) the reason of theremedy. There is also another Rule ofinterpretation which is equally well settledand which seems to follow as a necessarycorollary, namely, where the words,according to their literal meaning "producean inconsistency, or an absurdity orinconvenience so great as to convince theCourt that the intention could not have beento use them in their ordinary signification",the Court would be justified in "putting onthem some other signification, which, thoughless proper, is one which the Court thinksthe words will bear. Vide River War Commrs.vs. Adamson, (1877) 2 AC 743. ..." Again in paragraph 84, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Courtmade a reference to the case of Hutton vs. Phillips (45 Del. 156 :70 A 2d 15 (1949) ), which reads as under:"84. In Hutton v. Phillips, the SupremeCourt of Delaware threw useful light on theuse of contextual and environmental backgroundto correct construction of statutes:"...(Interpretation) involves farmore than picking out dictionarydefinition of words or expressionsused. Consideration of the contextand the setting is indispensableproperty to ascertain a meaning.Insaying that a verbal expression isplain or unambiguous, we meanlittle more than that we areconvinced that virtually anyonecompetent to understand it, and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ desiring fairly and impartially toascertain its signification, wouldattribute to the expression in itscontext a meaning such as the onewe derive, rather than any other;and would consider any differentmeaning, by comparison, strained,or far-fetched, or unusual, orunlikely..... Implicit in the finding of aplain, clear meaning of anexpression in its context, is afinding that such meaning isrational and 'makes sense' in thatcontext." (45 Del. 156 : 70 A 2d 15(1949) )." In the same paragraph 84, the Constitution Bench relied on thedecision of the A.P.Green Export Co. vs. United States, (284 F. 2d383, 386) (Dickerson, p.137), and the Constitution Bench held asunder:"An explanatory tale should not wag astatutory dog" (Attributed to Jones C.J. inA.P.Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 386) (Dickerson, p.137). True. But'the meaning of some words in a statute may beenlarged or restricted in order to harmonizethem with the legislative intent of the entirestatute .. It is the spirit .... of thestatute which should govern over the literalmeaning ...." 34. In the above context, the recent decision of the SupremeCourt reported in 2005 (5) SCC 420 (Prof.Yashpal vs. State ofChattisgarh) can also be usefully referred to. In that decision,the Supreme Court has stated as to under what circumstances, theexpression "or" can be read as "and", which reads as under:"59. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi has alsosubmitted that insofar as private universitiesare concerned, the word "or" occurring in theexpression "established or incorporated" inSections 2(f), 22 and 23 of the UGC Act shouldbe read as "and". He has submitted that thenormal meaning of the word "established" is tobring into existence and in order to avoid thesituation which has been created by theimpugned enactment where over 112 universitieshave come into existence within a short periodof one year of which many do not have any kindof infrastructure or teaching facility, itwill be in consonance with the constitutionalscheme that only after establishment of thebasic requisites of a university (classrooms,library, laboratory, offices and hostel https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ facility, etc.) that it should be incorporatedand conferred a juristic personality. The word"or" is normally disjunctive and "and" isnormally conjunctive but at times they areread vice versa to give effect to the manifestintentions of the legislature, as disclosedfrom the context. If literal reading of theword produces an unintelligble or absurdresult, "and" may be read for "or" and "or"may be read for "and". (See Principles ofStatutory Interpretation by G.P.Singh, 7thEdn., p.339 and also State of Bombay v.R.M.D.Chamarbaugwala, (1957 SCR 874 : AIR 1957SC 699) AIR at p.709 and Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v.CIT, 1959 SCR 848 : AIR 1958 SC 861). We areof the opinion that having regard to theconstitutional scheme and in order to ensurethat the enactment made by Parliament, namely,the University Grants Commission Act is ableto achieve the objective for which it has beenmade and UGC is able to perform its duties andresponsibilities, and further that the Stateenactment does not come in conflict with theCentral legislation and create any hindranceor obstacle in the working of the latter, itis necessary to read the expression"established or incorporated" as "establishedand incorporated" insofar as the privateuniversities are concerned."35. We can also usefully refer to Maxwell's "Interpretationof Statutes" at page 228, which reads as under: "Common Sense""Notwithstanding the general rule thatfull effect must be given to every word, yetif no sensible meaning can be given to aword or phrase, (Yorkshire Fire and LifeInsurance Co. v. Clayton (1881) 8 Q.B.D.421) or if it would defeat the real objectof the enactment, it may, or rather itshould, be eliminated (Lyde v. Barnard(1836) 1 M.&W. 115, per Lord Abinger; Stonev. Yeovil (1876)1 C.P.D. 701, per Brett,J.;though in that case the elimination was notnecessary, and where elimination isunnecessary there is no power to delete; seeibid., on appeal (1876)2 C.P.D. 99)). Thewords of a statute must be construed so asto give a sensible meaning to them ifpossible. They ought to be construed ut resmagis valeat quam pereat. (Curtis v. Stovin(1889) 22 Q.B.D. 513, per Bowen L.J.; TheDuke of Buccleuch (1889) 15 P.D. 86, perLindley L.J.; R. v. Bishop of Oxford (1879) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 4 Q.B.D. 245, and the reversing judgment, 4Q.B.D. 525; Att.-Gen. v. Beauchamp (1920) 1K.B. 650. See also Whitney v. I.R.C. (1926)A.C. 37 at p.52 per Lord Dunedin, and theForeword to this work). Again at page 229, it is stated as under: "The Conjunctions "or" and "and" "To carry out the intention of thelegislature, it is occasionally foundnecessary to read the conjunctions "or" and"and" one for the other. The Disabled SoldiersAct, 1601 (c.3) (repealed by S.L.R. Act, 1863(c.125)), for instance, in speaking ofproperty to be employed for the maintenance of"sick and maimed soldiers," referred tosoldiers who were either the one "or" theother, and not only to those who were both.(Duke, Charit. Uses 127. Cf. R. v. BrixtonPrison Governor, ex p. Bidwell ((1937) 1 K.B.305 ) )."At page 230, it is interpreted by Maxwell as under:"The Bankrupts Act, 1603 (c.15) (Repealed,Bankrupts (England) Act, 1825 (c.16), S.1 )which made it an act of bankruptcy for a traderto leave his dwelling-house "to the intent, or,whereby his creditors might be defeated ordelayed," if construed literally, would haveexposed to bankruptcy every trader who left hishome even for an hour, if a creditor calledduring his absence for payment. This absurdconsequence was avoided and the real intentionof the legislature was beyond reasonable doubteffected by reading "or" as "and" so that anabsence from home was an act of bankruptcy onlywhen coupled with the design of delaying ordefeating creditors. (Fowler v. Padget (1798) 7T.R. 509; R. v. Mortlake (1805) 6 East 397. Seenow Bankruptcy Act, 1914 (c.59), S.1 (1)(d))."Again at page 231, Maxwell interpreted as follows:"It has been said that in a penal statute"or" should only be changed into "and" or viceversa if the result is more favourable to thesubject, but there is no rule of law to thateffect (R. v. Oakes (1959) 2 All.E.R. 92)"36. In the light of the above proposition of law laid down bythe Supreme Court as well as explained in the renowned bookauthored by "Maxwell" in "Interpretation of Statutes", we cansafely conclude that even if it were to be held that Rule 5(b)(i)of the 1955 Rules will get attracted under all circumstances, in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ order to rule out the possibility of any absurdity as explained inthe earlier paragraphs of this judgment, we are of the view thatin Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules, the expression "or" between thewords "Court of law or by the Tribunal", has to be necessarilyread as "and". If the said provision is read in the said fashion,it will be couched in the following manner: "5(b)(i): Notwithstanding anythingcontained in rule 4, the Government shallafter consulting the head of the departmentconcerned, if necessary, decide whether thecase shall be tried in a Court of law and bythe Tribunal or by the departmental authorityconcerned."37. It may be that if the State prefers to make a referenceto the Tribunal under the 1955 Rules, there would be no necessityfor taking recourse to departmental action for one and the sameconduct. However, launching of the prosecution would not certainlyresult in deprivation of action to be taken either by making areference to the Tribunal or by way of disciplinary action. Wetherefore hold that such a construction alone would make theprovision meaningful and enforceable. Any other construction aspropounded by the learned counsel for the first respondent woulddefeat the very purpose of the Rules, which cannot be acceded to.38. It is relevant to note that along with the firstrespondent, the Regional Transport Officer was also prosecuted,who was also governed by the very same common judgment inCrl.A.Nos.633 and 634 of 1992, under which the acquittal came tobe ordered. The question whether after acquittal ordered inCrl.A.No.633 of 1992 dated 20.11.1997 where the RTO can beproceeded against by way of departmental action, came up forconsideration in the decision of a Division Bench of this Courtreported in 2002 (III) LLJ 66 (State of Tamil Nadu vs.H.A.Munaff), in which, one of us (F.M.Ibrahim Kalifula,J) was amember, and after elaborate discussion on the issue concerned,ultimately it was held that the departmental proceedings initiatedby the issuance of charge sheet dated 30.11.1998 should be allowedto be proceeded with in order to find out whether the misconductlevelled against the RTO is made out. The order of the Tribunal inhaving quashed the charge sheet was set aside by the DivisionBench of this Court in the said decision. In fact, in thatdecision, one of the arguments centred around the question ofdelay of 11 years involved in issuance of the charge sheet. Inparagraph 30 of the said judgment, the Division Bench held thatthe criminal proceedings came to be concluded only after thedisposal of the Criminal Appeal in the judgment dated 20.11.1997and inasmuch as the charge sheet came to be issued in November1998, it cannot be held that the said period can be construed asan extraordinary delay and on that ground to be interfered withthe issuance of the charge sheet. It was submitted by learnedcounsel for the first respondent that as against the above saidDivision Bench decision of this Court reported in 2002 (III) LLJ66, when appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court, the same https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ was dismissed on 26.9.2006 in Civil Appeal No.2674-2676 of 2004. 39. Though the very same learned counsel who is appearing forthe first respondent in this Writ Petition, appeared for the RTOalso, which has resulted in the dismissal of the Civil Appealsbefore the Supreme Court and the learned counsel for the firstrespondent took substantial time of this Court by referring tovarious decisions on the interpretation of Rule 5(b)(i) of the1955 Rules, to our dismay, the order of the Supreme Court dated26.9.2006 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.2674-2676 of 2004 was notplaced before us. After all, learned counsel appearing for theparties, as Officers of the Court, are expected to assist theCourt in arriving at a just conclusion and also as expeditiouslyas possible. Since it was submitted by the learned counselappearing for the first respondent before us that he was aware ofthe filing of the Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court and thatthe same was not entertained by the Supreme Court, though finalorder of the Supreme Court was not placed before us, in order tofind out the outcome in that case, we directed the Registry toplace the copy of the order of the Supreme Court, dated 26.9.2006passed in Civil Appeal Nos.2674-2676 of 2004. On a perusal of theorder of the Supreme Court, we find that the very same contentionswere raised before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Courtdeclined to entertain all those submissions. The very firstcontention raised therein was about the setting aside of theconviction by this Court in the judgment dated 20.11.1997 inCrl.A.Nos.633 and 634 of 1992 and that therefore, by virtue ofRule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules, the Government can either proceedwith the departmental proceedings or it can be tried in thecriminal Court or by the Tribunal and that the Department havingchosen to approach the criminal Court, it was not permissible toinitiate the departmental proceedings by issuing the charge memo.The said contention was straightaway rejected by holding that theacquittal in the criminal Court would not debar the appropriateGovernment to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against thedelinquent officer. The Supreme Court, while rejecting the saidcontention, has stated as under:"... Rule 5(b)(i) referred to by thecounsel for the appellant, does not inhibitthe Government from initiating thedepartmental proceedings against theappellant. Rule 5(b)(i) therefore, is of noassistance to the appellant." Thus, the very contention based on Rule 5(b)(i) of the 1955 Rules,having been rejected by the Supreme Court in the connected case,there is no scope for the first respondent to raise the saidcontention once over, again to be dealt with by this Court. Inother words, that contention is squarely covered by the abovereferred to order of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.2674-2676 of 2004, dated 26.9.2006.40. The next contention raised in those Civil Appeals wasthat the appellant therein was acquitted in the criminal case https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ honourably and therefore, it was impermissible to prove the chargeissued against him. Reliance was placed upon the decision reportedin 2006 (5) SCC 446 (G.M.Tank vs. State of Gujarat). The very samecontention has now been raised by the first respondent herein inthis Writ Petition. While dealing with the said contention, theSupreme Court, after referring to the two questions framed by theSupreme Court in the decision reported in 2006 (5) SCC 446 (citedsupra), held that those questions are not relevant in the facts ofthe case at hand, that it was not a case where the appellant wasdismissed from service even when there was no evidence against himin a criminal Court and that as already noted therein, theappellant therein was acquitted by the High Court by giving himthe benefit of doubt and not acquittal on merits. The SupremeCourt in its order dated 26.9.2006 in Civil Appeal Nos.2674-2676of 2004, therefore ultimately held that the decision reported in2006 (5) SCC 446 (cited supra), was distinguishable on facts andtherefore, the same is not applicable to the appellant therein. Asthe first respondent herein is in all respects, identically placedlike that of the appellant before the Supreme Court in CivilAppeal Nos.2674-2676 of 2004, the said decision applies on allfours to the facts of this case. 41. Therefore, we are convinced that the Tribunal was notjustified in having set aside the charge memo on the sole groundthat the criminal prosecution ended in acquittal by giving benefitof doubt and that since the State had preferred to launch acriminal prosecution, the departmental proceedings cannot beproceeded with.42. At this juncture, we wish to deal with one of thecontentions raised on behalf of the first respondent that for theincident which took place in the year 1989, the first respondentshould not be proceeded with by way of issuance of charge memo inthe year 1999. It was also pointed out that after the order ofthe Tribunal dated 20.12.2000, setting aside the charge memo, thefirst respondent was allowed to retire on superannuation on31.12.2000 afternoon. The learned counsel for the first respondentpointed out that by proceedings dated 31.12.2000, the firstrespondent was relieved of his duties on attaining the age ofsuperannuation. It was also pointed out that by proceedings dated1.6.2001, the Transport Commissioner directed the RTO,Ramanathapuram to take action to draw and disburse the pensionarybenefits admissible to the first respondent. It is thereforecontended that having regard to such subsequent development, thecharge memo issued on 2.6.1999 should not be proceeded with. 43. Under Rule 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, anydepartmental proceedings initiated at a time when the delinquentwas in service, can be proceeded with by the authority by whichsuch proceedings were commenced, in the same manner as if theGovernment servant had continued in service. By virtue of Rule 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, there is no impediment forthe petitioner-State to proceed with the departmental action for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ its logical conclusion. Therefore, the contention of the learnedcounsel for the first respondent that the first respondent wasallowed to retire on reaching the age of superannuation andtherefore, the charge memo should not be proceeded with, cannot beaccepted.44. The contention of the first respondent by relying uponG.O.Ms.No.228, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (Personnel.J)Department, dated 13.4.1989 and G.O.Ms.No.544, Personnel andAdministrative Reforms (F.R.III) Department, dated 19.6.1987, readalong with the amended Fundamental Rules in F.R.54 by way ofRuling No.9 therein, is concerned, we hold that the saidcontention is totally inappropriate to the case on hand. The saidGovernment Orders as well as the amended F.R.54 by way of RulingNo.9 therein, only concern the consequence as regards the paymentto be made in the event of a Government servant subsequentlyreinstated in service based on the decision of the Governmentafter his acquittal. In fact, the provision contained in the abovereferred to G.Os. as well as amended F.R.54 by way of Ruling No.9therein, is to the effect that the period of suspension ordismissal or removal or compulsory retirement from service, shouldbe deemed to have not been there after the State Governmentdecided to reinstate the Government servant based on his acquittalin the criminal proceedings. In the case on hand, we are notfacing such a situation in order to apply the consequences of theabove referred to G.Os. as well as amended F.R.54 by way of RulingNo.9. Therefore, the submission made based on the above referredto G.Os. and amended F.R.54 by way of Ruling No.9, is totallymisconceived and the same is rejected. 45. As far as the plea of "promissory estoppel" is concerned,it is well settled that there could be no estoppel against astatute. We reject the said contention at the threshold and wehold that having regard to Rule 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu PensionRules, which enables the State to proceed with the departmentalaction even after the retirement, there is no question of"estoppel" as against the petitioner-State.46. As far as the plea of 'res-judicata' is concerned, we arenot able to appreciate the contention at all to the case on hand.In order for the principle of res-judicata to apply, the matter inissue should be directly and substantially in issue in formerproceedings before a forum which is equal in status in allrespects to the latter and that such issue should be as betweenthe same parties, which issue has been heard and finally decidedin the former proceedings. By raising the plea of res-judicata,the learned counsel for the first respondent wants to compare thecriminal Court verdict with that of the present charge memo issuedby the petitioner.47. In the above context, it will be more appropriate torefer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR2004 SC 4647 (Management, K.Tea Estates vs. A.B.C.Mazdoor Sangh).The Supreme Court in that case dealt with a case where it was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ contended that the Labour Court dealt with a dispute relating tothe non-employment of a workman, the basis of such non-employmentwas the misconduct which was also tried in a Criminal Court,wherein it was contended that in view of the honourable acquittalby the criminal Court, the Labour Court ought not to have brushedaside the finding of the Criminal Court. In fact, in the criminalCourt verdict, it was specifically stated to the effect that,"Absolutely in the evidence on record of the prosecution witnessesI have found nothing against the accused persons. The prosecutiontotally fails to prove the charges under Sections 147, 353, 329,IPC." But yet, the Supreme Court took the view that the approachand objectives of the criminal proceedings and the disciplinaryproceedings are altogether distinct and different and that eventhe Labour Court was not bound by the findings of the criminalCourt. The Supreme Court by referring to its earlier decision inreported in AIR 1997 SC 13 (State of Rajasthan vs. B.K.Meena andothers), pointed out that the approach and objectives in thecriminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings beingdistinct and different, inasmuch as in the disciplinaryproceedings, the question is whether the delinquent is guilty ofsuch conduct as would merit his removal from service or lesserpunishment as the case may be, whereas in the criminalproceedings, the question is whether the offence registeredagainst him under the relevant Act is established and ifestablished, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The SupremeCourt reiterated that the standard of proof, mode of enquiry andthe Rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases areentirely distinct and different. Therefore, there is no questionof extending the principle of "res-judicata" in the case of adisciplinary action vis-a-vis the criminal proceedings. 48. Since we do not find any merit in any of the contentionsraised on behalf of the first respondent and as we are convincedthat the Tribunal was not justified in setting aside the chargememo dated 2.6.1999, for the various reasons set out above, theWrit Petitioner-State is bound to succeed in this Writ Petition.49. Before concluding, we are constrained to state that butfor the action of the first respondent in having approached theTribunal by questioning the charge memo at its very inception ofinitiation, it would not have dragged on upto this stage.Therefore, for the subsequent delay between 1999 and this date,the first respondent has to be solely held responsible fordragging on the proceedings. The first respondent having beenproceeded for a serious misconduct of corruption attracting Rule20 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants' Conduct Rules, where theintegrity and honesty of the first respondent in the course ofdischarge of his duties as a public servant had to be examined, weare of the view that the first respondent was hell-bent to somehowor other drag on the proceedings to his advantage and therebyfrustrate the whole proceedings. Such an attempt of the firstrespondent is bound to be condemned with an iron hand. Therefore,even while allowing this Writ Petition and setting aside theimpugned order of the Tribunal and by restoring the impugned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ charge memo, we direct the petitioner-State to expedite thedisciplinary proceedings and conclude the same expeditiouslypreferably within three months from the date of receipt of a copyof this order. Further, as we have held that the first respondentwas squarely responsible for the delay subsequent to 2.6.1999,i.e. the date of charge memo, we feel that in order to refrainsuch parties from abusing the process of Court, substantial costsshould be imposed on the first respondent.50. For all the above stated reasons, this Writ Petitionstands allowed by imposing the costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees tenthousand only) on the first respondent to be paid by the firstrespondent to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority, HighCourt Buildings, Chennai-600 104, within six weeks from the dateof receipt of a copy of this order, failing which the Tamil NaduState Legal Services Authority shall execute the order and recoverthe same from the first respondent through Court. The impugnedorder of the Tribunal is set aside and the impugned charge memoshall stand restored. The petitioner-State shall proceed with thedisciplinary proceedings expeditiously and conclude the samepreferably within three months from the date of receipt of a copyof this order. W.P.M.P. and W.V.M.P. are closed. Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.cs Copy to1. The Transport Commissioner, Chepauk, Chennai-5.2. The Section Officer,writ Section,High Court, Madras.3. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority, High Court Buildings, Chennai-600 104.1 cc to Government Pleader, sr. 401121cc to Mr.K.V. Srinivasaraghavan, Advocate, Sr. 39854W.P.No.19843 of 2001AKR (CO)kk 19/7