S. Arumainathan v. The Managing Director,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation(Villupuram Division-II) Ltd.,Vellore – 632009 & Ors.

the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation on 6.7.1985. On27.8.1995, while the petitioner was driving the bus bearingregistration No.TCB.3486 in route No.T-15B from Ambur to Vaniambadi,one person tried to board the moving bus and fell down and latersuccumbed to injuries in the hospital. The petitioner was issuedwith charge memo dated 21.9.1995, containing three charges. Thepetitioner submitted explanation and denied the charges. The saidexplanation having been found not satisfactory, domestic enquiry wasconducted and all the charges were found proved. Based on theenquiry report, the first respondent, by order dated 25.5.1996,dismissed the petitioner from service. Consequently petitionerraised an industrial dispute in I.D.No.317 of 1998 before the LabourCourt, Vellore. The said industrial dispute was dismissed by thesecond respondent-Labour Court, against which this writ petition isfiled.3.The contentions raised in the writ petition are that therewas a municipal lorry clearing debries and wastes at the entrance ofthe bus stand and therefore the bus could not enter into the busstand; that the deceased was in a drunken state, when he boarded thebus through the front entrance and fell down, and due to the saidact, he contributed to the accident; that the management failed toexamine any eye witness, including the conductor to prove the chargeand the only witness examined was the person who came to the accidentspot half an hour after the occurrence and therefore his evidence canonly be a hearsay evidence; that the Enquiry Officer has notconsidered the circumstance under which the bus was unable to enterthe bus stand; that the petitioner was acquitted in the criminalcase; and that, the discretion vested with the Labour Court underSection 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has not beenexercised.4.The first respondent filed counter affidavit by statingthat while the petitioner was working as driver in the respondentCorporation, on 27.8.1995 he drove the bus bearing registrationNo.TCB 3486 in route No.T-15B from Vaniambadi to Ambur, rashly andnegligently and caused the death of an intending passenger, whoattempted to enter the bus through the front entrance and hencecharge memo dated 21.9.1995 was issued. The explanation submitted bythe petitioner having been found not satisfactory, domestic enquirywas conducted. The petitioner fully utilised the opportunity tocross-examine the management witnesses. The enquiry report wassubmitted on 7.3.1996 holding that all the three charges were proved.The enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner, who alsosubmitted his remarks. The said remarks were considered and theenquiry report was accepted. Considering the fatal accidentscommitted by the petitioner earlier, the respondent passed the finalorder on 25.5.1996 and dismissed the petitioner from service. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5.Before the Labour Court, the petitioner marked Exs.W-1 toW-3 and on behalf of the management, Exs.M-1 to M-9 were marked.After considering the said documentary evidence and oral evidence,the Labour Court confirmed the dismissal order. Labour Court foundthat insofar as the contention that the municipal lorry was parked atthe entrance of the bus stand, the same was not proved by thepetitioner side witness, who has not spoken about the alleged parkingof the vehicle. The Labour Court observed that, had the petitionerobserved the rules and regulations and parked the vehicle inside thebus stand, he could have avoided the fatal accident. The LabourCourt also considered the criminal court judgment and by consideringthe previous fatal accidents committed by the petitioner, affirmedthe order of dismissal, by taking note of the life of the passengersand public.6.The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submittedthat the defence witness has clearly spoken about the accident thatthe deceased person was in drunken state while he tried to enter thebus through the front entrance and that the municipal lorry wasparked at the entrance of thebus stand. Non-consideration of theabove factors by the Enquiry Officer as well as the Labour Court hasvitiated the proceedings. The learned counsel also submitted thatthe Labour Court shifted the burden on the petitioner to prove hisinnocence as it is the duty of the prosecution/department to provethe charges against the delinquent officer. The learned counselfurther submitted that the failure to exercise the discretion givento the Labour Court under section 11A of the Industrial DisputesAct,1947, to consider whether the punishment is proportionate, hascaused great prejudice to the petitioner.7.The learned counsel cited the judgments of the DivisionBench of this Court reported in 2007 (2) LLJ 285 (R.Santhanam v.Madura Coats Ltd., Tuticorin), Division Bench of Bombay High Courtdecision reported in 1992 (1) LLJ 110 (Krishna Gopal Vaity v.M/s.Collins & Co. and Others), Division Bench of Punjab & HaryanaHigh Court reported in 1998 (2) LLJ 294 (Mangat Rai v. Punjab RoadTransport Corporation & Another) and the decision of the learnedsingle Judge of this Court reported in 1992 (1) LLJ 384 (CorkIndustries, Madras v. I Additional Labour Court, Madras & Another) insupport of his contentions and contended that Section 11A of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, empowers the Labour Court to interferewith the punishment awarded against the employee.8.The learned counsel for the first respondent-TransportCorporation on the other hand submitted that the fatal accidentcommitted by the petitioner while driving the Transport CorporationBus was proved in the enquiry before the Enquiry Officer. Thepetitioner having taken a defence that the victim was intoxicated, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ nothing prevented the petitioner to mark the post mortem report ofthe deceased to prove his stand. It is also contended by the learnedcounsel for the first respondent that the petitioner in his reply tothe charge memo has not stated about the parking of lorry blockingthe entrance of the bus stand, which prevented the entry of the businside the bus stand.9.The learned counsel cited the Judgments of the SupremeCourt reported in (2005) 3 SCC 241 (Cholan Roadways Ltd. v.G.Thirugnanasambandam); 2003 (3) LLN 713 (K.Ayyavu v. Management ofThiruvalluvar Transport Corporation Ltd.); 2007 (2) SLR 441 (ManagingDirector v. Devidas Manikrao Sadananda); (1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 (2)LLJ 1415 (R.S.Saini v. State of Punjab and Others); 2005 (1) CTC 625(The Management of Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v.S.Anthonysamy), and the decision of the single Judge of this Courtreported in 2004 (4) LLJ (Supp) 362 (M.Chella Thambi v. PresidingOfficer, Labour Court, Madurai) and 2003 (3) LLN 705 (TiruvalluvarTransport Corporation Ltd. v. K.Ayyavu) in support of hiscontentions.10.I have considered the rival submissions made by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner as well as the standing Counsel for thefirst respondent.11.The charges levelled against the petitioner are as follows:"1.Negligent in duty by not entering into Amburbus stand and reversed the bus at the entranceitself and allowed the passengers to alight thebus and then drove the bus towards Vaniambadi.2.Due to the negligence in duty, a person whotried to board the bus through the frontentrance, fell down and the bus ran over, therebycaused fracture to the said person, who died atHospital.3.Failed to follow the rules of theCorporation by not stopping the bus for thepassengers to board the bus and get down from thebus."The petitioner was directed to submit his explanation to the saidcharges and in the explanation the petitioner had stated that atabout 9.30 a.m. on 27.8.1995, he drove the bus to the bus stand amdwhen it was taken out of the bus stand, one male passenger tried toenter into the bus through the front door, who was under theinfluence of alcohol and fell down and he was ran over by the frontwheel of the bus. Immediately, the said injured person was taken tothe hospital by engaging an auto and after two hours he died.12.In the statement given by the petitioner about the accidenton 27.8.1995, nowhere it is stated that the entrance of the bus stand https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ was blocked by the municipal lorry to collect the garbages. The onlyreason given was that the deceased was in drunken state and he triedto enter into the bus through the front door and he fell down.13.The Conductor of the bus also gave a statement on 27.8.1995about the said accident and stated that the bus entered into the busstand and after alighting the passengers, it came out from the busstand and at that time, the driver applied sudden brake and he notedthat near the front left wheel one male person was lying and thatimmediately he arranged for one auto and he was taken to the hospitaland there was smell of alcohol.14.A criminal case was registered against the petitioner undersection 304 IPC in crime No.585 of 1995 and in the criminal case,petitioner was acquitted. Domestic enquiry was conducted and theEnquiry Officer found that the charges levelled against thepetitioner are proved. The Enquiry Officer held that even if thepassenger tried to enter through the front door in intoxicated state,the petitioner could have stopped the bus and taken the passengerinside the bus. Insofar as the contention that the municipal lorrywas parked in front of the entrance for collecting garbages isconcerned, the Enquiry Officer gave finding that no such plea wasmade in the statement given at the first instance. The statementgiven by the Conductor also do not contain such a statement. TheEnquiry Officer disbelieved the statement of the defence witness andheld that the petitioner ought to have filed post mortem report toprove that the deceased was under the influence of alcohol. Based onthe said reasons the Enquiry Officer found that the charges areproved.15.The Labour Court disbelieved the version of the petitionerabout the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, sincethe petitioner failed to prove that the deceased person was under theinfluence of alcohol. Insofar as the contention of the petitionerthat there was a lorry parked in front of the gate of the bus stand,was also disbelieved on the ground that no such statement was made bythe petitioner at the first instance. Taking note of the earlierfatal accidents committed by the petitioner the Labour Court refusedto exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11A of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947.16.The plea that the deceased person was under the influenceof alcohol, is stated by the petitioner as well as the conductor ofthe bus and also by the defence witness. When that being the case,the plea raised by the petitioner that there is contributorynegligence on the part of the injured/deceased, could have beenverified by producing the post mortem report of the deceased person.The report would have been filed before the Criminal Court when thepetitioner was an accused. The management as well as the Labour https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court blamed the petitioner for not producing the post mortemcertificate of the deceased. Since the petitioner had taken theplea of drunkenness of the deceased for his falling down from thebus, it is for the petitioner to prove the same to establish thesame.17.The Enquiry Officer has given a finding that due to therash and negligent driving of the petitioner the accident hadoccurred. The petitioner also failed to note the movement of thedeceased in getting into the bus through the front door, which waswithin the vicinity of the petitioner, if the petitioner was carefulenough. Failure to prove the fact about the drunkenness of thedeceased by the petitioner by producing the post mortem report ormedical evidence, is stated as the reason to disbelieve the defenceversion of the petitioner. The management accepted the findings ofthe Enquiry Officer and also considered the past conduct, includingthe earlier punishment of withholding of increment for two years byorder dated 2.8.1994 for having caused the death of another person on14.4.1994. Before imposing the said punishment the petitioner wasgiven show cause notice, namely the proposed penalty.18.The Labour Court concurred with the findings of the EnquiryOfficer with regard to the non-production of the medical opinion ofthe deceased to prove that he was under the influence of alcohol. TheLabour Court also found that the petitioner could have produced theavailable record from the police viz., post mortem certificate andthe report of the public analyst. The acquittal in the criminalCourt cannot be given much credit as the proof required in thecriminal case is beyond reasonable doubt. Considering thepreponderance of evidence against the petitioner for his rash andnegligent driving and the petitioner having failed to prove that thedeceased contributed for the negligence, the Labour Court gave afinding and upheld the order of dismissal.19.(a)In the decision reported in (1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 (2)LLJ 1415 (R.S.Saini v. State of Punjab) the Supreme Court consideredthe scope of the writ Court in interfering with the findings of theEnquiry Officer. It is held in that case that the High Court cannotreview the evidence and arrive at its own independent finding.Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Judgment (in SCC) read as follows:"16..........we will have to bear in mindthe rule that the court while exercising writjurisdiction will not reverse a finding of theinquiring authority on the ground that theevidence adduced before it is insufficient. Ifthere is some evidence to reasonably support theconclusion of the inquiring authority, it is notthe function of the court to review the evidenceand to arrive at its own independent finding. The https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ inquiring authority is the sole judge of the factso long as there is some legal evidence tosubstantiate the finding and the adequacy orreliability of the evidence is not a matter whichcan be permitted to be canvassed before the courtin writ proceedings.17. A narration of the charges and thereasons of the inquiring authority for acceptingthe charges, as seen from the records, shows thatthe inquiring authority has based its conclusionson materials available on record afterconsidering the defence put forth by theappellant and these decisions, in our opinion,have been taken in a reasonable manner andobjectively. The conclusion arrived at by theinquiring authority cannot be termed as eitherbeing perverse or not based on any material noris it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiringauthority. Likewise, the High Court has lookedinto the material based on which the enquiryofficer has come to the conclusion, within thelimited scope available to it under Article 226of the Constitution and we do not find any faultwith the findings of the High Court in thisregard."(EmphasisSupplied)(b)Similar issue as to whether it is the duty of the driver ofthe Transport Corporation to prove, if the accident not happened dueto the rash and negligent driving, was considered by this Court inthe judgment reported in 2004 (4) LLJ Supp 362 (M.Chella Thambi v.Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai and Another) and inparagraph 8 it is held thus,"8.In so far as such conduct of thedrivers of a public transport corporation areconcerned, time and again, it has been repeatedlyheld that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur wouldapply, that is, the accident speaks for itself.In other words, when it is in the exclusiveknowledge of the driver, who caused the accident,it is but proper that he discharges the onus,namely, that the accident did not happen due tohis rash and negligent driving, but due tovarious other reasons not attributable to him. Infact, in the Division Bench judgment cited by thelearned counsel for the second respondent,reference has been made to three decisions of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in PushpabaiParshottam Udesh v. Ranjit Ginning and PressingCompany Private Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1735 : 1977 (2)SCC 745; State of Karnataka v. Krishna, AIR 1987SC 861; 1987 (1) SCC 538 and Balbir Singh v.State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1677 : 2000 (5) SCC82. In the judgment reported in State ofKarnataka v. Krishna (supra), the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has cautioned to the effect that where adriver of a public transport Corporation is foundto have caused a fatal accident, the same has tobe looked at with certain amount of seriousness,since the public safety and convenience isparamount, the Court should not fall a prey tothe plea of misplaced sympathy. The Hon'bleSupreme Court has also held that award ofpunishment has to be weighed keeping in view theinterest of the public at large and thetravelling passengers and the disciplinaryactions are taken more as preventive measure sothat it may work as an effective warning againstother drivers to behave befitting their dutiesand maintaining due discipline in theestablishment."(Emphasis Supplied)(c)The scope of interference in the domestic enquiry findingsand the Labour Court decision and the effect of acquittal in thecriminal case was again considerd by the Honourable Supreme Court inthe decision reported in (2003) 3 SCC 583 (Popli v. Canara Bank),wherein in paragraphs 16 to 19 it is held thus:"16. It is fairly well settled that theapproach and objective in criminal proceedingsand the disciplinary proceedings are altogetherdistinct and different. In the disciplinaryproceedings the preliminary question is whetherthe employee is guilty of such conduct as wouldmerit action against him, whereas in criminalproceedings the question is whether the offencesregistered against him are established and ifestablished what sentence should be imposed uponhim. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiryand the rules governing the enquiry and trial areconceptually different. (See State of Rajasthanv. B.K. Meena) In case of disciplinary enquirythe technical rules of evidence have noapplication. The doctrine of “proof beyond doubt”has no application. Preponderance ofprobabilities and some material on record arenecessary to arrive at the conclusion whether ornot the delinquent has committed misconduct. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17. While exercising jurisdiction underArticle 226 of the Constitution the High Courtdoes not act as an appellate authority. Itsjurisdiction is circumscribed by limits ofjudicial review to correct errors of law orprocedural errors leading to manifest injusticeor violation of principles of natural justice.Judicial review is not akin to adjudication ofthe case on merits as an appellate authority.18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India thescope of judicial review was indicated by statingthat review by the court is of decision-makingprocess and where the findings of thedisciplinary authority are based on someevidence, the court or the tribunal cannotreappreciate the evidence and substitute its ownfinding.19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State ofPunjab in paras 16 and 17 the scope ofinterference is rather limited and has to beexercised within the circumscribed limits."(d)In (1995) 6 SCC 749 (B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India) inparagraph 18, it is held as follows:"18. A review of the above legal positionwould establish that the disciplinary authority,and on appeal the appellate authority, beingfact-finding authorities have exclusive power toconsider the evidence with a view to maintaindiscipline. They are invested with the discretionto impose appropriate punishment keeping in viewthe magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. TheHigh Court/Tribunal, while exercising the powerof judicial review, cannot normally substituteits own conclusion on penalty and impose someother penalty. If the punishment imposed by thedisciplinary authority or the appellate authorityshocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal,it would appropriately mould the relief, eitherdirecting the disciplinary/appellate authority toreconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten thelitigation, it may itself, in exceptional andrare cases, impose appropriate punishment withcogent reasons in support thereof."(e)In (2005) 7 SCC 764 (Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M.(PJ), Indian OilCorporation Ltd.) in paragraph 11, the Supreme Court held as follows:"11. As far as acquittal of the appellant bya criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the said order does not preclude the Corporationfrom taking an action if it is otherwisepermissible. In our judgment, the law is fairlywell settled. Acquittal by a criminal court wouldnot debar an employer from exercising power inaccordance with the Rules and Regulations inforce. The two proceedings, criminal anddepartmental, are entirely different. Theyoperate in different fields and have differentobjectives. Whereas the object of criminal trialis to inflict appropriate punishment on theoffender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings isto deal with the delinquent departmentally and toimpose penalty in accordance with the servicerules. In a criminal trial, incriminatingstatement made by the accused in certaincircumstances or before certain officers istotally inadmissible in evidence. Such strictrules of evidence and procedure would not applyto departmental proceedings. The degree of proofwhich is necessary to order a conviction isdifferent from the degree of proof necessary torecord the commission of delinquency. The rulerelating to appreciation of evidence in the twoproceedings is also not similar. In criminal law,burden of proof is on the prosecution and unlessthe prosecution is able to prove the guilt of theaccused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot beconvicted by a court of law. In a departmentalenquiry, on the other hand, penalty can beimposed on the delinquent officer on a findingrecorded on the basis of “preponderance ofprobability”. Acquittal of the appellant by aJudicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipsofacto absolve him from the liability under thedisciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. Weare, therefore, unable to uphold the contentionof the appellant that since he was acquitted by acriminal court, the impugned order dismissing himfrom service deserves to be quashed and setaside."(f)The Division Bench of this Court in the decision reportedin 2005 (1) CTC 625 (The Management of Thiruvalluvar TransportCorporation v. S.Anthonysamy). In paragraphs 8 to 13 it is held asfollows:"8.It is well settled that on the samecharges when there is a criminal proceeding aswell as a domestic enquiry, merely because theworkman is found innocent in the criminal case, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ it does not mean that he cannot be found guiltyin the departmental/domestic enquiry videThenmozhi v. The Chairman & Managing Director,Neyveli Lignite Corporation in W.A.Nos.202 and203 of 2005 dated 8.2.2005.9.In the aforesaid Division Benchdecision reliance had been placed on the SupremeCourt decisions in Allahabad District Co-Operative Bank Ltd., v. Vidhya Varidh Mishra,2004 (6) SCC 482 and Secretary, Ministry of HomeAffairs and Another v. Tahir Ali Khan Tyagi, JT2002 (Supp.1) SC 520.10.In paragraph 12 of the decision inAllahabad District Co-Op. Bank Ltd. v. VidhyaVaridh Mishra (supra) the Supreme Courtobserved:-"Mr.Rao submitted that the respondent hadbeen exonerated by the criminal Court. Hesubmitted that the termination was only onthe basis of his conviction. He submittedthat as his conviction is set aside, theCourts below were right in reinstating therespondent. We are unable to accede to thissubmission. The termination was pursuant toa disciplinary inquiry. It is settled lawthat in a disciplinary inquiry a conclusiondifferent from that arrived at by a criminalCourt, may be arrived at. The strict burdenof proof required to establish guilt in acriminal Court is not required indisciplinary proceeding. The respondent hasnot claimed that the disciplinaryproceedings were not conducted fairly. Asthe termination was based on findings of theDisciplinary Committee, the fact that theappellate Court exonerated the respondentwas no consequence."11.Similarly, in Secretary, Ministry ofHomes Affairs and Another v. Tahir Ali Khan Tyagi(supra) the Supreme Court observed (videparagraph -6):"Departmental proceeding and criminalproceeding can run simultaneously anddepartmental proceeding can also beinitiated even after acquittal in a criminalproceeding particularly when the standard ofproof in a criminal proceeding is completelydifferent from the standard of proof that isrequired to prove the delinquency of a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ government servant in a departmentalproceeding, the former being one of proofbeyond reasonable doubt, whereas the latterbeing one of preponderance of probability."12.In view of the above, we are clearly ofthe opinion that the Labour Court proceeded on awrong legal basis and wrongly orderedreinstatement of the workman concerned afterfinding that he was guilty of negligence.13.In Divisional Controller, KSRTC(NWKRTC) v. A.T.Mane, JT 2004 (8) SC 103 theSupreme Court observed that "once a domestictribunal based on evidence comes to a particularconclusion normally it is not open to theappellate tribunal or Courts to substitute theirsubjective opinion in the place of the onearrived at by the domestic tribunal". "(Emphasis Supplied)(g)The burden of proof in the accident cases is on the side ofthe driver of the bus was the view taken by the Supreme Court in thedecision reported in 2007 (2) SLR 441 (Managing Director, North EastK.R.T.C. v. Devidas Manikrao Sadananda). In paragraphs 10 and 11 itis held as follows:"10.In the case of Shyam Sunder and othersv. The State of Rajasthan, 1974 (1) SCC 690, thisCourt held that the maxim "res ipsa loquitur"does not embody any rule of substantive law nor arule of evidence. It is resorted to when theaccident is shown to have occurred and and thecause of the accident is primarily within theknowledge of the driver. It was held that themere fact that the cause of the accident isunknown does not prevent the plaintiff fromrecovering damages from the defendant if theproper inference to be drawn from thecircumstances, which are known is that theaccident was caused by the negligence of thedefendant. It was held that the fact of theaccident may constitute evidence of negligenceand in such cases the above maxim applies. Theprincipal function of the maxim is to preventinjustice which would result if the management iscompelled to prove the precise cause of theaccident, particularly, when the respondent-driver has knowledge of the cause of theaccident. This judgment has not been consideredby the Division Bench of the Karnataka HighCourt.11.In the case of Pushpabai Purshottam https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Udeshi and others v. M/s.Ranjit Ginning &Pressing Co (P) Ltd. And another, 1977 (2) SCC745, this Court held that where the evidenceshows dashing of the vehicle against the tree wasso violent that it caused the death of thepassengers then the burden rests on the oppositeparty to show that the cause of the accidentcould not have been avoided by exercise ofordinary care and caution (See para 5). In thepresent case no such attempt was made by thedriver to show the plea of inevitability,therefore, the Labour Court had erred inmisdirecting itself in not invoking the maxim"res ipsa loquitur." "(h)In 2005 (3) SCC 241 (Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G.Thirugnanasambandam) in paragraphs 21 to 26, it is held as follows:"21. Res ipsa loquitur is a well-knownprinciple which is applicable in the instantcase. Once the said doctrine is found to beapplicable the burden of proof would shift on thedelinquent. As noticed hereinabove, the enquiryofficer has categorically rejected the defence ofthe respondent that the bus was being driven at aslow speed.22. In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. RanjitGinning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. this Courtobserved: (SCC pp.750-51, para 6)“6. The normal rule is that it is forthe plaintiff to prove negligence but as insome cases considerable hardship is causedto the plaintiff as the true cause of theaccident is not known to him but is solelywithin the knowledge of the defendant whocaused it, the plaintiff can prove theaccident but cannot prove how it happened toestablish negligence on the part of thedefendant. This hardship is sought to beavoided by applying the principle of resipsa loquitur. The general purport of thewords res ipsa loquitur is that the accident‘speaks for itself’ or tells its own story.There are cases in which the accident speaksfor itself so that it is sufficient for theplaintiff to prove the accident and nothingmore. It will then be for the defendant toestablish that the accident happened due tosome other cause than his own negligence.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

23. The said principle was applied in SarlaDixit v. Balwant Yadav.24. In A.T. Mane this Bench observed: (SCCp. 257, paras 5-6)“5. … Learned counsel relied on ajudgment of this Court in support of thiscontention of his in the case of KarnatakaSRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti. That was also acase where a conductor concerned hadcommitted similar misconduct 36 times priorto the time he was found guilty and bearingthat fact in mind this Court held thus: (SCCp. 576, para 5)‘Be that as it may, the principle of resipsa loquitur, namely, the facts speak forthemselves, is clearly applicable in theinstant case. Charging 50 paise per ticketmore from as many as 35 passengers couldonly be to get financial benefit, by theconductor. This act was either dishonest orwas so grossly negligent that the respondentwas not fit to be retained as a conductorbecause such action or inaction of his isbound to result in financial loss to theappellant Corporation.’6. On the above basis, the Court cameto the conclusion that the order ofdismissal should have been set aside. In ouropinion, the facts of the above case and thelaw laid down therein apply to the facts ofthe present case also.”25. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab thisCourt observed: (SCC p.209, para 4)“4. It is admitted that the petitionerhimself was driving the vehicle at therelevant time. It is also admitted that buswas driven over a bridge and then it fellinto canal. In such a situation the doctrineof res ipsa loquitur comes into play and theburden shifts on to the man who was incontrol of the automobile to establish thatthe accident did not happen on account ofany negligence on his part. He did notsucceed in showing that the accidenthappened due to causes other than negligenceon his part.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

26. The burden of proof was, therefore, onthe respondent to prove that the vehicle was notbeing driven by him rashly or negligently."(i)The same is the view taken by the Division Bench of thisCourt in the decision reported in 2003 (3) LLN 713 (K.Ayyavu v.Management of Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation Ltd., Chennai).20.The contention of the learned counsel for the petitionerthat the management witness was not present in the scene of accidentand therefore his evidence cannot be relied upon by the EnquiryOfficer is also unsustainable. The Supreme Court in the decisionreported in 2008 AIR SCW 927 (Workmen of Balmadies Estatesv.Management, Balmadies Estate & Others) held that even hearsayevidence can be acted upon in the disciplinary proceeding, providedit has a reasonable nexus and credibility. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of thesaid judgment read as follows:"8.It is fairly well settled now that inview of the wide power of the Labour Court itcan, in an appropriate case, consider theevidence which has been considered by thedomestic Tribunal and in a given case on suchconsideration arrive at a conclusion differentfrom the one arrived at by the Domestic Tribunal.The assessment of evidence in a domestic enquiryis not required to be made by applying the sameyardstick as a Civil Court could do when a lis isbrought before it. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872(in short the Evidence Act) is not applicable tothe proceeding in a domestic enquiry so far asthe domestic enquiries are concerned, thoughprinciples of fairness are to apply. It is alsofairly well settled that in a domestic enquiryguilt may not be established beyond reasonabledoubt and the proof of misconduct would besufficient. In a domestic enquiry all materialswhich are logically probative including hearsayevidence can be acted upon provided it has areasonable nexus and credibility.9.In J.D.Jain v. Management of State Bankof India and Anr. (1982) 1 SCC 143 it was held,almost in a similar factual background, thatconfessional evidence and circumstantialevidence, despite lack of any direct evidence,was sufficient to hold the delinquent guilty ofmisconduct and to ustify the order of terminationthat had been passed."21.The decision cited by the learned counsel for thepetitioner reported in 1998 (2) LLJ 294 (SC) (Mangat Rai v. Punjab https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Road Transport Corporation & Another), 1992 (1) LLJ 110 (SC) (KrishnaGopal Vaity v. M/s.Collins & Co & Others) are in respect of thepowers conferred on the Labour Court to reappreciate the evidencerecorded by the Enquiry Officer and also to interfere with thequantum of punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial DisputesAct, 1947. The Division Bench Judgment reported in 2007 (2) LLJ 285(R.Santhanam v. Madura Coats Ltd., Tuticorin) is in respect ofconfirming the award passed by the Labour Court under Section 11A,where the Labour Court exercised its discretion and modified thepunishment of dismissal and ordered reinstatement without backwages,taking note of 12 years of unblemished record of service. In thedecision reported in 1992 (1) LLJ 384 (Cork Industries, Madras v. IAdditional Labour Court, Madras & Another) again this Courtconsidered the power of the Labour Court to differ with the findingsof the misconduct, if proper case is made out and to interfere withthe punishment, if it was found disproportionate.22.Here in this case, the Enquiry Officer's finding wasconsidered as just and proper by the Labour Court. The petitioner'spast conduct was also considered by the Disciplinary Authority whileimposing the punishment. The Labour Court also considered the pastconduct and refused to exercise its discretion even under Section 11Aof the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in interfering with thepunishment imposed. There is no perversity in the said order. Inview of the said findings, I am of the firm view that the abovereferred decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitionerare not applicable to the facts of this case.There is no merit in the writ petition and the writ petition isdismissed. No costs.vrSd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarTo1.The Managing Director,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (VillupuramDivision-II) Ltd.,Vellore – 632009. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,Vellore.+ 1 cc to Mr. V.R. Kamalanathan, Advocate, SR No.34312+ 1 cc to Mr. S. Sathiamurthi, Advocate, SR No.34635PKB(CO)SR/30.7.2009 ORDER INW.P.No.2943 of 2001