High Court · 2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 23.02.2010CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K. CHANDRUWrit Petition Nos.24311, 24580, 27261, 27265, 34540,35677, 35759/03, 18277 of 2003 and 2041 of 2004and W.V.M.P.No.1826 of 2004, WPMP.No.33310 of 2003 and WPMP.No.43335 of 2003R.Nanjundan .. Petitioner in WP NO.24311/2003 and 27261/2003A.K.Chandran .. Petitioner in WP No.24580/2003 and 27265/2003B.Dorai .. Petitioner in WP No.34540/2003 and 18277/2004T.Raju .. Petitioner in WP No.35677/2003 and 35759/2003R.Easan .. Petitioner in WP No.2041/2004 -VS-The District Judge-Cum-Tribunalfor Co-operative cases of theNilgiris District, Udagamandalam .. Ist Respondent in WP 24311/03 24580/03, 27261/03, 34540/03, 35677/03, 2041/04, 3rd Respondent in WP 27265/03, 35759/03, 18277/04 The Deputy Registrar ofCo-operative Societies,Udagamandalam, Nilgiris .. 2nd Respondent in WP 24311/03 24580/03, 27261/03,27265/03 34540/03, 35677/03, 35759/03, 18277/04 and 2041/04The Special Officer,The Nilgiris DistrictCentral Co-operative Bank,Manjoor Branch, Manjoor,The Nilgiris .. 3rd Respondent in WP 2041/04 24580/03, 24311/03, 27261/03, 35677/03, 34540/03, and Ist respondent in WP 35759/03, 27265/03 and 18277/04 Prayer in W.P.24211/2003Writ petition filed under article 226 of the constitution ofIndia praying for issue of a Certiorari, calling for the records ofthe order of the first respondent in proceedings in CMA No.51 of 2002 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of the second respondent in ThaThee No.3/2002 Sa Pa dated 2.9.2002 and quash the same.Prayer in W.P.24580/2003Writ petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, to call forthe records of the order of the first respondent in proceedings inCMA No.57 of 2002 dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of the secondrespondent in Tha Thee No.9/2001 Sa.Pa. dated 19.8.2002 and quash thesame.Prayer in W.P.27261/2003Writ petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, to call forthe records of the order of the first respondent in proceedings inCMA No.56 of 2002 dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of the secondrespondent in Tha Thee No.9/2001 Sa.Pa. dated 19.8.2002 and quash thesame.Prayer in W.P.27265/2003Writ petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, to call forthe records of the order of the 3rd respondent in proceedings in CMANo.50 of 2002 dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of the secondrespondent in Tha Thee No.9/2001 Sa.Pa. dated 19.8.2002 and quash thesame.Prayer in W.P.34540/2003Writ petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, to callingfor the records of the order of the first respondent in proceedingsin CMA No.42 of 2002 dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of thesecond respondent in Tha Thee No.9/2001 Sa.Pa. dated 19.8.2002 andquash the same.Prayer in W.P.35677/2003Writ petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, to callingfor the records of the order of the first respondent in proceedingsin CMA No.45 of 2002 dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of thesecond respondent in Tha Thee No.9/2001 Sa.Pa. dated 19.8.2002 andquash the same.W.P.No.35759/03:Writ Petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, calling forthe records of the order of the 3rd Respondent in proceedings in CMA43/02 dated 24.3.2003 confirming the order of the 2nd Respondent inDha.Thee No.10/01 Sapa dated 19.8.02 quash the same.W.P.No.18277/04:Writ Petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, calling forthe records of the order of the 3rd Respondent in proceedings in CMA46/02 dated 24.3.03 confirming the order of the 2nd Respondent inTha.Thee No.10/01 Sapa. dated 19.8.02 quash the same. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.P.No.2041/04:Writ petition filed to issue a writ of Certiorari, calling forthe records of the order of the 1st respondent in proceedings in CMA40/02 dated 24.3.03 confirming the order of the 2nd Respondent inTha.Thee.No.9/01 Sapa dated 19.8.02 quash the same.For Petitioner : Mr.S.Parthasarathy, S.C for Mr.R.Parthiban, in all WPs.For Respondents: Mr.N.Senthil Kumar, AGP for R2 in all WPs. Mr.P.Sivashanmuga Sundaram for R3 in W.P.2041/04, 24580/03, 24311/03, 27261/03, 35677/03, 34540/03 and for R1 in WPs 35759/03, 27265/03 and 18277/04.COMMON ORDERHeard both sides.2. In this batch of writ petitions, the petitioners who areemployees of the third respondent District Central Cooperative Bank,Nilgiris. Challenge is the order of the first respondentCooperative Tribunal in various appeals filed by them. The appealswere disposed of by separate orders dated 24.03.2003. The appealswere filed by the writ petitioners challenging the surchargeproceedings initiated by the second respondent, Deputy Registrarunder Section 90 of the Tamilnadu Cooperative Societies Act.Surcharge proceedings were initiated by the Deputy Registrar inrespect of the irregularities in the Manjoor branch of the thirdrespondent bank in several proceedings. The surcharge proceedingswere preceded by an enquiry under Section 81 of the TamilnaduCooperative Societies Act. By the enquiry report dated 17.06.1999and 05.02.2002, it was found that the employees were responsible forthe heavy loss caused to the society. Thereafter surchargeproceedings were initiated under Section 87 of the Act. Thesurcharge proceedings were taken on file as Tha.Thee.No.3 of 2002and 10 of 2001 and 9 of 2001. At the end of the proceedings inrespect of all the three surcharge proceedings, the total liabilityfor recovery of the petitioners were fixed as Rs.52,78,192.05 paise.Aggrieved by the surcharge order, the petitionersg preferredC.M.A.No.40 to 43 and 55 to 57 of 2002 and various other appealsunder Section 152 of the Tamilnadu Cooperative Societies Act.3. In the grounds of appeal raised before the Tribunal, thepetitioners contended that they were not given a copy of the reportfurnished under Section 81 of the Act and this had caused prejudiceto the petitioners. It was also stated that notice of enquiry underSection 81 was issued by the enquiry officer long after thecompletion of the report. It was also further stated that theenquiries were held under Section 87 beyond the statutory periodprescribed under the Act. Therefore, the enquiry was invalid. Itwas also further stated that necessary witnesses were not examined to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ prove that the petitioners were responsible for causing loss to thebank in respect of the irregularities.4. In so far as the non-furnishing of the report under Section81 was concerned, the third respondent bank contended that some ofthe petitioners filed a writ petitions before this Court inW.P.Nos.24275 and 24276 of 2001, for a direction to furnish theenquiry report and the statements of witnesses. The said writpetitions came to be allowed on 20.12.2001 and they have also actedas per the direction of this Court. A copy of the said order dated20.12.2001 was also furnished. In that order, it was stated thatthough the petitioners can have the copies of the documents askedfor, if any rules specifically impose a condition for payment ofcharges, the respondents are entitled to collect the said chargesfrom the petitioners regarding their demand for records and copies.Hence, the Bank contended that under Rule 173 of the TamilnaduCooperative Societies Rules, the society is entitled to collect feesfor certified copies of any document excluding privileged documentswhich can not be given. Even the stand of the thirdrespondent/society was that after the orders passed by this Court,they did not seek for copies by depositing the amount due forobtaining such certified copies. 5. With reference to the bar of limitation under Section 87(1),it was also contended that the said provisions are only directory,but not mandatory. The Tribunal by its order dated 24.03.2003,rejected the contentions of the petitioners. The Tribunal held thatthe enquiry under Section 81 was conducted within the statutoryperiod which was duly extended by the authorities. In so far as thelimitation under Section 87, the Tribunal held the permission wasobtained for passing orders and therefore it was held that there wasno infirmity in the procedural aspect in passing the surchargeorders.6. Further the contention raised by the petitioners that therewas no finding that there was any willful negligence on the part ofthe petitioners. Regarding this contention, the tribunal held thatthe accounts were falsified by the petitioners and the customers whowere examined have deposed that they had no knowledge about theillegal transactions. That by itself will indicate that there waswillful intention on the part of the petitioners in causing loss tothe society. It is against the order of the Tribunal in thoseappeals, the writ petitions have been filed by all the petitioners.7. Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned Senior counsel appearing for thepetitioners initially made a submission that the enquiry report underSection 81 dated 17.06.1999 was cancelled and therefore once thebasis of proceedings under Section 87 of the Act no longer survives,the resultant surcharge proceeding must also go. On this aspect, onbehalf of the third respondent/society, an additional counter dated13.02.2010 was filed. In that additional counter affidavit, inParagraph -2, it was stated as follows:"The real factual aspect is the first 81 inquiryordered by the Deputy Registrar Nilgiris in his proceedingsin R.C.No.4350 of 1999 Ve.Sa.dated 17.06.1999 was not https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cancelled. The second 81 inquiry ordered by the DeputyRegistrar, Nilgiris in his proceedings Rc.No.1845/2000Ve.Sa dated Na.Ka.1845/2000/Ve.Sa dated 20.04.2000 was onlycancelled by the same authority in his proceedings inNa.Ka.1845/2000/Ve.Sa dated 9.1.2001. After thecancellation of the second enquiry, the AdditionalRegistrar (Marketing Planning and Development), office ofthe Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Chennai vide inhis proceedings Rc.9508/2001/S.1S dated 5.2.2001 orderedinquiry under Section 81 of the Act to find out theirregularities in the Banker's cheque and Mini depositetc.,. Based on the submitted enquiry report, surchargeproceedings was initiated and also decree passed inTha.Thee.9/2001 Sa.Pa. Dated 19.8.2002."Though time was taken to controvert this point, no affidavit is filedchallenging the stand of the third respondent society and hence thisfactual position must be accepted.8. However, the petitioners have filed a miscellaneous petitionto raise additional grounds, with a supporting affidavit dated21.02.2010. In the additional grounds, it was contended that thesecond respondent (tribunal) did not advert to the materials beforeit. In some other cases, some of the petitioners were not employedon relevant dates and they were employed in some other branches.Therefore, individual responsibilities were not fixed. They werecollectively made responsible. It was also stated that copy of theenquiry report should be mandatorily furnished to the petitionerswhich had not been done. 9. In this context, reliance was placed upon the Judgment ofthis Court in Arignar Anna Weavers Co-operative Society Limited., vs.State of Tamilnadu reported in (AIR 1999 Madras 254). In that case,when a society was superseded, the enquiry report was not furnished.Hence this Court held that such a report must be furnished and in theabsence of furnishing such a report, the order was opposed toprinciples of natural justice.10. The learned Senior counsel also referred to anotherJudgment of this Court in K.A.Arangarasu and four others vs. TheJoint Registrar of Co-operative Societies and another reported in(2001 WLR 80), wherein it was held enquiry report under Section 88(1)should be furnished along with the show cause notice and non-furnishing of report should vitiate the show cause notice.11. The learned Senior counsel also placed reliance upon theJudgment of this Court in Sambandam vs. Deputy Registrar (Credit) Co-operative Societies, Mylapore reported in (1999(3) MLJ 310), tocontend that willful negligence should be proved in respect ofliability fixed by surcharge proceedings. The same view wasreiterated by the Division Bench of this Court in S.Subramanian vs.The Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies (Housing) Cuddaloreand others reported in (2002(3) LW 185).12. The learned Senior Counsel attempted to contend that theTribunal had passed an order within a short span of time. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Considering that there were so many appeals before the Tribunal, itmight not be possible to deal with every aspect of the case. Thatargument cannot be accepted. In a writ of certiorari, parties canargue only on the basis of findings rendered by the Tribunal. Incase of any lack of application of mind or omitting to look intorelevant documents, then this Court can find fault with such anapproach by the Tribunal. Only because some orders were made duringa short span, the orders cannot be doubted.13. In the present case, the Tribunal also passed individualorders emanating from two different surcharge proceedings. There isno reference to other surcharge proceedings or to the enquiryreports preceding the other surcharge proceedings. On the contrary,general statements have been made in the name of findings. Perhapsit may be due to the reason that the counsel for the petitionerswould not have argued those matters separately eventhough somegrounds were raised in the memorandum of grounds of appeal. In thepresent affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, nospecific attack have been made against the Tribunal.14. Even the contentions raised in the grounds of appeal donot merit acceptance. With reference to the furnishing of copies, itmust be stated that at least two members made an attempt to move thisCourt to get a copy and this Court directed furnishing of copies bydepositing the amount. Since the same has not been done, they cannotmake a complaint that the non-furnishing of the enquiry report itselfipso facto vitiated the surcharge proceedings. It has to be seenonly from fact situation of each case. The learned counsel appearingfor the society contended that in the show cause notice itself, therelevant portion of the enquiry report was extracted and furnished toeach of the petitioners and only on that basis they gave theirexplanations. Having given their explanation and after participatingin the enquiry, they cannot turn back and contend that naturaljustice has been denied. 15. In any event, in an appeal under Section 152 (which is inthe nature of an appeal suit) the Tribunal has power to go into bothquestions of fact and law. Therefore nothing prevented thepetitioners from filing appropriate application before the Co-operative Tribunal summoning those documents for the purpose ofmaking their contention more explicit. The Tribunal has power todecide all such questions. The petitioner cannot complaint beforethis court that the surcharge order must be set aside solely on theground of non-furnishing of the enquiry report. The petitioners havefailed to make such an exercise before the Tribunal. 16. On the second contention regarding limitation provided underSection 87 of the Cooperative Societies Act, the Tribunal itself hadfound that appropriate time extension have been obtained andtherefore it was within the time. In any event, this Court in itsJudgment vide G.Pannerselvam and others vs. Deputy Registrar ofCooperative Societies reported in (2009(2) MLJ 901), has held thatsuch a time constraint is not mandatory, but it only directory. Thesaid view of the learned Judge has been upheld by the Division Benchpresided by A.K.Ganguly, C.J., (as he then was) vide its Judgment inBalaraman Vs. Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, reported in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (2009(3) MLJ 1032).17. The Third contention is about willful negligence. Thoughit was contended that for proving that the petitioner's conduct wasdue to willful negligence, there must be some more material availablewith the respondent. Therefore in the absence of such materials, theorder of the Tribunal as well as the surcharge proceedings should beset aside. Such a contention has no substance. The meaning of theterm "willful negligence" came to be decided in many decisions of theSupreme Court arising out of Criminal law, civil liability and TortLaw. 18. In the decision of the Supreme Court in All India AnnaDravida Munnetra Kazhagam vs. L.K.Tripathi and Others reported in(2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases 417), the Court quoted the dictionarymeaning of that term which is as follows:-"57. As per Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol.5 (4thEdition), "willful disobedience" means:"(1) The willful disobedience of a SEAMAN orapprentice is 'willfully disobeying any lawful commandDURING the engagement': 'There may be many cases in whichDESERTION, or ABSENCE without leave, would not amount towilful disobedience, and in these cases the seaman wouldonly be liable to the lesser penalty. Where, however, theseaman deserts or is intentionally absent without leaveafter the time at which he has been lawfully ordered to beon board, his desertion or absence may amount to "wilfuldisobedience," and, consequently, that he would be liableto imprisonment. The words "during the engagement' seem tosuggest that the contract between the employer and theemployed should be taken into account, and that if, havingregard to that contract, the order was one which theemployed was bound to obey, his disobedience might be dealtwith under clause (d):58. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the term"wilful' has been defined as:"1.Asserting or disposed to assert one's own willagainst persuasion, instruction, or command; governed bywill without regard to reason; obstinately self-willed orperverse.2.Willing; consenting; ready to comply with a request,desire, or requirement – 1598.3. Proceeding from the will; done or suffered of one'sown free will or choice; voluntary – 1687.4.Done on purpose or wittingly; purposed, deliberate,intentional (Chiefly, now always, in bad sense of ablameworthy action: freq. Implying 'perverse, obstinate'.)"19. The Supreme Court further in its decision in Post Graduate https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh vs. JaspalSingh and Others reported in ((2009)7 SCC 330), had observed asfollows:"13.The term negligence is often used in the sense ofcareless conduct. Way back in 1866 in Grill v. GeneralIron Screw Collier Co. reported in 1866 LR 1 CP 600 at 612,Wills, J. referred to negligence as:"...the absence of such care as it was the duty of thedefendant to use."Bowen, L.J., in Thomas v. Quatermaine reported in(1887) 18 QBD 685) stated:"... ideas of negligence and duty are strictlycorrelative and there is no such thing as negligence inthe abstract, negligence is simply neglect of some carewhich we are bound by law to exercise towards somebody."14. In Donoghue v. Stevenson reported in (1932 AC 562)Lord Macmillan with regard to negligence made the followingclassic statement:"The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in theabstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only wherethere is a duty to take care and where failure in that dutyhas caused damage. In such circumstances carelessnessassumes the legal quality of negligence and entails theconsequences in law of negligence... The cardinalprinciple of liability is that the party complained ofshould ow to the party complaining a duty to take care, andthat the party complaining should be able to prove that hehas suffered damage in consequence of a breach of thatduty."15. In Jacob Mathew reported (2005) 6 SCC 1, thisCourt while dealing with negligence as tort referred to theLaw of Torts, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, (24th Edn., 2002edited by Justice G.P.Singh) and noticed thus:"Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by theomission to do something which a reasonable man, guided bythose considerations which ordinarily regulate the conductof human affairs would do, or doing something which aprudent and reasonable man would not do. Actionablenegligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinarycare or skill towards a person to whom the defendant owesthe duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by whichneglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to his person orproperty. ...the definition involves three constituents ofnegligence: (1)A legal duty to exercise due care on thepart of the party complained of towards the partycomplaining of the former's conduct within the scope of theduty; (2) breach of the said duty; and (3) consequentialdamage. Cause of action for negligence arises only when https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ damage occurs; for, damage is a necessary ingredient ofthis tort."16. Insofar as civil law is concerned, the termnegligence is used for the purpose of fastening thedefendant with liability of the amount of damages. Tofasten liability in criminal law, the degree of negligencehas to be higher than that of negligence enough to fastenliability for damages in civil law.17. In Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka reported in((1980) 1 SCC 30) this Court dealt with in detail thedistinction between negligence in civil law and in criminallaw. It has been held that there is a marked difference asto the effect of evidence, namely, the proof, in civil andcriminal proceedings. In civil proceedings, a merepreponderance of probability is sufficient, and thedefendant is not necessarily entitled to the benefit ofevery reasonable doubt; but in criminal proceedings, thepersuasion of guilt must amount to such a moral certaintyas convinces the mind of the court, as a reasonable man,beyond all reasonable doubt.18. In Bhalachandra Waman Pathe v. State ofMaharashtra reported in ((1968) ACJ 38 (SC)) this Courtheld that while negligence is an omission to do somethingwhich a reasonable man, guided upon those considerationswhich ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonableman would not do."If it is seen in the context of the above definition and theliability here being the civil liability, the standard of proof thatis required for proving such liability was already met. If thepetitioners who are dealing in banking transaction try to pervert anystanding instructions that itself is a sufficient proof of willfulnegligence.20. Even in Criminal law, while dealing with the scope ofSection 405 and 409 IPC, the Supreme Court in Sudhir Shantilal Mehtav. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 in paragraphs 64, 66 to 69 had observed asfollows:"64.An offence of criminal breach of trust by apublic servant attracts the penal provisions of Section409 of the Penal Code. Indisputably, the Bank entrustedits funds to its officers; they had the domination overthe said property; they were holding the said money intrust which is a comprehensive expression, inter alia, todenote a relationship of master and servant. The act ofcriminal breach of trust per se may involve a civil wrongbut a breach of trust with an ingredient of mens rea wouldgive rise to a criminal prosecution as well.........66. The Criminal breach of trust would, inter alia,mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ entrusted with or has otherwise domination thereover.Such an act must not only be done dishonestly but also inviolation of any direction of law or any contract expressor implied relating to carrying out the trust.67. It is one thing to say that any circular letterissued by Reserve Bank of India being not within thepublic domain would not be law but it would be anotherthing to say that it did not contain any direction of lawso as to attract the liability in terms of Section 405 ofthe Penal Code. Lawful directions were issued by ReserveBank of India. The circular letter was meant for allscheduled banks. The authorities and/or officers runningthe affairs of the scheduled banks therefore were awarethereof. If it is binding on the banks, it would bebinding on the officers.68. Any act of omission or commission on the part ofany authority of the Bank would amount to acting inviolation of any direction of law. A direction of lawneed not be a law made by Parliament or a legislature; itmay be made by an authority having the power therefore;the law could be a subordinate legislation, a notificationor even a custom.69. Indisputably, the higher authorities of the Bankwere entrusted with or otherwise had domination over theproperties of the Bank. They were dealing with publicfunds. Indisputably again they were required to apply thesame in terms of the circulars issued by the Bank as alsoReserve Bank of India. It has been accepted at the Barthat failure on the part of the officers of the Bank toabide by the directives issued under the circulars wouldresult in civil action. Subjecting the bank to a civilliability would thus attract one of the ingredients ofcriminal breach of trust. There cannot be, however, anydoubt whatsoever that a mere error of judgment would notattract the penal provision contained in Section 409 ofthe Penal Code. The materials brought on record by theparties must be judged keeping in view the aforesaid legalposition."21. In the present case, the Tribunal had held that if chargesare proved that by itself is wilful negligence of the petitionersthere was no further proof about their intention is required.Therefore, whatever contention raised by the petitioners that werefound rejected by the Tribunal was based on sound reasons. But,however the last submission of the learned senior counsel that theTribunal made a perfunctory order without fixing proper liabilitieson each of the petitioners . It did not even refer to the surchargeproceedings which emanated from three different orders and thesurcharge proceedings were also preceded on the basis of threedifferent enquiry reports. Since some of the petitioners have raisedcontentions, about either they were not in employment on the daysnoted or were not on duty during the period in question, theTribunal ought to have given a finding on such separate defence taken https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ by the petitioners.22. Though Mr.P.Sivashanmugasundaram, learned counsel for thesociety attempted to justify the impugned order by stating that nosuch contentions were raised, a perusal of the impugned order showsthat the Tribunal did not deal with any of the individual contentionsor the defects pointed by the petitioners. Since the liabilityfastened on the petitioners runs into more than half a Crorerupees, it is necessary that the attention of the Tribunal shouldhave been focussed on the issues raised and appropriate findingsshould have been given. Therefore, on that short ground, the writpetitions are liable to be allowed. The impugned orders passed bythe Tribunal will stand set aside and the tribunal is directed todispose of the said matter afresh and after due notice to theparties. Since the appeals were of the year 2001 and more than nineyears have elapsed, the Tribunal shall give preference to hearing ofthis matter and in any event dispose of the cases within a period ofsix months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.23. If it is made clear that the contentions regarding non-furnishing of the enquiry reports, not adhering to time scheduleunder Section 87 and also the finding on the grounds of willfulnegligence, no further issues can be raised by the petitioners. Ifany of the petitioners want to raise any independent issue abouttheir non-involvement or not being present for duty on such dates,they are allowed to raise such additional grounds and the bank isalso entitled to file additional counter statement resisting theircontentions. 24. With the above directions, all the writ petitions areallowed to the extent indicated above. Consequently connected WVMPand WPMPs are closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.Sd/-Asst. Registrar//true copy//Sub Asst.RegistrarksrTo1. The District Judge-cum-Tribunal forCo-operative Cases of theNilgiris District, Udhagamandalam.2. The Deputy Registrar ofCooperative Societies,Udhagamandalam, The Nilgiris. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

3.The Special OfficerThe Nilgiris District CentralCooperative Bank, Manjoor BranchManjoor, The Nilgiris.1 cc to Mr.P.S.Sivashanmugasundram, Advocate, Sr.No.127511 cc to Mr.R.Parthiban, Advocate, Sr.No.12632W.P.Nos.24311, 24580, 27261, 27265,34540,34677, 35759, 18277 of 2003 and 2041 of 2004 and W.V.M.P.No.1826 of 2004, WPMP.No.33310 of 2003and WPMP.No.43335 of 2003RB {CO}TP/RH/18.3.2010.