Madrasdated High Court · 2025

25.The Assistant Commissioner of PoliceTraffic Investigation Unit – WestGreater Chennai PoliceAnna Nagar, Chennai – 600 040.... RespondentsPRAYER: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issue of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records and quash the order dated 23.02.2022 made in Na.Ka.No.B2/1301524/2021 passed by the fourth respondent and appeal rejected order dated 18.02.2023 passed by the second respondent herein and direct the respondents to grant regular increments.***For Petitioner:: Mr. D.Vijaya BabuFor Respondents:: Mr. V.Nanmaran Additional Government PleaderORDERThe Writ Petition has been filed in the nature of a Certiorarified Mandamus seeking records relating to an order dated 23.02.2022 in Na.Ka.No.B2/1301524/2021 passed by the fourth respondent/ the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kancheepuram Range, Kanchipuram and on the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 3appeal which had been rejected by an order dated 18.02.2023 passed by the second respondent / Additional Director General of Police and to quash both the aforementioned orders and to direct the respondent to grant regular increments to the petitioner herein.2. In the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, it had been stated that when the writ petitioner was serving as Inspector of Police – 'E' Coy, Armed Reserve II, Greater Chennai Police, St.Thomas Mount, Chennai, on 24.10.2011, the Inspector of Police, City-II, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Chennai had registered FIR in Cr.No. 9/AC/2011/CC-II under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 naming the petitioner as the accused. The said FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint given by one Rajendran, who stated that the petitioner had demanded a sum of Rs.1,000/- as monthly mamool for permitting his buses to enter into the city at any time to pick up passengers. It had been further contended in the affidavit that on completion of investigation, final report had been laid before the Special Court for Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, Chennai and was taken cognizance as C.C.No. 8 of 2013 for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2), 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 4Act, 1988. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that after trial, the trial Court had acquitted the petitioner by Judgment dated 14.10.2016, holding that the demand and acceptance of bribe had not been proved by the prosecution. The State then filed an appeal along with an application seeking to condone the delay and also an application seeking leave to appeal. 4. All these applications came up for consideration before a learned Single Judge of this Court, who by an order dated 27.08.2019, had dismissed both the applications seeking to condone the delay and also seeking leave to appeal. It had been observed by the learned Single Judge that no illegality or perversity could be found in the Judgment of the trial Court. 5. Thereafter, the respondents however did not let the matter rest at that and proceeded with the departmental enquiry. The challenge in this Writ Petition is only with respect to the findings in the enquiry and the consequential punishment imposed and confirmed by the appellate https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 5authority. 6. The enquiry Officer had returned a finding on the two charges which were exactly the same and similar to the charges which the petitioner faced during criminal prosecution, namely that he had demanded bribe amount of Rs.1,000/- and that he had also accepted the bribe amount of Rs.1,000/-. Both oral and documentary evidence before the enquiry officer was also the practically the same. 7. Placing his arguments on the aforementioned circumstances, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2024(1) SCC 175 [ Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had also examined a similar issue, namely, identical charges being laid against an individual both before the criminal Court and during the enquiry proceedings and examination of the same on the same set of oral and documentary evidence. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered a case where the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 6criminal Court had acquitted the individual on the basis of the evidence adduced. On that basis, while examining the findings that the charges had been proved during the departmental proceedings and the challenge for judicial review against such a finding, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as follows in paragraph No.12:-“12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The Court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. (See G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121], State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 7SCC 657 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram [State of T.N.v.S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] .) ”9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also stated as follows in paragraph Nos. 28 and 29:-“28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 8and not go by the form of expression used. 29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. [Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P., (1990) 3 SCC 190 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 378] ). ”10. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on the aforementioned portions of the Judgment.11. In paragraph No.12 of the aforementioned Judgment, it had been https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 9very clearly pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if the charges in the departmental enquiry and in the criminal Court are identical and similar and if the evidence presented through the witnesses and the circumstances are also one and the same, then in judicial review, the Court could grant redress in certain circumstances. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had been very careful in the language which had been used and had stated that the Court, namely, the Court which exercise its authority to review the punishment imposed in the disciplinary enquiry can exercise its discretion and grant relief but at the same time had also cautioned the Court by stating that such relief could be granted only if a conclusion is reached that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This would automatically mean that mere acquittal in a criminal case is not sufficient to hold that the findings returned in an enquiry proceedings should be reviewed by the Court in favour of the delinquent and any punishment imposed should be automatically set aside by the Court. 13. The Court has a duty to return a finding that if the findings in the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 10disciplinary proceedings are permitted to stand, it would result in an unjust, unfair and oppressive proceedings as against the petitioner. 14. It had also been stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that “each case will turn on its own facts.” 15. It is thus seen that there cannot be a finding given that merely because there has been an acquittal in a criminal case and the charges that have been proved in the departmental proceedings should be reversed by the High Court.16. In the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the charge was that for the appointment to the post of a constable, the candidate, whose date of birth was 21.04.1974 was alleged to have altered it to 21.04.1972 and was then recruited to the post of constable. It had also been stated that consequent to such alteration of the date of birth, offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC had been invoked and FIR was registered. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

1117. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had examined the statements of the witnesses, who had been examined during the departmental enquiry and thereafter, had also examined the evidence tendered during the departmental proceedings with specific reference to the alleged alteration of the date of birth. It was also found that no alteration had been made in the mark sheet of the 8th class and that the date of birth was actually 21.04.1972. In view of that particular admission made during the departmental enquiry that no alteration had been made in the mark sheet, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had again opined that it was very clear that no alteration was found in the 8th class mark sheet and that the date of birth mentioned therein was 21.04.1972. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had examined the evidence as adduced and had stated that the findings in the departmental proceedings could be interfered with by the Court in judicial review. It is on the basis of such reasoning and after examining the evidence in that particular case that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that a conclusion should have been reached by the High Court that the disciplinary proceedings were unjust, unfair and oppressive.18. In the instant case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 12respondents, the defacto complainant Rajendran had very clearly stated during the course of his evidence that in the place where the demand and acceptance of bribe amount purportedly happened, there was a table and on the table, the petitioner had placed his waki taki and his money purse and the complainant had taken out the bribe amount from his pocket and had kept it below the money purse on the table and thereafter had shaken the hands of the writ petitioner, wished him for the Deepavali festival and thereafter had given a signal to the Vigilance Officials. The actual words are as follows:-jdJ ghf;bfl;oypUe;j U:gha; nehl;Lfis vLf;Fk;nghJ mth; irifahy; ntz;lhk; vd;W kWj;jhhh; vd;Wk;. mg;nghJ m';F cl;fhh;e;jpUe;j egh;fs; mtUld; ngrpf;bfhz;oUe;jdh; vd;Wk; mg;nghJ m';fpUe;j nlgpspd;nky; thf;fp lhf;fp bjhg;gp kw;Wk; kzpgh;R ,Ue;jjhft[k; mg;nghJ jdJ ghf;bfl;oypUe;j gzj;ij vLj;J nlgps;nky; ,Ue;j kzpgh;rpd; fPnH gzj;ij itj;Jtpl;L rhUf;F kPz;Lk; xUKiw ifFYf;fp jPghtsp thH;j;J Twptpl;L tp$pbyd;!; Ma;thsh; mth;fspd; mwpt[iuapd;go iffofhuj;ij fHl;o khl;oajhft[k;. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

1319. There are two aspects in the aforementioned extract. The first is that the entire incident did not take place in a private place. It took place in a public place. In the public place, the petitioner was in uniform. At that time, the defacto complainant had taken out the bribe amount from his pocket and wanted to shake the hands of the writ petitioner and hand over the money to him. The writ petitioner by a sign indicated that he would not receive it directly. Thereafter, in full view of the writ petitioner, the defacto complainant went over to the table, took the money purse, kept the bribe amount under the money purse and then shook hands with the writ petitioner and wished him for the Deepavali festival and then gave a signal to the Vigilance Officer. 20. The natural conduct of the writ petitioner when a stranger moves over to a table and takes out the money purse whould be to raise a protest. His purse, which contained his personal belongings had been taken from the table and thereafter, cash of Rs.1,000/- had been kept on the table under the money purse. The normal conduct of the writ petitioner should have been to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 14raise a hue and cry and protest against such conduct of the defacto complainant. Even if the writ petitioner had no inclination to receive the bribe, after this particular act of the bribe amount being kept under the money purse on the table, the writ petitioner should not have permitted the defacto complainant to shake his hands and wish him for the Deepavali festival. A wish for Deepavali festival could be termed as an innocuous act. But when it is done in the middle of the road after tainted money is kept under the money purse of the police officer on the table in public view, it would only indicate an acceptance of that money and not of rejection. 21. I hold the findings returned by the enquiry officer on this fact is certainly not unjust, unfair and oppressive. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner however pointed out the further evidence adduced in during the departmental enquiry of one Baskar, who could be termed as the decoy witness or a witness to the trap proceedings. According to this particular witness, he had stated as follows with respect to the demand and acceptance of bribe amount:- https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15khiy Rkhh; 5.00 kzpastpy; vjphp TN 01 G 4152 vd;w muR bts;isepw nkhl;lhh; irf;fpspd; AREVA fk;bgdp gpujhd thapiy xl;o ,lJg[wk; cs;s miw Kd;g[ tz;oia epWj;jptpl;L cs;ns brd;whh; vd;Wk;. mg;nghJ rpfdy; gf;fj;jpy; epd;Wbfhz;oUe;j jhDk; thjpa[k; vjphpia bjhlh;e;J mth; brd;w miwf;Fs; brd;wjhft[k; mg;nghJ vjphp m';fpUe;j bgd;r;rpy; cl;fhh;e;jpUe;jhh; vd;Wk; jh';fs; cs;ns brd;wt[ld; vjphp thjpaplk; v';nf gzk; vd;W nfl;L jdJ tyJ ifia ePl;oanghJ mtuJ ,lJ ifapy; thf;fp lhf;fp itj;jpUe;jhh; vd;Wk; clnd thjp jdJ Orh;l; ghf;bfl;oy; itj;jpUe;j gzj;ij vLj;J vjphpaplk; bfhLj;jhh; vd;Wk; mth; mij tyJ ifahy; th';fp bfhz;L jdJ ,lJ ifapypUe;j thf;fp lhf;fpia nki$apd;kPJ itj;Jtpl;L tyJifahy; jhd; nghl;oUe;j fhf;fp ngz;l;od; gpd;gf;f tyJ ghf;bfl;oypUe;J fUg;g[epw gh;ir vLj;J mjpy; gzj;ij itj;J kPz;Lk; mnj ghf;bfl;oy; gh;ir itj;Jf;bfhz;lhh; vd;Wk; kPz;Lk; thf;fp lhf;fpia vLj;Jf;bfhz;L j';fis nghfr;brhd;dhh; vd;Wk; https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16mg;nghJ neuk; Rkhh; 5.05 kzp ,Uf;Fk; vdt[k; gpwF jhDk; thjpa[k; me;j miwia tpl;L btspna te;jt[ld; thjp jdJ iff;fofhuj;ij fHl;o Jilj;J kPz;Lk; mzpe;J rkpf;if bra;jhh;.23. It was stated by the learned counsel that the decoy witness had given a contradictory version about the manner in which the money was demanded and the money was received. 24. The fact is that this witness had also stated that there was acceptance of the bribe amount. 25. He had spoken about the table, the walki takki and the money purse. In a Departmental proceedings, the enquiry Officer has to examine whether on preponderance of probabilities, namely while weighing the scales of the evidence which had been adduced, whether it could be determined that it was probable that there was a demand and that there was an acceptance. The enquiry Officer concluded that it was probable that there was demand of bribe and there was acceptance of bribe. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis

1726. Even if this witness had given a slightly different version about the manner in which the bribe was accepted, still the fact of acceptance had been reiterated. Again, if this evidence is to be appreciated, the only finding which could be returned in the departmental proceedings is that the petitioner had accepted bribe amount. In effect, the tainted money of Rs.1,000/- came to the possession of the writ petitioner. He had not rejected it. He had not questioned the conduct of the complainant. This acceptance of tainted money was unbecoming of a police officer in uniform while discharging duty in public. 27. I hold no grounds had been made out to disturb the said finding. 28. The punishment imposed was to the subjective satisfaction of the Officers and this Court can never review or examine the nature of the punishment imposed. 29. The Writ Petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 24.02.2025vsg https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 18Index: Yes/NoInternet: Yes/NoSpeaking / Non Speaking OrderTo1.The Director General of PoliceHead of the Police Force – TamilnaduOffice of the Director General of PoliceMylapore, Chennai – 600 004.2.The Additional Director General of PoliceLaw and Order, TamilnaduMylapore, Chennai – 600 004.3.The Joint Commissioner of PoliceTraffic-North, Greater Chennai Police,O/o, the Additional Commissioner of PoliceTraffic Zone, Vepery, Chennai – 600 007.4. The Deputy Inspector General of PoliceKancheepuram RangeKanchipuram.5.The Assistant Commissioner of PoliceTraffic Investigation Unit – WestGreater Chennai PoliceAnna Nagar, Chennai – 600 040. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 19C.V.KARTHIKEYAN, J.,vsgW.P.No. 31495 of 2024