PETITION NO.3789 of 2006and WPMP.No.4057 of 2006and WVMP.No.1435 of 2006..Murray & Co v. Appellate Authority under Central Act 40 of 1971 Public Premises (Eviction

negotiations were going on for renewal of lease as it has been donein the past, the petitioner cannot be treated as an unauthorisedoccupant.2(e). The Estate Officer, who is the Enquiring Authority underthe Act, conducted an enquiry by giving opportunity to both theparties and after completing the enquiry, reserved the matter fororders in September,2004. However, without passing orders, theEstate Officer has sent a notice on 03.02.2005, enclosing a letterdated 13.01.2005 of the second respondent, LIC of India, seeking toplace certain new materials to show as if the demised premises arein dilapidated condition and are to be demolished. The petitionercame to know that after the enquiry before the Estate Officer iscompleted, the second respondent, LIC of India has approached theCorporation of Chennai and obtained a demolition plan sanctioned inrespect of the property and wanted to place the said materialsbefore the Estate Officer along with some photographs.2(f). The petitioner has filed an objection on 03.03.2005before the Estate Officer, opposing the said application by thesecond respondent, however, the Estate Officer has rejected theopposition by the petitioner, passed an order under Section 5(1) ofthe Act on 10.05.2005 in Petition No.19 of 2004, and directed thepetitioner to vacate the leased premises within 15 days from thedate of receipt of the order, since the Estate Officer hasconcluded on the basis that when the tenancy in respect of thepublic premises is terminated, the tenant loses its authority to bein occupation and therefore, the tenant will be treated as anunauthorised occupant. 2(g). The petitioner has filed an appeal under Section 9 ofthe Act before the Appellate Authority, first respondent herein,viz., The Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras and ultimately,the same was heard by the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court,Madras in CMA.No.72 of 2005. After arguments, the appellateauthority, has dismissed the appeal by judgement dated 25.01.2006.2(h). The said order of the appellate authority is challengedby the writ petitioner on various grounds, including that the saidorder is vitiated by error on the face of record, since itproceeded on wrong presumption that the petitioner has questionedthe termination notice dated 18.03.2004, forgetting the fact thatthe petitioner has challenged the show-cause notice dated22.06.2004, purporting to be a notice under Sections 4(1) and 4(2)of the Act, and therefore, the challenge is not in respect of thetermination notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer ofProperty Act.2(i) That apart, it is the case of the petitioner that theimpugned order of the first respondent is perverse. According tothe petitioner, when the order of the Estate Officer shows thatsuch a tenant cannot be treated as a trespasser, even though it maybe regarded as an unauthorised occupant under Section 2(g) of theAct, it is not correct for the first respondent, appellateauthority to decide as if the petitioner has become an unauthorised https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ occupant, by merely giving notice of termination, and the firstrespondent has failed to consider the Scheme of the very Act,particularly when the Act contemplates cogent procedure of hearingand also filing of appeal. 2(j). There is a distinction between a case where terminationnotice of lease is challenged before the Court and a case whicharises under the Central Act 40 of 1971, based on issuance of show-cause notice and thereafter reply and then order passed on merits.It is the further case of the petitioner that the first respondenthas failed to take into consideration that when the negotiationbetween the petitioner and the second respondent was going on inrespect of renewal of lease and refixation of rent as it has beendone earlier, the termination notice happened to be given and show-cause notice issued and therefore, on the factual situation alsothe petitioner cannot be treated as an unauthorised occupant.2(k). It is the further case of the petitioner that the firstrespondent has exceeded its summary power arbitrarily passing theeviction order. The impugned order of the first respondent ischallenged on the ground that the first respondent ought not haveconsidered that the leased premises in occupation of the petitioneris dilapidated in nature, while the motivation of the secondrespondent is to get higher rent. According to the petitioner, thefirst respondent has failed to give purposive interpretation to theprovisions of the Act. It is also the case of the petitioner thatpending the appeal the petitioner has in fact filed CMP.No.2718 of2005, for permission to effect repairs to the leased premises,which was directed to be posted along with the appeal and it doesnot mean that the petitioner has admitted that the building is indilapidated condition. It is the further case of the petitionerthat the first respondent has acted in excess of its jurisdiction.3. The second respondent has filed counter affidavit. It isthe case of the second respondent that the petitioner is a tenantunder LIC of India and the premises being owned by LIC of India, isa public premises as per the Act and the extent of property, viz.,5588 sq.ft. is worth several crores and the same is situate in AnnaSalai, Chennai. According to the second respondent, the buildingis very old, existing for more than 80 years. While the petitionerwas paying Rs.11,000/- as rent per month, which is a very meageramount, the original lease granted to the petitioner came to an endin 1990, and thereafter, there was no fresh lease agreement enteredinto and since the petitioner was a tenant, its tenancy can beterminated by giving 15 days notice under Section 106 of theTransfer of Property Act. 3(a). It is also the case of the second respondent that merelybecause the petitioner was a tenant for several years, it does notgive permanent right of occupancy to it. It is also the case ofthe second respondent that inasmuch as no rental agreement is inexistence and therefore, the petitioner is governed by Section 106of the Transfer of Property Act, for terminating the tenancy forwhich no reasons need be given. By the said notice of terminationdated 18.03.2004, the tenancy right of the petitioner was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ determined and on expiry of the said period given under the notice,the petitioner has to vacate and deliver possession. However, thepetitioner gave a reply on 06.04.2004, refusing to vacate thepublic premises and as per the Act, the possession of thepetitioner thereafter is unauthorised occupation, as it has beenheld in various cases. In those circumstances, the secondrespondent approached the Estate Officer, seeking eviction onvarious grounds.3(b). It was, after due application of mind and finding thatthe petitioner is in occupation of a "public premises", the EstateOfficer has concluded that the petitioner is an unauthorisedoccupant and issued a show-cause notice under Section 4 of the Act.It was after due opportunity given to both parties, the EstateOfficer found that there is no agreed period of lease and thepetitioner was occupying only on monthly rental basis and there hasbeen a valid termination and in spite of the same, the petitionerfailed to vacate the premises and therefore, the petitioner is anunauthorised occupant as per the Act. However, before the orderswere pronounced by the Estate Officer, the demolition plansanctioned by the Chennai Corporation has been produced and theEstate Officer has in fact given an opportunity to the petitionerand the petitioner has filed a counter and it was after a detailedenquiry, the Estate Officer came to the conclusion that thepetitioner was liable to be evicted and accordingly, the evictionorder was passed.3(c). According to the second respondent, even pending appeal,the petitioner has filed an application admitting that the buildingrequires repair in roof portion and that is sufficient to prove thepoor condition of the building, which is more than 80 years old.It was, after elaborate arguments, the first respondent, appellateauthority has confirmed the order of eviction, holding that therewas no concluded contract for renewal of lease and the terminationof lease was valid and the show-cause notice and eviction orderpassed by the Estate Officer were justified on facts andcircumstances.3(d). That apart, the second respondent denied all the legalgrounds raised by the petitioner. It is the further case of thesecond respondent that the offer of the petitioner to pay higherrent itself cannot be the basis to contend that the secondrespondent has agreed to extend the lease and is willing to renewthe lease in favour of the petitioner, because the petitioner hasbeen paying a very meager amount as rent in respect of a propertysituate in prime locality. It is the case of the second respondentthat the appellate authority has comprehensively dealt with theentire issue and hence, it does not require or warrant anyinterference.4. Mr.K.C.Rajappa, learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner has submitted that the notice issued by the EstateOfficer under Section 4(1) of the Act itself is arbitrary. In thisregard, his submission is that when the discussion between thepetitioner and the second respondent was going on in respect of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ extension of lease with increase in rent, there was no necessityfor the Estate Officer to invoke the provisions of Section 4(1) ofthe Act. It is his further contention that issuance of said show-cause notice under Section 4(1) is not bona fide in the sense thatthe contract between the parties are about to be concluded, sincediscussion was going on and in the absence of any decision taken bythe second respondent on the negotiation, Act 40 of 1971 cannot beenforced.4(a). On the facts of the case, his further submission is thatwhen the Estate Officer has reserved the matter for orders inSeptember, 2004, it was not open to him to receive any additionaldocuments and give further notice on 03.02.2005 on the basis thatthe second respondent has produced some other documents to showthat the premises is in dilapidated condition. According to him,the Estate Officer has no power or jurisdiction to reopen the caseat all. Therefore, he submits that the Estate Officer havingreserved the orders in September,2004 and kept quite tillFebruary,2005, the second respondent filed application foradditional documents. He would also submit that to receiveadditional documents, the second respondent in fact has filed nopetition at all. Therefore, once show-cause notice was given underSection 4(1) of the Act and after enquiry, the matter was reservedfor orders, there is no power vested in the Estate Officer toreopen the case and the Estate Officer is duty bound to pronounceorders on the basis of the materials available. According to thelearned counsel for the petitioner, in the present case it appearsthat the Estate Officer has waited for some other materials fromthe second respondent and after receiving the materials, givennotice to the petitioner as well as to the second respondent, towhich he has no jurisdiction. 4(b). According to the learned counsel, in the absence ofstatutory powers to issue second show-cause notice, it should betreated as excess of jurisdiction. His further submission is thatthe conduct of the second respondent, LIC of India, in havingdiscussion with the petitioner in respect of enhanced rent, takinginto consideration its previous conduct by which every year thelease period has been extended after negotiation and rent has beenincreased, should be treated as an estoppel by conduct and in thisregard, he would also rely upon the judgements, viz., FoodCorporation of India vs. M/s.Babulal Agrawal [2004 (3) Law Weekly12] and Vijay Jaiswal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 2006 Madras65].4(c). His basic contention is that the petitioner cannot betermed as an unauthorised occupant. He submits that when thepurpose of the Act 40 of 1971 is to give speedy remedy of takingpossession in respect of "public premises", in the absence ofstatutory protection to the tenants, the authorities under the Actare expected to act more cautiously. He would also rely upon thejudgement of the Supreme Court in M/s.Crawford Bayley & Co. &Others vs. Union of India and others [AIR 2006 SC 2544]. Thelearned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that he isnot questioning the notice of termination issued by the second https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respondent under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hissubmission is only based on the validity or otherwise of the show-cause notice issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4(1) of theAct.4(d). He would also submit that the public authority like theEstate Officer is expected to act not like an ordinary landlord.He would also rely upon the judgement of the Supreme Court inJamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai [AIR2004 SC 1815]. He would submit that the decision of the publicauthorities must not be arbitrary and the conclusion should not beunjustified and relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court inBharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., vs. Maddula Ratnavalli andothers [2008 (1) Law Weekly 165]. Ultimately, he would submit thatone of the reasons assigned by the Estate Officer as well as theappellate authority for passing orders viz., the premises is indilapidated condition, is arbitrary and unjustified, since thatpoint was never raised at any point of time by the secondrespondent before the Estate Officer as a ground, while issuingshow-cause notice under Section 4(1) of the Act and therefore,according to him, the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to takenew materials for consideration.4(e). According to the learned counsel for the petitioner,the petitioner is a leading auctioneer in the State and carrying onbusiness for many long years and by virtue of various letters ofthe second respondent, the petitioner has been accepting theenhanced rent and extension of lease and in such circumstances, thesecond respondent ought to have chosen either of the courses beforeit approached the Estate Officer. According to him, Act 40 of 1971confers valuable right on the tenant. In this regard, he wouldalso reiterate the decision of the Bombay High Court in MinooFramroze Balsara vs. Union of India [AIR 1992 Bombay 375]. Hewould also rely upon an Official Memorandum issued by theGovernment giving guidelines and directions to the publicauthorities to be followed while resorting to eviction of publicpremises. His further submission is that even after the noticeissued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, thepetitioner has got a right not to be dispossessed. He would alsoplace reliance upon the judgement in Dr.Yash Paul Gupta vs.Dr.S.S.Anand and others [AIR 1980 Jammu & Kashmir 16].5. Per contra, Mr.R.Muthukumarasamy, learned senior counselappearing for the second respondent, by referring to the definitionof "public premises" and "unauthorised occupation", would submitthat an unauthorised occupant is a person who is in occupationwithout authority or continue to occupy after the authority isconcluded or a person who is allowed to occupy and who continues tobe in occupation even after the termination of agreement/lease,which need not be for any reason. Therefore, according to thelearned senior counsel, under the Act, which provides for summaryprocedure, there is no necessity to give any reason for terminationof tenancy. He would also submit that when the petitioner has madeit very clear that it is not questioning the termination noticeissued by the second respondent, it has to be presumed that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petitioner is no longer a tenant.5(a). He would submit that the object of the Act must be takeninto consideration as a whole and if the purpose of the presentAct, which provides for summary procedure for the purpose ofeviction, should be interpreted to give reason for eviction, thenit will be worse than the Rent Control Act and that is not thepurport of the Act dealing with "public premises". Therefore,according to the learned senior counsel, the premises under thePublic Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, isdifferent from the premises under the Rent Control Act or thecommon law. He would submit that even under the common law bygiving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,without assigning any reason, an Ejectment suit can be filed andthe same analogy is applicable for eviction of a person who is inoccupation of the public premises under the Act 40 of 1971.5(b). To substantiate his contention that no reason need begiven for the purpose of termination, he would rely upon thejudgement in Jiwan Das vs. LIC of India and another [1994 (3) SCC(Suppl.) 394] apart from the judgements in M/s.Jain InkManufacturing Company vs. LIC of India and another [1980 (4) SCC435]; and Commissioner, Jalandhar Division and others vs. MohanKrishan Abrol and another [2004 (4) CTC 35]. On the other hand, inthe present case, the second respondent has issued a terminationnotice on 18.03.2004, giving reason, which is not necessarily tobe given. His submission is that the procedure followed by theEstate Officer is perfectly in order and valid in law. With regardto additional documents submitted by the second respondent beforethe Estate Officer, his contention is that the Estate Officer isauthorised to see any further document and there is absolutely nobar on the part of the Estate Officer while conducting enquiryunder Section 5 of Act 40 of 1971 to consider subsequentdevelopments. In the present case, at the time of enquiry beforethe Estate Officer, the application for demolition was pendingbefore the Chennai Corporation and after the matter was reserved bythe Estate Officer, the demolition order was received from theChennai Corporation and that was also placed before the EstateOfficer. The Estate Officer, in conformity with the principles ofnatural justice, has, in fact given an opportunity to thepetitioner and the petitioner having participated in theproceedings, is not at all entitled to question the conduct of theEstate Officer.5(c). He would also submit that the appellate authority hasgiven a correct reason, which does not require/warrant anyinterference. His submission is that the direction to be followedfor eviction of public premises, which is relied upon by thelearned counsel for the petitioner, has no statutory force and suchdirection cannot be treated as a bar to take any furtherproceedings under the Act. In this regard, he would also rely uponthe judgement of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. S.L.Abbas[AIR 1993 SC 2444]. He would also submit that any executiveinstructions cannot be issued when the field is occupied. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 5(d). His further submission is that when Act 40 of 1971prescribes the entire procedure, there is no question of issuingany executive instruction. He would rely upon various judgements,viz.,(i)B.Sundararajan vs. Government of Tamil Nadu [1997 WLR 391];(ii)The Association of Management of Private Colleges, etc. &others vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, etc. & others [1997 WLR 647(DB)];(iii)Uttam Parkash Bansal vs. LIC of India [2002 Delhi Law Times497 (DB)]; and(iv)Mirta Lina Private Ltd., vs. LIC of India [1999 (2) CLJ 457].He would ultimately submit that such instructions cannot place afetter on the statutory powers of the executive authority, byrelying upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in IndianAluminium Company vs. Kerala State Electricity Board [1975 (2) SCC414]. His further submission is that the power given to the EstateOfficer under the LIC Act cannot be taken away by the executiveinstructions. 5(e). He would submit that the second respondent is notestopped by its conduct. At no point of time the second respondenthas made any representation that the petitioner will continue tobe a tenant on payment of enhanced rent. The negotiation cannot betreated as a representation, inasmuch as there is no renewal. Hewould rely upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in Pawan Alloys& Casting Pvt. Ltd. Meerut vs. U.P. State Electricity Board andothers [1997 (7) SCC 251]. He would submit that the question ofestoppel does not arise. It may be case of legitimate expectationfor renewal and that is not a ground for giving relief, for whichhe relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in FoodCorporation of India vs. M/s.Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries [1993(1) SCC 71].6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and thelearned senior counsel for the second respondent and perused theentire records, considered each and every aspects of the case.7. At the outset, it is clear that the premises, which is thesubject matter in the writ petition, viz., Old Door Nos.100, 101and 101-A and New Nos.149, 151 and 151-A, Anna Salai, Chennai 600002 respectively and in possession of the petitioner are publicpremises, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act and in thepresent case, the said Act is applicable. The object of the Act isfor speedy recovery of possession in favour of the Government orstatutory bodies from persons who are occupying the places by wayof summary eviction procedure. The premises in occupation of thepetitioner belongs to the second respondent, which is aCorporation, established under the Central Act, as per Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Act. The other requirement is that the petitioner,who is in occupation should be an unauthorised occupant.8. The term "unauthorised occupation" is defined under Section2(g) of the Act, which is as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "2(g) "unauthorised occupation", in relation to anypublic premises, means the occupation by any personof the public premises without authority for suchoccupation, and includes the continuance inoccupation by any person of the public premisesafter the authority (whether by way of grant of anyother mode of transfer) under which he was allowedto occupy the premises, has expired or has beendetermined for any reason whatsoever."9. Therefore, under the Act to constitute as an unauthorisedoccupation, the person must be,(i)in possession of public premises; and(ii)His possession must be without authority for occupation; or(iii)Person in possession of the public premises continuous inoccupation after authority has expired; or(iv)the authority by which a person was allowed to occupy thepremises expires or stands terminated for any reason whatsoever.By applying the above said requirements of 'unauthorisedoccupation' to the facts and circumstances of the case and on thecategoric admission by the petitioner and the learned counsel forthe petitioner that the second respondent, who is the owner of thepublic premises has terminated the tenancy by letter dated18.03.2004, which is the requirement under Section 106 of theTransfer of Property Act and the same has not been disputed orchallenged by the petitioner or his counsel, the petitioner has tobe treated as an unauthorised person who was holding the authorityunder the agreement which was subsequently terminated ordetermined. 10. It is also significant to note that Section 2(g) of theAct makes it explicit that in cases of such termination ofauthority of a person to occupy, it can be for any reasonwhatsoever and therefore, the reasonability of such reason cannotbe questioned. A reference to the said termination notice issuedby the second respondent dated 18.03.2004, is as follows:"You are the tenant under us in respect ofthe property comprising of the following area in DoorNo.101(old), Anna Salai, Chennai 600 002 for which arent of Rs.11,000/- is being paid by you.1.2400 sq.ft. In the ground floor of the United Indiabuilding (old).2.2059 sq.ft. Open ground at the back of the building3.77 sq.ft. For toilet4.583 sq.ft. In the old Hindi cell5.469 sq.ft. Area open to sky.For such an area situated in the heart ofChennai behind the landmark LIC Building, the returns tothe corporation is very meager. It has therefore beendecided to resume possession of the premises for takingsuitable steps for securing better returns. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Accordingly your tenancy shall standterminated on expiry of 15 days from the date of receiptof this notice after which you are called upon to vacateand hand over vacant possession to us."The above termination notice makes it very clear that the secondrespondent has terminated the tenancy of the petitioner and decidedto resume possession for the reason that the returns to theCorporation is very meager. 11. It is very strange for the petitioner to contend thatby virtue of various letters of the second respondent dated21.07.2003, 21.10.2003 and 14.11.2003, the petitioner was made tobelieve that the second respondent would renew the lease on higherrent and in this way, it is admitted by the petitioner itself thatthe rent paid by it to the second respondent is low, and thepetitioner has failed to prove that after expiry of the last leasegranted by the second respondent on 01.09.2000, there was anyagreement of lease entered by the second respondent with thepetitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitionercontinue to have the authority from the landlord to remain inpossession even after the termination and therefore is not anunauthorised occupant. Admittedly, after termination of tenancyissued by the second respondent/landlord, the authority of thepetitioner to remain in possession as a legal occupant comes to anend and thereafter, what is required is to follow the summaryprocedure for eviction under the Act. 12. The petitioner having categorically admitted that it isnot questioning the validity of the termination notice issued bythe second respondent/landlord dated 18.03.2004 and thereby hasbecome an unauthorised occupant under Section 2(g) of the Act,cannot find fault with the order of the Estate Officer and thefirst respondent, appellate authority on the basis that the reasonfor termination or requirement of possession of public premises waseither unreasonable or different reason has been adoptedsubsequently. That is not the intent and purport of the Act. 13. The termination notice issued by the second respondentdated 18.03.2004 is one covered under Section 106 of the Transferof Property Act, which is as follows:" 106. Duration of certain leases in absence ofwritten contract or local usage.-(1) In the absence of acontract or local law or usage to the contrary, a leaseof immovable property for agricultural or manufacturingpurposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year toyear, terminable, on the part of either lessor orlessee, by six months' notice; and a lease of immovableproperty for any other purpose shall be deemed to be alease from month to month, terminable, on the part ofeither lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained inany other law for the time being in force, the periodmentioned in sub-section (1) shall commence from the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ date of receipt of notice.(3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall notbe deemed to be invalid merely because the periodmentioned therein falls short of the period specifiedunder that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding isfiled after the expiry of the period mentioned in thatsub-section.(4) Every notice under sub-section (1) mustbe in writing signed by or on behalf of the persongiving it, and either be sent by post to the party whois intended to be bound by it or be tendered ordelivered personality to such party, or to one of hisfamily or servants at his residence, or (if such tenderor delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuouspart of the property." 14. Therefore, the notice of termination is expected to begiven only as per the time schedule granted under the Act and itdoes not require any reason. The Supreme Court in Jiwan Das vs.LIC of India and another [1994 (3) SCC (Supp.) 694], whilecomparing the said provision with that of an order of evictionpassed under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction ofUnauthorised Occupants) Act,1971, has held that when the latter Actempowers the authority to act in public interest and determine thetenancy, it cannot be said that the tenant should be put in higherpedestal as a statutory tenant under Rent Control Act. In thesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has held as follows:" 4. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does indicate thatthe landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy bygiving 15 days’ notice, if it is a premises occupied onmonthly tenancy and by giving 6 months’ notice if thepremises are occupied for agricultural or manufacturingpurposes, and on expiry thereof proceedings could beinitiated. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does notcontemplate of giving any reason for terminating thetenancy. Equally the definition of the public premises‘unauthorised occupation’ under Section 2(g) of the Actpostulates that the tenancy "has been determined for anyreason whatsoever". When the statute has advisedly givenwide powers to the public authorities under the Act todetermine the tenancy, it is not permissible to cut downthe width of the powers by reading into it thereasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating actionfor terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of theT.P. Act. If it is so read Section 106 of T.P. Act andSection 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. Thestatute advisedly empowered the authority to act in thepublic interest and determine the tenancy or leave orlicence before taking action under Section 5 of the Act.If the contention of the appellant is given acceptancehe would be put on a higher pedestal than a statutorytenant under the Rent Act. Take for example that apremises is let out at a low rent years back like thepresent one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ revise adequate market rent, tenant became liable toejectment. The contention then is, action is violativeof Article 21 offending right to livelihood. Thiscontention too is devoid of any substance. An owner isentitled to deal with his property in his own wayprofitable in its use and occupation. A public authorityis equally entitled to use the public property to thebest advantage as a commercial venture. As an integralincidence of ejectment of a tenant/licensee isinevitable. So the doctrine of livelihood cannotindiscriminately be extended to the area of commercialoperation. Therefore, we do not find any substance inthe contentions of the appellant. The appeal isaccordingly dismissed. No costs." (Emphasis supplied) 15.In the latest judgement rendered in Commissioner,Jalander Division and others vs. Mohan Krishan and another [2004(4) CTC 35], the Supreme Court, while dealing with the PunjabPublic Premises and Land (Eviction of Rent Recovery) Act, 1973, hasheld that after the expiry of a period of lease, when subsequentlyit was not renewed, the public premises is deemed to be inauthorised occupation. The operative portion of the judgement isas follows:"12. The only question, therefore, which remains tobe decided is whether the competent authority was rightin coming to the conclusion that Respondent 1 was inunauthorised occupation of the property as defined underSection 3(b) and, therefore, liable to be evicted underSection 5 of the 1973 Act.13. As stated above, during the lifetime of SmtChanan Kaur, a lease was executed in favour ofRespondent 1 on 7-6-1962 for ten years. Clause 8provides for renewal and not for extension of lease.Hence, Respondent 1 was required to apply for renewalwhich he never did. The so-called application dated 22-5-1972 for renewal merely states that there was a leasedeed dated 7-6-1962 and on its expiry, the lessee wouldcontinue. In this case, the intention of the testatrixunder the Will was to bequeath her bungalow to theHospital absolutely and free of all encumbrances and forall times. She wanted her bungalow to be used as a wardin the government hospital. In the circumstances, we areof the view that on expiry of the lease, Respondent 1was in wrongful and illegal use and occupation of theproperty in the nature of unauthorised occupation and,therefore, the competent authority was right in passingthe impugned order of eviction under the 1973 Act."Therefore, it is clear that there is no requirement of showing anyindependent ground for eviction, and validity or otherwise of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reasons cannot be the ground for an unauthorised occupant tosustain his possession. 16. Under Section 4 of the Act, if the Estate Officer is ofthe opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation andtherefore, he should be evicted, he shall give notice specifyingthe grounds. Section 4 of the Act is as follows:"Section 4. Issue of notice to show causeagainst order of eviction.- (1) If the estate officer isof opinion that any persons are in unauthorisedoccupation of any public premises and that they should beevicted, the estate officer shall issue in the matterhereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon allpersons concerned to show cause why an order of evictionshould not be made. (2) The notice shall-(a) specify the grounds on which the order ofeviction is proposed to be made; and[(b) require all persons concerned, that is tosay, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation, orclaim interest in, the public premises,-(i) to show cause, if any, against theproposed order on or before such date as is specified inthe notice, being a date not earlier than seven days fromthe date of issue thereof, and (ii) to appear before the estate officeron the date specified in the notice along with theevidence which they intend to produce in support of thecause shown, and also for personal hearing, if suchhearing is desired.](3) The estate officer shall cause the noticeto be served by having it affixed on the outer door orsome other conspicuous part of the public premises, andin such other manner as may be prescribed whereupon thenotice shall be deemed to have been duly given to allpersons concerned." 17. It is in accordance with the provisions of the Act, inthis case, the Estate Officer has given a notice to the petitioneron 22.06.2004, giving various reasons, which include the notice fortermination of tenancy issued by the second respondent dated18.03.2004 and after narrating the grounds, having satisfied thatthe petitioner is in unauthorised occupation, the Estate Officerhas issued the said notice. The grounds enumerated in the saidnotice issued by the Estate Officer are as follows:" 1. That you, the Respondent were a tenant under LifeInsurance Corporation of India, the Petitioner inrespect of the Public Premises.2.The Respondent was occupying a large extent ofproperty of 5588 sq.ft. Portion in United India https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Building (old) Door No.100 (old)/New (149), 101, (New151) and 101A (New 151A) Anna Salai Chennai 600 002carrying on commercial business and paying rent ofRs.11000/- per month from September 2000 onwards.3.There is no subsisting lease agreement and as suchthe tenancy was on a month to month basis only.4.A final termination notice was issued to theRespondent on 18.3.2004 terminating the tenancy onexpiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice.5.The notice dated 18.3.2004 was duly served on theRespondent on 31.3.2004.6.That you, are continuing to remain in the PublicPremises even after expiry of the notice period andhave failed to remove yourselves from the PublicPremises as required in the notice of termination oftenancy.7.That, on the expiry of 15 days from the date ofreceipt of the termination notice dated 18.3.2004,there is no authorisation for you, the Respondent, toremain in occupation of the Public Premises and you arean unauthorised occupant and therefore liable to beevicted from the Public Premises.Now therefore, in pursuance of subsection(1) of section 4 of the Act, I hereby call upon you toshow cause on or before 9th July 2004, why such an orderof eviction should not be made.And in pursuance of clause b(ii) ofsubsection (2) of Section 4 of the P.P.Act,1971, I alsocall upon you to appear before me in person or througha duly authorised representative capable of answeringall material questions connected with the matter alongwith the evidence which you intend to produce insupport of the cause shown, on 9th July 2004 at 3.00p.m. for personal hearing." 18. Section 5 enables the Estate Officer to pass orderssubsequently after giving opportunity to the parties, which issummary in nature. On the factual position and as per law laiddown by the Apex Court, it is clear that if a person is inunauthorised occupation, there is absolutely no reason to presumethat the notice issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4(2) ofthe Act is either arbitrary or mala fide in nature. The furthercontention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the orderof eviction passed by the Estate Officer under Section 5(1) of theAct on the basis of the subsequent development, viz., theadditional documents filed by the second respondent is notmaintainable for the reason that it was not raised as a ground inthe notice issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4(2) of theAct, is also not sustainable.19. A reference to the order passed by the Estate https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Officer under Section 5(1) of the Act dated 10.05.2005 shows thathe has taken into consideration the grounds given in the noticeunder Section 4(2) of the Act. The additional document was takenonly as an additional ground stating that the LIC's requirement fordeveloping the property is genuine and bonafide. In my consideredview, that itself cannot be taken to declare that the decision ofthe Estate Officer in ordering eviction is arbitrary, especially inthe circumstances that the petitioner has not challenged thetermination notice and by virtue of that after the expiry of thetime granted under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, thepetitioner became an unauthorised occupant of the public premises.20. The further contention raised by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner that the Estate Officer as well as thefirst respondent should have considered that the second respondentis estopped by the conduct since there were representation anddeliberations by the parties is also not sustainable. In fact, theEstate Officer as well as the appellate authority have taken intoconsideration in detail the said contentions and held that inasmuchas the petitioner's tenancy was terminated in accordance with lawby the second respondent and there is no tenancy createdsubsequently, the occupation of the petitioner should be treated asan unauthorised occupation in a public premises as per the Act.Therefore, the reliance placed on by the learned counsel for thepetitioner in Food Corporation of India vs. M/s.Babulal Agrawal[2004 (3) Law Weekly 12] and Vijay Jailswal vs. State of MadhyaPradesh [AIR 2006 Madras 65], has no relevancy to the factualcircumstances in this case.21. The next judgment on which the reliance was placedby the learned counsel for the petitioner is Minoo Framroze Balsaravs. Union of India [AIR 1992 Bombay 375]. As submitted by thelearned counsel for the petitioner himself, the Bombay High Courthas narrated the procedures to be followed by the Estate Officerwhile giving notice under Section 4(2) of the Act, stating that hemust be first prima facie satisfied that the person is inauthorised occupation of the premises and secondly he should besatisfied that such person should be evicted and the notice mustalso give reason, so as to enable the occupant to give properreply. The portion of the said judgement relied upon by thelearned counsel for the petitioner is as follows:"34. The provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, can beapplied to persons who are in unauthorised occupation ofpublic premises. A person, by reason of Section 2(g), isin unauthorised occupation if his occupation is withoutauthority. He is in unauthorised occupation if hecontinues to occupy public premises after the authorityunder which he was allowed to occupy the same has expiredor has been determined for any reason whatsoever. Theprovisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, therefore, entitlethe Government company or corporation which is the ownerof the public premises to terminate for any reasonwhatsoever the authority of the occupant to occupy the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ same and, by so doing, place the Government company orcorporation and the occupant in the position of landlordand tenant governed by the provisions of the Transfer ofProperty Act. The provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of theEviction Act, 1971, deal with the procedure for theeviction of an unauthorised occupant and must be readtogether. Section 4 prescribes that the unauthorisedoccupant must be issued with a notice in writing to showcause why an order of eviction should not be passedagainst him. That notice has to be issued by the EstateOfficer provided he is of the opinion that the addresseeof the notice is in unauthorised occupation of publicpremises and that he should be evicted. Prima faciesatisfaction of the Estate Officer is a sine qua non ofthe issuance of the show cause notice. The prima faciesatisfaction must be two-fold; firstly, that theaddressee is in unauthorised occupation of publicpremises, and, secondly, that, he should be evicted. Thenotice must set out the grounds on which the order ofeviction is proposed to be made. It must, therefore,state not only why the addressee is thought to be inauthorised occupation but also why it is thought that heshould be evicted. It must inform the addressee that heis entitled to show cause against the proposed order ofeviction. The addressee cannot effectively show causeunless he knows why the Estate Officer is of the opinionthat he is in unauthorised occupation. He also cannotshow effective cause unless he knows why his eviction isproposed. The provisions of Section 4 make it clear thatthe addressee may seek a personal hearing from the EstateOfficer and may lead evidence for the purposes of showingcause against the proposed order of eviction. This isclear also from the provisions of Section 8 which vest inthe Estate Officer the powers of a Civil Court in regardto the summoning of witnesses and examining them on oathand the discovery and production of documents."Applying the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of the BombayHigh Court on the factual situation in this case, there isabsolutely no difficulty to come to the conclusion that the EstateOfficer has in fact come to the conclusion that the petitioner isin unauthorised occupation and it should be evicted and he hasgiven so many reasons, which have been ultimately followed by himwhile passing final order under Section 5(1) of the Act. The abovesaid judgment is of no assistance to the case of the petitioner.22. Again, the learned counsel for the petitioner hasplaced reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in BharatPetroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Maddula Ratnavalli & Others [2008(1) Law Weekly 165], which is of no use to the petitioner's case.In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the executive actionsmust be fair and objective satisfaction must be the basis for anysuch action and State, "should act bona fide and not arbitrarilywhile acting as a landlord or tenant". In that case the Supreme https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court was dealing with the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited asa lessee of the respondent, who got an order of eviction againstthe said Corporation in the first appellate Court, which wassubsequently confirmed in the second appeal and considering thestand of the Corporation that the Corporation which has succeededthe previous lessee viz., Bhurma Shell Oil Storage and DistributingCompany of India Ltd., was paying the rent at the rate of Rs.50/-and the Corporation has been taken over by an enactment andtherefore, as a tenant, the Corporation is entitled to continue asa tenant on the same basis, the Supreme Court has elaborately dealtwith the fairness of reasons of the executive authorities byquoting various judgements and ultimately held as follows:"26. Reasonableness and non-arbitrariness are thehallmarks of an action by the State. Judged from anyangle, the action on the part of the appellant does notsatisfy the test of fairness or unreasonableness. Itbeing wholly arbitrary cannot be sustained. "23. Needless to state that in this case, we are dealing withunauthorised occupation and the action taken by the authoritiesunder the Act, viz., the Estate Officer and the appellateauthority, and not about the action of the second respondent LIC.This is relevant, because the petitioner as well as its counselhave made it very clear that they are not questioning the action ofthe second respondent in terminating the tenancy of the petitionerby issuing notice dated 18.03.2004 under Section 106 of theTransfer of Property Act. In such circumstances, even assumingthat there has been a prior discussion between the secondrespondent and the petitioner for enhancement of rent, it was onlydue to the reason that the discussion was not fruitful, ultimately,the second respondent has given termination notice, which is validin law. Therefore, the petitioner having taken the standcategorically that it has not questioned the termination noticeissued by the second respondent, cannot be permitted to raise thequestion of reasonableness or unreasonableness of the notice oraction of the second respondent, which has taken place before thetermination notice issued as stated above. That apart, as far asthe action of the authorities under the Act, viz., the EstateOfficer as well as the first respondent is concerned, there isabsolutely no reason to come to the conclusion that it is arbitraryin nature.24. The other Supreme Court judgment relied upon by thelearned counsel for the petitioner is M/s.Crawford Bayley & Co. &Others vs. Union of India [AIR 2006 SC 2544]. It is a case,wherein the Supreme Court has upheld the amendment to the PublicPremises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 40 of 1971, whichprovides that an officer of the statutory authority alone should beappointed as an Estate Officer in respect of the public premisesand it further provides that the Central Act 40 of 1971 willprevail over the State Act, viz., Maharashtra Rent Control Act, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2000, which was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court, wherein itwas held that the purpose of Act 40 of 1971 is to provide speedymeasure to recover public premises and for that purpose the Act wasenacted, holding that there is no discrimination, in the followingterms:"13. ......... In the context of the need for speedy andexpeditious recovery of public premises for utilisationfor important public uses, where dilatoriness of theprocedure may defeat the very object of recovery, thespecial procedure prescribed by the two Acts was held notto be really and substantially more drastic andprejudicial than the ordinary procedure of a Civil Court.The special procedure prescribed by the two Acts, it wasobserved, was not so substantially and qualitativelydisparate as to attract the vice of discrimination."25. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placedreliance on certain guidelines issued to prevent arbitrary evictionfrom public premises, and one such guidelines issued by theGovernment of India is, "Fresh guidelines to prevent arbitraryeviction from public premises" dated 27.06.2002. In the saidguidelines, a reference to Public Premises (Eviction ofUnauthorised Occupants) Act 40 of 1971 is made and it is explainedas to how the public authorities should get vacant possession inrespect of public premises and it also directed the publicundertaking to review all pending cases before the Estate Officeror Courts with reference to said guidelines. The guidelines are asfollows:" In order to prevent arbitrary use of powers to evictgenuine tenants from public premises under the control ofPublic Sector Undertaking and financial institutions, anotification has been issued seeking to limit the use ofpowers by the Estate Officers.The resolution already notified by the Ministry of UrbanDevelopment and Poverty Alleviation in the Gazette,states that the provisions of Public Premises (Evictionof Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 should be used"primarily to evict totally unauthorised occupants of thepremises of public authorities or subletees, or employeeswho have ceased to be in their service and thusineligible for occupation of the premises."The guidelines stipulate that the "provisions of the P.P.(E) Act 1971 should not be resorted to either with acommercial motive or to secure vacant possession of thepremises in order to accommodate their own employees,where the premises were in occupation of the originaltenants to whom the premises were let either by thepublic authorities or the persons from whom the premiseswere acquired."The resolution further states that the fact of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ unauthorised occupation shall be decided by following thedue procedure of law. The notification specifies thatthe contractual agreement shall not be wound up by takingadvantage of the provisions of P.P.(E) Act 1971.Moreover, the public authorities would have rightssimilar to private landlords under the Rent Control Actin dealing with genuine legal tenants to secure periodicrevision of rent. In order to give "no room for allegations" regardingselective eviction done for the purpose of securing anunwarranted increase in rent or that a change in tenancywas permitted so as to benefit particular individuals orinstitutions, the guidelines lay down that the release ofpremises or change of tenancy should be decided at thelevel of Board of Directors of public sectorundertakings.And finally the resolution says that "all the PublicUndertakings should immediately review all pending casesbefore the Estate Officer or Courts with reference tothese guidelines, and withdraw eviction proceedingsagainst genuine tenants on grounds otherwise than asprovided under these guidelines."26. The LIC of India is a statutory creation by theParliamentary enactment; therefore, the property in dispute, whichbelongs to the LIC of India is a public premises as per Section 2(e) of the Act. The Government of India has appointed the EstateOfficer under Section 3 of the Act. The nature of function and theprocedure to be followed by the Estate Officer in issuing showcause notice and also passing order of eviction are clearly dealtwith under the Act itself. In fact the Public Premises (Evictionof Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971 have been framed, which alsoexplain the manner of conducting enquiry and the procedure to befollowed by the appellate authority in appeal and all other minutedetails. While so, the question to be considered in the light ofthe reliance placed on by the learned counsel for the petitioner,the above said guidelines is, to what extent the guidelines isbinding. 27. It is well settled that in the presence of the statutoryprovisions, any such guidelines or executive instructions cannothave the nature of enforceability in law. While dealing with thefundamental rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution ofIndia, the Supreme Court has held in Union of India and others vs.S.L.Abbas [AIR 1993 SC 2444] that any guidelines issued by theGovernment does not confer any legally enforceable right. The saidguidelines referred to by the Supreme Court stipulates that as faras possible the husband and wife must be posted in the same place.Holding that no doubt the guidelines requires the spouses to beposted at one place as far as practicable, the Apex Court held thatit does not enable any spouse to claim such posting as a matter ofright, if the Departmental authorities do not consider it feasible. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

28. While dealing with the validity of a Government Order that50% of seats in All Unaided Colleges should be filled withGovernment quota, which was purported to be issued as an executiveinstruction under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, theDivision Bench of this Court consisting of Shivaraj Patil,J. (as hethen was) and P.D.Dinakaran,J. in Association of Management ofPrivate Colleges vs. State of Tamil Nadu represented by itsSecretary to Government, Higher Education, Chennai-9 and others[1997 WLR 647] has held,"Having regard to the fact that the field is alreadyoccupied relating to admission of students in the privateunaided self-finance colleges, the impugned GovernmentOrder issued invoking Executive power under Article 162of the Constitution cannot be sustained. The impugnedorder does not give the background, reasons or necessaryfor issuing it." The same was the view taken by E.Padmanabhan,J. in B.Sundararajanvs. Government of Tamil Nadu represented by the SpecialCommissioner and Secretary to Government, Municipal Administrationand Water Supply Department, Madras [1997 WLR 391].29. In Indian Aluminium Company vs. Kerala State ElectricityBoard [1975 (2) SCC 414], the Three Judge Bench of the SupremeCourt while dealing with the Electricity Supply Act,1948 in respectof Section 49, which relates to the power of the Electricity Boardto enhance rates for supply of electricity, held as follows:"10. Having analysed the provisions of Section 49, wemay now turn to consider the argument advanced on behalfof the Board that a stipulation binding the Board not tocharge anything more than a specific rate would be voidas it would have the effect of divesting the Board of thepower to fix and refix charges entrusted to it underSection 49, or hindering or fettering its futureexercise. Now, if there is one principle more wellsettled than any other, it is that when a publicauthority is entrusted by statute with a discretionarypower to be exercised for the public good, it cannot,when making a private contract in general terms, fetteritself in the use of that power or in the exercise ofsuch discretion. There are a number of decisions whichwould establish this principle beyond doubt. We may referto a few of them in order to appreciate the true scopeand ambit of this principle - what is its area ofoperation and what are its limitations.30. Therefore, on the factual position of this case, thesecond respondent, LIC of India has been created by theParliamentary enactment, for whom the Estate Officer has beenappointed under Section 3 of the Act which contains exhaustive https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provisions regarding his powers, and hence, any executiveinstruction cannot be a fetter on the statutory powers. Even on areference to the said guidelines relied upon by the learned counselfor the petitioner, there is nothing to infer against theproceedings of the Estate Officer as well as the appellateauthority, viz., the first respondent.31. While dealing with the principle of promissory estoppelagainst the State in granting any exemption or concession or rebatefor a specific period to a class of persons in public interestwithout any promise or representation and withdrawing suchconcession prior to the specified period under the Electricity(Supply) Act,1948, the Supreme Court has held in Pawan Alloys andCastings Private Limited vs. U.P.State Electricity Board and others[19976(7)SCC 251], that the principle of promissory estoppel has noapplication. It was held that even though the State can be heldresponsible for promissory estoppel, the necessary ingredient mustbe that based on such representation, the persons claiming estoppelshould have changed their position. Ultimately, the Supreme Courthas held in the following words."10. It is now well settled by a series of decisionsof this Court that the State authorities as well as itslimbs like the Board covered by the sweep of Article 12 ofthe Constitution of India being treated as 'State" withinthe meaning of the said article, can be made subject tothe equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel in caseswhere because of their representation the party claimingestoppel has changed its position and if such an estoppeldoes not fly in the face of any statutory prohibition,absence of power and authority of the promisor and isotherwise not opposed to public interest, and also whenequity in favour of the promisee does not outweigh equityin favour of the promisor entitling the latter to legallyget out of the promise."32. On the facts and circumstances of this case, as I havenarrated above, there is absolutely no sufferance or detriment onthe part of the petitioner merely because the representations havebeen made by the second respondent for negotiation in respect offixation of rent, especially in the circumstances that the secondrespondent has never agreed for renewal of lease after thetermination, which was effected on 18.03.2004. In view of thereasons enumerated above, I do not see any justification tointerfere with the impugned order of the first respondent on any ofthe grounds raised by the petitioner.With the result, the writ petition fails and the same isdismissed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ This Petition coming on for further orders this day in thepresence of the said Advocates the Court made the following order:-After delivery of the judgment, Mr.K.C.Rajappa, learnedcounsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that as per theAct, 14 days time is given for delivery and Notice was alreadygiven and the writ petitioner is likely to be dispossessed at anytime, even before filing of the Appeal. In view of the same, therespondents shall not disturb possession of the petitioner for aperiod of three weeks from this date.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.kkTo1.Appellate Authority under Central Act 40 of 1971 Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act V Addl.Judge, City Civil Court, Madras.2.Life Insurance Corporation of India Southern Zonal Office, 102, Anna Salai Chennai 600 002.1 cc to Mr.K.C. Rajappa, Advocate, sR. 101551 cc to Mr.M.B. Gopalan, Advocate, sr. 10160W.P.No.3789 of 2006VSV (CO)kk 26/2