M.P.Sundararajan (deceased) v. Secretary to Government, Home (Transport) Department
Case at a glance
- Decided
- 21 Sep 2011
- Bench
- T RAJA
Provisions considered
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED:21.09.2011CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.RAJAW.P.No.24489 of 20041. M.P.Sundararajan (deceased)2. Tmt. Devaki3. S.Meenakshi4. S.Elangovan5. S.Prabhakaran ... Petitioners (P2 to P5 substituted as LR's in the place of deceased petitioner vide order dated 17.03.2011 in WP.MP.No.201/2011)Vs.
Secretary to Government, Home (Transport) Department, Fort St. George, Chennai – 9.
The Transport Commissioner, Chepauk, Chennai – 5.... RespondentsPRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India praying to issue Writ of certiorarified mandamus as stated therein. For Petitioner :Mr.M.Nandakumar for Mr.A.GanesanFor Respondents: Mr.S.V.Duraisolaimalai, AGPORDERThe petitioners herein seek for issuance of writ ofcertiorarified mandamus to quash the proceedings No.89627/VI/2002,dated 26.07.2004, dismissing the petitioner from service, passed by the second respondent/the Transport Commissioner, Chennai, by calling for the records connected thereto and consequently to direct the first respondent herein to permit the petitioner to retire from service with effect from 30.09.2001 with all his retirement benefits. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/
2. The petitioner, after joining the service as JuniorAssistant on 19.06.1975, was promoted as Assistant on 07.04.1981and again, he was promoted as Superintendent with effect from09.08.1994. When he was due for promotion as Motor VehicleInspector (Non-Technical) for the year 1999-2000, he was served with a charge memo by the Regional Transport Officer under Rule 17(b) on 03.04.1998 for an allegation that he had released an OmniBus on 05.02.1998 without collecting the Tax amount for vehicles. On receipt of the said charge memo, even though the petitioner has submitted his explanations denying the charges levelled against him, the Enquiry was not proceeded with, within a reasonable time. Thereafter, he was again issued with another charge memo under Rule17(b) on 28.09.2001 for an allegation that he has issued aduplicate license to one Ravi without properly verifying the records. Therefore, it was submitted before this Court that when the petitioner was subjected to two charge memos, which are not related either to dishonest motive or corruption charges, they should have proceeded with further for completion of the enquiry, keeping in view the date of superannuation of the petitioner, which was scheduled on 30.09.2001, but without doing so, they had placed him under suspension on 29.09.2001.
Thereafter, the petitioner, on reaching the age of superannuation on 30.09.2001, awaiting for along time for completion of the enquiry, finding no gesture for completion of the enquriy, approached the Tribunal, by filingO.A.No.7343/2001, with a prayer to allow him to retire from service with all benefits. The Tribunal, by order dated 21.10.2002,directed the Transport Commissioner to pass final orders, on both the disciplinary proceedings, within 3 months from 21.10.2002, witha condition that, if no order was passed on or before 21.01.2003,the disciplinary proceedings shall stand annulled. Thereafter, when the said order dated 21.10.2002 passed in O.A.No.7343/2001 was received by the Transport Commissioner on 25.10.2002, accepting the said order, they have not passed any final order within the time limit prescribed by the Tribunal. After the expiry of the time limit fixed by the Tribunal, the Enquiry Officer was appointed on11.07.2003 and thereafter, the Enquiry Officer, with a delay of 10months, submitted his report only on 06.05.2004 holding the charges as proved. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when the Tribunal has given a time limit of 3 months inO.A.No.7343/2001, dated 21.10.2002, to second respondent/TransportCommissioner, to complete the entire exercise, after receipt of the order passed by the Tribunal, they allowed the impugned disciplinary proceedings stand automatically annulled, for, the department has appointed the Enquiry Officer only on 11.07.2003,which is after 9 months from the date of receipt of the order passed by the Tribunal, hence, it was contended that, if the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respondent is aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, they should have filed an appeal against that order. But, admittedly, in the present case, no appeal has been filed. Even if they had faced any administrative difficulties, they should have approached the Tribunal or this Court seeking extension of time for completion of the enquiry. But, even that has not been followed. Therefore, it is not open to the respondents to pass the present order, beyond the time limit fixed by the Tribunal.
In this connection, he has also relied upon a judgment of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu & another v. T.Ranganathan (2010(2) L.W.867) for a proposition that once a competent Court fixes an outer time limit to complete the enquiry and pass final orders, the parties to the proceedings are bound to strictly adhere to the time granted to comply with the said order. On that basis, he prayed for allowing the present writ petition.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that though the Tribunal has given a time limit of 3months to complete the entire exercise, the petitioner did not come forward to cooperate with the enquiry and as a result, the department was not in a position to complete the entire exercise within a time limit prescribed by the Tribunal.
The above said argument of the learned counsel forrespondents does not find force, inasmuch as the order passed by aDivision Bench of this Court in T.Ranganathan's case (cited supra),has held in paragraph 21 thereof as under; "21. It is well settled in law that once acompetent Court fixes an outer time limit to complete the enquiry and pass final orders, the parties to the proceedings are bound to strictly adhere to the time granted to comply with the said order. If on any reason the time fixed by the competent Court is unable to be adhered to and the proceedings are unable to be finalised, the party to the proceedings can approach the very same Court seeking extension of time stating sufficient reasons and once valid reasons are given, normally the Court/Tribunal would extend the time, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly the said procedure has not been followed in this case and the department has chosen to ignore the direction given by the Tribunal, which is binding onthem.
" https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ In the instant case, the Tribunal, in its order dated21.10.2002 passed in O.A.No.7343/2001, directed the TransportCommissioner/second respondent herein to pass final order, on both the disciplinary proceedings, within 3 months from 21.10.2002, witha condition that, if no order was passed on or before 21.01.2003,the disciplinary proceedings shall stand annulled. Thereafter, the second respondent/the Transport Commissioner has also received the order passed by the Tribunal on 25.10.2002. After receiving such order from the Tribunal, they have appointed the EnquiryOfficer only on 11.07.2003, which is, admittedly, after the three months time prescribed by the Tribunal, in its order, dated21.10.2002, and in turn, the Enquiry Officer, with a delay of 10months, submitted his report only on 06.05.2004. Therefore, from the above, it is clear that neither the department has followed the order passed by the Tribunal nor the Enquiry Officer had adverted to the order passed by the Tribunal.
On the other hand, if the department has found any non-cooperation on the part of the petitioner, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is for the department to point out the non-cooperation on the part of the petitioner in finalising the proceeding and the hardships faced by the department in not strictly adhering to the time schedule due to the fault of the petitioner or for any valid reason and get appropriate orders seeking extension of time. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that even if the time granted originally to complete the enquiry is over, nothing prevented the department from filing anappropriate application after expiry of the time. It is now well settled in law that application seeking extension of time can befiled and the Courts are having inherent powers to grant further time, even though the original time granted got expired, based on the principles of invoking inherent powers to meet the ends of justice.
In this case, there is no whisper about the non-cooperation of the petitioner in conducting the enquiry and completing the enquiry within the time. Hence, the department is bound to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal inO.A.No.7343/2001. Therefore, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in T.Ranganathan's (cited supra), once a competent Courtfixes an outer time limit to complete the enquiry and pass final orders, the parties to the proceedings are bound to strictly adhere to the time granted to comply with the said order, but, admittedly, in the present case, the said procedure has not been followed with by the respondents. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/
Therefore, this Court, for the aforesaid reasons, bysetting aside the impugned order passed by the second respondent, allows the present writ petition with a direction to the first respondent to pass appropriate order, as though the petitioner has retired from service on 30.09.2001 and grant the consequential retirement benefits to the legal heirs within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No Costs.rkmSd/-Asst. Registrar//True Copy//Sub Asst. RegistrarTo1.The Secretary to Government, Home (Transport) Department, Fort St. George, Chennai – 9.2.The Transport Commissioner, Chepauk, Chennai – 5.+ 1 cc to Mr. A. Ganesan, Advocate SR No.59282+ 1 cc to Government Pleader, SR No.59173SR(CO)SR/29.10.2011W.P.No.24489/2004
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.