M. STANLEY13. C. NAGENDRA KUMAR14. A. SWAMY DHAS15. K.R. EDWIN BABU SINGH16 v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADUREP BY THE SECRETARYTRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS DEPARTMENTFORT SAINT

S.John Philip..Petitioner in WP.34890/06D.Panjalingam..Petitioner in WP.34891/06V.Manimuthu..Petitioner in WP.34892/06S.Singadevan..Petitioner in WP.34893/06A.Thiralogasundar..Petitioner in WP.34894/06R.Chelladurai..Petitioner in WP.34895/06L.Anandhakumar..Petitioner in WP.34896/06T.Subramanian..Petitioner in WP.34897/06T.Kathiresan..Petitioner in WP.34285/06M.Munibasavarajan..Petitioner in WP.28015/06V.Manimozhi..Petitioner in WP.28016/06T.Mani..Petitioner in WP.28017/06N.Boobesh..Petitioner in WP.28018/06L.Madeswaran..Petitioner in WP.28019/06K.Murugan..Petitioner in WP.28020/06G.Gnanavel..Petitioner in WP.28021/06M.Sakthivel..Petitioner in WP.28022/06D.Santhamoorthi..Petitioner in WP.28023/06N.Chandrakumaran..Petitioner in WP.45060/06M.Srinivasan..Petitioner in WP.45076/06P.Arjunan..Petitioner in WP.45077/06N.Rajendran..Petitioner in WP.45118/06K.Krishnan..Petitioner in WP.45119/06 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ C.Chinnasamy..Petitioner in WP.45120/06K.Arulselvan..Petitioner in WP.45396/06P.Arunachalam..Petitioner in WP.45397/06P.P.Murugan..Petitioner in WP.45422/06C.Jayakumar..Petitioner in WP.45039/06S.Subramanian..Petitioner in WP.45040/06V.Poornachandran..Petitioner in WP.43040/06R.Manokaran..Petitioner in WP.43041/06A.M.Karthikeyan..Petitioner in WP.35412/06Dr.Ambedkar Transport CorporationTask Force Union, rep. by its General Secretary,Kannadapalayam, Chennai 66...Petitioner in WP.33427/06D.VijayanR. Jayakumar..Petitioners in WP.34825/06M.Sivakumar..Petitioner in WP.42523/06S.Senthil..Petitioner in WP.46245/06K. Chandramohan..Petitioner in WP.47719/061. Velu2. C. Ramesh3. C. Sureshkumar4. D. Boopthi5. G. Janipremakumar6. N. Yuvaraj7. M. Gunanithi8. A. Srinivasan9. J. Arthar Jankins10. P. rajamani11. T. Jayaraj12. K.P. Chandrasekaran https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

13. E. Shaji14. M. Kingsly15. N. Vijayakumar16. A. Sudakar17. A. Xavier Alias18. C. Ranganathan19. K. Charles20. J. Sivakumar21. G. Sankar22. J. Jose23. P. Rajkumar24. S. Vasanth25. D. Sathishkumar26. S. Padmanadoss27. S. Raju28. B. SankarW.P.No.30687/20061. Velu2. C. Ramesh3. C. Sureshkumar4. D. Boopathi5. G. Janipremakumar6. N. Yuvaraj7. M. Gunanithi8. A. Srinivasan9. J. Arthar Jankins10. P. rajamani11. T. Jayaraj12. K.P. Chandrasekaran13. E. Shaji14. M. Kingsly15. N. Vijayakumar16. A. Sudakar17. A. Xavier Alias18. C. Ranganathan19. K. Charles20. J. Sivakumar21. G. Sankar22. J. Jose23. P. Rajkumar24. S. Vasanth25. D. Sathishkumar26. S. Padmanadoss27. S. Raju28. B. Sankar... Petitioners in w.P.30687/06 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

1. K.P.Srinivasan2. L. Kasi3. J. Amalasvaran4. S. Suresh5. G. Ravi6. B. Murali7. S. Murugan8. A.G.Ragu9. D. Ramesh10. R. Gobi11. R. Ruban12. T. Jayasingh13. R. Ramesh 14. A. Thamaraiselvan15. T. Ashokkumar16. K. Hemanathan17. J. Murugan18. S. Srinivasan19. S. Masilamani20. V.V. Gubara Ramanujam21. D. Srinivasan22. K. Manickam... Petitioners W.P.No.30688 of 2006-Vs-1. The Government of Tamil Nadurep. by its Secretary,Transport Department,Fort St. George, Chennai 9.2. The General Manager,State Express Transport Corporation,Pallavan Salai, Chennai 2...Respondents in WP.Nos.25167 to 25169/0625007 to 25009/06, 34700, 24724/06 and24725/06.Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd.,rep. by its Managing Director,37, Mettupalayam Road, Coimbatore...Respondent in WP.Nos.34805/06,to 34811,and 34816 to 34823/06, 34872/06 to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 34881, 34887 to 34891/06, 34893, 34894 to 34897/86.1) The State of Tamilnadu rep. by itsSecretary to Govt, Transport Dept,Secretariat, Chennai-9.2. The General Manager,The Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationSalem Division, Salem-7. ..Respondents in WP Nos. 25699 &25700/06, 25447 to 25449/06, 25450 & 25451/06, 25520 to 25528/0624805/06 to 24810/06.1) The Govt. of Tamilnadu rep. by its Secretary, Transport Dept,Fort St. George, Chennai-9.2) The Tamilnadu Govt. Transport CorporationCoimbatore Ltd, rep. by its General Manager (Admn.)Erode Region... Respondents in WP No. 26189/06Tamil nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,rep. by its Managing Director,Chennimalai Road, Erode... Respondent in WP NO.34862/06 to34864/06, 34892/061) The State of Tamilnadu rep. by itsSecretary to Govt, Transport Department,Secretariat, Chennai-9.2) The General Manager,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,Kumbakonam Ltd, Tiruchy Division,Tiruchy... Respondents in WP NO. 29269/06 &29270/06Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd.,rep. by its Managing Director,Coimbatore Division-II, Erode,Erode District... Respondent in WP NO.45076/06,45077, 45118 to 45120, 45396,45397, 45422/06, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd.,rep. by its Managing Director,Pallavan Salai, Chennai-2... Respondent in WP No.33427/06,34825/06The State of Tamilnadu rep. by itsSecretary to Govt, Transport Dept,Secretariat, Chennai-9. .. 1st Respondent in WP No. 39292/06,27849/06, 30332, 34833, 24723, 41278, 23559, 27081, 27082, 4129038216, 45062, 45081, 40363, 24285, 28015 to 28023/06, 45060, 43040, 43041, 35412, 42523, 46245, 45459and 47719/06. .. 2nd Respondent in WP No. 39363/06The General Manager, Metropolitan Transport Corporationltd, (Chennai), Chennai-2... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 39292/06,27849/06,30332, 34833, 43040, 43041, 42523Tamil Nadu State Transport CorporationLtd, rep. by its managing DirectorCoimbatore, Division II, Erode,Erode District... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 35412/06The General Manager,Metropolitan Transport CorporationLtd., Pallavan Illam, Pallavan Salai,Chennai-2... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 24723/06,41278/06The Metropolitan Transport Corporationrep. by its General Manager (Admn)Chennai-2... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 24285/06The General ManagerTamil Nadu State Transport Corportion Ltd,Coimbatore Division, Coimbatore-43... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 23559/0647719/06 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The General manager, Tamilnadu StateTransport Corporation (Salem)Dharmapuri Division, Salem-7... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 28015/06to 28023/06The General Manager,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,(Coimbatore Division-II) Ltd.Chennimalai Road, Erode... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 27081/06& 27082/06 , 38216The General Manager,Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation(Kumbakonam Division-I) Ltd,Kumbakonam - 612 001... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 45062/06, 45081, 46245The Tamilnadu State Transport Corporationrep. by its Managing Director, Salem.. 1st Respondent in WP No. 39363/06Tamilnadu Transport Corportion ltd,Formerly Known as Jeeva TransportCorporation Ltd, rep. by itsManaging Director, CoimbatoreDivision-II, Chennimalai, Erode DT.. 2nd Respondent in WP No. 40363/06Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationLtd, rep. by its Managing Director,Kumbakonam Division, Periyamilaguparai,Tiruchy District... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 45060Kovai Arasu Pokkuvarathu OOzhiyarSangam, rep.by its General SecretaryNo.109, Park St, Coimbatore - 641 009... 3rd Respondent in WP No. (R3 impleaaded as per order of this 23559/06Court dt. 1.11.06 and made inMP 5/06 in WP No. 23559/06) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The General Manager, Tamilnadu STateTransport Corporation Ltd, Madras Division, Chennai-2... 3rd Respondent in WP No.45043/06The General Manager, Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,Coimbatore Division-II, Erode, Erode District... 3rd Respondent in WP No. 35412/06 The Managing Director,Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationCoimbatore Division(2),Mettupalayam Road, Coimbatore... Respondent in WP No. 45039/06,45040/06The General manager,Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation ltd,madurai Division-III, Nagercoil,Kanyakumari Dist... 3rd Respondent in WP No. 24975/06The Assistant Manager,Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,Coimbatore Division, Coimbatore-43... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 41290/06The Managing DirectorTamilnadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,Pallavan House, Chennai-2... 2nd Respondent in WP No. 45043/061. The Governemnt of Tamilnadurep by its secretary transportDepartment, Fort St. George,Chennai-9.2. The General Manager (Admn)Metropolitan Transport Corporation(Chennai) Ltd., Chennai-2... Respondents in W.P.30687/061. The Government of Tamilnadurep by its secretary https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Transport Department, Fort St. George,Chennai-9.2. The General Manager (Admn)Metropolitan Transport Corporation(Chennai) Ltd., Chennai-2... Respondents in W.P.30688/06Prayers in all WPs:-Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India toissue a writ of certiorarified Mandamus calling for the recordspertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 41 dated 13.7.2006 issued bythe 1st Respondent herein, quash the same and consequently directthe respective respondents herein to permit the petitioner to joinduty forthwith in pursuance to the appointment orders issuedbetween 25.2.06 & 28.2.2006 (WP.Nos.25167 to 25169/06). 27849/06,24723 to 24725/06.Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India toissue a writ of certiorarified Mandamus calling for the recordspertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 41 dated 13.7.2006 issued bythe 1st Respondent herein, quash the same and consequently directthe respective respondents herein to permit the petitioner to joinduty forthwith in pursuance to the appointment orders issuedbetween order dated 25.2.2006 in W.P.Nos. 25007 to 25009/06,39292/06, 34833, 23559, 43040, 43041, 42523, and 47719/06.calling for the records relating to the impugned G.O.Ms. No.41dated 13.7.2006 issued by the first respondent herein andconsequential order No.53/062928/A4/AGV POKA/05 dated 26.7.2006 andquash the same and consequently direct the respondent herein topermit the petitioner to join the duty in pursuance of theappointment letter dated 25.2.2006 WP.34700/06.calling for the records pertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms. No.41dated 13.7.2006 issued by the first respondent herein quash thesame and consequently direct the respondents herein to permit thepetitioner to join the duty forthwith in pursuance to theappointment order dated 28.2.2006 (WP.No.25520/06 to 25528/06,24806, 24808 and 24809/06 38216, 45062, 45081, 46245 and 25387/06).To issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the recordsand quash G.O.Ms. 41 Transport (C1) Dept dated 21.7.2005 in so faras restricts the benefits of the G.O to appointments made in 1997alone. (WP.No.39363/06) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ calling for the records of the first respondent made in G.O.Ms. No.41 Transport (C1) Dept dated 13.7.2006 and the impugned order ofcancellation issued by the 2nd Respondent in the impugnedmemo.No.8097A/P2/Papi/Tha.A Poka (KO) ema/06 dated 21.7.2006 andquash these orders and direct the 2nd respondent herein to giveposting to the petitioner WP.No.26189/06.To issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the recordsof the 1st respondent made in G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Deptdated 13.7.2006 and quash the same and direct the 2nd Respondentherein to give posting to the petitioner in accordance with theappointment order issued him underMemo.No.26330/Papi/Po7/Mapoka/2005 dated 25.2.2006 (WP.No.24285/06)calling for the records pertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms. No.41dated 13.7.2006 issued by the first re33spondent herein quash thesame and consequently direct the respondents herein to permit thepetitioner to join the duty forthwith in post of Driver andconductor pursuant to the selection procedure WP.Nos.25699 &25700/06.To issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records in connectionwith Para 3 of the G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 13.7.2006 and quash the sameWP.No.24975/06calling for the records pertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms. No.41dated 13.7.2006 issued by the first respondent herein quash thesame and consequently directing the respondents herein to permitthe petitioner to join the duty forthwith in pursuance to theappointment order dated 27.2.2006. WP.Nos.29269/06 30332/06. and29270/06.To issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to re employthe petitioner as Driver existing vacancies as per section 25-H ofID Act and GO.41, Transport Dept dated 13.7.2006 award costs in(WP.Nos.34805 to 34811/05 34818 to 34821/06, 34877, 34880,34889,/06To issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to re employthe petitioner as Driver and Conductor existing vacancies as persection 25-H of ID Act and GO.41, Transport Dept dated 13.7.2006award costs 34816/06 and 34822, 34223, 34892, 34896/06, 34862 to34864 and 34872 to 34876, 34878, 34879, 34881, 34887, 34888, 34890,34891, 34893 to 34895 34897/06) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To issue a writ of certiorarified Mandamus calling for the recordsof the 2nd Respondent in proceedings No. BA3/RSI/6739/Tha.A. POKa/Da Puri/06 dated 24.7.2006 issued pursuant to G.O.Ms.41 dated13.7.2006 and quash the same and consequently direct therespondents to permit the petitioner to join duty forthwith inpursuance to the appointment order 28.2.2006 (Wp.No.28015/06 to28023/06)To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to givepreference to the petitioner in the employment as conductor in the2nd respondent Corporation in compliance of Section 25H of theIndustrial Disputes Act orders passed in WA.No. 2985/2003 etc Batchdated 8.12.2005 and G.O.Ms. No. 41 Transport Dept Dated 13.7.2006before appointing new persons either by fresh recruitment orotherwise in the respondent Corporation (Wp.Nop.45060.06, 45076,45077, 45118 to 45120, 45396 45397, 45222/06. To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to provide reemployment to the petitioner as conductor inthe 2nd respondentcorporation without reference to the age limit (WP.No.35412/06)To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to offer reemployment as Driver to the members 25H of the Industrial DispatesAct 1947 (WP.No.33427/06)To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to offer reemployment as Conductor to the members 25H of the IndustrialDispates Act 1947 . (W.P.34825/06)calling for the records of the first respondent in relation toG.O.Ms. No. 41, Transport (C1) Dept dated 13.7.2006 and quash thepara 3 of the said Govt order in so far as the petitioner isconcerned and issue a consequential direction to the responsnt tore employ the petitioner as Driver in the respondent corporationbefore resorting to the appointment by way of direct recruitment asper the direction given by this Court in WP.No. 37727/05 by theorder dated 9.12.2005 with service and monetary benefits (WP.No.40363/06)To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent herein toconsider the representation dated 13.11.2006 for re instatement ofthe petitioner in service as conductor in the respondentcorporation in accordance with the ratio laid down by the DivisionBench of this court in WA.Nos.1294 to 1299/97 dated 8.12.97 with inthe period that may be stipulated by this court (WP.No.45039/06,45040/06) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ WP.Nos.39516 to 39519/06:-To issue a writ order of specifically writ in the nature of writ ofcertiorarified mandamus calling for the records pertaining to theimpugned order G.O.Ms. No.41 dated 13.7.2006 issued by the firstrespondent and consequential order passed by the 3rd respondent inhis proceedings Pa.No.8097A/B2/Pa.Pee.1/TNSTC (Ko) E.Ma/2006, dated21.7.2006 herein quash the same and consequently direct therespective respondents herein to permit the petitioner to joinduty forthwith in pursuance to the appointment orders issued on27.2.2006.To issue a writ in the nature of a Writ of certiorarified Mandamusor any other appropriate writ, direction or order calling for therecords of the 1st respondent made in G.O.Ms. No.41 Transport (C1)Dept, and the impugned order of cancellation issued by the 2ndrespondent in the impugned memo.No.26047/Papi(Po)7mapoka/2005 dated26.7.2006 and quash these orders and direct the 2nd respondentherein to give posting to the petitioner (WP.No.26188/06, 26192,26193, 26196 to 26199/06.to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus or any therappropriate wirt, order of direction in the nature of a writcalling for the records pertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41dated 13.07.2006 issued by the 1st respondent herein, quash thesame and consequently, direct the respondents herein to permit thepetitioner to join duty forthwith in pursuance to the appointmentorder dated 28.02.2006. WP.No.25447/06 to 25449/06, 25450 &25451/06.calling for the records of the 1st respondent in G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (c1) Department dated 13.07.2006 and the impugned orderof cancellation issued by the 2nd respondent in the impugned memoNo.8097A/P2/Pap1/Tha A Poka(Ko) ema/2006 dated 21.07.2006 and quashthese orders and direct the 2nd respondent herein to give postingto the petitioner. WP.No.26189/06.Issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the 2ndrespondent in proceedings No.Pa.No.8097A/P2/Pa p1/Tha.Aa.Po.Ka(Ko)E.Ma/06 dated 21.07.2006 quash the same (WP.No.27081/06 & 27082/06)to issue a writ in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari Mandumusor any other appropriate Writ, direction or order calling for therecords of the 1st respondent made in G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department dated 13.07.2006 and the impugned order of cancellationissued by the 2nd respondent in the impugned memo.No.26330/papi(po) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 7/mapoka/2005 dated 26.07.2006 and quash these orders and directthe 2nd respondent herein to give posting to the petitioner.WP.No.26190/06, 26191, 26194, 26195/06.to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, or any otherappropriate Writ or order or direction in the nature of a Writ,calling for the records pertaining to the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41,Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 issued by the firstrespondent herein and the consequential order in ProceedingsNo.26047/Pa.P.(Po)7/MTC/2006 dated 26.07.2006, issued by the secondrespondent and quash the same and consequently direct therespondents herein to permit the petitioner to join duty forthwithin pursuance to the appointment order dated 27.02.2006.WP.No.41278/06.to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus or any otherappropriate writ, or order or direction, more in the nature of Writby calling for the records, pertaining to the order in G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department dated 13.07.2006, issued by the 1strespondent herein and the consequential order No.26330/PA.P.(Po)1/MAPOKA/2005 dated 26.07.2006 issued by the 3rd respondent hereinand quash the same as not valid and direct the respondents 2 and 3to permit this petitioner to join the conductor post as per theappointment order dated 25.02.2006. WP.No.45043/06.to issue a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records leadingto issue the impugned order vide No.26330/Pa.(Po)1/MAPOKA/2005dated 26.07.2006 passed by the 2nd respondent herein quash thesame. WP.No.41290/06.To issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the2nd respondent in proceedings No.E1/31753/Tha.A.Po.Ka(salem) 2006dated 24.07.2006 quash the same. WP.No.24805/06, 24807, 24810/06.to issue a Writ in the nature of Certiorarified Mandamus aftercalling for the records relating to G.O.41, Transport Departmentdated 13.07.2006 from the first respondent and the order in MemoNo.26047/Pa Pi/(Po)7/MTC/2005 dated 26.07.2006 from the secondrespondent and to quash that portion of the order in G.O.41,Transport Department dated 13.07.2006 directing the 2nd respondentto withdraw the appointment order issued to the petitionerspursuant to the completion of the selection process and theconsequential orders in Memo No.26047/Pa Pi(Po)7/MTC/2005/dated26.07.2006 of the 2nd respondent, withdrawing appointment orderissued to the petitioners and consequently to direct therespondents to issue suitable posting orders to the petitioners.W.P.33517/06) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ ororder or direction, directing the Respondents to implement theG.O.Ms.No.41 dated 13.7.2006 passed by the 1st Respondent andappoint the petitioners for the post of Conductors/Drivers within astipulated period.WP.No.45459/06)to issue appropriate writs orders or Directions and in particularissue a writ in the nature of Certiorarified Mandmus after callingfor the records relating to G.O.41 Transport Departmentdated13.7.06 from the first respondent and the order in MemoNo.26047/Papi (Po)7/MTC/2005 dated 26.7.2006 from the secondrespondent and to quash that portion of the order in G.O.41,Transport Department dated 13.7.2006 directing the 2nd respondent towithdraw the appointemnt order issued to the petitioners pursuantto the completion of the selection process and the consequentialorders in Memo No.26047/PaPi(Po)7/MTC/2005/dated 26.7.2006 of the2nd respondent with drawing appointment orders issued to thepetitioners and consequently to direct the respondents to issuesuitable posting order to the petitioners. (W.P.30687/06)to issue appropriate writs orders or Directions and in particularissue a writ in the nature of Certiorarified Mandmus after callingfor the records relating to G.O.41 Transport Department dated13.7.06 from the first respondent and the order in MemoNo.26330/PaPi (Po)1/MTC/2005 dated 26.7.2006 from the secondrespondent and to quash that portion of the order in G.O.41,Transport Department dated 13.7.2006 directing the 2nd respondent towithdraw the appointment order issued to the petitioners pursuantto the completion of the selection process and the consequentialorders in Memo No.26330/PaPi(Po)1/MTC/2005/dated 26.7.2006 of the2nd respondent with drawing appointment orders issued to thepetitioners and consequently to direct the respondents to issuesuitable posting order to the petitioners.(W.P.30688/06)For Petitioners in W.P.No.34696/06 : Mr.I.David SinghFor Respondents : Mr.R.Viduthalai Advocate General Asst.by Mr.G.Sankaran,Spl.G.P. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ O R D E RIn majority of the cases, in the present batch of writpetitions, the petitioners, who either claim to have beenappointed, selected or proposed to be appointed, challenge thevalidity of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 and for the consequential direction against therespondents to permit the petitioners to join duty forthwith eitheras Conductors or Drivers in the respondent Transport Corporations,pursuance to the orders earlier issued by the respective TransportCorporations. Those are the cases in W.P.Nos.26195, 26196, 26197,26198, 26199, 26188, 26194, 26189, 26190, 26191, 26192, 26193,29269, 29270, 39292, 27849, 30332, 34833, 39516, 39517, 39518,39519, 34700, 25520, 25521, 25522, 25523, 25524, 25525, 25526,25527, 25528, 24723, 24724, 24725, 41278, 23559, 25167, 25168,25169, 25387, 25699, 25700, 25007, 25008, 25009, 25447, 25448,25449, 25450, 25451, 33517, 24285, 30687, 30688, 28015, 28016,28017, 28018, 28019, 28020, 28021, 28022, 28023 of 2006 and inW.P.Nos.38216, 45043, 45062, 45081, 47719, 42523, 43040, 43041 of2006.2. Some petitioners have filed writ petitions challengingcancellation of the selection order issued to them by therespective Transport Corporations. Even though there are noreference in these cases about the impugned G.O.Ms.41, admittedly,the cancellation is pursuant to the said impugned G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006. They are inW.P.Nos.27081, 27082, 41290, 24805, 24806, 24807, 24808, 24809,24810 of 2006.3. There are some other cases, wherein the writ petitionerschallenge the G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006, only in respect of clause 3 of the said G.O., whichstipulate that preference in employment to be given under the saidG.O., only in respect of persons appointed from 1997 onwards andterminated later. They are the cases in W.P.Nos.26239, 30326,39363, 34696, 24975, 40363 of 2006.4. The remaining, are the cases, where the petitioners havefiled writ petitions to implement the G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 and also in the face of Section 25(H)of the Industrial Disputes Act, and provide re-employment and alsobased on the Division Bench judgement of this Court in Writ AppealNos.1294 to 1299 of 1997, apart from Writ Appeal No.2985 of 2000.They are cases in W.P.Nos.45459, 34805, 34806, 34807, 34808, 34809, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 34810, 34811, 34816, 34817, 34818, 34819, 34820, 34821, 34822,34823, 34862, 34863, 34864, 34872, 34873, 34874, 34875, 34876,34877, 34878, 34879, 34880, 34881, 34887, 34888, 34889, 34890,34891, 34892, 34893, 34894, 34895, 34896, 34897, 45060, 45076,45077, 45118, 45119, 45120, 45396, 45397, 45422, 45039, 45040 of2006. 5. The other cases, namely, in W.P.Nos.35412, 33427, 34825 of2006 are to implement Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,in giving preference in respect of the re-employment of theretrenched employees. 6. Relating to the batch cases, challenging the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006Mr.N.R.Chandran learned Senior Counsel has made his submission,apart from Mr.Palani and Mr.Manojpandian and the other learnedcounsels have adopted the same. In respect of the persons who9+have challenged the G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 only in respect of relating to clause 3, Ms.D.Nagasailahas made her submissions, apart from Mr.Gangadharan. In respect ofthe petitioners, who have supported the implementation of theG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006,Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, Ms.Vaigai and Mr.Hariparanthaman have made theirsubmissions as adopted by the other learned counsels. The learnedAdvocate General has defended the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport(C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 on behalf of the respondents. 7. As I have stated earlier, in respect of the batch of writpetitioners, like the writ petitioner in W.P.No.23559 of 2006, therespective second respondent and in that case, it was the TamilNadu State Transport Corporation Ltd., Coimbatore Division, by theletter dated 25.02.2006, has stated that the second respondentproposed to give employment to the petitioner as Driver based onthe sponsorship of the list by the respective Employment Exchangeand the subsequent interview, in which the concerned petitionershave participated. 8. Apart from that the said orders also stipulate variousconditions, namely, that the petitioner concerned should producecertificate, having passed in the 10th Standard. Further, he mustproduce the Heavy Motor Vehicle License, First Aid certificate andPublic Service Batch. That apart, the candidate shall have thephysical requirement of 160 cms. height and 48 Kgs. weight alongwith the certificate of physical fitness and hearing fitness issuedby the Government Civil Assistant Surgeon and he must have 18months experience in driving the heavy vehicles, having passed inthe test conducted thereon and he must have completed 24 years and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ not crossed 40 years of age and in respect of the age and educationqualification he should produce Transfer Certificate and CommunityCertificate. It also states in the last paragraph that if all theabove conditions are satisfied "you will be appointed as a Driver".9. In other cases of the batch, the respective orders issuedby the Transport Corporations show that it is a provisionalappointment and in some other cases it also states, as if thepetitioner concerned was selected, apart from other cases, whereinit says that the concerned petitioners have been appointed. Allthese orders are invariably during February 2006 and theappointments were made as temporary and the candidates are directedto produce the certificates before the concerned officials. 10. It is the case of the petitioners in these cases thatwhen accordingly, they went in person with records with a desire ofjoining duty, they were not allowed to join on the ground that theelection process in respect of public election has been initiatedand as per the directions of the Chief Electoral Officer, theappointments should not be made and it is the case of thepetitioners that they are qualified and sponsored throughEmployment Exchange which is the due process and therefore, thecandidates were directed to contact after the intimation from therespective second respondent. It was thereafter, the petitionerscame to know that the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 was passed by the Government,directing the Managing Directors of all State TransportCorporations to withdraw the provisional appointment orders issuedto the Drivers/Conductors, pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1)Department dated 21.07.2005. The respective second respondentshave also passed consequential orders, canceling the provisionalselections. 11. The case of the petitioners is that by virtue ofG.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005,considering the fact that the shortage position ofDrivers/Conductors in the State Transport undertakings hasincreased and the State Transport undertakings are in the categoryof essential services, the Government calculating on the said datethat there are 1776 vacancies of Drivers and 586 vacancies ofConductors as on 30.04.2005, has directed, the lifting of ban onrecruitment issued in G.O.Ms.No.27 (Finance) Department dated21.01.2002 and permitting the Corporations to recruit 2000 Driversand 700 Conductors of course based on certain conditions. 12. The Annexure to the said G.O. gives the vacancy positionsin respect of Drivers and Conductors in the Transport undertakings https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ which is as follows: Allotment of Drivers and Conductors to State Transport UndertakingsName of the CorporationsNo.of DriversNo.of Conductors1. Metropolitan TransportCorporation Limited, Chennai-2.2301902. State Express TransportCorporation Limited, Chennai-2. Nil903. Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation (VPM)Limited, villupuram64NIL4. Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation (CBE)Coimbatore5541105. Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation (Salem)Ltd., Salem4301106. Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation (KBM)Ltd., Kumbakonam3771407. Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation(Madurai) Ltd., Madurai3456013. It was based on the said decision of the Government inG.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005, therespondent Corporations have called for eligible candidates fromEmployment Exchange and accordingly, the Employment Exchange hassponsored the petitioners name, who are eligible and appointmentorders were issued in February 2006, as I have stated above,namely, that in some cases stating proposed appointment, in somecases stating provisional appointment and in some other casesstating, as if the persons are appointed etc., and thereafter, theelection process came into effect and then impugned G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, was passed and theconsequential orders of cancellation. The said orders ofcancellation of appointments are challenged on the ground that theprovisions of Section 25(F) and Chapter V (A) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, were not followed, apart from the other contentionthat the cancellation is due to political reasons. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

14. It is also the case of the petitioners that the secondrespondent after giving the appointment order cannot suomoto cancelthe same. Apart from that it is the case of the petitioners thatthe cancellation is only to accommodate a particular group ofpeople. When large number of vacancies are available, as it isevident from the communication of the Government and also thestatement of the Hon’ble Minister, who is stated to have admittedthat there are 8000 vacancies in the Transport Corporations, thecancellation is only arbitrary. 15. Apart from that it is the case of the petitioners that itis the exploitation by the Government, who is expected to be amodel employer. It is also the case of the petitioners that as faras the petitioners are concerned, the selection process is alreadyover and it is only to take charge in the post, the time waspostponed, since the election process has intervened and therefore,after election process the respondent ought to have given effect tothe appointment orders. Since it is the matter relating toadministrative action resulting in civil consequences, as per thejudgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court the petitioners are entitledfor a notice on principles of natural justice, which has not beenfollowed. 16. The first respondent has filed the counter affidavit.According to the first respondent, there are 7 State Transportundertakings functioning in the state of Tamil Nadu. While thefirst respondent admits that pursuant to the lifting on ban ofrecruitment as per G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated21.07.2005 and the respective Corporations have selected candidatesfor appointment, obtaining the list from Employment Exchange and insome cases provisional appointment orders have been sent to theselected candidates, inasmuch as the model code of conduct ofElection Commission came into force, in the mean time, during thegeneral elections to the State Legislative Assembly in 2006, theElection Commission has ordered, the selected candidates should notbe allowed to join duty before completion of election process andtherefore, appointments were not made. 17. It is the specific case of the first respondent that from1997 on wards, appointments to the post of 4553 Drivers and 4061Conductors were made by the Transport Corporations on daily wagesbasis either on sponsorship from the Employment Exchange or withoutreferring to the Employment Exchange or on compassionate ground andtheir services were no longer required subsequently. Around 1685retrenched persons filed writ petitions and in the batch of casesin the judgement dated 08.12.2005, there was a direction to provide https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ re-employment to 952 retrenched persons as per Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, on preference, stating that in respect ofthe persons who have completed 240 days in the respectiveCorporations and satisfied with the other conditions, they shall begiven preference in appointment under Section 25(H) of the saidAct, to the new entrance. In respect of the persons who have notcompleted 240 days, they are directed to be re-employed and thequestion of their regularization was only after completion of 240days and subject to the fulfilment of the other conditions. Thesaid order was subsequently clarified on 07.04.2006, stating thatsuch persons given preference, shall satisfy regarding physicalfitness and eye fitness and driving skill test in respect ofDrivers. Following the said Division Bench order, subsequently,persons who were retrenched have approached and the Division Benchhas issued similar orders. It was after the election process wasover, the Government for the purpose making appointment of Driversand Conductors to which, there was acute shortage, has issued theimpugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006,in Clause 4 of the said G.O., stating that preference will be givento the persons retrenched from service and obtained orders from theHigh Court for re-employment in terms of Section 25(H) of the Act,apart from giving preference to similar persons who approached thecourt and cases are still under consideration. Further, it statedthat preference shall be given to the persons who are similarlysituated but, who have not approached the court but approached theManaging Directors seeking re-employment and that while giving suchpreference as per the clarification of this Court dated 07.04.2006in W.P.No.38097 of 2005 etc., both the physical fitness, eyefitness and driving skill test are to be satisfied. Since therespondents had to give preference to the candidates as per thedirection of this Court, it warranted the State TransportCorporations to cancel the provisional selection intimation andaccordingly, the provisional appointment orders already issued werecancelled. 18. It is also the case of the first respondent that theorders issued in February 2006, are not appointment orders but theywere all provisional in nature subject to certain conditions.While it is true that due to intervention of the assembly election,the petitioners were directed to come after receipt of information,it remains a fact that after election, the respondents have nevergiven any intimation for verification of the certificates. 19. It is also the case of the first respondent that it wasas per the direction of this Court, the second respondent has toprovide re-employment to about 897 Drivers and it was in thosecircumstances, the second respondent was unable to provide https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ employment to the petitioners in the near future and that hasresulted in the cancellation of the provisional orders. It is alsodenied that 8000 vacancies have arisen in the Transport CorporationDepartment. It is also stated that withdrawal of the provisionalappointment does not in any way deny the right of the petitionersto be sponsored again by the Employment Exchange and it isspecifically stated that the names of the petitioners are keptalive in the register of the Employment Exchange, until the secondrespondent resorts to fresh recruitment through EmploymentExchange. 20. According to the respondents there was no violation ofthe provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, inasmuch as thepetitioners were not appointed at all and therefore, there was noquestion of application of Section 25(F) and Chapter V (A) of theIndustrial Disputes Act. The question of giving opportunity to thepetitioners does not arise because there was no appointment orderissued and in any event, the petitioners have no right to claim tobe appointed. 21. In respect of the writ petitions filed challenging theimpugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006clause 3, the writ petitioner in W.P.No.39363 of 2006 which is theAnna Transport Corporation Indian National Trade Union CongressTozhilalar Nala Sangam states that when it was in 1997, there wasmass retrenchment of Drivers and Conductors in the variousTransport Corporations including the erstwhile Anna TransportCorporation which has been subsequently renamed as Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation and actually, 239 Drivers and Conductors wereretrenched in June 1996 in violation of Section 25(S) and 25(H) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act. It was in those circumstances, thepetitioner Union filed W.P.No.114 of 1997 and W.P.No.3745 of 1997in respect of 84 workers and 239 workers respectively, challengingthe retrenchment as violative of Section 25(F) and 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act. The writ petitions were allowed on29.04.1997 by directing the respondents to offer re-employment toretrenched workmen before recruiting new persons through EmploymentExchange. When the respondent Corporation has filed appeals inWrit Appeal No.143 of 1997 and 144 of 1997 the same was dismissedby the Division Bench of this Court on 08.12.1997. The DivisionBench while dismissing the Writ Appeals, has directed therespondent Corporation, by directing the management to verify thenumber of days worked by each one of the employees and in all thosecases, wherein employees worked for more than 240 days in a 12calendar month and Section 25(F) was not complied with, suchworkers were directed to be reinstated with back-wages andcontinuity of services within 2 months. Further, it was directed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that in respect of persons who have not completed 240 days, theyshould be given preferential treatment in re-employment underSection 25(H) of the Act, and that process was directed to becompleted in a period of 3 months time. It was also specificallystated that those who were in employment should not be disturbeduntil the above exercise was completed. In spite of the specificdirection, the workers were not given employment and in fact,contempt applications were filed and thereafter, the respondentsCorporation has preferred S.L.P.No.12956 to 12958 of 1998 beforethe Supreme Court. 22. It is the case of the petitioner Union that the Hon’bleSupreme Court has directed, the workers to be present before theTransport Corporation on 17 to 19th September 1998, for verificationand however, there has been some untoward incidents by themanagement and the management ultimately reported the Hon’bleSupreme Court that out of 259 workers only 35 workers were providedwork to which the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not inclined to givesuch direction and it was at that stage the S.L.Ps. were withdrawnby the management on 19.03.1999. In spite of withdrawal, themanagement which should have implemented the order in the WritAppeal No.1019 of 1997, has not implemented even as on today. Infact the petitioner Union has filed contempt petition. 23. The Division Bench has closed the contempt application,after the Labour Commissioner has identified as per the directionthat 85 workers are entitled under Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act. The case of the petitioner Union is that after thepassing of G.O.Ms.No.57 dated 21.07.2005, lifting the ban onrecruitment, out of 2000 vacancies of Drivers, there are 430vacancies of Drivers in the Salem Division and out of 700Conductors in the State, 110 Conductor vacancies are available inSalem Division. When the process of sponsorship through EmploymentExchange pursuant to the said G.O.Ms.No.57 was commenced, thepetitioner Union filed W.P.No.31461 of 2005, for a direction toimplement the order in Writ Appeal No.1017 to 1019 of 1997 dated08.12.1997, by appointing the workers on preferential basis underSection 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said writpetition was allowed on 08.12.2005 by the Division Bench of thisCourt and it was thereafter, the letters of appointment were givento the workers, represented by the petitioner Union on condition ofsatisfying the age limit, educational qualification, etc.24. It was in those circumstances, on the petitioners filingthe clarification petition in W.P.M.P.No.7582 of 2006 in WritPetition No.31461 of 2005, the Division Bench has clarified that itis physical fitness and driving skill test that should be satisfied https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and not other requirements. It is in such circumstances, theG.O.Ms.No.41, dated 13.07.2006 came to be issued, deciding toimplement the above said order of the Division Bench of this Court,however, referring that this is applicable only to the workersappointed after 1997, again ignoring the claim of the petitionerUnion, whose workers have joined prior to 1997. 25. It is the case of the petitioner Union that afterG.O.Ms.No.41 came into existence, about 170 retrenched workers weregiven appointment orders, who were appointed after 1997. It isalso stated that as against the order dated 08.12.2005 passed inW.P.No.31461 of 2006 by the Division Bench of this court, an S.L.P.filed by the management, is admitted on 28.08.2006 and the same ispending. The case of the petitioner Union is that there is norational basis to restrict the benefits of G.O.Ms.No.41 in respectof Clause 3, only relating to the persons appointed and retrenchedafter 1997, especially in the circumstance that the members of thepetitioner Union have been fighting in these years and they wereappointed before 1997 and retrenched. 26. It is the case of those petitioners, who have fled writof mandamus for direction to implement the G.O.Ms.No.41 thatinasmuch as the petitioners were employed under the secondrespondent Transport Corporation and they were retrenched withoutassigning any reasons and without following the provisions of theIndustrial Disputes Act, and also the direction given by theDivision Bench in Writ Appeal No.1194 to 1199 of 1997 and pursuantto the G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006,when the petitioners’ name have been forwarded by the respectiveEmployment Exchange and they were also called for interview, theywere not given any appointment so far and therefore, they areentitled for preferential treatment as per the Section 25(H) of theAct, apart from G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 itself, which categorically assures that even in respectof persons, who have been retrenched but have not approached thecourt, they will be given preference, however, subject to twoconditions of physical fitness and eye fitness and driving skilltest. 27. Mr.N.R.Chandran learned Senior Counsel appearing for thepetitioner in W.P.No.23559 of 2006 which has been adopted by allother learned counsels, in respect of the similar writ petitions,while challenging the validity of the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 specifically refers toClause 6 whereby, the orders issued by the second respondentTransport Corporation have been cancelled and also would submitthat in respect of these writ petitioners, their appointments have https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ been done by following the procedure established by law, namely,they have been sponsored through Employment Exchange and all ofthem have confirmed to the required qualifications for the post ofDrivers/Conductors in the second respondent Corporations. 28. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the order issuedby the second respondent in February 2006, offering to provideemployment as a Driver or Conductor to the petitioners, is anappointment order, since the same is not for a casual appointmentand the petitioners are not sought to be appointed as casuallabourers, inasmuch as it is the admitted case of the respondent asseen in G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005itself that there has been in existence vacancies to the extent of1776 in respect of Drivers and 586 in respect of Conductors as on30.04.2005, and it was pursuant to the said vacancy position,notified by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1)Department dated 21.07.2005, the appointment orders were issued bythe second respondent and therefore, it cannot be lightly taken asprovisional selection for the reason that the appointments are madeto the regular post. According to him, calling upon thepetitioners pursuant to the appointment orders dated 25.02.2006 toproduce various certificates and that itself will not make theappointment as provisional. It is in this regard, the learnedcounsel would submit that even under the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 in paragraph No.2, itis clearly stated that when once appointment orders are sent to theselected candidates, the term provisional appointments statedtherein cannot take away their right to claim the post, especiallyin the circumstance that the appointments are made to the regularpost. Therefore, the word provisional appointment is only amisconception and the petitioners are not merely selectees but theyare appointees in the legal sense of the term and therefore, thecivil consequences have occurred to them. They were not allowed tojoin duty which is only consequential to the appointment ordersissued, not by fault on part of the petitioners, but due to theintervention of election process and according to the learnedSenior Counsel, even Election Commission has recognized theappointment but only directed the appointees to join after theelection process is over. 29. The conditions mentioned in the orders by the secondrespondent dated 25.02.2006 to produce the certificates werealready produced and it was only for verification purpose, the samewas called for and that cannot make the appointment provisional.He would insist that as far as these petitioners are concerned, theprocess of selection has been followed, namely, they have beensponsored through Employment Exchange in respect of regular https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ vacancies, which are available as it is admitted in G.O.Ms.No.57Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 and therefore, it shouldbe treated as an appointment and not merely a selection and thereis no right on the part of the second respondent to cancel thesame, since the appointment cannot be termed as either illegal,irregular or improper. He would also submit that mere inability onthe part of the second respondent cannot be the ground to taint theorder as a provisional selection. 30. He would also rely upon the judgement of the Hon’ble ApexCourt reported AIR 1991 SC 309 to support his contention that whensuch appointments are cancelled, it requires an opportunity. Hewould also rely upon an order passed by me, while sitting in theMadurai Bench of Madras High Court, dated 14.03.2006 inW.P.No.2397, 2401 of 2006, wherein I have given direction that whenpursuant to such orders, they have approached the secondrespondent, the petitioners were not allowed to join because of theprocess of election as directed by the Chief Electoral Officer andtherefore, a direction was given by this Court stating that in viewof the said circumstances, the petitioner’s appointment order shallbe given effect after the election process is over. Therefore,according to the learned Senior Counsel, the present G.O., whichcancels the appointment is against the order of the court and alsoagainst the order of the Election Commission itself. 31. In respect of the preference sought to be given to theretrenched employees as per Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that eventhough as far as the candidates directed by the court to givepreference under Section 25(H) of the Act, he may not have muchquarrel, nevertheless, the learned Senior Counsel would submit thatwhen earlier the workers were working as casual employees and werenot appointed in the existing vacancies as that of the presentappointment order of the petitioners and therefore, they cannot betermed as regular employees and especially in the circumstance thatsome of them were sponsored through Employment Exchange and otherswere not. By using the provisions under Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, their original appointments which were notproper or regular or by following the procedure established by law,cannot be regularized. 32. On the other hand, by giving preferential treatment to aperson who was not appointed by due process of law and who has beensubsequently retrenched, against persons like that of thepetitioners herein, who have been appointed to regular vacancies byfollowing the procedure established by law, will only amount toacting against the principles of law as such and will jeopardize https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the interest of the regularly appointed persons like that of thepetitioners. According to him, Clause 3 of the G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 will only be actuallyinvalid because it in effect seeks to validate an improper andillegal appointment of a person not qualified and appointments notby following procedures established by law. 33. The learned Senior Counsel would also take exception tothe counter affidavit which has been filed without even givingspecific particulars about how many candidates have been appointedas per the direction of the court under Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, and actually what are the vacanciesavailable as on date and therefore, the counter affidavit suffersfrom want of necessary particulars as such. 34. According to the learned Senior Counsel, Section 25(H) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act cannot confer an automatic right of re-employment. He would also submit that in the absence of thecounter filed by the second respondent who has given theappointment orders and on the face of the counter of the firstrespondent, comprising no material particulars regarding thevacancy position and as to how many persons have been accommodated,and in the absence of the exact figure, it should be taken that thepleading is not complete, especially in the circumstance that novalid reason is given for the purpose of withdrawing theappointments. 35. According to the learned Senior Counsel, while as per theG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, Clause 4,the first sub-clause stands in a different position in respect ofsecond and third clauses, wherein a person has gone to court and noorder has been passed and persons who have not gone to court. Areference to the Division Bench order in W.P.No.2985 of 2003 etc.batch dated 08.12.2005 applies only to cases where the workmen whohave retrenched and who have come to court in respect of whomassurance were given on behalf of the Government. 36. He would also submit that in respect of persons who havenot completed 240 days, they can only be given preference in re-employment in the same category, which they were holding,especially, when originally they were holding the casual labourerpost. Now, taking advantage of the order of the Division Bench,they cannot be posted to a regular employment and that is not thesprit of Section 25(H) of the Act. He would submit that even inrespect of the persons who have worked less than 240 days, thebenefit of the Division Bench order can be given only to thepersons who have come to court and that cannot be granted to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ persons who have not come to the court or otherwise that willencourage the backdoor entry, especially, when originally they werenot appointed by following due process of law and theirappointments were casual in nature and by applying Section 25(H) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, they were seeking to enter into theregular employment. He would also rely upon the assurance statedto have been given by the Government as referred by the DivisionBench in the said judgement in respect of the candidates entitledfor the benefit under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,can be made applicable only in respect of the persons who have cometo the court and such assurance cannot be for the purpose of givinga regular appointment to the persons who have not even completed240 days. He would also contend that as per the Tamil NaduIndustrial Disputes Rule, 1958, especially Rule 62, the respondentshave a duty to maintain the seniority list and in case ofretrenchment, the same has to be followed on the occurrence ofvacancies by following the procedure under Rule 63. He would alsospecifically refer to the proviso to Rule 63, which says thatobligation of the employer to give notice to the retrenchedemployees for re-employment, does not arise in cases of temporaryand casual workers, which according to him means that the re-employment is not a matter of right for the purpose of casualworkers. Therefore, according to him Clause 2 and Clause 4 of theG.O.Ms.No.41 (4) Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 isvague and without any particulars. 37. He would submit that on the other hand, the petitionersin these cases are different from those who are claiming rightunder Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, not only in thesense that the persons claiming right under Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, were not appointed through EmploymentExchange and they have not having educational qualification asrequired and they are not even produced the age proof and the samewas dispensed with and therefore, third Clause of G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 cannot be appliedregarding those irregularly appointed persons. 38. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel would relyupon the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in A.UmaraniVs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and others reported in 2004(7) SCC 112 to substantiate his contention that in cases ofappointments, where a reference by the Employment Exchange is givena go bye, to such persons the benefits under second and thirdclause of G.O.Ms.No.41(4) Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 cannot be conferred. He would also rely upon thesubsequent judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported inSecretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umadevi and others https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reported 2006(4) SCC 1 to contend that in respect of publicemployment, if the process of appointment is not adhered to and theappointments are made irregularly without reference to the properappointment procedure and keeping out those who are qualified toapply for the post concerned and deprive them of an opportunity tocompete the post as illegal. 39. He would also submit that the qualification prescribed bythe Transport Department in respect of the vacancies of Drivers andConductors should be equated to the rules, which are framed as perArticle 309 of the Constitution India regarding the publicemployment. According to him it cannot be said that the post ofDrivers and Conductors in the Transport Corporation are not publicemployment. He would also further submit that inasmuch as it isseen that the second respondent has not prepared or not maintainedthe records as required under the Tamil Nadu Industrial DisputesRules 1958 and the seniority list under Rule 62, there is noquestion of application of Section 25(H) of the Industrial DisputesAct, since the Section 25(H) presupposes the condition ofpreserving that records. 40. The learned Senior Counsel also would rely upon thejudgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2002(2) SCC 507(State of Hariyana Vs. State of Punjab and another) to substantiatehis contention that the cancellation of the order cannot be passedmerely based on the change of Government. He would specificallyrely upon the portion of the judgement of the Honb’le Apex Court atpage No.538 which runs as follows: "What really bothers us most is the functioning of thepolitical parties, who assume power to do whatever thatsuits them and whatever would catch the vote bank. Theyforget for a moment that the Constitution conceives of aGovernment to be manned by the representatives of thepeople, who get themselves elected in an election. Thedecisions taken at the governmental level should not beso easily nullified by a change of Government and by someother political party assuming power, particularly whensuch a decision affects some other state and the interestof the nation as a whole. It cannot be disputed that sofar as the policy is concerned, a political partyassuming power is entitled to engraft the politicalphilosophy behind the party, since that must be held tobe the will of the people. But in the matter ofgovernance of a State or in the matter of execution of adecision taken by a previous Government, on the basis ofa consensus arrived at, which does not involve anypolitical philosophy, the succeeding Government must be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ held duty-bound to continue and carry on the unfinishedjob rather than putting a stop to the same."41. The learned Senior Counsel also relies upon anotherjudgement of this Court rendered in B.Kamaraj Vs. The Director ofTechnical Education, Guindy, Chennai-04 and others reported in 2004WLR 271 to show that even though it is true that the selectedcandidates do not have right to the post, after an order ofappointment is issued, there cannot be an arbitratory decision onthe part of the Government, since for not appointing the selectedpersons, a proper reason must be given and therefore, the nongiving of such a reason will affect the legitimate expectationwithout any reasonable basis. 42. He would also rely upon another judgement of the Hon’bleSupreme Court reported in 2006(7) SCC 350 in Union Bank of Indiaand others Vs. M.T.Latheesh wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court hasheavily come down against the compassionate appointment, whichreduces considerably the fresh employment affecting the unemployedyouth. 43. He would also submit that the very fact that thepetitioners have undergone selection process and subsequent ordershave been passed by the second respondent shows that the intentionof the second respondent is that the petitioners are appointed andtherefore, the wordings whether proposed to be appointed orprovisionally appointed, all those things are immaterial.According to him, even though it is stated to be an offer, inasmuchas the petitioners have accepted the offer, the appointment iscompleted and therefore, if such order is cancelled, it must be forsome reason, since there is a legitimate expectation on the part ofsuch persons who are appointed. The state has not given any reasonfor such withdrawal. Whether a person is selectee or appointee aright has been conferred. He would also contend that if thecontentions by some of the writ petitioners that the cut off year1997 given in G.O.Ms.No.41(3) Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 is wrong, then the entire G.O. should go. This was thesubmission made by the learned Senior Counsel Mr.N.R.Chandran inresponse to the reply of the learned Advocate General. 44. Mr.Sreeramulu has adopted his arguments. He would alsosubmit that since the post of the Driver or Conductor is being apublic appointment made by the respondents who are definitelycoming under the definition ‘state’ and under Article 12 of theConstitution of India, the re-employment offered to such personswho were not regularly appointed but were appointed on casual basisor daily wages basis without qualification and without sponsored by https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Employment Exchange and therefore, those appointments should beheld invalid and in such cases question of applicability of Section25(H) in respect of those candidates does not arise. He would relyupon the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Accounts Officers(A&I) A.P.SRTC and others Vs. P.Chandra Sekar Rao and othersreported in 2006(7) SCC 488 by referring to paragraph 6 of thejudgement which runs as follows: "6. The High Court did not have the benefit ofconsidering the recent decisions of this Court includingthe Constitution Bench judgement in Secy.,State ofKarnataka Vs. Umadevi(3). In the said decision it hascategorically been held that the appointments made on acontract basis or on daily wages and in violation of thestatutory rules or the Rules framed under the provisoappended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India,being void ab initio and thus nullity and hence thequestion of regularising their services would not arise."He would also reiterate his stand that the order of the DivisionBench earlier passed based on the undertaking given on behalf ofthe respondents cannot be treated as a precedent. 45. Mr.Palani learned counsel appearing for the petitioner inW.P.No.24285 of 2006 would submit that the petitioner was appointedas Conductor by the order of the second respondent dated25.02.2006. He would refer to the terms of the wordings in thesaid order wherein it is stated that the petitioner is appointed.According to him by supporting the contention of the learned SeniorCounsel Mr.N.R.Chandran, since the appointment of the petitionerhas been made subsequent to G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Departmentdated 21.07.2005 in the substantial vacancies, the appointment cannever be treated as a casual vacancy, especially in thecircumstance that the due process of selection has been followedand the petitioner’s name has been forwarded by the EmploymentExchange. According to the learned counsel, the Government has noright to issue the impugned order at all. By applying the saidimpugned order, various orders issued in the light of Section 25(H)of the Industrial Disputes Act, giving preference to thoseemployees who were not employed through Employment Exchange andtherefore, the appointments become irregular and such appointmentsare sought to be made illegally. 46. He would also submit forcefully that Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act cannot apply for entry of the employeesunder backdoor method, especially in the respondents organizationwhich is a public sector undertaking. He would also submit that byquoting the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2004(7)SCC 112 (A.Umarani Vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ others) that regularization cannot be a mode of recruitment by thestate and appointments made in violation of mandatory provisions ofstatues, ignoring the minimum educational qualifications and otheressential qualifications will be wholly illegal. He wouldspecifically refer to paragraph No.39 of the judgement of theHon’ble Apex Court, which runs as follows: "39. Regularising, in our considered opinion, is not andcannot be the mode of recruitment by any "State" withinthe meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India orany body or authority governed by a statutory Act or theRules framed thereunder. It is also now well settledthat an appointment made in violation of the mandatoryprovisions of the statute and in particular, ignoring theminimum educational qualification and other essentialqualification would be wholly illegal. Such illegalitycannot be cured by taking recourse to regularisation.(See State of H.P.Vs.Suresh Kumar Verma). 40. It is equally well settled that those who come byback door should go through that door. (See State ofU.P. Vs. U.P.State Law Officers Assn.)"47. Therefore according to him, the earlier appointments madein the respondent Transport Corporations were not by following thedue process and appointments were made on casual basis and dailywages basis, not based on the the existence of sanctioned strengthand therefore, those appointments cannot be treated as validappointments at all and to such persons who were retrenched, thequestion of applicability Section 25(H) does not arise. He wouldalso rely upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in2006(7) SCC 161 rendered in Principal Mahar Chand Polytechnic andanother Vs. Anu Lamba and others to contend that when once theappointments were not issued based on the vacancies existed orafter notifying through Employment Exchange or no advertisementissued before appointment to enable eligible candidates to fileapplications then such appointments should be held invalid and alsorelying upon the judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’bleSupreme Court in Umadevi case reported in 2006(4) SCC 1, with thespecific reference to the following wordings of the Hon’ble ApexCourt in paragraph No.48 at Page No.40 which runs as follows: "There is no fundamental right in those who have beenemployed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractualbasis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed inservice. As has been held by this Court, they cannot besaid to be holders of a post, since, a regularappointment could be made only by making appointmentsconsistent with the requirements of Article 14 and 16 ofthe Constitution. The right to be treated equally with https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot beextended to a claim for equal treatment with those whowere regularly employed. That would be treating unequalsas equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a rightto be absorbed in service even though they have neverbeen selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules.The arguments based on Article 14 and 16 of theConstitution are therefore overruled."48. According to the learned counsel, even the order passedby this Court in preference on re-employment is a nullity, byvirtue of the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court as stated above,since by conferring the benefits under Section 25(H) of the Act,the public employments made contrary to rules and irregularly aresought to be regularized. The learned counsel also would refer tothe judgement of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.2985 of 2003etc., batch dated 08.12.2005 to state that the said judgementcovers two sets of people; one is that the person who have beensponsored by Employment Exchange and another relates to the personswho were not sponsored through Employment Exchange. In that regardhe also would refer to another Division Bench judgement of thisCourt in Writ Appeal No.1294 to 1299 of 1997 dated 08.12.1997,wherein the Division Bench has held that even in respect of thepersons who were not appointed through Employment Exchange must beoffered the benefit under Section 25(H) of the Act. 49. He would submit that a reading of the relevant rulesunder the Industrial Disputes Rules, which contemplate themaintenance of the seniority list of workmen and also re-employmentbased on the seniority shows that the benefit of re-employmentunder Section 25(H) of the Act applies, only in respect of thoseemployees who are regularly appointed and does not apply in respectof appointments which are not made in accordance with law andprocedure. He would also submit that the reason given by therespondents for canceling the regular appointment made to thepetitioners as that of the direction given by the court is notvalid. He would also rely upon the various judgements of theHon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 1071, 1972(1) SCC 409and 1979(4) SCC 507 to substantiate his contention that illegal andirregular appointments cannot give any right to such appointees.He would also reiterate that the post of Drivers and Conductors inthe respondent’s organisation being the public employment, byapplying the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the appointmentsmade in respect of the casual employees earlier should be onlytreated as illegal and such illegal appointment cannot be sought tobe regularized by invoking Section 25(H) of the Industrial DisputesAct. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

50. He would also place reliance on the judgement of theHon’ble Apex Court reported in 2006(5) SCC 173 that in respect ofpublic employment, appointments must be in open market and theappointments effected without advertisement in the newspapers orwithout resorting to the sponsorship by Employment Exchange canonly be treated as illegal appointments. He would also submit thatthe stand taken by the respondents that appointment to thesepersons who were appointed earlier on casual basis withoutreference to Employment Exchange and who were retrenched, weregiven appointment subsequent to the Division Bench direction, isonly against the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He wouldalso finally submit that the vacancies that are existed as on todayare much more and even assuming that the said persons were re-employed either as per the direction of the court or afterretrenchment, the writ petitioners can also be accommodated. 51. Mr.P.H.Manojpandian would submit placing reliance uponthe judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 1994(6) SCC154 that inasmuch as the petitioners are qualified and the orderwas only to verify the certificates, in the absence of any fault onthe part of the petitioners, they should not be put to loss, sincethe legitimate expectation is affected by the conduct of therespondents. To support his contention he also would rely upon thejudgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2003(11) SCC584. 52. Mr.R.T.Duraisamy learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner while adopting the arguments of Mr.N.R.Chandran wouldalso submit that in respect of the petitioner, he was appointed inthe year 1998 through Employment Exchange and terminated,thereafter called for interview now, after the G.O.Ms.No.57Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 and he was given re-employment. 53. Ms.Nagaseela learned counsel appearing for the writpetitioner in W.P.No.39363 of 2006 challenging the G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 Clause 3 in so far itis restricts the persons to be benefited under Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, only in relation to those who wereappointed after 1997 as adopted by other learned counsels appearingin similar writ petitions, would narrate as to how many rounds oflitigations, the said union had filed, till the Hon’ble SupremeCourt and ultimately. After withdrawal of the S.L.P. in theHon’ble Supreme Court, the respondents were bound to follow thejudgement of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1019 of 1997,after a prolonged battle G.O.Ms.No.41(3) Transport (C1) Department, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dated 13.07.2006 came to be passed, however, stating that the sameis applicable only in respect of persons appointed after 1997 whichhas no reasonable or rational basis whatsoever. It is hercontention that even though earlier some persons were not appointedthrough Employment Exchange and the appointment was not made by thepublic advertisement, it is not correct to say that they were notqualified. According to her, they were all workmen as per Section2(S) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and there is no distinctionbetween the regular appointment and adhoc appointment. The benefitgiven under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, afterinsertion of Chapter V(A) on 24.10.1953, is conferred without anydistinction between the adhoc workmen and regular employee. 54. On the other hand, the benefits are conferred for re-employment on preferential basis as a mandatory requirement, sincethe term "shall" is used. She would also submit that inasmuch asSection 25(J)(1) of the Act, gives over riding effect to Chapter V(A), as per the law, the preferential treatment to the employees,irrespective of their being adhoc or regular is a mandatory and thesame is a statutory right. She would also submit that the DivisionBench of this Court in the judgement rendered in Writ AppealNo.2985 of 2003 etc., batch dated 08.12.2005 has in fact referredto various judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as theother High Courts, to come to a conclusion that there is nodistinction between the temporary employment and permanentemployment in respect of the powers conferred under Section 25(H)of the Industrial Disputes Act, apart from the fact that the 25(H)imposes a mandatory duty. 55. She would also submit that Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, has nothing to do with the regularization,it only offers only the preferential right in respect of re-employment of the retrenched employees. She would also submit thatwhat was referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Umarani caseand Umadevi case, are the case of illegal appointments of thepersons who were not even qualified to hold the post and in suchcircumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court has come to a conclusion thatwhen many qualified unemployed persons are standing in the queue,the unqualified persons cannot be made usurp their positions. Shewould also rely upon the various judgements of the various HighCourts also, as confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court to show thatunder the Industrial Disputes Act, the concept of casual labourerand permanent labourer are alien. 56. Mr.Gangadharan learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner in W.P.No.24975 of 2006 while adopting the argument ofthe Ms.D.Nagasaila would also submit that there cannot be a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ discrimination between persons appointed after 1997 and before 1997and there is no rational nexus between the provision and the objectsought to be achieved. The said contention has also been followedby Mr.Mohandass, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner inW.P.No.34825 of 2006. 57. Mr.Hariparanthaman learned counsel in W.P.No.30687 and30688 of 2006 etc., batch appearing for the workers in the MetroTransport Corporation, while opposing the argument of the learnedSenior Counsel Mr.N.R.Chandran would submit that the Hon’bleSupreme Court, while dealing with the judgement in Umarani case aswell as Umadevi case had no occasion to discuss about either theconcept of workmen under Section 2(S) of the Industrial DisputesAct, or to decide about the implication for Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act. According to him, Section 25(F) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, is dealing with the payment ofcompensation in respect of persons who have been retrenchedillegally and in that process certain number of days are stated tohave been worked by workmen to enable them to get compensation,whereas in respect of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,it speaks about the right of re-employment irrespective of thenumber of days. He would rely upon the Hon’ble Apex Court reportedin 1996(2) LLJ 820 to substantiate his contention that as far asthe right under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, isconcerned, the word retrenchment does not mean that such personsshould always be eligible for the retrenchment compensation underSection 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It means that evenif he is not eligible for the compensation, he will be entitled forthe preferential right of re-employment under Section 25(H) of theAct. Therefore, there is no distinction of permanent and temporaryemployee as far as the rights under Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, are concerned. 58. According to him, Section 25(H) contemplates twocategories of workmen saying that the workmen who is eligible forre-employment under Section 25(H) and workmen who have not rendered240 days of required service as per Section 25(F) and are noteligible for compensation under the said provisions of Section 25(F) of the Act. Therefore, according to the learned counsel,Section 25(H) does not contemplate the number of days to be worked.The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in 1996(2) LLJ820 has been followed by the Division Bench in 2006(1) LLN 257(Writ Appeal No.22985 of 2003 etc., dated 08.12.2005). 59. The learned counsel would submit that the petitioners whohave been earlier retrenched are not claiming regularization. Theyare only claiming a preferential treatment in re-employment and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ inasmuch as Chapter V(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is havingover riding effect, certainly the persons who were retrenchedearlier, whether they were appointed on adhoc or regular basis, areentitled for the preemption. The learned counsel also would relyupon the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 1990(2)LLJ 70 to show that the term retrenchment means it is thetermination by the employer of the services of the workmen for anyreason whatsoever, except those that are specifically excluded inthe section namely, Section 2(oo). 60. He would also take me to the fact of the said casewherein, the respondent workmen were terminated on the ground thattheir original appointment was not valid, since the Chairman has nopower to appoint and in those circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Courthas held as stated above. The same was the judgement rendered bythe Hon’ble Apex Court subsequently, in 1993(2) LLJ 696 (SC).According to the learned counsel, the law under the IndustrialDisputes Act, is very well settled, especially, in respect ofretrenchment, right under Section 25(H) of the Industrial DisputesAct, and retrenchment compensation under Section 25(F) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, and that cannot be stated to have beenunsettled by the subsequent judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court inUmadevi’s case, wherein the provisions of the Industrial DisputesAct, were never under consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court atall and those were relating to the rules framed under Article 309of the Constitution of India, in respect of public employment. 61. The learned counsel would also distinguish the judgementrelating to Apprentice who are not treated as workmen andtherefore, they are not entitled as a matter of right foremployment, as it is found in the judgement of the Hon’ble ApexCourt in 1995(2) SCC 1. He would also submit that even in respectof the project workers as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1985(2) LLJ 406 (Supreme Court) (Inter Pal Yadav and others etc. Vs.Union of India and others etc), the re-employment is not a matterof right even though, the court has directed the Railway to preparea list of project casual labour and as and when they startabsorbing, to give employment on the seniority basis among thepersons who were removed. Likewise, he would also refer to thejudgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported 1995(2) LLN 1129(SC) and also 1997(3) LLN 67(SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Courthas directed the Management to maintain a register in respect ofseasonal employees so that as and when season arises they shall begiven a preferential right of employment. 62. He would also rely upon the judgement of the Hon’bleSupreme Court reported in 2001(7) SCC 1 (Steel Authority of India https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Ltd., and others Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and others)and state that even in respect of Steel Authority of India Ltd.,which is also a public employment, the Hon’ble Apex Court hasdecided the issue under the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore,according to the learned counsel Mr.Hariparanthaman, even if it isa public employment, if they are governed by the labourlegislations, it is the Industrial Disputes Act, which will prevailand inasmuch as the judgements reported by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt in Umadevi and Umarani case has not dealt with anything aboutthe Industrial Disputes Act, it cannot be said that the rightsgiven under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, have beeneither taken away or restricted, for, under the labour legislation,there was no distinction between the casual worker and permanentworker. 63. He would also submit that in respect of the persons whowere earlier retrenched, it is not as if they were withoutqualification. It may be true that in some cases, there was noadvertisement and Employment Exchange list was not called for, butnevertheless, it remains the fact that they were all the qualifiedpersons and it is only those persons who were now appointed as perthe provisions of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, asit is conferred under G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006. 64. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner in W.P.No.426239 of 2006 submits the very fact thatunder G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006clause 3, it is stated that the appointment will be made in respectof persons appointed after 1997 shows that there are permanentvacancies. That was the case wherein, the writ petitioner claimedin earlier W.P.No.16292 of 1998 for regularization of service asper the clause 12(3) settlement entered under the IndustrialDisputes Act, between the trade union and the management. ThisCourt while disposing of the writ petition and based on thedecision given in Writ Appeal No.1294 to 1299 of 1997 dated08.12.1997 has directed the respondent Corporation to dispose ofthe representation and subsequently when a contempt application wasfiled in Contempt Petition No.307 of 2002 by order dated12.07.2002, it was made clear that the direction of Court dated10.11.1998 has been complied with in terms of the order of theDivision Bench and recording the same, the contempt petition cameto be closed. It was in those circumstances, by order dated01.08.2001, the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, MaduraiDivision-3, Nagercoil has informed the petitioner that as and whenre-employment is to be effected, the petitioner will be givenpreference on the basis of the seniority list relating to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ temporary employees, maintained by the respondents. Therefore,according to the learned counsel, the petitioner has to be givenemployment, without distinction as to whether the appointment wasafter 1997 or before 1997. This argument, the learned counsel hasadvanced in addition to the argument advanced by various counselsthat there was no rational nexus for fixing 1997 as a date ofappointment. In that case, the petitioner was appointed andretrenched before 1997. 65. He would also submit that the First Bench of this Courtin the batch of cases in Writ Appeal No.1294 to 1299 of 1997 dated08.12.1997, in paragraph 3, stated as follows: "3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, weare of the view that since the workers were taken inservice, it is immaterial whether one was taken throughthe Employment Exchange or directly. Under theIndustrial law, which is a welfare legislation, a righthas been conferred under the Act on worker to have apreference for the employment in case of freshrecruitment over the ones who have not earlier served theEmployer. Consequently, the appellant - Corporation willoffer the job to the retrenched employees complying withSection 25-H of the Act, irrespective of the fact whetherthe worker was employed through the Employment Exchangeor directly, unless the Authority comes to the conclusionthat the employment to the worker was provided malafideor for some ulterior consideration. This exercise may becompleted within three months from today."66. He would also rely upon the judgement of the Hon’bleSupreme Court reported in 2006(6) SCC 310 (Mineral ExplorationCorporation Employees Union Vs. Mineral Exploration CorporationLtd., and another) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held thatjudgement reported in 2006(4) SCC 1 in Umadevi’s case, makingdistinction between the irregularly appointed employees andillegally appointed employees and regularize them, has restrictedin paragraph 15 to 17 of the said judgement as one time measure andalso directing that the skilled employees have been employed formany years, doing the work of permanent nature. 67. According to the learned counsel, the said publicemployment relates to employment wherein, Article 309 to befollowed and as far as the transport employees in the respondentCorporation are concerned, there is no rules framed under Article309 of the Constitution of India. It was in those circumstances,according the learned counsel for the petitioner, the DivisionBench has correctly held that the offering of employment under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was the irrespectiveof the fact whether the workers were employed through theEmployment Exchange, are directly. Therefore according to him, thedecisions rendered in Umadevi case and Umarani case by the Hon’bleApex Court has no application. 68. Ms.Vaigai in addition to the arguments advanced as statedabove, would submit stating that the requirement as perG.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 was thedriving test and efficiency test, etc. The learned counsel apartrelying on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in2006(6) SCC 310 as stated above, would also rely upon thesubsequent order of the Division Bench passed in W.P.M.P.No.7523 of2006 in W.P.No.38097 of 2005 etc. batch dated 17.04.2006 whereinwhile clarifying the earlier orders passed in Writ Appeal No.2585of 2003 etc. batch dated 08.12.2005, especially relating toparagraph 34 (III)(A), wherein the term "other conditions if any"have been used, the Division Bench has clarified stating that thepetitioners therein have in fact satisfied the required conditionsprevailing on the relevant date namely 1996 to 1999 and therefore,made it clear that they are also to be considered, subject to thesatisfaction of physical fitness and eye fitness, driving skilltest, etc, while granting re-employment as per the said order dated09.12.2005. 69. Therefore according to her, even a person who wasappointed before 1997 when they were confirmed to the saidqualifications they will be eligible for preferential treatment onre-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act.While referring to the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court inUmadevi’s case reported in 2006(4) SCC 1, the learned counsel wouldsubmit that, that was the case of writ of mandamus filed by thetemporary employees, appointed on daily wages or casual basis,directing praying that they should be made permanent in theappropriate post. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whilereferring to the earlier judgements in R.N.Nanjundappa Vs.T.Thimmiah reported in 1972(1) SCC 409 and also in B.N.NagarajanVs. State of Karnataka in 1979(4) SCC 507 has differentiated theillegal appointments and irregular appointments, has not only foundthat the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot direct the temporaryemployees to be made permanent or regular, since those were, caseswhere, the appointments were made under the scheme and in suchcircumstances, giving such direction will only amount toperpetuating illegality, based on Dharwarad decision reported in1990(2) SCC 396. Therefore according to her, the facts of the caseinvolved in the Hon’ble Apex Court relates to a case wherein, therules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ involved. According to the learned counsel, the appointmentssought to be made are to the sanctioned post and especially, afterthe clarification made by the Division Bench by making applicable,the direction earlier given dated 08.12.2005 to persons appointedfrom 1996 to 1999 and also the present process of appointment is byvirtue of G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005.There is no question of denying the rights to these workers underSection 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 70. She would also submit that when the purpose ofG.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 was thatthere were permanent vacancies to the extent of 1776 in respect ofDrivers and 586 in respect of Conductors as on 30.04.2005, theTamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rule, 1958, Rule 63(1)(iv) iscontrary to the same. She would rely upon the judgement of theHon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2005(6) SCC 751, to show that itwas only in cases where the status of permanency cannot be claimedwhen there was no post, whereas in the present case a reading ofG.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 shows thatthere are posts available. 71. In support of her contention under Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, she would rely upon the various judgementsof the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 1985(2) SCC 648, 1987(1) SCC677, 2004(13) SCC 638 apart from 2006(3) SCC 297. She would alsosubmit that the persons who are selected pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.57Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 cannot complain aboutthe validity or otherwise of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 and therefore, according to herSection 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, gives right not onlyto persons who approached the court but also to other persons whoare eligible. 72. Per contra, Mr.R.Viduthalai learned Advocate Generalwould submit that the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 is perfectly valid in law. He wouldsubmit that a reference to the Industrial Disputes Act would showthat in cases where there is retrenchment within the meaning ofSection 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, Section 25(F) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, contemplate certain procedure to befollowed failure of which will result in payment of retrenchmentcompensation. According to him Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, stands in different footing and the same isindependent of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thereis no requirement of working for 240 days as far as applicabilityof Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The very factthat Section 25(J)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act give over https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ riding effect to these Chapter V (A), shows that the intentionunder Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act is to givebetter benefits to the workers. 73. He would also submit that Section 25(S) of the Act alsomakes Section 25(H) including the other provisions in Chapter V(A)are applicable to the industrial establishments to which Chapter V(B) is applied. According to the learned Advocate General, thedefinition of workmen under Section 2(S) is so liberal that itincludes even an Apprentice. He would submit that under the TamilNadu Industrial Disputes Rule and especially Rule 62(2), a duty isimposed on the employer to prepare a seniority list of theretrenched workers during the preceding 24 months and it is inrespect of them, the preference shall be given while re-employmentas it is seen under Rule 63. Therefore, according to him, if thepersons like that of the petitioners who are challenging thevalidity of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 were appointed in violation of Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, namely when the persons who were alreadyworking and retrenched are available and are entitled for re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as amatter of statutory right, necessarily the petitioners who are nowchallenging the validity of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department,dated 13.07.2006 cannot claim better right than those who arealready entitled for a statutory right under Section 25(H) of theAct. 74. The contention of the learned Advocate General in thisregard is that first of all without going into the merits of thecase as to whether, these persons who are now challenging thevalidity of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 were appointed or selected or whether they have anysubstantial right to hold the post, the order issued to them inFebruary 2006 are patently contrary to the provisions of Section 25(H) of the Act, since by taking away the powers given to theretrenched employees, already worked in the respondentCorporations, the above said appointment orders have been issued inFebruary 2006. Inasmuch as persons who were retrenched within 24months before have got a statutory right of re-employment onpreference basis as per the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules,especially, under Rule 62(2) read with Rule 63, the persons whowere retrenched within two years from the date of the proposal forre-employment are having a mandatory right by way of statutorycompulsion to get a preferential treatment in the case of re-employment. Of course, he would also submit that in respect of thepersons, who were retrenched beyond 24 months, even though therewas no right of re-employment as a matter of compulsion as per the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ rules, the appointment of those persons should be treated ascompassionate appointment and such appointment should bediscretionary. Therefore, by adopting the criteria of 24 months,the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department dated13.07.2006 has fixed the year of appointment of persons as 1997 tohave the benefit because according to him from 1999 to 2004 therewas a ban on recruitment and consequently there was no recruitmentprocess from 1999 to 2004, the criteria of application of 24 monthstime entitles the Government from fixing the date as 1997 as acurtail date for providing a right of preference under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore according to him,the statutory right conferred under Section 25(H) has beenestablished under the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 which is perfectly in accordance withlaw. According to the learned Advocate General, such personsappointed in 2005 have no right, since those appointments wereagainst the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 75. That apart, the learned Advocate General would proceed todeal with the cases of persons who have challenged the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, whileadmitting that the orders issued in February 2006 and the wordingswere different in various Corporations, while in some Corporationsthe word "appointed" is used and in some Corporations the word"proposed to be appointed" is used and some other Corporations theword "provisional appointment" is used. According to the learnedAdvocate General, whatever may be the term used, apart from thefact that such orders are illegal as per the arguments stated byhim supra, he would state that even assuming that a person isissued an appointment order even on merit basis such persons willnot have a right to claim the post as a matter of right. 76. He would rely upon the judgement of the Hon’ble SupremeCourt reported in AIR 1991 SC 1612 apart from 2001(6) SCC 380 toshow that even the persons who are in the merit list have no rightover the post. To substantiate his contention he would also relyupon some other judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in2006(1) SCC 779, 2005(9) SCC 22. He would also quote anotherjudgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2006(3) SCC 330 toshow that even in cases where appointment orders have been issued,subsequently it came to light that the said appointment orders wereissued wrongly and the same was cancelled, the Hon’ble SupremeCourt has held that such appointees have no manner of right overthe post. According to the learned Advocate General, in thepresent case as stated above, even assuming that an appointmentorder has been issued in February 2006 to the persons who are nowchallenging the validity of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dated 13.07.2006, such orders are patently against Section 25(H) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, having realized that bymistake the orders have been issued, under the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, underclause 6 such orders were withdrawn, which is perfectly in orderand the petitioners therein have no substantial right to claim thepost. 77. He would also rely upon the judgement of the Hon’ble ApexCourt in 2003(10) SCC 144 to the effect that the orders issued inFebruary 2006, in these cases were not merely irregular but theywere illegal, since they were against the provisions of theIndustrial Disputes Act. 78. The learned Advocate General would also submit that theDivision Bench in M.Sekaran Vs. General Manager, Tamil Nadu StateTransport Corporation, Coimbatore Division-II, Erode reported in2006(1) LLN 257 has clearly held that rights given under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is a substantial right and areading of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act makes itamply clear that it imposes a statutory duty on the employer togive an opportunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselvesfor re-employment and in view of the said categoric finding of theDivision Bench of this Court dated 08.12.2005, there was astatutory obligation on the part of the respondent Corporation toprovide job to large number of persons who were retrenched earlierand it was only after giving them the preferential right, theremaining vacancies can be filled up by the subsequent appointmentsand the Hon’ble Division Bench has also dealt with G.O.Ms.No.57Transport (C1) Department dated 21.07.2005 which was passed asearly as 21.07.2005 quoting that substantial number of regularvacancies are available. It was in those circumstances, accordingto the learned Advocate General, after the Election Commission hasimposed a restriction in May 2005, after the election process wasover on 13.07.2006 the present impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 came to be passed, rightly givingpreference to all the workers already employed in the respondentCorporation and retrenched, not only based on the judgement of theDivision Bench of this Court but also based on the substantiveobligation imposed on the respondent Corporation under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was only incidentally whenthe statutory obligation was to be implemented, under G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 Clause 6, the earlierorder passed in February 2006 grossly in violation of theprovisions of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, came tobe cancelled on the basis that they were not merely irregular butwere basically illegal. It was also the case of the learned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Advocate General that the decision taken under the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 is not dueto the change of Government but it was based on the legalprinciple. 79. That apart, the learned Advocate General would alsosubmit that no one of the candidates who were given orders inFebruary 2006 and who are now challenging the validity ofG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 have anyright accrued to them, apart from the fact that there was noappointment and such orders given to them were illegal and void abinitio, since the same cannot have a legal basis to stand inasmuchas they were against Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,and that no one of them have ever taken charge. 80. He would also submit that the earlier First Bench of thisCourt in Writ Appeal No. 1017 to 1019 of 1997 batch dated08.12.1997, has also clearly held that 25(H) has to be followedeven in cases whether such employees earlier retrenched wererecruited through Employment Exchange or otherwise and inasmuch asthe said judgement has become final, since the S.L.P. filed againstthe said judgement has been withdrawn, the present point raised inrespect of Employment Exchange is not available to the petitionersherein. He would also submit that in addition to the order of theDivision Bench dated 08.12.2005, the same has been subsequently,clarified by the Division Bench in W.P.M.P.No.7523 of 2006 inW.P.No.38097 of 2005 etc. batch dated 17.04.2006. 81. While meeting the contention raised by Mr.N.R.Chandranlearned Senior Counsel that the persons who were appointed andwhose appointments have been cancelled as per the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 were notgiven even notice before cancellation, the learned Advocate Generalwould submit that for the reason stated above namely that theirappointments were totally illegal, there was no question of anynotice to them. According to him giving notice to an illegallyappointed persons will only become an useless formality and wouldcontend placing reliance upon the useless formality theory asenunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in 1999(6) SCC 237, apart fromthe judgement reported in AIR 2000 SCC 2783. The learned AdvocateGeneral while meeting the contention of the learned Senior CounselMr.N.R.Chandran placing reliance on the judgement of the Hon’bleApex Court reported in AIR 1991 SC 309 would submit that, that wasthe case wherein persons were validly appointed on the facts andwhen that was sought to be cancelled, the Hon’ble Apex Court hasheld that it requires notice. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

82. In this regard, the Advocate General would rely upon thejudgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in 2006(6) SCC 310 todistinguish the same to the effect that when persons who haveemployed even on temporary basis for many years and they wereperforming the duties of regular employees, the regularisation isthe proper remedy, especially in the circumstances wherein theappointments were made in accordance with law. According to thelearned Advocate General, the appointment of the persons who weremade as Drivers and Conductors in the respondent Corporations andsubsequently, retrenched and thereby entitled for the benefitsunder Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, were qualified.According to him the very fact that they have worked for many yearsbefore their retrenchment shows that they cannot be termed asdisqualified persons. In that regard he would rely upon thejudgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court stated above namely in 2006(2)SCC 315 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has distinguished thejudgement reported in 2006(4) SCC 1 (Umadevi’s case) wherein theappointments were made irregularly and illegally. In the presentcase, according to the learned Advocate General, the appointmentssought to be given under the impugned order pursuant to Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is not given to the person whowere illegally appointed. 83. On the other hand, those persons were performing thefunctions of Drivers and Conductors of the respondent TransportCorporations as that of any other Drivers and Conductors who havebeen appointed on regular basis and therefore, it cannot be saidthat their appointments were illegal. He would also submit thatthere was no question of legitimate expectation for theappointments stated to have been issued some times in February 2006illegally and against Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,which is sought to be cancelled by the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 within a short span oftime on 13.07.2006 and therefore, there was no question of anyright vested on those persons, especially, in the circumstance thatno one of the persons have ever taken charge either as Drivers orConductors. 84. While meeting the arguments regarding the legitimateexpectation, the learned Advocate General would rely upon thejudgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2003(5) SCC 437to show that there cannot be a legitimate expectation againstpublic interest. He would submit that the person claiminglegitimate expectation must have their right founded on sanction oflaw. In the present case, appointments made against the provisionsof Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in respect of thepetitioners who were challenging the validity of G.O.Ms.No.41 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 cannot be said to havethe sanction of law. To Support his contention that the legitimateexpectation must be founded on legal basis, the Advocate Generalalso would rely upon the judgement reported in 2006(5) SCC 515. 85. The learned Advocate General while meeting the cut ofdate that the cut of date was made based on the provisions of theTamil Industrial Disputes Rules, especially Rule 62 and 63, whereinthe list of the persons retrenched with a period of two years aresought to be made and taking into consideration that from 1999 to2004 there was no recruitment, the Government has rightly taken1997 as a cut of date and therefore, it cannot be said that using1997 as a cut of date cannot have the rational nexus to the objectsought to be achieved. He would also submit that apart from theprovisions Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, therespondent Corporations are bound by the direction given by theHon’ble Division Bench of this Court more than once and the samehas become final in the sense that the S.L.P. filed against thejudgement in the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been withdrawn. Hewould also submit that it is not as if the judgement of theDivision Bench of this Court is in respect of particularindividuals alone and it was the general direction and in fact, thedirection was given by the Hon’ble Division Bench based on thestatutory obligation of the respondent Corporation under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, according to thelearned Advocate General, the benefit of the said Division Bench aswell as Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act should be madeapplicable to all persons who are entitled as per the law. 86. He would also submit that apart from the fact that therewouldn’t be any discrimination shown among the persons on re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, theimpugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006makes it very clear about the procedures to be followed and thebenefits have been given under Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, not only to the persons who have filed the writpetitions, who approached this Court but also to all other persons.87. In view of the same, the learned Advocate General wouldsubmit that the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department,dated 13.07.2006 is well in accordance with law and the same cannotbe questioned by the petitioners and prayed for the dismissal ofthe writ petitions challenging the validity or otherwise of anyportions of the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department,dated 13.07.2006, whether it is Clause 3 or Clause 6. The learnedAdvocate General has also produced the details regarding thevacancy positions of State Transport Undertaking as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ SL.No.DetailsNo.of persons1Retrenched employees from STU's inTamil Nadu58102Number of persons re-employment10403Retrenched employees not re-employment given47704Available vacancies 63855Employees retrenched coming underpurview of G.O.Ms.No.41dated:13.07.200653886Retrenched employees covered byG.O.Ms.No.41 dated 13.07.200610407Retrenched employees coming underpurview of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated13.07.2006 who have been not beenre-employed till now434888. I have heard the learned counsels for the petitioners asstated above and also the learned Advocate General and perused theentire records. 89. The crux of the issue involved in this batch of cases isabout not only the validity or otherwise of the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, but alsoit relates to applicability of Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act. Before going into the merits of the cases, I wouldlike to trace out the various judgements of this Court in respectof the Transport Corporations relating to the issue involved inthese cases. It was in a writ petition filed by Anna TransportCorporation Indian National Trade Union Congress Thozhilar NalaSangam, Salem in W.P.No.114 of 1997 and other batch of cases, thepetitioners therein have sought for a mandamus, directing therespondents the then Anna Transport Corporation to continue toemployee the workmen. They were originally employed as temporaryworkers on casual basis and they approached the court for absorbingthem in permanent vacancies on the ground that there were vacanciesin the post of Drivers and Conductors in the TransportCorporations. While disposing of the said writ petitions,K.Govindarajan,J. has allowed the batch of cases in terms ofparagraph 11 of the earlier judgement of this Court in WritPetition Nos.10564 and 15957 of 1996 dated 12.12.1996 byS.M.Alimohammed,J. The said paragraph 11 which was passed relying https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex court reported in 1996(7)SCC 201 runs as follows: "11. In view of the above ruling of the Supreme courtwhether the members of the petitioner Union completed 240days in a year or not they are entitled to the benefit ofthe section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 beconsidered by the respondent for re-employment by givingan opportunity to the retrenched workmen for re-employment and the retrenched workmen who offer forreemployment shall have preference over other persons andafter exhausting the retrenched workmen, it is open tothe respondent to request the Employment Exchange tosponsor the name of candidates and in addition therespondent shall call for the names by publication in thenewspapers in compliance with the ruling of the SupremeCourt in The excise superintendant. Malkapatnam Vs.K.B.H visweswara Rao (1996(7) Supreme Court, 201) As faras the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchangeand the candidates through advertisement are concerned,it is open to the respondents to select them on merits inaccordance with law. It is open to the members of thepetitioner union to apply to the concerned authorities,under Tamil Nadu industrial Establishments (conferment ofpermanent status to workmen) Act, 1981 to get the benefitunder the Act. In view of the above, these writpetitions are ordered accordingly."In that case, there was a direction to the respondent Corporationsto take up the workers sponsored by the Employment Exchange andalso through advertisement concerned with a direction to select onmerits and in accordance with law. It was as against the saidjudgement in Writ Petition Nos. 114 of 1997 batch dated 29.04.1997,the Transport Corporations have filed appeals in Writ Appeal No.1017 and 1019 of 1997, apart from many other batch of casesincluding Writ Appeal No.143, 144 of 1997 etc. While disposing ofthe batch of appeals, the Division Bench consisting of the Hon’bleChief Justice M.S.Liberhan and Justice S.Jagadeesan by order dated08.12.1997, has categorically found that it is not in dispute thatthe persons who filed the writ petitions are workers as definedunder the Industrial Disputes Act. The Division Bench was dealingwith two categories of persons namely those persons who havecompleted 240 days of service and were terminated without complyingwith Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and thosepersons who have not completed 240 days and their services havebeen dispensed with without complying with Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act. 90. Even then a problem arose, as submitted by the learned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Advocate General that while re-employing persons, persons who havecome through Employment Exchange claimed preference over thepersons employed by complying with Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act. The Division Bench found that persons who belongs tofirst category and terminated without complying with Section 25(F)of the Act and their termination should be treated as illegal andare liable to be reinstated. Therefore, the Division Bench hasdirected the respondent Corporations to undertake an exercise inrespect of individual cases, where a worker has completed 240 daysand the provision of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Actwas not followed, directing them to be reinstated with all back-wages etc. It was found that after due exercise by the respondentCorporation, those workmen were re-employed and it was in thosecircumstances, the Hon’ble Division Bench has passed the followingorder: "3. After hearing learned counsel for the Parties we areof the view that since the workers were taken in service,it is immaterial whether one was taken through theEmployment Exchange or directly under the industrial Law,which is a welfare legislation, a right has beenconferred under the act, on worker to have a preferencefor the employment in case of fresh recruitment over theones who have not earlier served under the employer.Consequently, the appellant corporation will offer thejob t the retrenched employees complying with Section 25-H of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether the workerwas employed through the Employment Exchange or directly,unless the Authority come to the conclusion that theemployment to the worker was provided malafide or forsome ulterior consideration. This exercise may becompleted within three months from today."91. The Writ Appeals were dismissed in the above terms. Itis relevant to point out at this stage that Special Leave Petitionwas filed against the said order of the Division Bench in WritAppeal Nos.1017 to 1019 of 1997 and ultimately, the said petitionsSpecial Leave to appeal (No.12956 - 12958 of 1998) came to bedismissed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 19.03.199 as not pressed.The order of the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows: "UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDERIt is stated by learned Additional Solicitor Generalthat in view of the subsequent events, the special leavepetitions are not being pressed. They are accordinglydismissed as not pressed."92. Therefore, on fact it is clear that the said order of theHon’ble Division Bench passed in Writ Appeal Nos.1017 to 1019 of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1997 dated 08.12.1997 have become final and is binding upon therespondent Corporations and other Corporations, which havesubsequently been created or re-named. It is seen that in spite ofthe said Division Bench order, there was no further progressresulting in the filing of Contempt Application No.402 of 1999.The complaint of the workers was that the Corporation has onlyexamined the papers and documents and has not looked into its ownrecords to examine, whether each of the workers have really workedat all and further for more than 240 days and ultimately theDivision Bench in the Contempt Application has directed the LabourCommissioner, Salem to find out the real position and the LabourCommissioner has found that out of 209 cases, the Union has givenup 108 workers, leaving only 101 labourers on fray. The DivisionBench found that out of the 101 workers, the management refused toproduce the records regarding 40 workers who have not filed thewrit petitions and directed the Labour Commissioner to examine allthe 209 workers, who have attended the employer as per thedirection of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Division Bench hasultimately held recording the submissions made on behalf of therespondent Corporation that nearly 30 persons will be givenadvantage of the Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,treating them as employees of Corporation and in respect of othersa direction was given to Labour Commissioner to take exercisewithin a stipulated time making it clear that it is open to any ofthe workman to approach the Labour Court after finding by theLabour Commissioner. This shows that in respect of those employeeswho were the petitioner before the Court were employed as theworkmen under the Industrial Disputes Act and exercise was done atthe direction of the Division Bench by the Labour Commissioner onlyto find out as how many days each of the workers have worked, etc.93. Again in respect of the Tamil Nadu State TransportCorporation, Coimbatore Division II, and other TransportCorporations certain number of employees were recruited as Driversthrough Employment Exchange during March 2001, who underwentselection process and they were also sent to the training inChithode Training School and on completion of their training,orders were issued in April 2001 appointing them on consolidatedwages as trainee Drivers. They have relied upon a settlemententered under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, statingthat they should be treated as daily rated workmen and not as onconsolidated pay and as per the terms of settlement on completionof 240 days as Drivers, they should be made permanent. Subsequentto the competition of their 240 days of work, they were made asDrivers by issuance of orders in January to March 2003 underregular basis. However, those Drivers were terminated fromservices by order dated 03.04.2003, which was challenged by the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ said 75 Drivers individually. The writ petitions were finallydisposed of by a common order by the Hon’ble JusticeK.Sivasubramaniam in W.P.No.12279 of 2003 batch in the followingterms: "14. However, in view of the stand taken by theCorporation as mentioned above and bearing in mind theright of the workers to seek compliance of the terms ofsettlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial DisputesAct, I am inclined to pass the following order:-(i) The services of the petitioners shall not beterminated, other than the 31 employees who have alreadybeen relieved. (ii) They will be retained in service on the sameterms and conditions and salary as they were entitled tobefore the order of confirmation were issued on30.01.2003. (iii) Their services will not be terminated merelyon the basis that their appointments are temporary andthat their period of training has been completed. Theywill continue to be employed in the same capacity and inthe same terms as before 30.01.2003 till they areregularized in service as and when vacancies in thepermanent cadre arise or the permanent cadre strength isincreased. It is not disputed that their services arebeing utilized and are required as on date. (iv) It is open to the Corporation to take actionagainst any individual employee for any misconduct eitherin the context of the allegation of fraud or collusion asstated above or any misconduct which may arise in futureand this order will not stand in the way of such action."94. It was as against the said judgement of the learnedSingle Judge, appeals were filed in Writ Appeal No.2985 of 2003etc., batch. The Division Bench consisting of Hon’ble JusticeP.Sathasivam and Hon’ble Justice S.K.Krishnan, in the order dated08.12.2005 have found that it is not in dispute that thepetitioners were appointed by following the procedure and method ofrecruitment by calling for list from Employment Exchange concernedand it is also not in dispute that they were sent for trainingafter selection and therefore, they are entitled for permanentabsorption in the available vacancies as per the terms ofsettlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 95. The Division Bench has also considered the submissions byMr.N.R.Chandran learned Senior Counsel appeared on behalf of theTransport Corporation that the orders of confirmation given tothose workers were invalid because the confirmation were given in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the post which were not in existence. By referring to thejudgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Punjab Vs.Jagadeshsing reported in AIR 1964 SC 521, the Division Bench hasfound that paragraph 14 of the order passed by the learned SingleJudge as narrated above, is to be made applicable even to allworkers who have not approached the court. 96. While dealing with the other batch of writ petitionsfiled for the purpose of implementing the orders of the DivisionBench in Writ Appeal Nos.1017 to 1019 of 1997 dated 08.12.1997, byapplying Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the DivisionBench after exhaustively explaining and defining the provisions ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, relating to Section 25(H) and allother legal implications with the case laws, and also afterconsidering the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for theTransport Corporation Mr.N.R.Chandran, held that Section 25(H) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, is clear that the retrenched workmenshould be given an opportunity to offer themselves for re-employment and when once they offer themselves for re-employment,they should have preference over other persons, however, relayingupon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2003(5)SCC 341 that the term "preference" means only when other thingsbeing equal and therefore, the petitioners cannot demand employmentby using Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act has held incategoric manner as follows: "26. On going through the Division Bench decision dated08.12.1997, specific direction therein, the language usedin Sections 25-H, 25-J of the Act and Rule 63 of theRules as well as various orders passed by the learnedSingle Judges of this court, following the Division Benchdecision dated 08.12.1997, we are unable to accept theargument projected by the learned Senior Counsel for theTransport Corporation. Section 25-J uses non-obstanticlause placing the right of re-employment provided underSection 25-H in Chapter V-A of the Act in higherpedestal. Further, Section 25-H uses, "any workmen" andworkman is defined under Section 2(s) of the Act and thesaid definition is wide and includes all category ofworkmen, such as permanent, temporary, casual, badli,etc. More over, Section 25-H uses "any person" and thattherefore irrespective of the category for which vacancyarose, the right of re-employment is protected underSection 25-H."The Division Bench proceeds further "27. We have already extracted the direction/observationof the Division Bench dated 08.12.1997 and in view of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ same, we are of the view that the respondents-TransportCorporations are bound to offer jobs to the petitioners.It is not in dispute that the Transport Corporationsfiled Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court andthe same was dismissed as withdrawn. It was also broughtto our notice that later, they have filed Review and theReview was also dismissed. Though an argument wasadvanced that the judgement in Writ Appeal Nos.1294 to1299 of 1997 etc., dated 08.12.1997 was based on theconcession given by the counsel for the TransportCorporation, it is brought to our notice that thisargument was rejected by another Division Bench judgementin W.A.No.2083 of 1999 dated 26.10.1999."97. Therefore, the reference to the said paragraphs wouldshow that the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.2985 of 2003 etc.batch dated 08.12.2005 has not only considered the employees of allTransport Corporations but also the judgement of the earlierDivision Bench in Writ Appeal No.1017 to 1019 of 1997 dated08.12.1997. This shows that it can never be argued that the saidjudgement applies only in respect of the particular case alone,even though the Division Bench has held in paragraph 29 as follows:"29. Apart from the series of orders of this Court basedon the earlier Division Bench order which became final,as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for thepetitioners, the Transport Corporations are bound bytheir own assurance given based on the Court orders, theyare estopped from going back on their assurance."98. Ultimately, the Division Bench has passed the followingfinal order, which runs as follows: "34. We pass the following orders:(i) Writ Appeals are allowed. The appellants areentitled similar orders/directions/observations asprovided in para 14 of the order of the learned SingleJudge dated 13.05.2003 in Writ Petition Nos. 11785 of2003 etc., batch: (ii) In view of the allowing of the Writ Appeals,the Writ Petitions, namely, Writ Petition Nos. 31378 to31383, 31430 to 31433, 31499 to 31504, 31534 to 31539,33870 to 33876 of 2005 are dismissed, as agreed to byMr.D.Hariparanthaman;(iii) (a) In other Writ Petitions direction isissued to the respondents-Transport Corporations toprovide re-employment to the writ petitioners whocompleted 240 days in the respective Corporations andsatisfied other conditions, if any, in accordance with https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Section (b) Those (writ petitioners) who worked less than240 days shall also be given re-employment and theirservices will be regularized, only after completion of240 days and subject to fulfilling other conditions, ifany. Writ Petitions are allowed on the above terms. NoCosts. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitionsare closed."99. A clarification was sought for in respect of the abovesaid order of the Hon’ble Division Bench dated 08.12.2005 passed inWrit Appeal No.2985 of 2003 etc., batch and ultimately, by theorder dated 07.04.2006 passed in W.P.M.P.No.7523 of 2006 inW.P.No.38097 of 2005 etc., batch, the Division Bench whileclarifying paragraph 34 III(a) has held that the other conditionsmentioned therein means physical fitness and eye fitness anddriving skill test in respect of Drivers. The clarification runsas follows: "4. It is the grievance of the petitioners thatsince all these persons have been in employment from1996, in any event before 1999, they satisfy the requiredconditions prevailing as on the said date. It is alsopointed out that it is not a case of fresh employment.On the other hand, as per the earlier order of this Courtdated 8/9.12.2005, it is the case of re-employment. Insuch circumstances, though in the earlier order inparagraph 34(iii)(a), this Court directed them to satisfy"other conditions, if any,", in the light of the factualinformation that all of them satisfied the requiredconditions prevailing on the relevant dates viz., 1996-1999, we make it clear that all those persons referred toin the main order are to be considered subject tosatisfaction of (a) physical fitness and eye fitness (b)driving skill test in respect of drivers. Aftersatisfaction the above two conditions, the respondentCorporations are directed to give re-employment as perthe orders of this Court dated 8/9.12.2005. 5. In the course of the argument, it is alsobrought to our notice that by letter dated 03.03.2006,the Chief Electoral officer and Secretary to Governmentsent a letter to the Secretary to Government, TransportDepartment, Chennai 600 009 instructing all the StateTransport undertakings that even if appointment ordershave been issued, they should not be allowed to join dutybefore the completion of the process of election. Forthis, we clarify that the persons involved in thesepetitions are not new appointees. On the other hand, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ they worked in the Transport Corporations in the year1996-1999. For various grievance, they approached thisCourt and by contested order of this Court dated8/9.12.2005, directions have been issued to therespective Transport Corporations for reemployment. Inview of the same, we clarify that the instructions issuedby the Chief Electoral Officer and Secretary toGovernment, Chennai, is not applicable to the cases onhand. To this extent, we clarify our earlier order andthese petitions are ordered accordingly. The abovedirection shall be complied with within a period of threeweeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this orders."100. Therefore, on fact it is clear that the respondentCorporations are bound to give re-employment to those persons whowere earlier employed in the respondent Corporations and retrenchedfrom service. There is a clear case of estoppel against therespondent Corporations in respect of the same. This is relevantto point out that the direction given by the Division Bench of thisCourt as stated above are in accordance with the statutorycompulsion and requirements under Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, and it does not require any further clarification. 101. Even though the various provisions of the IndustrialDisputes Act, have been exhaustively discussed and explained indetail by the Division Bench, since a point is raised by one of thelearned counsels Mr.Palani that Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, cannot be read to encourage illegality in publicemployments and therefore, it is relevant to again refer to some ofthe provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The avowed objectof the Industrial Disputes Act, is to settle the dispute betweenthe workmen and employer, workmen and workmen, etc, in a morefeasible manner along with the conciliation efforts so as to bringindustrial peace. Therefore, Industrial Disputes Act, is one thebeneficial legislations, which is normally construed liberally.The Industrial Disputes Act, defines the term "workmen" underSection 2(S) of the Act, as follows: "[s) "workman" means any person (including anapprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual,unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical orsupervisory work for hire of reward, whether the terms ofemployment be express or implied, and for the purposes ofany proceeding under this Act in relation to anindustrial dispute, includes any such person who has beendismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with,or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal,discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ does not include any such person -(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the NavyAct, 1957 (62 of 1957); or(ii) who is employed in the police service or as anofficer or other employee of a person; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial oradministrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity,draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees permensem or exercises, either by the nature of the dutiesattached to the office or by reason of the powers vestedin him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.]"102. Therefore, the except those who are excluded, the term"workmen" is vide in its sense, and it even includes an apprenticefor the purpose of giving benefit of the provisions of theIndustrial Disputes Act. A reference to the Industrial DisputesAct shows that there is no distinction between the temporaryworkmen and the permanent workmen under the Industrial DisputesAct. It is only in cases where for the purpose of conferringcertain benefits like retrenchment compensation, the Actcontemplates the workers to have worked for a particular period soas to enable them to get the monitary compensation. One suchprovision is Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, whichcontemplates certain condition precedents for the retrenchment ofworkmen and the said section runs as follows: "25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen -No workman employed in any industry who has been incontinuous service for not less than one year under anemployer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month's noticein writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment andthe period of notice has expired, or the workman has beenpaid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of thenotice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time ofretrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent tofifteen days' average pay (for every completed year ofcontinuous service) or any part thereof in excess of sixmonths; (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served onthe appropriate Government (or such authority as may bespecified by the appropriate Government by notificationin the Official Gazette)"103. The term "continuous service" mentioned under Section 25 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (F) of the Act, is defined under Section 25(B) of the Act, whichruns as follows: "25B. Definition of continuous service.- For thepurposes of this Chapter,-(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuousservice for a period if he is, for that period, inuninterrupted service, including service which may beinterrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave oran accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any faulton the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous servicewithin the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one yearor six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuousservice under an employer- (a) for a period of one year, if the workman,during a period of twelve calendar months preceding thedate with reference to which calculation is to be made,has actually worked under the employer for not less than-(i) one hundred and ninety days, in the case of aworkman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;(b) for a period of six months, if the workman,during a period of six calendar months, preceding thedate with reference to which calculation is to be made,has actually worked under the employer for not less than-(i) ninety five days, in the case of a workmanemployed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any othercase. Explanation.- For the purpose of claue (2), the number ofdays on which a workman has actually worked under anemployer shall include the days on which- (i) he has been laid off under an agreement or aspermitted by standing orders made under the IndustrialEmployment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), orunder this Act or under any other law applicable to theindustrial establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages earned inthe previous years; (iii) he has been absent due to temporarydisablement caused by accident arising out of and in thecourse of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been onmaternity leave; so, however, that the total period ofsuch maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.]" https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

104. Further, the term "retrenchment" is defined underSection 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which runs asfollows: "(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by theemployer of the service of a workman for any reasonwhatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted byway of disciplinary action,"105. It is also relevant to point out that the said Section25(F) which is under Chapter V(A) has over riding effect, as it isseen under Section 25(J) of the Act, which runs as follows: "25J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter.-(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained inany other law (including standing orders made under theIndustrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of1946)): (Provided that where under the provisions of anyother Act or rules, orders or notifications issued there-under or under any standing orders or under any award,contract of service or otherwise, a workman is entitledto benefits in respect of any matter which are morefavourable to him than those to which he would beentitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to beentitled to the more favourable benefits in respect ofthat matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits inrespect of other matters matters under this Act.)(2) For the removal of doubts, it is herebydeclared that nothing contained in this Chapter shall bedeemed to affect the provisions of any other law for thetime being in force in any State in so far as that lawprovides for the settlement of industrial disputes, butthe rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in sofar as they relate to lay-off and retrenchment shall bedetermined in accordance with the provisions of thisChapter.)"106. Therefore, a reading of the retrenchment and Section 25(F) shows that in respect of the worker, who has been retrenched,he shall be entitled for a compensation and it is for the purposeof fixing the compensation, the work for 240 days in a period ofone year, is a condition precedent. 107. In addition to the rights conferred under the above saidSection 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, confers a further benefit to the workmen, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ who has been retrenched, giving him an option for re-employment,when the employer proceeds to re-employ persons. Therefore, underthe concept of retrenchment, which does not impute with sigma ofany punishment on a workmen but termination for any other reason,the employee who has been retrenched, apart from the compensationis eligible for re-employment, in cases were the employer proceedsto offer fresh employment. That right is a preferential rightgiven to the retrenched workman. It is in this regard, significantto note that the duty of the employer to provide preferentialtreatment by making offer of appointment to the retrenched workmenin an establishment is mandatory in nature, which is signified bythe term "who offer themselves for re-employment shall havepreference over other persons". Therefore, it is clear that whenonce the employer proceeds to re-employe, after retrenchment of theworkmen, the first offer shall go to the persons, who were alreadyemployed in the establishment and retrenched, whether retrenchmentcompensation was paid to him or not and that offer is a mandatoryduty of the employer. Of course, it is for the employee either todecide to accept the same or not. This is not only the statutoryobligation on the part of the employer but also certainly a legalright which has been enshrined under the Industrial Disputes Act,especially in the circumstance that retrenchment is not atermination on disciplinary ground. 108. It was to streamline the said avowed object of theIndustrial Disputes Act, especially, relating to Section 25(H), theIndustrial Disputes (Central) Rule, 1957, contemplates theprocedure to be followed for the purpose of effectivelyimplementing the objects and the relevant Rules are 77 and 78,which run as follows: "77. Maintenance of seniority list of workmen.- Theemployer shall prepare a list of all workmen in theparticular category from which retrenchment iscontemplated, arranged according to the seniority oftheir service in that category and cause a copy thereofto be pasted on a notice board in a conspicuous place inthe premises of the industrial establishment at leastseven days before the actual date of retrenchment.78. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.- (1) At leastten days before the date on which vacancies are to befilled, the employer shall arrange for the display on anotice board in a conspicuous place in the premises ofthe industrial establishment details of those vacanciesand shall give intimation of those vacancies byregistered post to every one of all the retrenched https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ workmen eligible to be considered therefor, to theaddress given by him at the time of retrenchment or atany time thereafter: Provided that where the number of such vacancies isless than the number of retrenched workmen, it shall besufficient if intimation is given by the employerindividually to the senior most retrenched workmen in thelist referred to in rule 77, the number of such senior-most workmen being double the number of such vacancies:Provided further that where the vacancy is of aduration of less than one month shall be no obligation onthe employer to send intimation of such vacancy toindividual retrenched workmen: (Provided also that if a retrenched workman, withoutsufficient cause being shown in writing to the employer,does not offer himself for re-employment on the date ordates specified in the intimation sent to him by theemployer under this sub-rule the employer may notintimate to him the vacancies that may be filled on anysubsequent occasion.)(2) Immediately after complying with the provisionsof sub-rule (1), the employer shall also inform the tradeunions connected with the industrial establishment, ofthe number of vacancies to be filled and names of theretrenched workmen to whom intimation has been sent underthat sub-rule: Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule neednot be complied with by the employer in any case whereintimation is sent to everyone of the workmen mentionedin the list prepared under rule 77."109. The Tamil Nadu Government has framed the Tamil NaduIndustrial Disputes Rules, 1958, which also correspondinglyprovides the provisions for streamlining the effectiveimplementation of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act.They are Rule 62 and Rule 63, which run as follows: "62. Maintenance of seniority list of workmen. (1) The employer shall prepare and maintain a listof all workmen in each category employed in hisestablishment, their names being arranged according toseniority of service in the category concerned. He shallmake out copies of the list of all workmen in theparticular category in which retrenchment is contemplatedindicting in it clearly the names of all those who areproposed to be retrenched and cause copies of such listto be pasted on the notice board in a conspicuous placein the premises of the establishment easily accessible to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the workmen, at least seven days before the date ofactual retrenchment. Copies of the list shall also besent to the registered trade union connected with theindustrial establishment. (2) As soon as a retrenchment is effected, he shallalso prepare another list of workmen who were retrenchedat the time as also those retrenched during the(preceding twenty-four months), their names beingarranged according to the seniority of their service inthe category and cause copies thereof to be pasted on thenotice board in a conspicuous place in the premises ofthe establishment easily accessible to the retrenchedworkmen. Copies of the list shall also be sent to theregistered trade union connected with the industrialestablishment: 63. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.--(1) On the occurrence of vacancies afterretrenchment, when an employer proposes to take into hisemploy any person, he shall --(i) arrange for the display on the notice board inthe premises of the industrial establishment of thedetails of the vacancies to be filled: (ii) give notice of the vacancies in writing toevery individual retrenched workman eligible to beconsidered for the vacancies, such notice beingdispatched by registered post to the address given by theworkman at the time of retrenchment or any timethereafter: (iii) at the same time send a notice to theregistered trade union or unions of workmen connectedwith the industrial establishment giving the number ofvacancies and the names of the retrenched personsaddressed; and (iv) if the employer seeks the assistance of theEmployment Exchange in the area in filling the vacancies,inform the Exchange that the names of such of hisretrenched employees as may have been registered with theExchange may be submitted to him along with the names ofother suitable candidates: (Provided that clause (ii) shall not apply tovacancies which are temporary or casual and of less thana month’s duration or which arise after the expiry of aperiod of two years from the date of retrenchment. (2) A retrenched workman on receipt of the noticeof vacancies from the employer shall offer himself forwork or send a reply within a period of ten days from the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ date on which the notice is posted, and, if he fails todo so, he shall lose all his claim for preference infuture vacancies and the employer shall be free to fillthe vacancies in all cases when retrenched persons do notcome forward for re-employment."110. In this regard, it is relevant to point out that theminute difference between the Central Rule and the State Rule is,while the Central Rule does not contemplate the duty of theemployer in preparing the list of workmen retrenched for anypreceding period, the State Rule contemplate the duty of theemployer to prepare the list of retrenched employees during thepreceding 24 months. However, it is to be pointed out that evenunder the State rules the term is not only restricted to thepreceding 24 months but also it states that "the employer shallprepare another list of workmen, who were retrenched at the time as also those retrenched during the preceding 24 months ("the emphasisis mine"). Therefore, even a reading of the Tamil Nadu rules showthat the right of employees retrenched is not restricted to thosewho were retrenched within 24 months from the date of retrenchmentbut it applies to all the retrenched workmen who were earlieremployed in the establishment, irrespective of the year ofemployment and year of retrenchment, as it can be seen plainly inthe Central rule and can be harmoniously construed in respect ofthe State rule also. 111. Even otherwise, there is absolutely no difficulty tocome to a conclusion that when once Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act confers a mandatory duty on the part of the employerand enforceable right on the part of the workmen without insistingany period of limitation, even if such limitation is prescribed bythe rules, those rules can never stand to the test of law. 112. Therefore, it is clear that the duty of the employer inso far as those persons, who were earlier employed and areretrenched, to prepare the list of those retrenched persons for thepurpose of offering the job subsequently, when the employerproceeds to make re-employment, which is a mandatory right. Itgoes without saying that even if the employer fails to follow theprovisions of the Rules, the right given under the Act, namely,under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot bestated to be taken away, since in my considered view and as it hasbeen categorically held by the Division Bench also, it is a veryvaluable substantial right conferred on a workmen, who was asked togo out of the employment not based on the stigma of disciplinaryproceedings but due to other reasons which are not attributable tothe workmen. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

113. As I have stated, the right under Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, is applicable to all the retrenchedworkmen whether following the condition precedent as enunciatedunder Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, whichcontemplates under conditions, namely, that he must have beencontinuous service for not less than one year, as it is definedunder Section 25(B) of the Act, or not. While the right ofcompensation payable to retrenched employee under Section 25(F) isnot a condition precedent for the offering of reemployment to theretrenched employee under Section 25(H) of the Industrial DisputesAct, while offering the reemployment, employees who were paid oreligible for payment of retrenchment compensation under Section 25(F) shall stand above the employees, who are not eligible for suchcompensation under Section 25(F). The restricted meaning of theword retrenchment in relation to conferring of benefits underSection 25(F) is not applicable to Section 25(H) of the Act, whileoffering reemployment, which means that even if a retrenchedemployee is not entitled for the benefit under Section 25(F), hewill be eligible for conferment of his rights under Section 25(H).Of course as stated above among them, while offering reemploymentthe retrenched employees entitled to the benefit under Section 25(F) stand ahead of the other retrenched employees not entitled forbenefits under Section 25(F), thereby not having worked for thecontinuous period as per Section 25(B), in order of preference.This was the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in CentralBank of India Vs. S.Sathyan and others reported in 1996(1) LLJ 820.The operation portion of the judgement of the Hon'ble Apex courtare "In other words, the expression 'continuous service fornot less than one year' in Section 25-F has to be soconstrued by virtue of Section 25-B. The benefit ofapplicability of Section 25-F can, therefore be claimedby a workman only if he has been in continuous servicefor not less than one year as defined in Section 25-B.Any other retrenched workman who does not satisfy thisrequirement of continuous service for not less than oneyear cannot avail the benefit of Section 25-F whichprescribes the conditions precedent to retrenchment ofworkman of this category. Section 25-G prescribes theprocedure for retrenchment and ordinarily applies theprinciple of 'last come first go'. 7. Section 25-H the provides for reemployment ofretrenched workmen. It says that when the employerproposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall,in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunityto the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ offer themselves for reemployment, and such retrenchedworkmen who offer themselves for reemployment shall havepreference over other persons. Rule 77 and 78 of theIndustrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 prescribe themode of re-employment. Rule 77 requires maintenance ofseniority list of all workmen in a particular categoryfrom which retrenchment is contemplated arrangedaccording to seniority of their service in that categoryand publication of that list. Rule 78 prescribes themode of reemployment of retrenched workmen. Therequirement in Rule 78 is of notice in the mannerprescribed to every one of all the retrenched workmeneligible to be considered for reemployment. Shri Paicontends that Rule 77 and 78 are unworkable unless theapplication of Section 25-H is confined to the categoryof retrenched workmen to whom Section 25-F applies. Weare unable to accept this contention. 8. Rule 77 requires the employer to maintain aseniority list of workmen in that particular categoryfrom which retrenchment is contemplated arrangedaccording to the seniority of their service. Thecategory of workmen to whom Section 25-F applies isdistinct from those to whom it is inapplicable. There isno practical difficulty in maintenance of seniority listof workmen with reference to the particular category towhich they belong. Rule 77, therefore, does not presentany difficulty. Rule 78 speaks of retrenched workmeneligible to be considered for filling the vacancies andhere also the distinction based on the category ofworkmen can be maintained because those falling in thecategory of Section 25-F are entitled to be placed higherthan those who do not fall in that category. It is nodoubt true that persons who have been retrenched after alonger period of service which places them higher in theseniority list are entitled to be considered forreemployment earlier than those placed lower because of alesser period of service. In this manner a workmanfalling in the lower category because of not beingcovered by Section 25-F can claim consideration forreemployment only if an eligible workman above him in theseniority list is not available. Application of Section25-H of the other retrenched workmen not covered bySection 25-F does not, in any manner, prejudice thosecovered by Section 25-F because the question ofconsideration of any retrenched workman not covered bySection 25-F would arise only, if and when, no retrenchedworkman covered by Section 25-F is available for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reemployment. There is, thus no reason to curtail theordinary meaning of 'retrenched workmen' in Section 25-Hbecause of Rules 77 and 78, even assuming the rulesframed under the Act could have that effect. 9. The plain language of Section 25-H speaks onlyof re-employment of 'retrenched workmen'. The ordinarymeaning of the expression 'retrenched workmen' mustrelate to the wide meaning of 'retrenchment' given inSection 2(oo). Section 25-F also uses the word'retrenchment' but qualifies it by use of the furtherwords 'workman ......... who has been in continuousservice for not less than one year'. Thus, Section 25-Fdoes not restrict the meaning of retrenchment butqualifies the category, of retrenched workmen coveredtherein by use of the further words 'workman ..... whohas been in continuous service for not less than oneyear'. It is clear that Section 25-F applies to theretrenchment of a workman who has been in continuousservice for not less than one year and not to any workmanwho has been in continuous service for less than oneyear; and it does not restrict or curtail the meaning ofretrenchment merely because the provisions therein ismade only for the retrenchment of a workman who has beenin continuous service for not less than one year.Chapter V-A deals with all retrenchments while Section25-F is confined only to the mode of retrenchment ofworkmen in continuous service for not less than one year.Section 25-G prescribes the principle for retrenchmentand applies ordinarily the principle of 'last come firstgo' which is not confined only to workmen who have beenin continuous service for not less than one year, coveredby Section 25-F. 10. The next provision is Section 25-H which iscouched in wide language and is capable of application toall retrenched workmen, not merely those covered bySection 25-F. It does not require curtailment of theordinary meaning of the word 'retrenchment' used therein.The provision for reemployment of retrenched workmenmerely gives preference to a retrenched workman in thematter of reemployment benefit of the retrenched workmenand there is no reason to restrict its ordinary meaningwhich promotes the object of the enactment withoutcausing any prejudice to a better placed retrenchedworkman. 11. Chapter V-A providing for retrenchment is notenacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whomSection 25-F applies but for all cases of retrenchment https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and, therefore, there is no reason to restrictapplication of Section 25-H therein only to one categoryof retrenched workman. We are, therefore, unable toaccept the contention of Shri Pai that a restrictedmeaning should be given to the word 'retrenchment' inSection 25-H. This contention is, therefore, rejected."114. The Hon’ble Apex Court while deciding about theretrenchment has emphasised the term termination for any reasonwhatsoever, excluding punishment inflicted by way of disciplinaryproceeding and held that expression retrenchment could not be givena narrow interpretation to cover cases of discharge from service onaccount of surplus only. That was the judgement reported in 1980(2) LLJ 72 rendered in Santhosh Guptha Vs. State Bank of Patiala. 115. While analysing the various earlier judgements of theHon’ble Apex Court, wherein the termination included an automaticcessation of service as per the order of appointment, that was thecase wherein, the workmen was terminated not on the ground ofsurplus labour but "due to the failure of the workmen to pass thetest which would have enabled her to be confirmed in the service"and in such circumstances, negativing the contention of theemployer that it would not cover under the term retrenchment underSection 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, holding that thedischarge of workmen on the ground, she did not pass the test, wasretrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Theoperative portion of the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex court asfollows: "14. Dr.Anand Prakash, cited before us the decision of afull Bench of the Kerala High Court in Robert D'Souza Vs.Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and another, (1979-IL.L.J.211), and some other cases decided by other HighCourts purporting to follow the decision of this Court inHariprasad Shivshankar Shukla Vs. A.D.Divikar's case,(supra) Shukla's case, we have explained. The ratio ofShukla's case in fact, has already been explained inHindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Officer, LabourCourt Orissa and others (Supra). The decision inHindustan Steel Ltd., Vs. The Presiding Officer, LabourCourt, Orissa and others (Supra), The State Bank of IndiaVs. N.Sundara Money (Supra) have, in our view, properlyexplained Shukla's case and have laid down the correctlaw. The decision of the Kerala High Court in L.RobertD'Souza Vs. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway andanother (supra) and the other decisions of the other HighCourts to similar effect, viz., The Managing Director,National Garage Vs. J.Gohsalve, (1962-I L.L.J.56); https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Goodless Nerloc Paints Vs. Chief Commissioner, Delhi(1967-I L.L.J.545), and Rajasthan State Electricity BoardVs. Labour Court, (1966-I L.L.J. 381), are therefore,overruled, We hold, as a result of our discussion, thatthe discharge of the workman on the ground she did notpass the test, which would have enabled her to beconfirmed was "retrenchment" within the meaning of S.2(oo) and, therefore, the requirements of S.25F had to becomplied with. The order of the Presiding Officer,Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,New Delhi, are set aside and the appellant is directed tobe reinstated with full back wages. The appellant isentitled to her costs." (the emphasis is mine)116. In a subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supremeconsisting of 5 judges, when the issue involved was that theworkmen under the management of the Punjab Land Development andReclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandighar and their services wereterminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appointthem, that was the case decided in 1990(2) LLJ 70 (Punjab LandDevelopment and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh etc, andseveral others Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh,etc., and several others), wherein by elaborately discussing theentire case law on the issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court withauthoritative pronouncement has laid down as follows: "82. Applying the above reasonings, principles andprecedents, to the definition in S.2(oo) of the Act, wehold that "retrenchment" means the termination by theemployer of the service of a workman for any reasonwhatsoever except those expressly excluded in theSection."117. In yet another judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Courtrendered in D.K.Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in 1993(2) LLJ 696, while considering the law laid down in 1990(2) LLJ 70,the Hon’ble Apex Court has again authoritatively pronounced asfollows: "3. In Punjab Land Development and ReclamationCorporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer,Labour Court, Chandigarh, 1990-II-LLJ-70 theConstitution Bench considered the scope of the word'retrenchment' defined by S.2(oo) and held in para 71at page 91 that analysing the definition ofretrenchment in S.2(oo) we find that termination by theemployer of the service of a workman would nototherwise have covered the cases excluded in Cls.(a)and (b) namely, voluntary retirement and retirement on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reaching the stipulated age of retirement or on theground s of continued ill health. There would be noviolational element of the employer. Their expressexclusion implies that those would otherwise have beenincluded". In para 77 at page 94 it was further heldthat "right of the employer and the contract ofemployment has been affected by introducing S.2(oo)".The contention of the management to terminate theservice of an employee under the Certified StandingOrders and under the contracts of employment wasnegatived, holding that the right of the management hasbeen affected by introducing of S.2(oo) and S.25F ofthe Act. The second view was that the right as suchhas not been affected or taken away, but only anadditional social obligation has been imposed on theemployer to abide by the mandate of S.25F of the Act totide over the financial difficulty which sub serves thesocial policy. This Court relied on the maxim - Statpro ratione valuntas populi: the will of the peoplestands in place of a reason. In paragraph 82 at page95 this Court concluded that the definition in S.2(oo)of the Act of retrenchment means "the termination bythe employer of the service of a workman for any reasonwhatsoever except those expressly excluded in thesection". Same view was taken by three Benches ofthree Judges of this Court in State Bank of India Vs.N.Sundara Mani 1976-I-LLJ-478, Delhi Cloth & GeneralMills Ltd., Vs. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee, 1978-II-LLJ-1and Hindustan Steel Ltd., Vs. Presiding Officer, LabourCourt, 1977-I-LLJ-1 and two Benches of two judges inRobert D'Souza V. Executive Engineer Southern Railway1982-I-LLJ-330 and H.D.Singh V. Reserve Bank of India(AIR 1986 sc 132) took the same view. Therefore, wefind force in the contention of SriR.K.Jain, thelearned Senior counsel for the appellant, that thedefinition 'retrenchment' in S.2(oo) is a comprehensiveone intended to cover any action of the management toput an end to the employment of an employer for anyreason whatsoever. We need not, however, rest ourconclusion on this point as in our considered view itcould be decided on the other contention raised by SriJain that the order is violative of the principles ofnatural justice. We are impressed with that argument.Before dealing with it, it is necessary to dispose ofinter-related contentions raised by Dr.Anand Prakash."118. In a recent judgement rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd., and another Vs. ShramikSena and another reported in 2001(2) SCC 529, which was the caserelating to the management running a canteen and as per therequirement of the Factories Act, 1948, when a claim ofregularisation was made, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court hasreferred to about the 5 conditions for the purpose of absorbingemployees, namely, a) At the time of initial appointment, the workmen should becomplying with the minimum and maximum age limit prescribed underthe policy of the Corporation. b) They must be medically fit according to their standardsprescribed by the Corporation c) Those who were appointed prior to the filing of the writpetition must have 3 years minimum service to their credit on thedate of the present judgement. d) Those who were appointed during the pendancy of the writpetition must have 4 years of minimum service to their credit onthe date of the present judgement and e) All those who are not absorbed in service of theCorporation for any of the reasons indicated above their casesshall be considered in accordance with the provisions of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947.When fresh recruitment to the canteen staff was made by theCorporation, after discussing the entire case law and alsoreferring to Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, whichmakes the Chapter V (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, apply tothe Industrial establishment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has passed thefollowing order: "15. From the above discussion, it follows that theobligation to comply with Condition (e) is contingentupon the retrenchment of the workmen in accordance withlaw. It is not disputed that the management is anindustrial establishment to which Chapter V-B complies;if that be so, Sections 25-N and 25-H read with Section25-S will be attracted. Therefore, we are of the viewthat the following direction in the impugned order of theHigh Court, "we direct that those workers who do notfulfil Directions (a),(b),(c) and (d) of the conditionsfor regularisation, be retrenched in accordance with lawafter following the provisions of Chapter V-B of theIndustrial disputes Act, 1947", does not correctlyinterpret Condition (e). In our view, Condition (e)postulates that in the event of the management choosingto retrench the workmen who do not fulfil Directions (a)to (d) of the conditions for regularisation, they shallbe paid retrenchment compensation under Section 25-N andtheir cases for reemployment should be considered under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 25-H of the Act."119. In another judgement rendered in Workmen rep. by AkhilBhartiya Koyla Kamgar Union Vs. Employers in Relation to theManagement of Industry Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., andothers reported in 2001(4) SCC 55, while dealing with the cokingcoal mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, wherein under Section 8 and9 of the said Act, provides immunity to Central Government fromprior liabilities, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that theobligation of the employer under Section 25(H) of the Act, does notfall within the scope of Section 9 of the Nationalisation Act, inthe following words: "6. Bearing these principles in mind if we examine thescope of the Nationalisation Act, we may notice that inrespect of properties that vested in the CentralGovernment, as provided under Section 8 and 9, theNationalisation Act provides immunity to the CentralGovernment or its company from prior liabilities.Chapter III of the Nationalisation Act provides forpayment of amount under that chapter. Chapter VIprovides for appointment of Commissioner of Payments whohas an obligation to deal with the claims made Section 23of the said Act to persons who make a claim before theCommissioner within 30 days from the specified date. Onexamination of the provisions thereof, we may relate allthose items that have been mentioned in Section 9 toSection 23 of the Nationalisation Act. They all pertainto pecuniary or commercial obligations and not to othermatters. The claim made in the present case is onerelating to employment under Section 25-H of the Actwhich merely creates an obligation that a retrenchedworkman will have preference when fresh appointments aremade and an opportunity will have to be given to them tooffer themselves for reemployment. Such an obligationdoes not fall within the scope of Section 9 of theNational Act."120. Therefore, the above analysis of the case law on thesubject shows that the obligation of the employer under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is unfettered and absolute andis available to all retrenched employees except those who areexcluded under Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, andsuch employees entitled for reemployment include even cases wherethe original appointment were made by the authority not competentand also in cases where the original appointment was lackingcertain qualifications. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

121. It was considering all those legal position in detail,the Hon’ble Division Bench in the judgement rendered in M.SekaranVs. General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,Coimbatore Division II, Erode reported in 2006(1) LLN 257 haspassed the following operative orders: "(iii)(a) In other writ petitions direction is issued tothe respondents-Transport Corporations to provide re-employment to the writ-petitioners, who completed 240days in the respective Corporations and satisfied otherconditions, if any, in accordance with S.25H of theIndustrial Disputes Act in preference to new entrants. (b) Those (writ petitioners) who worked less than240 days shall also be given re-employment and theirservices will be regularised, only after completion of240 days and subject to fulfilling other conditions, ifany."122. In this connection it is relevant to point out that thequestion of regularisation was not in issue and in respect of thepetitioners, who have worked less than 240 days, were directed tobe given reemployment subject to other conditions, namely, therequirement of 240 days in the preceding one year, so as to makesuch workmen eligible for reemployment on regular basis aftercompletion of 240 days subject to the above conditions and assubsequently clarified by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the orderdated 07.04.2006 in W.P.M.P.No.7523 of 2006, etc., in W.P.No.38097of 2005 etc., stating that the right of reemployment is onlysubject to two conditions, namely, a) Physical fitness and eye fitness b) Driving skill test in respect of Driverswhich should be taken as other conditions. Therefore, it is clearthat the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the series ofjudgements stated above, as followed by the Hon’ble Division Benchof this Court were consistent as far as applicability of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is concerned, making it clearthat it is the statutory obligation on part of the employer toprovide reemployment in respect of retrenched workmen, irrespectiveof considering the nature of their original appointment, for, it isonly the retrenchment, which has been followed as per theconditions laid down under the Industrial Disputes Act. 123. By considering the above said facts, there is absolutelyno difficulty to come to the conclusion, especially taking intoconsideration the avowed object of the Industrial Disputes Act,that the purport of the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006, especially relating to Clause 4, isperfectly in accordance with the statutory obligation, as enshrined https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ under the Industrial Disputes Act, of course, apart from the ordersof the court. It can never be said that persons who got order fromthis Court for the purpose of implementing their right underSection 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, alone should beconferred the benefit of the Act. 124. It is in this situation relevant to point out, thejudgements relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe petitioners Mr.N.R.Chandran, namely, the judgement reported inA.Umarani Vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies and others reportedin 2004(7) SCC 112 and Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs.Umadevi and others reported in 2006(4) SCC 1. The Hon’ble ApexCourt has dealt with the case of appointment made in contraventionof mandatory provisions of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments(conferment of permanent status workmen) Act, 1981, andregularisation of such employees who were irregularly appointed andheld that the appointments made in contravention of mandatoryprovisions of the Act and statutory rules framed in ignorance ofthe qualifications will be illegal and cannot be regularized by thestate by invoking powers under Article 162 of the Constitution ofIndia and also dealing with the Tamil Nadu Cooperative SocietiesAct, 1983, especially, when the said Act of the 1981 makes astatutory obligation on the part of the societies to notify theEmployment Exchange regarding the existing vacancies and thoseappointments were sought to be regularized. 125. By relying upon the previous judgements of the Hon’bleApex Court in R.N.Nanjundappa Vs. T.Thimmiah reported in 1972(1)SCC 409, apart from the judgement in State of Mysore Vs.S.V.Narayanappa reported in AIR 1967 SC 1071 it was held that therecannot be a regularization permissible in exercise of the statutorypowers of the state under Article 162 of the Constitution of India,if the appointments have been made in contravention of statutoryrules. 126. Likewise, in the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court inUmadevi’s case reported in 2006(4) SCC 1, the decision was renderedin respect of public employment apart from absorption,regularisation and permanent continuance of temporary andcontractual appointees in public employment, dehorse theconstitutional scheme of public employment. The Hon’ble Apex Courthas dealt with the case of the rules framed regarding publicemployment under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and alsodealing with the circumstances wherein, the persons, who wereappointed by the state on a temporary basis or daily wages orcasually and who were working in the sanctioned post withoutpossessing requisite qualification in the said post and made claim https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for regularisation, the Hon’ble Apex Court has heavily come downagainst the regularisation of such persons who are not qualified.The relevant passage from the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Courtin this regard as follows: "6. The power of a State as an employer is morelimited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it issubjected to constitutional limitations and cannot beexercised arbitrarily (see Basu's Shorter Constitution ofIndia). Article 309 of the Constitution gives theGovernment the power to frame rules for the purpose oflaying down the conditions of service and recruitment ofpersons to be appointed to public services and posts inconnection with the affairs of the Union or any of theStates. That article contemplates the drawing up of aprocedure and rules to regulate the recruitment andregulate the service conditions of appointees appointedto public posts. It is well acknowledged that because ofthis, the entire process of recruitment for services iscontrolled by detailed procedures which specify thenecessary qualifications, the mode of appointment, etc.If rules have been made under Article 309 of theConstitution, then the Government can make appointmentsonly in accordance with the rules. The State is meant tobe a model employer. The Employment Exchange (CompulsoryNotification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 was enacted toensure equal opportunity for employment seekers. Thoughthis Act may not oblige an employer to employ only thosepersons who have been sponsored by employment exchange,it places an obligation on the employer to notify thevacancies that may arise in the various departments andfor filling up of those vacancies, based on a procedure.Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authorityof law governing employment. It is recognised that nogovernment order, notification or circular can besubstituted for the statutory rules framed under theauthority of law. This is because, following any othercourse could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprivethe security of tenure and the right of equalityconferred on civil servants under the constitutionalscheme. It may even amount to negating the acceptedservice jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rulesare framed under Article 309 of the Constitution whichare exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to makeappointments based on the rules so framed.7. These two sets of appeals reflect the cleavageof opinion in the High Court of Karnataka based on the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ difference in approach in two sets of decisions of thisCourt leading to a reference of these appeals to theConstitution Bench for decision. The conflict relates tothe right, if any, of employees appointed by the State orby its instrumentalities on a temporary basis or on dailywages or casually, to approach the High Court for theissue of a writ of mandamus directing that they be madepermanent in appropriate posts, the work which they wereotherwise doing. The claim is essentially based on thefact that they having continued in employment or engagedin the work for a significant length of time, they areentitled to be absorbed in the posts in which they hadworked in the department concerned or the authorityconcerned. There are also more ambitious claims thateven if they were not working against a sanctioned post,even if they do not possess the requisite qualification,even if they were not appointed in terms of the procedureprescribed for appointment, and had only recently beenengaged, they are entitled to continue and should bedirected to be absorbed."The Hon’ble Apex Court has ultimately held in para"26. With respect, why should the State be allowed todepart from the normal rule and indulge in temporaryemployment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view,is bound to insist on the State making regular and properrecruitment and is bound not to encourage or shut itseyes to the persistent transgression of the rules ofregular recruitment. The direction to make permanent -the distinction between regularisation and makingpermanent, was not emphasised here-can only encourage theState, the model employer, to flout its own rules andwould confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of manywaiting to compete. With respect, the direction made inpara 50 (of SCC) of Piara Singh is to some extentinconsistent with the conclusion in para 45 (of SCC)therein. With great respect, it appears to us that thelast of the directions clearly runs counter to theconstitutional scheme of employment recognised in theearlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be saidthat this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc,temporary or casual employees engaged without followingthe regular recruitment procedure should be madepermanent."127. Two other paragraphs of the judgement of the Hon’bleApex Court, which are relevant to be extracted in this regard are https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as follows: "49. It is contended that the State action in notregularising the employees was not fair within theframework of the rule of law. The rule of law compelsthe State to make appointments as envisaged by theConstitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier.In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees hadworked for some length of time but this has also beenbrought about by the pendency of proceedings in tribunalsand courts initiated at the instance of the employees.Moreover, accepting an arguments of this nature wouldmean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate anillegality in the matter of public employment and thatwould be a negation of the constitutional scheme adoptedby us, the people of India. It is therefore not possibleto accept the argument that there must be a direction tomake permanent all the persons employed on daily wages.When the court is approached for relief by way of a writ,the court has necessarily to ask itself whether theperson before it had any legal right to be enforced.Considered in the light of the very clear constitutionalscheme, it cannot be said that the employees have beenable to establish a legal right to be made permanent eventhough they have never been appointed in terms of therelevant rules or in adherence of Article 14 and 16 ofthe Constitution. 50. It is argued that in a country like India wherethere is so much poverty and unemployment and there is noequality of bargaining power, the action of the State innot making the employees permanent, would be violative ofArticle 21 of the constitution. But the very argumentindicates that there are so many waiting for employmentand an equal opportunity for competing for employment andit is in that context that the Constitution as one of itsbasic features, has included Article 14, 16 and 309 so asto ensure that public employment is given only in a fairand equitable manner by giving all those who arequalified, an opportunity to seek employment. In theguise of upholding rights under Article 21 of theConstitution, a set of persons cannot be preferred over avast majority of people waiting for an opportunity tocompete for State employment. The acceptance of theargument on behalf of the respondents would really negatethe rights of the others conferred by Article 21 of theConstitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that the right to employment is also a right comingwithin the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution.The argument that Article 23 of the Constitution isbreached because the employment on daily wages amounts toforced labour, cannot be accepted. After all, theemployees accepted the employment at their own volitionand with eyes open as to the nature of their employment.The Governments also revised the minimum wages payablefrom time to time in the light of all relevantcircumstances. It also appears to us that importing ofthese theories to defeat the basic requirement of publicemployment would defeat the constitutional scheme and theconstitutional goal of equality."128. Therefore, it is clear that while dealing with the rulesframed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, wherein, thepersons without qualification appointed on adhoc basis or dailywages seeking for regularisation of their services, the Hon’bleApex Court has heavily come down against such practice stating thatit would amount to perpetuating illegality. On the other hand, itremains the fact that the statutory right of retrenched employeesunder Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, was not anissue before the Hon’ble Court in those two cases at all. Apartfrom the fact that those two cases were for regularization ofillegally appointed persons, which can never be encouraged. Insuch circumstances, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusionthat the Hon’ble Apex Court had no occasion to decide the issueunder Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the abovesaid two judgements and they were relating to public employment asper the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution ofIndia. 129. In such circumstances, I am of the considered view thatconsidering the hierarchy of judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Courtin interpreting Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Actrelating to retrenchment, Section 25(F) of the Industrial DisputesAct relating to retrenchment compensation and 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, relating to the right of preference inreemployment, the state was certainly having a legal obligation togive preferential right to those retrenched employees, when theyhave decided as per G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Department dated21.07.2005, to provide employment in respect of the Tamil NaduState Transport Corporations by recruiting 2000 Drivers and 700Conductors, to give preference to those Drivers and Conductors, whowere earlier employed and retrenched in accordance with law asstated above. Without following the same any orders given to thepetitioners, whether they are selection, appointment or proposed to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ be appointed, cannot have a legal basis to stand the scrutiny oflaw. 130. Therefore, there is absolutely no difficulty to come tothe conclusion, even without going into the controversy as towhether there was valid appointments in respect of those writpetitioners who are challenging the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport(C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 whether they were only selectedor there were only proposal, to come to a conclusion that suchproposal or such appointments or such selections are totallyopposed to the statutory rights conferred on retrenched employeesunder Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 131. Therefore, I am in total agreement with the contentionraised by the learned Advocate General that the said orders issuedin February 2006 to the petitioners, who are challenging thevalidity of G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006 are opposed to and in violation of the statutoryprovisions of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Italso remains a fact as correctly pointed out by the learnedAdvocate General that as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble ApexCourt consistently, mere selection of persons to a post does notconfer on them any right. As correctly pointed out, the Hon’bleApex Court in the judgement rendered in Shankarsan Dash Vs. Unionof India reported in AIR 1991 SC 1612 has held that even a personwho finds in the merit list cannot have a right to hold the post.The relevant portion of the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court,which runs as follows: "7. It is not correct to say that if a number ofvacancies are notified for appointment and adequatenumber of candidates are found fit, the successfulcandidates acquire an indefeasible right to beappointed which cannot be legitimately denied.Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to aninvitation to qualified candidates to apply forrecruitment and on their selection they do not acquireany right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitmentrules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty tofill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it doesnot mean that the State has the licence of acting in anarbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up thevacancies has to be taken for appropriate reasons. Andif the vacancies or any of them are filled up, theState is bound to respect the comparative merit of thecandidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, andno discrimination can be permitted. This correctposition has been consistently followed by this Court, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and we do not find any discordant note in the decisionsin State of Haryana Vs. Subhash Chander Marwaha, (1974)1 SCR 165: (AIR 1973 SC 2216), Miss Neelima Shangla Vs.State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 268: (AIR 1987 SC 169),or Jitendra Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCR899: (AIR 1984 SC 1850)."132. In this case, it is not even the case of the petitionerswho challenged the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department,dated 13.07.2006 that any discrimination is shown by the TransportCorporation in canceling the orders of appointment or selectionunder the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated13.07.2006. In yet another judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court inthe State of U.P. and others Vs. Rajkumar Sharma and othersreported in 2006(3) SCC 330 wherein, the result of selection waspublished by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission and UttarPradesh Government has also forwarded the recommendations inrespect of appointment of candidates to the Chief Engineer’s OfficeHill Cadre Almora and subsequently, when the separate Uthranjalstate came into existence on 09.11.2000 and the new governmentissued orders not to appoint the selected candidates, the Hon’bleApex Court has held that the selectees cannot claim appointment asa matter of right and holding that even in cases where anappointments are made by mistake that does not confer any right toany person by quoting various judgements. The operative portion ofthe judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court, are as follows: "13. filling up of vacancies over and above thenumber of vacancies advertised would be violative of thefundamental rights granted under Articles 14 and 16 ofthe Constitution. (See Union of India Vs. Ishwar SinghKhatri; Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Assn. Vs.State of Gujarat State of Bihar Vs. Secretariat Asstt.Successful Examinees Union, 1986, Prem Singh Vs. HaryanaSEB; Surinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Kamlesh KumarSharma Vs. Yogesh Kumar gupta.)14. Selectees cannot claim the appointment as amatter of right. Mere inclusion of candidate's name inthe list does not confer any right to be selected, evenif some of the vacancies remained unfilled and thecandidates concerned cannot claim that they have beengiven a hostile discrimination. (See Shankarsan Dash Vs.Union of India; Asha Kaul Vs. State of J & K; Union ofIndia Vs. S.S.Uppal; Hanuman Prasad Vs. Union of India;Bihar Public Service Commission Vs. State of Bihar;Syndicate Bank Vs. Shankar Paul; Vice-Chancellor,University of Allahabad Vs. Dr.Anand Prakash Mishra https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Punjab SEB Vs. Seema; All India SC & ST Employees' Assn.V. A.Arthur Jeen ; Vinodan T. V. University of Calicut;S.Renuka V. State of A.P. and Batiarani Gramiya Bank V.Pallab Kumar.)15. Even if in some cases appointments have beenmade by mistake or wrongly that does not confer any righton another person. Article 14 of the Constitution doesnot envisage negative equality, and if the Statecommitted the mistake it cannot be forced to perpetuatethe same mistake. (See Sneh Prabha Vs. State of U.P.;Secy.Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Daulat Mal Jain;State of Haryana Vs. Ram Kumar Mann; Faridabad C.T.ScanCentre Vs. D.G.Health Services; Jalandhar ImprovementTrust V. Sampuran Singh; State of Punjab V. Dr.RajeevSarwal; Yogesh Kumar V. Govt.of NCT, Delhi; Union ofIndia V. International Trading Co. And Kastha NiwarakGrihnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit V. President, IndoreDevelopment Authority.)"133. That apart, as rightly pointed out by the learnedAdvocate General, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgement reportedin 2006(1) SCC 779 and 2001(6) SCC 380 has held that mere inclusionin the list or even in the merit list published, the selectedcandidates would not get any right to the post. That was alsofollowed in the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in 2003(10) SCC144. 134. Therefore, considering all the above said facts, I am ofthe considered view that the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 relating to Clause 4, Clause 5 andClause 6 are perfectly in order. 135. As far as the Clause 3 of the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 is concerned, ascorrectly pointed out by the learned counsel Ms.D.Nagasaila andother learned counsels who have adopted her arguments, there is norational nexus in conferring the benefits of the G.O. in givingpreference in respect of employees appointed from 1997 onwards andwere terminated later and to the object of giving preference to theretrenched employees as per Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act. As I have narrated earlier Section 25(H) of the Actdoes not prescribe any period of limitation for the purpose ofgiving preference except to state that the conditions mentioned forthe purpose of retrenchment, has to be complied with. Therefore,there is absolutely no reason for the respondent Corporation torestrict the right of preferential treatment in reemployment to be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ given only to those employees, who were appointed from 1997 andterminated there after, which means retrenched there after. 136. In view of the same, the portion of the said impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006, Clause 3,in so far as it applies regarding reemployment to the persons,appointed from 1997 is set aside, making it clear that the right ofreemployment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act,shall be made applicable to all persons appointed by the respondentCorporations earlier and there after terminated irrespective of theyear of their appointment and retrenchment. 137. In respect of the contention raised on behalf of thelearned Senior Counsel Mr.N.R.Chandran appearing on behalf of thepetitioners challenging the G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department,dated 13.07.2006 that even after giving preference to those personswho are directed to be reemployed or even persons who wereretrenched and given benefits under Section 25(H) of the IndustrialDisputes Act, there are surplus vacancies available to which thepetitioners can be considered. Even though the learned AdvocateGeneral has produced the following particulars regarding thevacancy position, which is follows: SL.No.DetailsNo.of persons1Retrenched employees from STU's inTamil Nadu58102Number of persons re-employment10403Retrenched employees not re-employment given47704Available vacancies 63855Employees retrenched coming underpurview of G.O.Ms.No.41dated:13.07.200653886Retrenched employees covered byG.O.Ms.No.41 dated 13.07.200610407Retrenched employees coming underpurview of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated13.07.2006 who have been not beenre-employed till now4348138. I do not propose to go into the said fact, making itclear that after giving benefits to the persons eligible underSection 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is always open tothe respondent Corporations to consider the case of thepetitioners, who challenged the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 along with other eligiblecandidates, while making appointments. 139. In view of the reasons stated above the writ petitionsare disposed of as follows:1) W.P.Nos.26195, 26196, 26197, 26198, 26199, 26188, 26194,26189, 26190, 26191, 26192, 26193, 29269, 29270, 39292, 27849,30332, 34833, 39516, 39517, 39518, 39519, 34700, 25520, 25521,25522, 25523, 25524, 25525, 25526, 25527, 25528, 24723, 24724,24725, 41278, 23559, 25167, 25168, 25169, 25387, 25699, 25700,25007, 25008, 25009, 25447, 25448, 25449, 25450, 25451, 33517,24285, 30687, 30688, 28015, 28016, 28017, 28018, 28019, 28020,28021, 28022, 28023, 38216, 45043, 45062, 45081, 47719, 42523,43040, 43041, 27081, 27082, 41290, 24805, 24806, 24807, 24808,24809, 24810 of 2006 challenging the G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1)Department, dated 13.07.2006 except Clause 3 stand dismissed. 2) W.P.Nos. 26239, 30326, 39363, 34696, 24975, 40363 of 2006challenging the impugned G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department,dated 13.07.2006 Clause 3 in so far as it restricts thereemployment in respect of persons, who were appointed after 1997and terminated thereafter stand allowed and the said portion of theimpugned G.O. is set aside. 3) W.P.Nos.45459, 34805, 34806, 34807, 34808, 34809, 34810,34811, 34816, 34817, 34818, 34819, 34820, 34821, 34822, 34823,34862, 34863, 34864, 34872, 34873, 34874, 34875, 34876, 34877,34878, 34879, 34880, 34881, 34887, 34888, 34889, 34890, 34891,34892, 34893, 34894, 34895, 34896, 34897, 45060, 45076, 45077,45118, 45119, 45120, 45396, 45397, 45422, 45039, 45040, 35412,33427, 34825 of 2006 stand allowed with a direction to implementthe G.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 Clause4 along with Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, bygiving preference on reemployment.a) to the employees who were terminated from services subjectto the condition that such employees have completed 240 daysservice in a period of one year during the period of 12 calendarmonths, preceding the date on which the respondents proposed fillup the vacancies as per G.O.Ms.No.57 Transport (C1) Departmentdated 21.07.2005. b) and thereafter to consider the employees who have notcompleted the required service as per Section 25(H) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, for reemployment, however, making it clearthat the same shall not apply to any persons who have not actuallyworked under the respondent Corporations but made a bogus claim. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ c) After exhausting the above said two categories, toconsider the cases of the petitioner who challenged the impugnedG.O.Ms.No.41 Transport (C1) Department, dated 13.07.2006 forremaining vacancies of Drivers/Conductors in accordance with law. The writ petitions stand disposed of with the above terms. NoCosts. Consequently, connected W.P.M.Ps.are closed.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.To1. The Secretary,Government of Tamil NaduTransport Department,Fort St. George, Chennai 9.2. The General Manager,State Express Transport Corporation,Pallavan Salai, Chennai 2.3. The Managing Director,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd.,37, Mettupalayam Road, Coimbatore.4. The General Manager,The Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationSalem Division, Salem-7.5. The General Manager (ADMn.)Tamilnadu Governemnt Transport CorporationCoimbatore Ltd., Erode Region.6. The Managing Director,Tamil nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,Chennimalai Road, Erode. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. The General Manager,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,Kumbakonam Ltd, Tiruchy Division,Tiruchy.8. The Managing Director,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd.,Coimbatore Division-II, Erode,Erode District.9. The Managing Director,Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd.,Pallavan Salai, Chennai-2.10.The General Manager, Metropolitan Transport Corporationltd, (Chennai), Chennai-2... 11.The General Manager,Metropolitan Transport Corporation,Pallavan Illam, Pallavan Salai,Chennai-2.12. The General Manager, (ADMN)The Metropolitan Transport CorporationChennai-2.13.The General ManagerTamil Nadu State Transport Corportion Ltd,Coimbatore Division, Coimbatore-43.14.The General manager, Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation Salem, Dharmapuri Division, Salem-715. The General Manager,Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,(Coimbatore Division-II) Ltd.Chennimalai Road, Erode.16.The General Manager,Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation(Kumbakonam Division-I) Ltd,Kumbakonam - 612 001. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17.The Managing Director,The Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationSalem18. The Managing Director,Tamilnadu Transport Corportion ltd,Formerly Known as Jeeva TransportCorporation Ltd, CoimbatoreDivision-II, Chennimalai, Erode DT.19.The Managing Director,Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationKumbakonam Division, Periyamilaguparai,Tiruchy District.20. The General SecretaryKovai Arasu Pokkuvarathu Oozhiyar Sangam, No.109, Park St, Coimbatore - 641 009.21.The General Manager, Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation Ltd, Madras Division, Chennai-2.22. The General Manager, Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,Coimbatore Division-II, Erode, Erode District.23.The Managing Director,Tamilnadu State Transport CorporationCoimbatore Division(2),Mettupalayam Road, Coimbatore.24.The General manager,Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation ltd,Madurai Division-III, Nagercoil,Kanyakumari Dist.25.The Assistant Manager,Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation Ltd,Coimbatore Division, Coimbatore-43.1 cc to M/s. Sudha Ramalingam, Advocate, Sr. 624051 cc to Mr.R. Sassetharan, Advocate, Sr. 62864 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1 cc to Mr.R. Ganesan, Advocate, sr. 625431 cc to Mr.D.Nagasaiq Advocate, Sr. 625411 cc to M/s. V. Kasinatha Bharathi, advocate, sr. 627431 cc to Mr.T. Pappiah Dharmaraju , Advocate, sr. 626551 cc to Mr.I.c. Vasudevan, Advocate, sr. 626922 ccs to Mr.P. Chinnadurai, Advocate, sr. 62719 & 627201 cc to M/s. S. Niveditha, Advocate, sr. 631181 cc to Mr.M. Ravi, Advocate, sr. 629791 cc to Mr.D. Hariparanthaman, Advocate, sr. 625601 cc to Mr.K. Premkumar, Advocate, sr. 631291 cc to mr.S.M. Subramaniam, Advocate, Sr. 626041 cc to Mr.S.T. Varadharajulu, Advocate, sr, 630411 cc to mr.P.H. Manoj Pandian, Advocate, sr. 625713 ccs to Mr.I. Davidsingh, Advocate, sr 63181 to 631832 ccs to Mr.C.S. Saravanan, Advocate, Sr. 62844 & 628452 ccs to Mr.N. Manokaran, Advocate, sr. 62660 & 626612 ccs to Mr.M. Palani, Advocate, Sr. 625621 cc to Mr.R.T. Doraisamy, Advocate, sr. 625516 ccs to Government Pleader, Sr.Nos. 62895 to 62900W.P.Nos.26195 of 2006 etc.,batchJE (CO)kk rvl,sr,gp,bp, Nm 22/1