N.Kumar v. M.O.Roy

was one of the Directors of a company known as M/s.Square D SoftwareLimited. The name of the company was changed into M/s.DSQ SoftwareLimited with effect from 01.04.1997.3. The sum and substance of the allegation, as per thecomplaint, is that the Company delayed in funding the dividendaccounts of the company and failed to distribute the dividend withinthe stipulated time, viz., within a period of 42 days for thefinancial years 1995-1996 to 1998-1999 and within a period of 30days for the financial year 1999-2000 and therefore, it is allegedthat the Company and its Directors have contravened the procedurecontemplated under Section 207 of the Act and committed the offenceunder that Section.4. Mr.Habibullah Basha, learned senior counsel put forward thefollowing contentions :(i) The complaint filed in this case is barred by limitation.Under Section 207 of the Companies Act, prior to amendment, within42 days time from the date of declaration, dividend should bedistributed and the failure of the same would attract the offenceunder this Section and after the amendment the time limit is 30 daysfrom the date of declaration. In this case, the dividend wasdeclared by the company on 19.09.1996 and forty two days for postingthe dividend warrant expired on 31.10.1996 and therefore, thecomplaint ought to have been filed within a period of one year fromthat date i.e. on or before 01.11.1997 as the punishment for theoffence under Section 207 of the Companies Act, 1956, during therelevant period, i.e. 1995-1996 is punishable with simpleimprisonment for a term which may extend to seven days and shallalso liable to be fine. Under Section 468 (2) (b) of Cr.P.C., theperiod of limitation shall be one year, if the offence waspunishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.Therefore, the complaint is liable to be dismissed as the same isbarred by limitation.(ii) The petitioner resigned from the Directorship of thecompany as early as on 10.06.1996 and his resignation was acceptedby the Company and also a resolution was passed on 19.09.1996 andthe dividends were also declared on 19.09.1996. Therefore, thepetitioner cannot be held liable as he has resigned even prior tothe date of declaration of dividend. The fact that the petitionerresigned as early as on 10.06.1996 is also admitted in the counterfiled by the respondent. It is also not disputed by the respondentthat the dividend was declared only on 19.09.1996 and under suchcircumstances, the petitioner is not at all liable to be prosecutedfor the contravention of Section 207 of the Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (iii) Even assuming that the petitioner was the Director duringthe relevant period of commission of offence, the complaint does notcontain any allegation to the effect that the petitioner was incharge and responsible for the conduct of the business of thecompany and there is also no allegation or averment in the complaintto the effect that the petitioner was having knowledge about thedefault committed by the company for the contravention of provisionunder Section 207 of the Companies Act. Therefore, the petitionercannot be fastened with the vicarious liability of the offence saidto have been committed by the company.5. Per contra, Mr.M.Damodharan, learned Additional CentralGovernment Standing Counsel made the following submissions :(i) The complaint is not barred by limitation. Only on thereceipt of the report of the Inspector dated 01.12.2005, therespondent got the knowledge about the commission of the offence andthereafter the respondent was authorised through the letter dated01.05.2006 to file the complaint against the petitioner and othersand the respondent accordingly filed the complaint on 23.08.2006 andtherefore the complaint was filed well within the stipulated periodof one year. Under Section 469 (1)(b) of the Code, the limitationstarts from the date of knowledge of the commission of the offenceby the aggrieved person. Under Section 470(b) of the Code, theperiod required for obtaining sanction of the Government shall beexcluded for computing the limitation. Therefore, in this case thecomplaint was filed within the stipulated period of one year fromthe date of knowledge of the commission of the offence and afterobtaining the sanction and as such the complaint is not barred bylimitation.(ii) The petitioner resigned as a Director as per his letterdated 10.06.1996 and his resignation was accepted by the Board ofDirectors on 19.09.1996 and the dividend was declared on the sameday, i.e. on 19.09.1996. The contravention of the provision ofSection 207 of the Act was committed even during the financial year1995-1996, apart from the financial years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000 and therefore, the offence was committed even during the periodthe petitioner was working as Director till 19.09.1996 and as suchhe cannot escape from the liability of the offence. The learnedACGSC also placed reliance on the following decisions :1.R.S.Nayak V. A.R.Antulay and another reported inAIR 1986 SC 2045 ;2.Thomas Philip Vs. Asst. Registrar (2006) 131Comp.Cases 842 (Ker) ; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

3.The Registrar of Companies Vs. Fair Growth AgenciesLimited (2006) 133 Comp.cas314 (Kar) ;4.Registrar of Companies Vs. Rajshree Sugar &Chemicals Ltd (2000) 101 Comp. Case 271 (SC);6. I have carefully considered the rival contentions putforward by either side and also perused the impugned complaint,petition, counter and other materials available on record.7. The following important questions arise in this case for theconsideration of this Court, viz.,(i) Whether the offence under Section 207 of the Act has beenvalidly taken cognizance before the expiry of the period oflimitation ?(ii) Whether the petitioner, who has resigned from theDirectorship of the Company as per his resignation letter dated10.06.1996, could be fastened with the vicarious liability of thealleged contravention of the provision under Section 207 of the Actby the company for the non-payment of dividend or non-posting ofwarrant by the company for the financial years 1995-1996 to 1999-2000 ?(iii) Whether the allegation contained in the complaintconstitutes the offence under Section 207 of the Act as against thepetitioner ?8. Let me now have a bird's eye view in respect of the relevantprovisions :(i) Section 621 of the Companies Act reads as follows :“621. Offences against Act to be cognizable only oncomplaint by Registrar, shareholder or Government -(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offenceagainst this Act, thereof, except on the complaint inwriting of the Registrar, or of a shareholder of thecompany, or of a person authorised by the CentralGovernment in that behalf ;"(ii) Section 207 of the Act, during the relevant period of thecommission of offence (before amendment) reads hereunder :“207. Where a dividend has been declared by a companybut has not been paid, or the warrant in respect https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ thereof has not been posted, within forty-two daysfrom the date of the declaration, to any shareholderentitled to the payment of the dividend, everydirector of the company (its managing agency orsecretaries and treasurers ; and where the managingagency is a firm or body corporate, every partner inthe firm and every director of the body corporate ;and where the secretaries and treasurers are a firm,every partner in the firm and where they are a bodycorporate, every director thereof ;) shall, if he isknowingly a party to the default, be punishable withsimple imprisonment for a term which may extend toseven days and shall also be liable to fine :"(iii) Section 207 of the Act (After amendment) reads hereunder:“207. Where a dividend has been declared by a companybut has not been paid, or the warrant in respectthereof has not been posted, within thirty days fromthe date of the declaration, to any shareholderentitled to the payment of the dividend, everydirector of the company shall, if he is knowingly aparty to the default, be punishable with simpleimprisonment for a term which may extend to threeyears and shall also be liable to a fine of onethousand rupees for every day during which suchdefault continues and the company shall be liable topay simple interest at the rate of eighteen percentper annum during the period for which such defaultcontinues :"(iv) Section 468 (2)(b) of Code of Criminal Procedure reads asfollows :“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of theperiod of limitation - (1) Except as otherwiseprovided elsewhere in this Code, no court shall takecognizance of an offence of the category specified insub-section (2), after the expiry of the period oflimitation.(2) The period of limitation shall be -(b) one year, if the offence is punishable withimprisonment for a term not exceeding one year ”9. Let me now consider the first question whether the offenceunder Section 207 of Companies Act has been validly taken cognizancewithin the period of limitation ? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9.1. There is no dispute that limitation for initiation ofproceedings for offence under the Companies Act had not beenprescribed under the Act itself and hence, the general law under theCode of Criminal Procedure will stand attracted.9.2. Since the offence alleged under Section 207 of the Act ispunishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7days and shall also be liable to fine, the period of limitation fortaking cognizance of the offence will be one year. Under Section468(2)(b) of Cr.P.C., the period of limitation for taking cognizanceof the offence is one year if the offence is punishable withimprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.9.3. It is relevant to note under Section 469 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, the period of limitation would commence onlyfrom the date on which the offence comes to the knowledge of thepersons aggrieved by the offence.9.4. In this case, the respondent filed the complaint as he wasauthorised by the communication dated 01.05.2006 to file a complaintagainst the petitioner and others. Therefore, it is very clear thatthe respondent is the authorized person as contemplated underSection 621 (1) of the Companies Act to prefer the private complaintagainst the petitioner herein.9.5. It is pertinent to note that in this case the complaintwas filed on 23.08.2006 before the learned Additional ChiefMetropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences, E.O.I, Egmore, Chennai.The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance by his order dated29.08.2006. The order of the Magistrate reads as follows :"Perused. The complainant has filed a complaintagainst the accused for the violation of offence underSection 621 and 207 of Companies Act. On a perusal ofthe records reveals prima facie case to take thecomplaint on file against the accused for the saidviolation. Accordingly, the complaint is taken onfile against the accused and forwarded to A.C.M.M.(E.O.II), for disposal according to law."9.6. It is evident from the perusal of the complaint that thereis absolutely no averment as to how the period of limitation iscalculated. It is also not disclosed in the complaint in respect ofthe date of the knowledge of the commission of the offence by thesaid company. In paragraph 10 of the complaint, it is merely statedin respect of the period of limitation as follows :"10. That the Ministry of Company Affairs vide itsletter No.5/10/2005-CL.II dated 1st May 2006 (Annexure E) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ has accorded its sanction and instruction of filingprosecution against the accused above named and hencethe present complaint is well within the period oflimitation as contemplated under Section 468 of CriminalProcedure Code."9.7. The respondent/complainant has come forward with thedetails of computing the period of limitation only for the firsttime while filing the counter before this Court. In paragraph 5 ofthe counter, it is stated by the respondent/complainant that afterinvestigation was completed by the respondent office, a report wassubmitted to the Central Government (Ministry of Company Affairs) on01.12.2005 and thereafter the Central Government granted sanction toprosecute the Board of Directors of the company through its letterdated 01.05.2006 and the complaint was filed on 23.08.2006. It isalso stated in the same paragraph that the complaint was filedwithin the period of one year from the date of the knowledge of thecommission of the offence in respect of the financial year 1995-1996on the basis of the results of the investigation. Therefore, thecounter filed by the respondent reveals that the limitation wascomputed on the basis of the alleged knowledge of the commission ofthe offence on the basis of the investigation report dated01.12.2005 and ultimately, the complaint was filed on 23.08.2006after obtaining sanction order dated 01.05.2006 from the Ministry ofCompany Affairs.9.8. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that there isabsolutely no provision available under the Companies Actcontemplating prior sanction for initiating prosecution for theoffence under Section 207 of the Act. The contention of the learnedACGSC to the effect that the Central Government had the knowledgeabout the commission of the offence only on the basis of the reportof investigation dated 01.12.2005 and thereafter, the complaint wasfiled after obtaining sanction order from the Ministry of CompanyAffairs dated 01.05.2006 is unacceptable. It is relevant to notethat as early as on 23.10.2003 itself the Government passed an orderto investigate into the affairs of the company by appointingMr.Sharad Krishan Sharma as Inspector to investigate into theaffairs of the company, viz., DSQ Software Limited. Therefore, theGovernment could have had the knowledge even as early as in the year2003 itself about the alleged commission of the offence by the saidcompany under Section 207 of the Act as per the document dated23.10.2003 produced by the learned ACGSC. As already pointed out,there is no provision available under the Companies Actcontemplating the prior sanction for initiating prosecution for theoffence under Section 207 of the Act. It is also rightly contendedby the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the knowledgeof the alleged commission of the offence under the Companies Act https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ must have come to the notice of the Central Government on19.09.1996, viz., the date of declaration of dividend.9.9. This Court in NEPC INDIA LTD. V. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIESreported in 1999 (Vol.97) Comp. Cases 500 held as follows :"C.C.No.167 of 1998 also relates to an offence underSection 207 of the said Act. It is seen from thecomplaint itself, the respondent came to know aboutthe default on September 8, 1997. However, para.3 ofthe complaint indicated that the inspection has beendone and the same was completed on January 20, 1997.Under the circumstances, even at the time of theinspection itself, the respondent could have been wellaware of the commission of the offence by the saidcompany. They have caused a delay of nearly eightmonths in sending the show-cause notice. The delaycaused by the respondent cannot be made use of to savetheir complaint. The complaint was filed in the courton August 31, 1998. Taking into consideration thefact that even according to the averments in thecomplaint, the respondent had completed the inspectionon January 20, 1997, naturally the complaint ought tohave been filed within a period of one year, butaccording to the complaint itself, it was filed onAugust 31, 1998, and, as such, it is beyond the time."In the above cited decision, this Court ultimately quashed thecomplaint on the ground that the complaint is barred by limitation.The principle laid down in the decision cited supra is squarelyapplicable to the facts of the instant case as in this case also theInspector commenced his investigation as per the order dated23.10.2003 and ultimately, submitted the report only on 01.12.2005and therefore, it is crystal clear that the respondent/complainantmust have had the knowledge of the commission of the offence asearly as in the year 2003 itself and therefore, the complaint isclearly barred by limitation.9.10. As already pointed out, Section 468 (2)(b) of Cr.P.C.contemplates that the period of limitation is one year if theoffence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding oneyear. Under Section 207 of the Act, prior to amendment,contravention of Section 207 is punishable with simple imprisonmentfor a term which may extend to seven days. As far as the petitioneris concerned, relevant period is only in respect of the financialyear 1995-1996 for the alleged commission of offence under Section207 is 1995-96 as it is admitted by the respondent/complainant thatthe petitioner resigned on 10.06.1996 and his resignation wasaccepted by the Board of Directors on 19.09.1996. Therefore, this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court is of the considered view that the complaint preferred by therespondent is barred by limitation on the following grounds:(1)The complainant or the Central Government must have hadthe knowledge about the alleged commission of the offenceunder Section 207 of the Act from the date of thedeclaration of dividend, i.e. 19.09.1996 and therefore,the complaint ought to have been filed within a period ofone year from that date i.e. on or before 01.11.1997 asthe punishment for the offence under Section 207 of theAct, during the relevant period, i.e. 1995-1996, ispunishable with simple imprisonment for a term which mayextend to seven days and under Section 468 (2)(b) ofCr.P.C., the period of limitation shall be one year, ifthe offence was punishable with imprisonment for a termnot exceeding one year.(2)Even assuming that the complainant or the CentralGovernment not had the knowledge about the allegedcommission of offence under Section 207 of the Act, on thedate of declaration of dividend, i.e. On 19.09.1996, thedocuments relied on by the respondent/complainant, viz.,order of the Government of India (Ministry of CompanyAffairs) dated 23.10.2003 appointing the Inspector toinvestigate into the affairs of the accused companyclearly shows that the respondent could have had theknowledge of the commission of offence as early as in theyear 2003 and therefore, the complaint filed only in theyear 2006 is certainly barred by limitation as thecomplaint is not filed within a period of a year from thedate of knowledge of the commission of the offence as thecomplaint was admittedly filed only on 23.8.2006 and thelearned Magistrate has taken cognizance on 29.08.2006.(3)No averments or explanations given in the complaint inrespect of computing the period of limitation and furtherthere is no whisper about the date of knowledge of thealleged offence by the complainant.(4)There is no provision under the Act contemplating priorsanction for prosecution of the companies under Section207 of the Act and as such the complainant cannot takeshelter under the guise of obtaining sanction for thepurpose of computing the period of limitation. It is alsopertinent to note that the complainant neither filed anyapplication under Section 470 (3) Cr.P.C. explanation forexcluding the period of obtaining consent or sanction norfiled any petition under Section 473 Cr.P.C. for extensionof period of limitation for filing the complaint andtaking cognizance of the offence by the trial Court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (5)The order of the learned Additional Chief MetropolitanMagistrate, Economic Offences, E.O.I, Egmore, Chennai,dated 29.08.2006 for taking cognizance of the offence isalso bereft of details about the limitation and there isno mention to the effect that the complaint was filedwithin the period of limitation by the learned Magistrateand as such the learned Magistrate has committed a seriouserror of law in taking cognizance of the offence beyondthe period of limitation in this case.Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the complainantfiled the complaint beyond the period of limitation and thecognizance was taken by the trial Court only after the expiry of theperiod of limitation and as such the entire proceedings is liable tobe quashed in respect of the petitioner herein.9.11.This Court has taken a similar view in V.Karthikeyan v.Registrar of Companies reported in 2001 (106) Comp. Cases 68510.1. Now let me consider the second question viz., Whether thepetitioner, who has resigned from the Directorship of the Company asper his resignation letter dated 10.06.1996, could be fastened withthe vicarious liability of the alleged contravention of theprovision under Section 207 of the Act by the company for thenon-payment of dividend or non-posting of warrant by the companyfor the financial years 1995-1996 to 1999-2000 with the stipulatedtime ?10.2. It is not disputed even in the counter filed by therespondent/complainant that the petitioner has resigned from theDirectorship as early as on 10.06.1996 and the same was accepted bythe Board of Directors of the company on 19.09.1996. It ispertinent to note that as far as the petitioner is concerned, therespondent/complainant implicated the petitioner in respect of thecontravention of Section 207 of the Act during the period 1995-1996.Even in the counter filed by the respondent/complainant it isspecifically stated in paragraph 6 as follows :“This Respondent states that the petitioner was aDirector in this company upto 31.12.1996 that is thedate of recording of his resignation in the record ofthe Office of the ROC, Chennai, and in the report ofthe Inspector, offences committed from the financialyear 1995-1996 onwards were found.”Therefore, it is clear that the respondent/complainant implicatesthe petitioner herein only for the offence said to have beencommitted during the financial year 1995-1996. At this juncture, it https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is relevant to point out that in the earlier para it is admitted bythe respondent/complainant that the resignation of the petitionerwas accepted by the Board of Directors on 19.09.1996 and as such itcannot be stated that the petitioner continued as a Director upto31.12.1996, which is the date of Registration of the resignation ofthe petitioner by the Registrar of Companies. It is relevant tonote that as per the complaint, as narrated in para 6 of thecomplaint, the delay in respect of declaration of dividend for thefinancial year 1995-96 is only two days, such delay is verynegligible. As it is already pointed out that the dividend wasdeclared by the company, as admitted by the complainant, on19.09.1996 and on that date the resignation already submitted by thepetitioner dated 10.06.1996 is also accepted by the Board ofDirectors and therefore, it is crystal clear that the petitioner wasnot a party to the declaration of dividend made by the Board ofDirectors on 19.09.1996 and as such the petitioner cannot bevicariously held liable for the alleged contravention of Section 207of the Act. Therefore, on this ground also the proceedingsinitiated by the complainant, as far as this petitioner isconcerned, is liable to be quashed.11.1. Let me now consider the third question involved in thismatter, viz., Whether the allegation contained in the complaintconstitutes the offence under Section 207 of the Companies Act asagainst the petitioner ?11.2. The provision under Section 207 of the Act contemplatesthe implication of any Director of the body corporate only in theevent of such Director is knowingly a party to the default. At therisk of repetition it is relevant to incorporate the provision underSection 207 of the Act which reads hereunder :“207. Where a dividend has been declared by a companybut has not been paid, or the warrant in respectthereof has not been posted, within forty-two daysfrom the date of the declaration, to any shareholderentitled to the payment of the dividend, everydirector of the company (its managing agency orsecretaries and treasurers ; and where the managingagency is a firm or body corporate, every partner inthe firm and every director of the body corporate ;and where the secretaries and treasurers are a firm,every partner in the firm and where they are a bodycorporate, every director thereof ;) shall, if he isknowingly a party to the default, (Emphasis supplied)be punishable with simple imprisonment for a termwhich may extend to seven days and shall also beliable to fine :" https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

11.3. A perusal of the complaint clearly shows that there isnot a whisper against the petitioner to the effect that thepetitioner was knowingly a party to the default. It is alsopertinent to note that in the cause title itself it is stated thatthe first accused is the Managing Director and the third and tenthaccused are the whole time Directors and fourth, fifth, sixth,seventh, eleventh and twelfth accused are the Directors. Therefore,it is very clear that the petitioner is not a whole time Directorto aware about the entire affairs of the company. Therefore,in view of the absence of specific averment in the complaint tothe effect that the petitioner had the knowledge about thecommission of the offence by the company or the petitioner wasknowingly a party to the default, the petitioner cannot be heldvicariously liable for the contravention under Section 207 of theAct and as such even on this ground the proceedings is liable to bequashed as against the petitioner herein.12.1. One more infirmity in this case is that the complainanthas not sent any show-cause notice to the petitioner or any of theaccused in this case to explain about the alleged contravention ofSection 207 of the Act. Though there is no specific provisionavailable under the Companies Act contemplating the issue of show-cause notice, proviso to Section 207 contemplates implied procedureof sending show-cause notice calling for explanation for thecontravention of Section 207 of the Act. This Court can read intothe Provision and Proviso to Section 207 reads hereunder :Provided that no offence shall be deemed to have beencommitted within the meaning of the foregoingprovisions in the following cases, namely :-(a)where the dividend could not be paid by reason ofthe operation of any law ;(b)where a shareholder has given directions to thecompany regarding the payment of the dividend andthose directions cannot be complied with ;(c)where there is a disputed regarding the right toreceive the dividend ;(d)where the dividend has been lawfully adjusted byby the company against any sum due to it from theshareholder ; or (e)where, for any other reason, the failure to paythe dividend or to post the warrant within theperiod aforesaid was not due to any default on thepart of the company.12.2. In view of the above stated proviso to Section 207 of theAct, unless and until the Central Government or the complainantgives opportunity by issuing a show-cause notice to the accused, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ accused may not be in a position to explain the reason for delay indistributing the dividends within the stipulated period. If theaccused satisfies anyone of the category of cases enumerated underthe proviso to Section 207 of the Act, then such accused could nothave deemed to have been committed the offence under Section 207 ofthe Act. The perusal of several reported cases in respect of theoffence under Section 207 of the Act reveals that the concernedauthorities issued show-cause notice to the accused callingexplanation in respect of the contravention of Section 207 of theAct. This Court is constrained to point out this serious infirmityin this case only with a view to highlight that the prosecution wasinitiated against the petitioner and other accused hurriedly andarbitrarily without following the procedure contemplated under theproviso to Section 207 of the Act and this infirmity itself is not aground for quashing the proceedings. 13. It is also made clear that the decisions relied on by thelearned ACGSC are not helpful to advance the case of thecomplainant. In one of the decisions relied on by the learned ACGSCin R.S.NAYAK V. A.R.ANTULAY AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1986 SC2045, the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held in respect ofthe considerations for discharge of accused under Section 227, 239and 245 Cr.P.C. that the test of "prima facie" case has to beapplied to decide whether any materials available on record toproceed against the accused. The principle of law laid down by theHon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the instant case as inthis case the allegations contained in the complaint do not make outa prima facie case for the offence under Section 207 of the Act.14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lalreported in 1992 (2) Supp (1) SCC 335 pointed out certain categoriesof cases and laid down certain guidelines for quashing theproceedings and the first guideline is stated as follows :"(1) Where the allegations made in the firstinformation report or the complaint, even if they aretaken at their face value and accepted in theirentirety do not prima facie constitute any offence ormake out a case against the accused."The above said principle of law laid down by the Apex Court issquarely applicable to the facts of the instant case as in this casealso the complaint is not only barred by limitation but also theallegations contained in the complaint do not attract theingredients of the offence under Section 207 of the Act as againstthe petitioner herein and as such allowing the proceedings tocontinue against the petitioner would amount to a clear case ofabuse of process of Court and the proceedings initiated in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ E.O.C.C.No.129 of 2006 pending on the file of the learned AdditionalChief Metropolitan Magistrate, E.O.II, Egmore, Chennai, as far asthe petitioner is concerned, is liable to be quashed and accordinglyquashed.15. This petition is ordered accordingly. Consequently,connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.ggTo1. Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate E.O.IIEgmore, Chennai.2. Do Thro The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai1 cc to Mr.C. Manishankhar, Advocate, Sr. 264411 cc to Mr.M. Dhamodaran, Advocate, Sr. 26501VC (CO)kk 9/6Crl.O.P.No.27813 of 2006