THE HONOURABLE MR v. Secretary to Government

capacity until the date of his dismissal from service. While thepetitioner was working in Thiruppapuliyur Police Station inCuddalore District, departmental proceedings were initiated inP.R.No.61 of 1991 for the following delinquencies:"(i) Reprehensible and improper conduct inhaving been keeping one Banumathi, W/o Ramasamy ofVannathur as his concubine and begot her threechildren by deceit means of giving false promisesof marrying her.(ii) In having married one Thenmozhidishonestly for purpose of having dowry byconcealing his conduct of keeping Banumathi as hisconcubine.(iii) In having tortured both Banumathi andThenmozhi by frequently beating them for gettingmoney in also having illegal contacts with severalladies.(iv) In having attempted to marry another girlKalaiarasi on 5.5.91 for purpose of dowry deceivinghis wife and concubine. (v) In having brought discredit to policeforce by having illegal contact with several ladiesand attempting to marry for purpose of money."The case of the Department is that the petitioner was married to oneThenmozhi, D/o Mayavan of Vellaiyur on 8.6.1984 and through her, hehas two children and even before the marriage, he had contact withone Banumathi and through her, he has three children. While livingwith both Banumathi and Thenmozhi, the petitioner demanded money andharassed them to get money from their parents. The petitioner wasalso having illegal contact with Kalaiarasi, D/o lateKrishnamoorthy, a deceased Sub-Inspector of Police, native ofMarnatham and had made arrangements to marry her on 5.5.1991 at PaliNew Colony, even though he was living with his wife and the saidBanumathi. The wife and Banumathi had given a complaint on 4.5.1991to the Superintendent of Police of Cuddalore District and to theSub-Inspector of Police (Law and Order), Ulundurpet. The gist ofthe complaint signed by the wife and the said Banumathi is to theeffect that the petitioner, after driving away the wife andBanumathi, is attempting to marry the said Kalaiarasi in his nativeplace deserting the two ladies and the family of five children.Therefore, they sought for appropriate legal action to be takenagainst the petitioner. The photographs of the family consisting ofthe wife and Banumathi and the wedding invitation card of the firstmarriage with Thenmozhi was also enclosed along with the complaint.Based on the complaint, F.I.R.No.339/91 dated 5.5.1991 wasregistered at the early hours on 5.5.1991 and the Inspector ofPolice, Ulundurpet along with the Sub-Inspector of Police (Law andOrder), Ulundurpet, rushed to the scene-village Pali New Colony andnoticed that the marriage function was ready to commence on 5.5.1991with Kalaiarasi and the petitioner. The Inspector of Police arrestedthe petitioner at 6.00 hours on 5.5.1991. As the petitioner-accusedwas adamant to obey the orders of the Police, minimum force was usedto arrest the petitioner. He was thereafter brought to UlundurpetPolice Station at 7.30 hours and remanded on the same day. Thepetitioner was charged for the offences under Sections 419, 420,498-A and 506 (ii) IPC. In addition to the criminal proceedings, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ charges under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police SubordinateServices (Discipline and Appeal) Rules was framed and served on1.9.1991, the details of the charge memo have been set out earlier.The petitioner participated in the enquiry and perused the connectedrecords on 10.10.1991 and oral enquiry commenced on 12.10.1991.P.Ws.1 to 3, namely Banumathi, Thenmozhi and the father of Thenmozhiwere examined. Thereafter, further oral enquiry was held on11.1.1992 and P.Ws.4 and 5 were examined. On 22.2.1992, P.W.6 wasexamined. The petitioner-delinquent did not attend the oral enquiryon 11.1.1992, though a memo was served on him on 10.1.1992. However,he sent a letter dated 10.1.1992 stating that he has to go to HighCourt in connection with the appeal. The subsequent memo dated17.1.1992 fixing the oral enquiry on 22.1.1992 was sent byRegistered Post to the petitioner/delinquent and also throughpersonal messenger. But the petitioner refused to receive the same.In their evidence before the enquiry officer, P.Ws.1 and 2 acceptedthat they gave a petition on 4.5.1991 to stop the marriage of thepetitioner with Kalaiarasi believing the words of certain villagersof Paliyur who had met them in Ulundurpet and in order to preventthe marriage, they had given the petition on 4.5.1991 to theSuperintendent of Police, Cuddalore and also to the Uludurpet PoliceStation. They accept that they have signed the petition. However, itis stated that they did not give the petition to arrest thedelinquent and that the villagers' version about the marriage withKalaiarasi was false and no such thing had happened. P.W.2 has alsogiven similar statement to the effect that the petition was given tothe Police in the night of 4.5.1991 to prevent the marriage of thepetitioner with Kalaiarasi. However, she denies that such anincident happened. P.W.3 is the father of the wife of thepetitioner who stated that he did not accompany the daughter at thetime of the complaint. The other witnesses are Police Officers whoacting on the complaint proceeded to the place, namely Pali NewColony and were responsible for stopping the marriage of thepetitioner with Kalaiarasi on 5.5.1991, which eventually led to thearrest of the petitioner. The petitioner did not submit anexplanation to the charge memo. However, he stated that he willsubmit his explanation after the completion of the oral enquiry. Inthe oral enquiry held on 12.10.1991, there was no objection by thepetitioner, when P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined. P.W.3 was not cross-examined. Examination of P.Ws.4 and 5 was fixed on 11.1.1992 onprior intimation to the petitioner. However, the petitioner onlywanted the enquiry to be deferred till the disposal of the criminalcase. It appears that the request letter dated 10.1.1992 wasreceived on 11.1.1992 after the examination of P.Ws.4 and 5 wasover. Examination of P.W.6 was posted on 22.2.1992 and thecommunication dated 17.2.1992 sent to the petitioner by specialmessenger PC 626 was declined and the communication by post was alsoreturned with endorsement "refused". The petitioner therefore didnot avail of the opportunity of cross-examining the officialwitnesses. By memo dated 22.2.1992, the petitioner was informedabout the nature of oral enquiry conducted till then and thepetitioner was called upon to furnish his list of defence witnessesand documents, if any. The petitioner once again refused to receivethe communication. However, by a petition dated 2.3.1992, hesubmitted that he would attend the oral enquiry only after thedisposal of the appeal in the High Court. As the petitioner failed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to avail the opportunity to produce documents or witnesses in hissupport, the petitioner was called upon to give his statement ofdefence, by memo dated 13.3.1992, which was sent by Registered Postand the same was returned undelivered with endorsement "refused".The personal communication through Police could not be served as noone was in the house and the memo was pasted on the door in thepresence of witnesses. The petitioner was therefore not co-operating with the oral enquiry and he did not furnish his statementof defence. Therefore, the enquiry officer proceeded to go aheadwith the enquiry and found that though initially P.Ws.1 and 2, thewife and Banumathi were serious about the complaint to prevent themarriage of the petitioner with Kalaiarasi, he found that for thereasons best known to them, they had subsequently changed theirstand and denied such an incident. However, based on the complaint,which was originally lodged on 5.5.1991 and the various incidentswhich happened at that point of time, the enquiry officer came tothe conclusion that all the five charges were proved. It ispertinent to point out that the petitioner avoided participating inthe enquiry only when P.Ws.4 and 5 were examined and he has failedto submit his explanation. 3. The enquiry report H-1/PR.61/91, dated 30.5.1992 was soughtto be served on the petitioner and since he refused to receive thesame, it was pasted on the residential door of the petitioner inthe presence of the Village Administrative Officer on 31.7.1992.Even after the service of the report of the enquiry officer asabove, there was no response from the petitioner. Therefore, byproceedings dated 21.9.1992, the petitioner was dismissed fromservice. As against the order of dismissal, it is admitted that noappeal has been filed. Thereafter, the petitioner after nearly sevenyears made a representation on 20.8.1999 to the second respondent-Director General of Police stating that in the criminal case inC.C.No.190/91, by order dated 25.11.1991, the petitioner washonourably acquitted and by order dated 16.6.1994 in Crl.R.C.684 of1991, certain observations made by the learned Judicial Magistrate,were expunged. Therefore, it was contended that the order ofacquittal has been confirmed by the High Court and he was honourablydischarged and consequently, he should be reinstated. It was alsocontended that the findings in the departmental enquiry werecontrary to the findings of the criminal Court. Therefore, he prayedfor quashing the order of disciplinary authority dismissing him fromservice and to reinstate him in service with consequential benefits.This was followed by another representation dated 8.1.2001 which isthe very same representation made on 20.8.1999. Since, according tothe petitioner, no action has been taken on his representation, hefiled O.A.No.1093 of 2001 for a direction to pass orders on therepresentation dated 20.8.1999 and 8.1.2001. The Tribunal, by orderdated 9.2.2001, directed that petitioner's representation should beconsidered on merits within a period of two months. Subsequent tothe order of the Tribunal, by proceedings Rc.No.30749/AP.1(2)/2001,dated 26.4.2001, the second respondent-DGP passed a detailed orderon the representations and held that the petitioner had notparticipated in the enquiry nor did he submit his written statementof defence. Though the two witnesses, namely the wife of thepetitioner and Banumathi having turned hostile, taking note of thestatement of the two ladies in the preliminary enquiry and the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ record of proceeding in the oral enquiry, the second respondent-DGPconcluded that there was no miscarriage of justice and principles ofnatural justice were followed and that the disciplinary proceedingswere conducted in accordance with the Rules. The second respondentheld the order of the disciplinary authority as correct based on theprinciple of preponderance of probabilities, which is the paramountconsideration and requirement for coming to the conclusion in thedepartmental proceedings. He therefore rejected the representationsas devoid of merits. As against this order of the secondrespondent, the petitioner filed an appeal dated 15.12.2001 to thefirst respondent-Secretary to Government. In the appeal to thefirst respondent, it was contended that the second respondent oughtnot to have confirmed the order of dismissal solely based on thepreliminary enquiry report. Further, there was no opinion of thedisciplinary authority based on the evidence adduced during thecourse of oral enquiry and it is a case of no evidence andtherefore, there was violation of principles of natural justice.However, even before the appeal could be disposed of, O.A.No.2158 of2002 was filed before the Tribunal for the following relief: "To call for the records of the 3rdrespondent herein pertaining to the orderD.O.2439/91; C.No.H.1/PR.61/91 dated 21.9.1992,awarding the punishment of dismissal from serviceand the records of the 2nd respondent hereinpertaining to the order R.C.No.30749/AP.1(2)/2001dated 26.4.2001 confirming the order of dismissalfrom service and quash the same and consequentlydirect the respondents to reinstate the applicantinto service with all consequential benefits andthus render justice."The Tribunal, by order dated 16.7.2002, considered the case of thepetitioner in detail and dealt in depth to the various incidentswhich led to the arrest of the petitioner based on the complaint ofthe petitioner's wife and Banumathi who is admittedly living withthe petitioner. Various factual materials were considered by theTribunal and are set out in paragraphs 11,12, 13 and 14 of theorder of the Tribunal. The Tribunal came to the conclusion thatthough the charge of demand for money or torture was notsubstantiated in view of the two main witnesses — the wife andBanumathi turning hostile, the fact remains that there was ampleevidence before the enquiry officer to hold the charge ofreprehensible and immoral conduct of the petitioner, therebybringing discredit and embarrassment to the entire Police force,which is the sum and substance of the charge memo. The Tribunalrejected the plea of the petitioner that the criminal Court hadfound him not guilty and therefore, the departmental proceedings onthe same set of charges and the finding of guilt, were not valid.The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the charge in the criminalcase is relating to torture and harassment of the wife andtherefore, Sections 498-A and 506 (ii) IPC were invoked. However,the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings is entirelydifferent as is evident from the charges set out earlier. Itrelates to the misconduct of the petitioner and his adulterous wayof life living with one Banumathi and his attempt to marryKalaiarasi suppressing the earlier marriage with Thenmozhi. The https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ fact that the petitioner was attempting to marry Kalaiarasi wasthwarted by the timely intervention of the Police Officers who werealerted by the wife and Banumathi. The Police Officers were citedas witnesses and their evidence is not controverted. The Tribunalcame to the conclusion that the order of dismissal was rightlypassed in the facts and circumstances of the case and found that itwas not excessive, severe or disproportionate to the proved chargesframed under Rule 17(b) of the Rules. While dismissing the aboveapplication, the Tribunal considered yet another issue regardingdelay and laches. The Tribunal felt that the application should bedismissed on the ground of limitation and laches on the part of thepetitioner, as the order of dismissal was passed on 21.9.1992 andno appeal was preferred as against the said order of dismissal. TheTribunal also took into consideration one important factor thateven before the order dated 21.9.1992 imposing punishment by way ofdismissal from service was passed, the criminal case has ended inacquittal. The petitioner did not prefer an appeal against theorder of dismissal even at that point of time. From 1992 to 2001,the petitioner kept quiet and only in 2001, a representation wasmade to the DGP, making it appear as though it is an appeal, and inthis process, the petitioner has tried to re-agitate the issueafter long lapse of time. In any event, the Tribunal also came tothe conclusion that it was only a representation to the DGP and theTribunal, by its earlier order, only directed that the same shouldbe considered. The order dated 26.4.2001 passed by the DGP cannotbe considered as an order in appeal and it is only a rejection ofmemorandum which admittedly is belated. In any event, the appealbecame time barred long before 2001. Therefore, only to get a freshcause of action and a starting point for limitation, the saidrepresentation was made. Therefore, the Tribunal came to theconclusion that the order of dismissal had come to a finality longbefore the filing of the Original Application. The Tribunaldismissed the O.A. both on merits as well as on the grounds oflimitation, delay and laches. Review Application No.19 of 2003 wasfiled before the Tribunal, which was also dismissed by order dated9.7.2003. As against the same, the writ petition has been filed. 4. The only contention of the petitioner now is that in termsof Rule 3(b)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, before passing the order imposingpenalty of dismissal from service, the copy of the report referredto in Rule 3(b)(i) was not furnished and no show cause notice wasgiven granting him an opportunity against the penalty proposed to beinflicted.5. Rule 3(b)(i) and (ii) reads as follows:"(b)(i) In every case where it is proposedto impose on a member of a service any of thepenalties specified in clauses (d), (h), (i) and(j) of rule 2 the grounds on which it isproposed to take action shall be reduced to theform of a definite charge or charges, whichshall be communicated to the person chargedtogether with a statement of the allegations onwhich each charge is framed and of any othercircumstances which it is proposed to take into https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ consideration in passing orders on the case. Heshall be required, within a reasonable time, toput in a written statement of his defence and tostate whether he desires an oral enquiry or onlyto be heard in person. An oral inquiry shall beheld if such an inquiry is desired by the personcharged or is directed by the authorityconcerned. At that inquiry oral evidence shallbe heard as to such of the allegations as arenot admitted, the person charged shall beentitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to giveevidence in person and to have such witnessescalled as he may wish, provided that the officerconducting the inquiry may, for special andsufficient reason to be recorded in writingrefuse to call a witness. After the inquiry hasbeen completed, the person charged shall beentitled to put in, if he so desires, anyfurther written statement of his defence.Whether or not the person charged desiredor had an oral enquiry, he shall be heard inperson at any stage if he so desires beforefinal orders are passed. A report of the inquiryor personal hearing (as the case may be) shallbe prepared by the authority holding the inquiryor personal hearing whether or not suchauthority is competent to impose the penalty.Such report shall contain a sufficient record ofevidence, if any, and a statement of thefindings and the grounds thereof.(ii) After the inquiry or personal hearingreferred to in clause (i) has been completed andafter the authority competent to impose thepenalty mentioned in that clause has arrived atprovisional conclusions in regard to the penaltyto be imposed, the person charged shall besupplied with a copy of the report referred toin clause (i) and be called upon to show cause,within a reasonable time not ordinarilyexceeding one month, against the particularpenalty proposed to be inflicted. Anyrepresentation in this behalf submitted by theperson charged shall be duly taken intoconsideration before final orders are passed:Provided that such a representation shallbe based only on the evidence adduced during theenquiry."6. On going through the records produced at the time of hearingand also based on the various factual details as culled out from theorder of the Tribunal, the various contentions now raised by thecounsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. The petitioner having accepted the charge memo, participatedon the first date of enquiry when his wife and Banumathi wereexamined. However, he refused to receive the notice for subsequentoral enquiry. The petitioner has also not submitted his statementof defence inspite of specific memo having been served on him. Inview of the above, the authority had no other option except toproceed with the enquiry as contemplated under Rule 3(b)(i) andsubmit a report. The enquiry report dated 30.5.1992 was sought tobe served on the petitioner in terms of Rule 3(b)(ii) and thepetitioner having refused to accept the same, it was served by wayof affixture. It is therefore evident that the report of theenquiry was served on the petitioner. Even after receipt of theenquiry report, he has not submitted his objections, if any, to thesaid report. In this case, the copy of the enquiry report dated30.5.1992 was served by way of affixture on 31.7.1992 and after areasonable time, as contemplated under the Rules, the order ofdismissal was passed on 21.9.1992. The conduct of the petitionerfrom the inception clearly indicates his intention that he is notinterested in participating in the enquiry proceedings and submithis statement of defence. Therefore, the contention of thepetitioner that the subsequent show cause notice in terms of Rule 3(b)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Police Service (Discipline and Appeal)Rules, indicating the intention of the disciplinary authority toimpose punishment, has not been served on him, cannot be accepted.8. The petitioner, having refused to receive the copy of theenquiry report, which subsequently was served by way of affixture,has clearly abandoned his rights in the departmental proceedings.When the petitioner consciously refused to participate in thedepartmental proceedings, the question of issuing separate showcause notice in terms of Rule 3(b)(ii) calling upon him to showcause, would be an empty formality, as has been held by the ApexCourt in AIR 2000 SC 2783 (Aligarh Muslim University vs. Mansoor AliKhan). 9. Even after the enquiry report was served on him by way ofaffixture, he has not come forward with any response. The conduct ofthe petitioner clearly shows that he is not interested in proceedingwith the departmental enquiry. The question of violation ofprinciples of natural justice or prejudice, much less, realprejudice, therefore does not arise in this case. In the case ofState Bank of Patiala vs. S.K.Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 1669), the ApexCourt has laid down the principles to be kept in mind while dealingwith the matters relating to disciplinary enquiries and orders ofpunishment and in paragraph 32, the Supreme Court held as follows: "32. We may summarise the principlesemerging from the above discussion. (These areby no means intended to be exhaustive and areevolved keeping in view the context ofdisciplinary enquiries and orders of punishmentimposed by an employer upon the employee):(1) An order passed imposing a punishmenton an employee consequent upon adisciplinary/departmental enquiry in violationof the rules/regulations/statutory provisions https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ governing such enquiries should not be set asideautomatically. The Court or the Tribunal shouldenquire whether (a) the provision violated is ofa substantive nature or (b) whether it isprocedural in character.(2) A substantive provision has normally tobe complied with as explained hereinbefore andthe theory of substantial compliance or the testof prejudice would not be applicable in such acase.(3) In the case of violation of aprocedural provision, the position is this:procedural provisions are generally meant foraffording a reasonable and adequate opportunityto the delinquent officer/employee. They are,generally speaking, conceived in his interest.Violation of any and every procedural provisioncannot be said to automatically vitiate theenquiry held or order passed. Except casesfalling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and'no hearing' categories, the complaint ofviolation of procedural provision should beexamined from the point of view of prejudice,viz., whether such violation has prejudiced thedelinquent officer/employee in defending himselfproperly and effectively. If it is found that hehas been so prejudiced, appropriate orders haveto be made to repair and remedy the prejudiceincluding setting aside the enquiry and/or theorder of punishment. If no prejudice isestablished to have resulted therefrom, it isobvious, no interference is called for. In thisconnection, it may be remembered that there maybe certain procedural provisions which are of afundamental character, whose violation is byitself proof of prejudice. The Court may notinsist on proof of prejudice in such cases. Asexplained in the body of the judgment, take acase where there is a provision expresslyproviding that after the evidence of theemployer/government is over, the employee shallbe given an opportunity to lead defence in hisevidence, and in a given case, the enquiryofficer does not give that opportunity in spiteof the delinquent officer/employee asking forit. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof ofprejudice as such need be called for in such acase. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice,i.e. whether the person has received a fairhearing considering all things. Now, this veryaspect can also be looked at from the point ofview of directory and mandatory provisions, ifone is so inclined. The principle stated under(4) hereinbelow is only another way of lookingat the same aspect as is dealt with herein andnot a different or distinct principle. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (4)(a) In the case of a proceduralprovision which is not of a mandatory character,the complaint of violation has to be examinedfrom the standpoint of substantial compliance.Be that as it may, the order passed in violationof such a provision can be set aside only wheresuch violation has occasioned prejudice to thedelinquent employee.(b) In the case of violation of proceduralprovision, which is of a mandatory character, ithas to be ascertained whether the provision isconceived in the interest of the personproceeded against or in public interest. If itis found to be the former, then it must be seenwhether the delinquent officer has waived thesaid requirement, either expressly or by hisconduct. If he is found to have waived if, thenthe order of punishment cannot be set aside onthe ground of said violation. If, on the otherhand, it is found that the delinquentofficer/employee has not waived it or that theprovision could not be waived by him, then theCourt or Tribunal should make appropriatedirections (include the setting aside of theorder of punishment), keeping in mind theapproach adopted by the Constitution Bench inB.Karunakar, (1994 AIR SCW 1050). The ultimatetest is always the same, viz., test of prejudiceor the test of fair hearing, as it may becalled.(5) Where the enquiry is not governed byany rules/regulations/statutory provisions andthe only obligation is to observe the principlesof natural justice — or, for that matter,wherever such principles are held to be impliedby the very nature and impact of theorder/action — the Court or the Tribunal shouldmake a distinction between a total violation ofnatural justice (rule of audi alteram partem)and violation of a facet of the said rule, asexplained in the body of the judgment. In otherwords, a distinction must be made between "noopportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e.between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fairhearing". (a) In the case of former, the orderpassed would undoubtedly be invalid (one maycall it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to).In such cases, normally, liberty will bereserved for the Authority to take proceedingsafresh according to law, i.e., in accordancewith the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b)But in the latter case, the effect of violation(of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem)has to be examined from the standpoint ofprejudice; in other words, what the Court orTribunal has to see is whether in the totality https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the circumstances, the delinquentofficer/employee did or did not have a fairhearing and the orders to be made shall dependupon the answer to the said query. (It is madeclear that this principle (No.5) does not applyin the case of rule against bias, the test inwhich behalf are laid down elsewhere.)(6) While applying the rule of audi alterampartem (the primary principle of naturaljustice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority mustalways bear in mind the ultimate and overridingobjective underlying the said rule, viz., toensure a fair hearing and to ensure that thereis no failure of justice. It is this objectivewhich should guide them in applying the rule tovarying situations that arise before them.(7) There may be situations where theinterests of state or public interest may callfor a curtailing or the rule of audi alterampartem. In such situations, the Court may haveto balance public/State interest with therequirement of natural justice and arrive at anappropriate decision."10. In this case, since the conduct of the petitioner clearlyestablishes that he has no intention to participate in thedepartmental proceedings and refused to receive the report of theenquiry proceedings and the fact that no appeal has been filedagainst the order of dismissal, would only go to show that thepetitioner is not serious in pursuing the departmental proceedingson merits. It can be inferred that the petitioner has intentionallywaived his rights. The matter has become final and the petitionercannot plead that there is a violation of Rules after a lapse ofnine years. Therefore, the non-observance of the abovesaid ruleswill not vitiate the proceedings and the same is not liable to beinterfered with. 11. The subsequent representations made in the years 1999 and2001 to the Director General of Police is only to clutch atlimitation. The acquittal by the criminal Court, which on thepeculiar facts and circumstances of the case, extended the benefitof doubt to the petitioner, as two important witnesses, namely thewife and Banumathi had turned hostile. The fact however remains thatat the earliest point of time, there are materials to show that thepetitioner while living with two women, was attempting to getmarried to another one Kalaiarasi on 5.5.1991 and at that point oftime, he was arrested by the Police on compliant by the wife of thepetitioner. The charges framed against the petitioner are grave innature and therefore, the charge memo was issued under Rule 17(b) ofthe disciplinary Rules. The petitioner has not participated in theenquiry proceedings except on the day when his wife was examined.There is no denial to the various charges made in the charge memo.The charge in the departmental proceedings and criminal case isdifferent. The report of the enquiry officer has been submitted tothe disciplinary authority by proceedings No.H-1/PR.61/91, dated30.5.1992 and the punishment of dismissal from service was imposed, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ which order of the disciplinary authority has not been challenged sofar on any of the grounds now agitated after nine years. Hence, wefind that the present proceedings lack bona-fides and there is nomerit in the contention of the petitioner. The contention regardingviolation of the Rules is raised belatedly as a last resort by thepetitioner to somehow salvage the sunken ship. The petitioner hasnot shown diligence and sincerity in pursuing the departmentalproceedings. On the contrary, his conduct of withdrawing from theproceedings half-way, clearly disentitles him from raising the pleaof violation of the rule and the plea that principles of naturaljustice as being violated besides pleading prejudice, cannot besustained. 12. The other contention made by learned counsel for thepetitioner is that the second respondent-DGP, while considering therepresentation made in the year 1999, has confirmed the order ofdismissal and rejected the prayer of the petitioner. Such an orderwas challenged before the Tribunal. The limitation in this casewould start from the order of the second respondent-DGP dated26.4.2001 and the Original Application is well within time. Such anargument cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the enquiry report is dated30.5.1992 and the order of dismissal from service was passed on21.9.1992. There is no appeal filed against the said order ofdismissal. The subsequent proceedings based on the so-calledrepresentations of the years 1999 and 2001, cannot give any right tothe petitioner to plead that his claim in the Original Applicationis bona-fide and is not hit by delay and laches. Such a plea cannotbe accepted and the same is rejected. The subsequent claim made isonly based on a representation to the DGP and it is not an appealagainst the order of dismissal. The Original Application has beenfiled long after the order of dismissal dated 21.9.1992. Thepetitioner has to be non-suited only on the ground of delay andlaches as rightly held by the Tribunal.13. In the result, there is no merit in the writ petition andthe same is dismissed. No costs. Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.csTo1.The Secretary to Government, Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai-600 009. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2. The Director General of Police, Mylapore, Chennai-600 004.3. The Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore District.4. The Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Rep. by Registrar, Chennai-600 104.1 cc to Mr. Kalaiselvan, Advocate, Sr. 112581 cc to Govt. Pleader, Sr. 11581W.P.No.12752 of 2004AMB (CO)kk 16/3