Cameo Exports v. Sundararajan Managing Partner Tirupur2.The Appellate Assistant Commissioner

2.The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT) Virudhunagar:: R1 & R2 in W.A.4085/03/ 1st RespondentPetitioner in WPGobichettipalayam AgriculturalProducers' Co-operative Marketing :: Appellants in W.A.NOsSociety Limited,Gobichettipalayam, Erode 1826 to 1831 of 2005Petitioner in all WPs:versus:1.The Deputy Commercial Tax OfficerGobichettipalayam2.The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT)Erode::Respondents/Respondents inall WPs- - - - -Appeals under Cl.15 of the Letters Patent against the orders dated12-8-2003, 18.9-2003, 6-10-2003 and 17-8-2005 passed in W.P.Nos.22347, 26083, 27441 of 2003 and 36661 to 36666 of 2004respectively.1. These Petitions filed under Articel 226 of the Constitution ofIndia to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records on thefiles of the second respondent pertaining to the order dated2.7.2003 made in Na.Ka.1438/2003 and quash the same as illegal.(WP.No.22347/2003)2. To issue a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for therecords in K.Dis.No.1647/2003 dated 23.7.2003 andK.Dis.No.2093/2003 dated 19.9.2003 on the file of the 1strespondent and quash the same as illegal and direct the 1strespondent to entertain the appeal without insisting for paymentof 25% of disputed Tax (WP.No.26083 and 27441/2003)3. To issue a writ of certiorari to call for the records on thefiles of the first respondent herein in N.K.1462/2003/A3 dated22.9.2004 and to quash the proceedings (WP.No.36661 of 2004)4. To call for the records on the files of the second respondentherein in Ref.Nos.1193/03A, 1194/03A, 1195/03A, 1196/03A, and1197/03A dated 19.12.2003 and issue a writ of certiorarifiedmandamus and quashing the proceedings while directing the secondrespondent to entertain the appeal filed by the petitiners on19.12.2003 along with stay application without seeking to apply https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respectively the condition of Pre-deposit of 25% of the differencebetween the tax assessed and admitted as introduced by Act 14/99dated 31.5.99 (WP.Nos.36662 to 36666/2004 respectively.For Appellants in:: Mr. T. Ayyasamy W.A. Nos.3093/03 Spl. Govt. Pleader (Taxes)3710 & 4085/2003For Respondents in W.A. Nos.3093/03 :: Mr. A. Thiagarajan3710 & 4085/2003For Appellants in:: Mr. N. Prasad W.A. Nos.1826/05 to 1831/05 For Respondents:: Mr. T. Ayyasamy W.A. Nos.1826/05 Spl. Govt. Pleader (Taxes)to 1831/05- - - - -COMMON JUDGMENT(Delivered by the Honourable The Chief Justice)Since the issue involved in all these appeals is one andthe same, the appeals are being disposed of by this commonjudgment.2. In all these cases, the assessees, against theorders of assessment, have filed the appeals before the AppellateAssistant Commissioner (CT) under Sec.31 of the Tamil Nadu GeneralSales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter, for the brevity sake, referredto as 'the Act') and the appellate authority returned the appealpapers since appeals did not accompany the proof of payment of 25%of the disputed tax as per proviso 2 to Sec.31 of the amended Act19 of 2002, with effect from 3-6-2002. Challenging the orderspassed by the appellate authority, assessees have filed thepresent writ petitions.3. In W.P. Nos.22347, 26083 and 27441 of 2003, thelearned single Judge (K. Govindarajan, J.), following the decisionin the case of ARASU RUBBER CORPORATION LTD. v. Addl. D.C.T.O.(Mad.), reported in 2002 Vol.126 STC 32, allowed the writpetitions and directed the appellate authority to entertain theappeals without insisting upon the pre-deposit of 25% of thedisputed tax. While so, in the other batch of writ petitions, i.e.W.P. Nos.36661 to 36666 of 2004, the learned single Judge (K.Raviraja Pandian, J.), holding that the issue is covered by thedecisions in the case of H.K. DADA (INDA) LTD. v. STATE OF MADHYAPRADESH (4 STC 114) and VITTHALBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL v. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX (12 STC 219), dismissed the writpetitions. Hence, the present writ appeals at the instance of theRevenue as well as the assessees.4. In all these appeals, the issue involved is what isthe crucial date on which the right of the assessees to preferappeals against the order of assessment/re-assessment getscrystalised – whether it is the date of assessment order or thedate on which return is filed or required to be filed as per thestatute or the date of issuance of pre-assessment notice.5. As against the order of assessment under Sec.12 ofthe Act or against the order of re-assessment under Sec.16 of theAct passed by the assessing authority, appeals lie under Sec.31 ofthe Act before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. As per thesecond proviso to Sec.31 of the Act, as it stood prior to 10-6-1999, the appellant had to pay only the tax admitted by him to bedue. By Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (4th Amendment) Act, 1999(Act No.14 of 1999), with effect from 10-6-1999, the secondproviso to Sec.31 of the Act was amended to provide for mandatorypre-deposit of 25% of the difference between the tax assessed andadmitted before a first appeal is entertained. Correspondingamendment was brought about to Sec.36 of the Act providing for aright of appeal to the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal (inshort 'the Tribunal) requiring mandatory pre-deposit of the entiretaxes ordered to be due by the first appellate authority underSec.31 of the Act. By Act 32 of 2000, effective from 26-11-2000,the pre-deposit under Sec.31 of the Act was reduced to 12.5% ofthe disputed tax. Finally, by Act 19 of 2002, effective from 3-6-2002, the pre-deposit under Sec.31 of the Act was once againraised to 25% of the disputed tax. 6. It is not disputed that the amended provisions of theAct are not given retrospective effect as and from an enteriordate. In other words, the amended provisions are prospective.According to the appellants, the above restrictions placed on theappeals will not relate to the assessments and returns filed bythe assessees prior to 14-6-1999. It is their submission thatthe amendment introducing condition of pre-deposit beingsubstantive in nature cannot have retrospective effect and thattheir right of appeal is governed by the provisions on the datesthey filed their monthly returns, which were prior to the Act 14of 1999, and as on the said date, there was no mandatory conditionfor pre-deposit of disputed tax before the appeal was lodged. 7. According to the Revenue, on the other hand,although the right of appeal is substantive, it vests in anassessee only on the date when the order of final assessment ismade under Sec.12(2) of the Act or the order of re-assessment is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ made under Sec.16 of the Act and, in any case, on the date when anotice for final assessment is issued under Sec.12(2) of the Actor a show cause notice for re-assessment is issued under Sec.16 ofthe Act and, since those events having taken place after theamendment brought about by Act 19 of 2002, effective from 23-6-2002, the appellants' right of appeal is governed only by theamended law.8. The main questions to be decided are:(1)Whether the right of an assessee to file an appeal isa substantive right? and (2)Whether such a right get crystalised at the time ofinitiation of assessment proceedings?9. In the case of HOOSEIN KASAM DADA (INDIA) LTD. v.THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS (1953 Vol.IV STC 114 SC),the Supreme Court was required to consider a similar issue, whicharose under Sec.22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales TaxAct, 1947. Under the proviso to Sec.22(1) of the said Act, as itstood prior to its amendment by the Central Provinces and BerarSales Tax (Second Amendment) Act (LVII of 1949), an aggrievedassessee was entitled to appeal provided he paid such amount oftax as he might admit to be due from him, but after the amendmentthe appeal had to be accompanied by satisfactory proof of paymentof the tax in respect of which the appeal had been preferred. Theassessment proceedings of the assessee were initiated prior to theamendment of the section but the order of assessment was madeafter the amendment. The assessee contended that as the amendmenthad not been made retrospective its right of appeal under theoriginal Section 22(1) remained unaffected and that such right ofappeal was a substantive right which the assessee had acquiredunder the Sec.22(1) as it stood prior to amendment and thesubsequent amendment to that section did not take away the rightof appeal without depositing the impugned amount. The assessee'sappeal, filed without accompanying the proof of payment of the taxassessed as required under the amended provision, was rejected. Inshort, the issue was whether the imposition of restriction by theamendment of the section could affect the assessee's right ofappeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior tosuch amendment and which right of appeal was free from suchrestriction under the section as it stood at the time of thecommencement of the proceedings. Das, J., speaking for the Bench,observed:"Whenever there is a proposition by one party and anopposition to that proposition by another a 'lis'arises. It may be conceded, though not deciding it,that when the assessee files his return a 'lis' may notimmediately arise, for under Section 11(1) the authoritymay accept the return as correct and complete. But if https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the authority is not satisfied as to the correctness ofthe return and calls for evidence, surely a controversyarises involving a proposition by the assessee and anopposition by the State. The circumstance that theauthority who aises the dispute in the interest of theState and in so acting only represents the State. Itwill appear from the dates given above that in this casethe 'lis' in the sense explained above arose before thedate of amendment of section. Further even if the 'lis'is to be taken as arising only on the date ofassessment, there was a possibility of such a 'lis'arising as soon as proceedings started with the filingof the return or, at any rate, when the authority calledfor evidence and started the hearing and the right ofappeal must be taken to have been in existence even atthose dates. For the purposes of the accrual of theright of appeal the critical and relevant date is thedate of initiation of the proceedings and not thedecision itself."10. In GARIKAPATI VEERAYA v. N. SUBBIAH CHOUDHRY ANDOTHERS (AIR 1957 SC 540), a Constitution Bench of the SupremeCourt, formulated the principles, from the decisions in HooseinKasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, supra, GanpatRai Hiralal v. Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 409,R.M. Seshadri v. Province of Madras AIR 1954 Mad. 543, In ReReference under Section 5, Court Fees Act, AIR 1955 Bom. 287 andSawaldas Madhavdas v. Arati Cotton Mills Ltd. AIR 1955 Bom. 332,as follows:(a)That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal andsecond appeal are really but steps in a series ofproceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity andare to be regarded as one legal proceedings.(b)The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedurebut is a substantive right.(c)The institution of the suit carries with it theimplication that all rights of appeal then in forceare preserved to the parties thereto till the rest ofthe career of the suit.(d)The right of appeal is a vested right and such aright to enter the superior Court accrues to thelitigant and exists as on and from the date the liscommences and although it may be actually exercisedwhen the adverse judgment is pronounced such right isto be governed by the law prevailing at the date ofthe institution of the suit or proceeding and not bythe law that prevails at the date of its decision orat the date of the filing of the appeal. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (e)This vested right of appeal can be taken away only bya subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly orby necessary intendment and not otherwise."11. Another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court inthe case of VITTHALBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL v. COMMISSIONER OF SALESTAX, MADHYA PRADESH, NAGPUR (1961 [12] STC 219 SC) held asfollows:"That leaves over for consideration the questionwhether Hoosein Kasam Dada's case, should be applied.That also presents some difficulty to us. We havebefore us the petition which was made in the High Court,and we cannot allow that to be amended. That petitiondoes not mention the dates on which the return wasfiled, so that we could apply the dictum of this Courtin Hoosein Kasam Dada's case. Dr. Barlingay deduces thedate of filing of the return from the dates on thechallans accompanying the payment of tax in thetreasury, and argues that this was prior to theamendment. He contends that this is sufficient for theapplication of the principle in the said case.The decision in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case proceededon the ground that when a lis commences, all rights getcrystallised and no clog upon a likely appeal can beput, unless the law was made retrospective, expressly orby clear implication. From the record of this case, wecannot say when the lis commenced, and unless it can beproved conclusively that it was before the amendment ofthe law, the rule in Hoosein Kasam Dada's case, cannotapply. There is no averment that a right of appeal hadvested, and has been wrongly taken away."12. Mr. T. Ayyasamy, learned Special Government Pleader(Taxes), however, relied upon the Constitution Bench decision inHARDEODAS JAGANNATH v. STATE OF ASSAM,reported in (1970) 26 STC10, to contend that the law prevailing on the date of the order ofassessment is applicable and that the earlier decision in HooseinKasam Dada's case, supra, stands impliedly overruled. We areunable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for theRevenue.13. In the case of Hardeodasm, supra, the registereddealer's business was raided and thereafter a notice was issueddated 4th April, 1959 under Sec.19A of the Assam Sales Tax Act,1947 for reassessment in respect of the half-yearly return periodsending on September 30, 1956, March 31, 1957 and September 30,1957. Thereafter, orders of re-assessments were passed. Theappellant filed an appeal against the orders of reassessment. Inthe meanwhile, Sec.30 of the said Act was amended with effect from https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ April 1, 1958, as a result of which, the appellants were requiredto pay the amount of assessed tax or other reduced amount as maybe directed by the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes before filingappeals. It was contended that the amended provisions of Section30 should not be applied because the periods of assessments wereprior to 1st of April, 1958. This contention was summarily rejectedby the Supreme Court which observed that the assessment for theperiods in question had been completed after the amendment cameinto force. Hence the amended provisions would apply. This wasnot a case where the returns had been filed by the assessee priorto the coming into effect of the amendment. From the facts, whichwere set out in the judgment, it appears that the proceedings ofreassessment commenced in April 1959, after the amendment cameinto force. It was not even contended before the Supreme Courtthat the reassessment proceedings were initiated prior to theamendment. It was only contended that the period for which thedealer was being reassessed was prior to the amendment and hencethe amendment did not apply. This contention was negatived by theSupreme Court. It is well-settled that a judgment has to beunderstood in the light of the facts involved therein. We fail tounderstand as to how the decision in Hardeodas Jagannath case canbe said to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in the caseof Hoosein Kasam Dada case, supra, by implication, as contended bythe learned counsel for the Revenue.14. The next question is as to when such a pre-existingright of appeal becomes vested in a party – Is it on the date offiling of the returns? or is it on the date when a pre-assessmentnotice is issued? or it is on the date when proceedings areinitiated for reopening an assessment?.15. Learned counsel for the appellants drew ourattention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case ofGHANSHYAMDAS v. REGIONAL ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX,NAGPUR AND OTHERS (1963[14]STC 976). The Supreme Court in thatcase was dealing with escaped assessment. Under Section 11-A ofthe Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, if theCommissioner was satisfied that any turnover of a dealer for anyperiod had escaped assessment, the Commissioner could, withinthree years from the expiry of the period proceed to assess thetax payable on such turnover. The core issue before the Court waswhether the assessment of the escaped turnover was within theprescribed period. To decide this issue, the Court discussed whenassessment proceedings can be said to be intiated. It said (atpage 986):"From the foregoing discussion it is seen that in thecase of a registered dealer there are four variations inthe matter of assessment of his turnover: (1) He submitsa return by the date prescribed and pays the tax due in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ terms of the said return; the Commissioner accepts thecorrectness of the return and appropriates the amountpaid towards the tax due for the period covered by thereturn. (2) The Commissioner is not satisfied with thecorrectness of the return; he issues a notice to himunder Section 11(2), and makes an enquiry as providedunder the Act, but does not finalise the assessment.(3) The registered dealer does not submit a return; theCommissioner issues a notice under Section 10(3) andSection 11(4) of the Act; and (4) the registered dealerdoes not submit any return for any period and theCommissioner issues notice to him beyond three years.If the return was accepted and the amount paid wasappropriated towards the tax due for the relevantperiod, it means that there has been a final assessmentin regard to the said period. If any turnover escapedassessment, clearly it can be reopened only within theperiod prescribed in Section 11-A. In the case wherea return has been made, but the Commissioner has notaccepted it, and has issued a notice for enquiry, theassessment proceedings will certainly be pending tillthe final assessment is made. Even in a case where noreturn has been made, but the Commissioner initiatedproceedings by issuing a relevant notice either underSection 10(3) or under Section 11(4), the proceedingswill be pending thereafter before the Commissioner tillthe final assessment is made. But where no return hasbeen made and the Commissioner has not issued any noticeunder the Act, how can it be held that some proceedingsare pending before the Commissioner when none existed asa matter of fact?"It was argued before the Supreme Court that a statutory obligationto make a return within a prescribed time would amount toinitiation of proceedings. This contention was negatived by theSupreme Court. It held that the proceedings will commence afterthe return was submitted and would continue until final order ofassessment was made in regard to the said return. Once theproceedings were initiated no question of limitation will arise.Similar are the observations made in the case of REGIONALASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, INDORE v. MALWA VANASPATI ANDCHEMICAL COMPANY LIMITED (1968[21]STC 431 SC) and STATE OF PUNJABv. MURLIDHAR MAHABIR PARSHAD (1968[21]STC 29 SC). 16. In OSWAL AGRO MILLS LTD. v. STATE OF PUNJAB ANDOTHERS (2005[139]STC 51), a Division Bench of the Punjab andHaryana High Court, after considering the various decisions of theHigh Courts and the Supreme Court, concluded as under: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "In civil proceedings, lis commences on thepresentation of the plaint or in cases claimingcompensation under the Motor Vehicles Act on filingclaim application. The question is when lis can be saidto commence under the taxation laws. Section 25 of HGSTAct enjoins a duty upon an assessee to file quarterlyreturn and deposit tax thereon. If such returns areaccepted, there is no lis. Consequently, there would beno occasion for the parties to file an appeal. However,if such returns are not accepted, the cause of actionwill arise on the date when returns are required to befiled. The cause of action can be said to be arisenalso when an assessee is called upon to furnish returnon his failure to do so in terms of the provisions ofthe old Act. In fact, that is the relevant date as inVitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel's case [1961] 12 STC 219(SC).In view of the above discussion, we hold that rightof appeal is a vested right as it exists on the date ofcommencement of lis. The lis can be said to commenceunder the HGST Act on the date when return is filed oris required to be filed. Therefore, the provisions ofSection 39(5) of the HGST Act would continue to governthe right of appeal vested in the petitioner which issaved in terms of section 4 of the Punjab GeneralClauses Act (as applicable to State of Haryana)."17. In SIEMENS INDIA LTD. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA(62 STC 40), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has heldthat assessment proceedings against a registered dealer commencewhen he files his return and against an unregistered dealer, whenthe Commissioner calls upon him to file a return of his turnover.When the registered dealer has not filed a return, the proceedingscommence when the Commissioner issues a notice. The DivisionBench further held that an appeal is a continuation of assessmentproceedings and the right of appeal is a substantive right whichgets crystallised when assessment proceedings are initiated. 18. Similar view was taken by a Division Bench of thePatna High Court in BAHADUR KAMAKHYA NARAYAN SINGH v. STATE OFBIHAR (1962[46]ITR 516 Pat.) and also by the Allahabad High Courtin COMMISSIONER, SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH v. TIKA RAM ARTHI (1977[39]STC 147 All.).19. Learned counsel for the appellants also drew ourattention to the Division Bench judgment of the Andhra PradeshHigh Court in STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. HINDUSTAN SHIPYARD https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ LIMITED (1988[68]STC 220 AP) wherein it was held that theamendment taking away the power of stay of the Sales Tax AppellateTribunal would not apply to 'assessment periods' prior to thatamendment indicating thereby relevance of the period of thereturn.20. Learned counsel appearing for the Revenue submittedthat the decisions of the Bombay High Court and Punjab and HaryanaHigh Court in the case of Siemens India Limited and Oswal AgroMills Limited (supra) respectively would not apply in the contextof the scheme of the TNGST Act and the Rules framed thereunder.He urged that those decisions were rendered in the context of theprovisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act and Punjab General SalesTax Act. The provisions in the said Acts vest the Commissionerthe power to issue notice to the assessee calling upon him to filethe returns whereas there is no such provision under the TNGST Actand the rules framed thereunder. In our opinion, the distinctionsought to be made by the learned counsel for the Revenue iswithout any difference. It is seen that the judgments of theBombay High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court do not turn onthat provision at all. In Siemens India Limited case, supra,the assessee filed its returns voluntarily without being calledupon by the Commissioner to file its return. In Oswal Agro Millscase, supra, also the assessee had filed its return prior to theamendment coming into force. 21. Learned counsel appearing for the Revenuealternatively submitted that the reassessment order under Sec.16(1)(a) of the Act will not result in the wiping out of theoriginal assessment order and the original order of assessmentretains its character and identity. In other words, theproceedings under Sec.16 of the Act are totally distinct anddifferent. Learned counsel also drew our attention to thedecision of a Division Bench of this Court in JOINT COMMERCIAL TAXOFFICER-II, TUTICORIN v. EKAMBAREESWARAR COFFEE AND TEA WORKS(1983 STC 457) wherein it was held that the reassessment orderpassed under Section 16(1)(a) of the Act will not result in theobliteration of the original assessment order and that originalassessment order retains its character and identity. Learnedcounsel also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in thecase of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. SUN ENGINEERING WORKS PVT.LTD. (198 ITR 397). The reliance placed on the said decision isclearly misconceived. The question in that case was as regardsthe right of the assessee to contest matters closed by theoriginal assessment in a revision of assessment under Sec.16 ofthe Act. In the context of the question posed before the Court,it was held that the revision of notice under Section 16 of theAct was a limited right given to the Revenue and the assesseecould not utilise that opportunity to agitate matters which had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ become final in the original assessment. In a revision ofassessment under Section 16 of the Act, the emphasis is on thereturn. Under Sec.16, the tax authority passes a judgment on thecorrectness of the return. Sec.16(2) of the Act provides for levyof penalty in a situation involving 'wilful non-disclosure'. Theexpression 'non-disclosure' itself indicates that the assessmentunder Sec.16 is concerned with the returns. The nature of re-assessment is nothing but an assessment itself. 22. In the case of STATE OF MADRAS v. LATHEEF HAMEED &CO. (1968) 21 STC 476, a Division Bench of this Court observed asfollows:"There is no controversy before us that the assessee'sright to file an appeal and a further appeal under theearlier Act is a vested right. Such a right becomesvested in the assessee, the mement he filed his returnwhich commenced the assessment proceedings ..."23. Our attention was also drawn to the decision of theTamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal in the case of HUGSADVERTISING INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS v. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER,VADAPALANI ASSESSMENT CIRCLE, CHENNAI AND OTHERS (2000) 119 STC591 wherein the Tribunal observed as follows:"We also give considerable weight to the Full Benchjudgment in Tamil Nadu Small Scale IndustriesCorporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu [1989] 74 STC303 (Mad). They have diluted the emphasis on 'lis' andtherefore the emphasis on commencement of proceedings intax laws, become important. In this connection, we canalso refer to rules 7 to 18 of the Tamil Nadu GeneralSales Tax Act. They prescribed the dates when dealersare obliged to file returns, under variouscircumstances. Even if a nil return is filed andaccepted, there is no guarantee that it will not be re-opened. Any assessment order can also be revised. Itis not proper to leave the discretion to theauthorities, as to when they call for accounts or whenthey issue a pre-assessment notice or a revision notice.It is wiser and safer to adopt a firm date as the dateon which the vested right of appeals vests on theassessee."24. It is conceded by the learned counsel for theRevenue that no appeal has been filed against the above judgmentof the Taxation Special Tribunal and that the judgment, therefore,has become final. It appears that pursuant to the said judgmentof the Taxation Special Tribunal dated 22-11-1999, hundreds ofappeals have been entertained and disposed of by the AppellateAssistant Commissioner Sec.31 of the Act and by the Sales Tax https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Appellate Tribunal under Sec.36 of the Act without insisting forpre-deposit of 25% of the disputed tax as per the amendedprovisions of the Act.25. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold thatthe crucial date on which the right of the assessees to prefer anappeal under Sec.31 or Sec.36 of the Act is the date on which thereturns are filed under the Act. In all these appeals, returnswere filed long prior to the date when the provisions of Sec.31 ofthe Act was amended by virtue of Act 14 of 1999. Further more, itis not disputed by the parties that the aforesaid amendments tothe Act have not been given retrospective effect as and from ananterior date and those amendments are prospective. Therefore,the appeals are liable to be entertained without insisting of pre-deposit of 25% of the disputed tax as per the amended provisionsof the Act.26. In the result, the order of the learned singleJudge, dated 17-8-2005, in W.P. Nos.36661 to 36666 of 2004 is setaside. The writ appeals preferred by the Revenue, i.e. W.A.Nos.3093, 3710 and 4085 of 2003, are dismissed and the appealsfiled by the assessees, i.e. W.A. Nos.1826 to 1831 of 2003 areallowed. The appellate authority is directed to entertain theappeals filed by the assessees/appellants without insisting forpre-deposit of 25% of the disputed tax and dispose of the same inaccordance with law. Connected WAMP Nos.4911, 6070, 6736 of 2003are closed.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To:1.The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT) Pollachi2.The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT) Virudhunagar3. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer,Gopichettipalayam.4. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT)Erode.5. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer,Tirupur Central I Assessment Circle, Tirupur.6. The Commercial Tax Officer I, Sivakasi.7. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer - II, Sivakasi.+ 2 ccs to Mr.A. Thiyagarajan, Advocate SR No.47169 to 47170+ 6 ccs to Mr.N. Inbarajan, Advocate SR No.47153+ 4 ccs to Spl Government Pleader (Taxes) SR Nos.47362 to 47365W.A. Nos.3093, 3710 and 4085 of 2003 andW.A. Nos.1826 to 1831 of 2005JE(CO)SR/6.1.2006