C.M.A.No. 1675/2003 Tamil Nadu State TransportCorporation Ltd., Periyakulam Branch v. Dr. P. Shanmugaraj,2. Minor Srikanth Sibi Raja,3. Minor Lakshmi Deepa Raja (Minor

C.M.A.No. 1675/2003Tamil Nadu State TransportCorporation Ltd., Periyakulam Branch,represented by its Managing Director. .Appellant Vs.1. Dr. P. Shanmugaraj,2. Minor Srikanth Sibi Raja,3. Minor Lakshmi Deepa Raja (Minor respondents 2 and 3 are represented by their father and friend-1st respondent). 4. Subramaniam,5. P.N. Nallasivam,6. K. Govindaraj,7. T.P. Mohana Sundaram,8. United India Insurance Company Ltd., Erode. .. Respondents.C.M.A.No. 1676/2003Tamil Nadu State TransportCorporation (Division-I) Limited,Dindigul,represented by its Managing Directorat Bye-Pass Road, Chetty Naickenpatti,Dindigul. .. Appellant. Vs.1. K. Govindaraj 2. P. Subramani .. Respondents. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ C.M.A.No.1677/2003Tamil Nadu State TransportCorporation (Division-I) Limited,Dindigul,represented by its Managing Directorat Bye-Pass Road, Chetty Naickenpatti,Dindigul. .. Appellant. Vs.1. Nachimuthu,2. Mrs. Pavazhoy Ammal,3. Mrs. K.T. Manimala,4. P. Subramani .. Respondents.C.R.P (NPD) No. 1031 of 2003Managing Director,Tamil Nadu State TransportCorporation (Division-I) Limited,Dindigul. .. Petitioner Vs.1. K. Govindaraj,2. T.P. Mohana Sundaram,3. Branch Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited, Erode. .. Respondents Civil Misc., Appeals filed under Section 173 of the MotorVehicles Act, 1988; and Civil Revision Petition filed under Article227 of the Constitution of India, against judgement and decree dated31-12-2002, made in M.C.O.P.Nos. 528/95; 528/95; 903/98; 1084/96; and1083/96 respectively on the file of Principal Subordinate Judge (in-Charge)(Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal), Coimbatore. Mr. R. Gandhi, Senior counsel for M/s R.G. Narendran:- Appellants in CMA 532/2003 and Respondents 1 to 3 in CMA.1675/2003. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Mr. R. Thiagarajan, Senior counsel for Mr. L.G. Sahadevan:- Appellants in CMA Nos. 1675 to 1677/2003 and CRP No. 1031/2003 and for 2nd Respondent in CMA. 532/2003. Mr. Saravanan for R1 to R3 in CMA 1677/2003. No appearance for R4 to R8 in CMA.1675/2003. No appearance for R1 and R2 in CMA.1676/2003; R4 in CMA.1677/2003; R1,R3 and R4 in CMA.532/2003R5 & R6 given up in CMA No.532/03. COMMON JUDGEMENT(Judgement of the Court was delivered by P. Sathasivam,J.,) Since the above appeals and Revision arise out of thevery same accident that had taken place on 19-12-1994, they are beingdisposed of by the following common Judgement. 2. Claimants in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95 filed C.M.A.No.532/2003, praying for the balance amount of Rs.2,27,18,040/- out ofthe restricted amount of Rs. 3 Crores. Questioning the findingregarding negligence and compensation of Rs.72,81,960/-, Tamil NaduState Transport Corporation has filed C.M.A.No. 1675/2003. Aggrievedby the award of compensation of Rs.48,852/- granted in favour of K.Govindaraj, claimant in M.C.O.P.No. 903/98 towards damages caused tohis car, the State Transport Corporation has filedC.M.A.No.1676/2003. In respect of compensation of Rs.2,61,200/-granted in favour of legal heirs of the car driver inM.C.O.P.No.1084/96, the State Transport Corporation has filedC.M.A.No. 1677/2003. The same Transport Corporation has filedC.R.P.No. 1031/2004 in respect of rejection of their claim fordamages to their vehicle in M.C.O.P.No. 1083/96. 3. Thus, in the first C.M.A. (C.M.A.No. 532/2003) theclaimants in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95 seek for higher compensation, whilein the other C.M.As., and the C.R.P., the Transport Corporationquestion the compensation granted as well as rejection of their claimpetition for damages caused to their bus to the extent of Rs.3,931/-. 4. Heard Mr. R. Gandhi, learned senior counsel for theclaimants/appellants in C.M.A.No. 532/2003 and Mr. R. Thiagarajan,learned senior counsel for the Transport Corporation/appellants inC.M.A.Nos.1675 to 1677/2003 and petitioner in C.R.P.No. 1031/2003. 5. For convenience we shall refer the case of bothparties in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95 (which is the subject matter in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ C.M.A.Nos. 532/2003 and 1675/2003). The petitioners in M.C.O.P.No.528/95 are the husband and children of the deceased Dr. SaraswathiShanmugaraja. The deceased was aged about 38 years at the time ofthe accident. She was employed as a part-time Senior Registrar inAnnaesthetics in the Northern and Yorkshire Regional HealthAuthority. She was employed ever since 1994. Her monthly salary was1790 pounds. The deceased was a doctor by profession and she wasalso doing private consultancy, earning 1000 pounds per month. Thedeceased along with her husband’s brother proceeded on a pilgrimagetour to Tiruchendur on 19-12-94 by an Ambassador car bearingregistration No. TN-37-A-2076 driven by one P.N. Nallasivam, owned byK. Govindaraj and T.P. Mohanasundaram and insured with United IndiaInsurance Company, Erode, respondents 3 to 6 respectively. Thedeceased was seated in the back and her brother-in-law was seated bythe side of the driver in the front side. At about 12 noon while thecar was going on a moderate speed along Dindigul-Karur NH 7 Road, avehicle belonging to State Transport Corporation (Rani MangammalTransport Corporation) No. TN-57-0411, driven by first respondenttherein, came from the opposite direction in a rash and negligentmanner, and hit against the Ambassador car as a result of which, thedeceased sustained multiple fracture on the skull and met with herinstantaneous death. In the very same accident, the driver of theAmbassador car also died. The heirs of the deceased Dr. SaraswathiShanmugaraj and the heirs of the deceased driver of the car havefiled Claim Petitions praying for compensation. Common evidence waslet in. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, theTribunal, after holding that the accident was caused due to thenegligence of the driver of the Transport Corporation bus, passed anaward of Rs.72,81,960/- in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95. As against the claimof Rs.6 Crores, which was subsequently restricted to Rs.3 Crores, theclaimants therein filed C.M.A.No. 532/2003 praying for a furthercompensation of Rs.2,27,18,040/-. As said earlier, questioning thefinding regarding negligence and quantum, the Transport Corporationhas also filed appeal in C.M.A.No.1676/2003. In M.C.O.P.No. 903/98filed by one K. Govindaraj, the Tribunal has granted damages to theextent of 48,852/-, against which the Transport Corporation has filedC.M.A.No. 1675/2003. In respect of death of the car driver, hislegal heirs, namely, father and mother as well as his sister obtainedan award for Rs.2,61,200/- in M.C.O.P.No. 1084/96, against which theTransport Corporation has filed C.M.A.No. 1677/2003. In respect ofdamages caused to their bus, the Transport Corporation has prayed fora compensation of Rs.3,931/- in M.C.O.P.No. 1083/96 which wasultimately rejected; hence they preferred C.R.P.No. 1031/2003. 6. An elaborate argument was advanced with regard tothe manner of the accident and the ultimate finding of the Tribunalthat the bus driver alone was negligence and responsible for thesame. An argument was also addressed with reference to the amountdetermined in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95. As said earlier, while theclaimants pray for higher compensation to the extent of Rs.3 Crores;the Transport Corporation feels that the amount is excessive. No https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ argument was advanced with regard to the award passed in otherpetitions. In such circumstances, the following points arise forconsideration: i) Whether the accident was caused due to the negligence ofthe driver of the Transport Corporation bus as claimed by theclaimants and upheld by the Tribunal; or whether the car driveralone was negligent and responsible for the same, as claimed by theTransport Corporation; ii) Whether the amount determined in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95 isjust and reasonable or it requires either enhancement as claimed bythe claimants, or reduction as argued by the Transport Corporation. 7. Let us consider the first issue, namely, findingrelating to negligence. It is the case of the claimants that on 19-12-94, when the deceased and her husband’s brother were traveling inan Ambassador car bearing registration No. TN-37-A-2076 along withher two children, aged about 4 ½ years and one year respectivelytowards Tiruchendur on a pilgrimage tour at about 11-30 A.M. Theaccident occurred between the Ambassador car and the TransportCorporation bus near Viduthalaipatti in Karur-Dindigul road. On theside of the claimants, one Vetrivel who is said to have witnessed theoccurrence, was examined as P.W.2. In his evidence before Court hehas stated that he is residing in a village by name Mayanur nearKarur. At that time he was working as a construction supervisor.According to him, at about 11-30 A.M. on the date of occurrence,while he was proceeding on Karur-Dindigul Main Road, nearViduthalaipatti, in order to take tea, he saw an Ambassador carproceeding at a moderate speed. At that time, a Transport Corporationbus was also coming from the opposite side at high speed. Heasserted that the Transport Corporation bus, which was driven by itsdriver in a rash and negligent manner, dashed against the Ambassadorcar. Then he rushed towards the car where he found 4 persons insidethe car, out of them, he took a child from the damaged car. He alsonoticed a lady in the car lying in a pool of blood. He assertedbefore the Court that the car driver was proceeding at a moderatespeed and because of the negligent act of the bus driver, theaccident occurred. Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned senior counselappearing for the Transport Corporation, would contend that thoughone of the occupants of the car is available who is the best personto speak about the manner of the accident, he has not been examinedon the side of the claimants. According to him, P.W.2 is not acompetent person to speak about the occurrence and placing relianceon his evidence by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. In the light ofthe above argument, we have carefully perused the evidence of P.W.2who is said to have witnessed the occurrence. According to him, heis a construction supervisor. He asserted that at about 11-30 A.M.when he was proceeding near the accident spot in order to take tea,he saw the Ambassador car proceeding in a moderate speed and that atthat time the Transport Corporation bus coming from the opposite https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ direction at a high speed, dashed against the Ambassador car.According to him, it was he who lifted a minor child from inside thecar. Though he was not the person who made a complaint to thepolice, his evidence, particularly his evidence in cross-examination,very much impressed us that he is a bona fide witness and he deposedbefore Court what he had seen and that there is no reason todisbelieve his version. He explained before the Court the manner ofthe accident, the damage caused to the car as well as the Corporationbus, the actual place of impact, the position of the vehicle afterthe impact etc. No doubt, Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned senior counselfor the Transport Corporation, would submit that it would not bepossible for a person by standing on a road to ascertain or gauge theactual speed of the vehicles proceeding on either side of the road.In cross-examination, P.W.2 has stated that the car was coming at aspeed of 45 to 50 K.M per hour, whereas the bus was proceeding at aspeed of 100 K.M per hour. The above statement of P.W.2 is onlyapproximate and it would be possible for any one to guess the speedof the vehicle and it is not so difficult as claimed by the learnedcounsel for the Transport Corporation. Though P.W.2 has admittedthat a tyre of the Ambassador car separated, he denied the suggestionthat after burst of the tyre, the wheel got separated. He was alsosubjected to examination by the police. As discussed above, theperusal of the entire evidence of P.W.2 coupled with the otherdocuments would show that he had spoken the truth before the Courtand the Tribunal has rightly relied on his evidence. 8. As against the eye witness-P.W.2, the driver ofthe Transport Corporation bus was examined as R.W.1. According tohim, on 19-12-94 at about 12.30 P.M. near Viduthalaipatti in Karur-Dindigul road, he noticed an Ambassador car coming from the oppositeside at high speed and on seeing the same, he stopped his vehicle onthe left side of the road and at a distance of 10 feet, he heard adashing noise wherein the Ambassador car dashed against the rightside bumper of the bus and after rubbing the bus on its right side,it fell into a nearby canal. He also deposed that due to burst oftyre, the right wheel of the car got separated. According to him, itwas he who went to Vedachandur police station and made a complaint.The copy of the F.I.R. was marked as Ex.P-41. Sketch was marked asEx. R-6. He also stated that though he was implicated in a criminalcase and charge-sheet was filed by the police, ultimately thecriminal case ended in acquittal. A copy of the judgement of theDistrict Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate's Court, Vedachandur inC.C.No.112/95 has been marked as Ex. R-7. The observation mahazarprepared by the police was marked as Ex. R-5. Though R.W.1 hasclaimed that due to bust of right side tyre of the car, the car wasforced to dash against the bus, as rightly stated by the Tribunal,admittedly no wheel mark was noted in Ex. R-5 observation mahazar. Asrightly stated, if tyre had burst and got removed from the wheel, thedisc of the wheel could have made some mark on the tar road and ifthat is so, the same should have definitely been noted in Ex.R-5-observation mahazar. On perusal of Ex.R-5, we do not see any disc https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mark on the tar road. The observation mahazar also showed theposition of the car after the impact, and the damaged parts of thecar etc. Though the conductor was also examined as R.W.2 on the sideof the Transport Corporation, he also reiterated the defence taken byR.W.1. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the view that hisevidence is also not acceptable. The observation mahazar also showsthe tyre mark of the bus to an extent of 20 feet which clearly provesthat the bus driver had driven the bus at high speed. Ex. P-35-MotorVehicle Inspector's report also does not contain any reference as toburst of car tyre, as claimed by R.Ws.1 and 2. As said earlier, theobservation mahazar shows the tyre mark of the bus alone to adistance of 20 feet. Though complaint-Ex.P-41 was given by R.W.1,admittedly there is no reference therein regarding burst of car tyre.If it had really happened, then nothing prevented him (R.W.1) inmentioning the same in his complaint-Ex. P-41 to the police. Thoughit is stated that the criminal case filed against the driver of thebus ended in acquittal, as seen from Ex. R-7, the acquittal of thedriver in a criminal case has no bearing for arriving at a conclusionby the Tribunal, since the degree of proof before the Criminal Courtis different. As discussed earlier, P.W.2 is an independent witnessand his statement before Court is more probable and acceptable andthe same has rightly been relied on and accepted by the Tribunal.Though Ex.P-41-First Information Report was given by R.W.1, it is tobe noted that the sketch and the observation mahazar were prepared bythe police and the bus driver alone was charge sheeted by the policefor the accident in question. The perusal of the sketch would alsoclearly show that the accident was caused only due to the rash andnegligent driving of the bus driver and the car driver was nowhereresponsible. After considering all these relevant material aspects,the Tribunal has rightly concluded that the bus driver alone wasnegligent and responsible for the accident. On perusal of the sameand in the light of the above discussion, we concur with the aboveconclusion and reject the contra argument made by the learned seniorcounsel for the Transport Corporation. 9. Now let us consider the quantum of compensationpayable to the claimants in M.C.O.P.No. 528/95. The claimants in thatpetition are husband and minor children of the deceased. Secondclaimant-minor son was aged about 4 ½ years and third claimant, minordaughter was aged about 1 year. Altogether they made a claim forRs.6 Crores. The case of the claimants is that the deceased Dr.Saraswathi was employed as Senior Registrar in Anaesthetics, NorthernYorkshire Regional Health Authority, Queens Building, Park Parade,Harrogate, U.K. At the time of the accident, she was aged about 38years and as a Senior Registrar was drawing a salary of 1790 Sterling[hereinafter referred to as "P.S"] per month. She was also earning1000 P.S. per month from private consultancy. If the total amount of2790 P.S. is converted into Indian currency, it would come toRs.1,35,319/- per month. In order to prove the educationalqualification, employment and earning of the deceased at London, herhusband Dr. P. Shanmugaraj, first claimant, was examined as P.W.1. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ According to him, his wife had passed her Post-Graduate inF.F.A.R.C.S. (Dublin) in 1998 and D.A. (Diploma in Anaesthesia) inLondon in October, 1998. P.W.1 further deposed that she was employedas Senior Registrar in Anaesthesia in Northern Yorkshire RegionalHealth Authority, which is a Government employment in U.K. The dateof birth of the deceased is 27-06-1956 as per S.S.L.C. Book-Ex.P-5.It shows that at the time of the accident, she had just completed 38years of age. She had M.B.B.S. degree as per Ex. P-6. Ex.P-7 is theinternship. Ex. P-8 is to prove her admission as fellow of facultyAnaesthetic by a Royal College of Surgeon in Ireland. Ex.P-9 is thecertificate granting Diploma in Anaesthesia in U.K. Ex.P-10 is thecertificate issued by the Joint Committee of the Post GraduateTraining for General Practice in U.K. National Health Service, to thedeceased in September, 1992. Ex.P-11 is the certificate issued to thedeceased by the University of Birmingham Institute of Child Health.Exs. P-12 to P-14 are the documents which would evidence that thedeceased was engaged in private consultancy work and was earning aconsiderable sum. There are various other documents to prove hermeritorious service in her capacity. It is also the evidence of P.W.1that she had acted as an Indian Ambassador in U.K. and therebybringing fame and glory to Indian Doctors in general and the countryin particular. By pointing out the oral and documentary evidence, Mr.R. Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the claimants, wouldsubmit that her commitment to medical profession is well demonstratedby the documentary evidence. It is also his argument that thedeceased Dr. Saraswathy having obtained diploma and her qualificationin Anaesthesia in U.K. and obtaining Senior Reigistrar's position isa very difficult proposition for any overseas female doctor. Heargued that it can be stated without fear of contradiction that byputting her in such placement, the highest honour has been showeredon an Indian female Doctor which is a rare commodity. 10. In order to prove her salary, her income taxreturns-Exs. P-1 to P-3 have been filed. Ex. P-4 series are thesalary slips of the deceased. Though Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learnedsenior counsel for the Transport Corporation, submitted that there isno acceptable documentary evidence to prove her salary and perks, theincome-tax returns, viz., Exs. P-1 to P-3 clearly show her income.Further, Exs. P-4 and P-5 series also show the scale of pay for aSenior Registrar and also the scale of pay for a consultant. Theparticulars furnished show that for a Senior Registrar the maximumpay per annum in the year 1994 was 28025 P.S. in 1997 it was 30970P.S.; in 1998 it was 32830 P.S; in 2001 it was 36460 P.S; in 1994 fora consultant the maximum scale was 51165 P.S; in 1997 it was 55705P.S; in 1998 it was 59040 P.S; and in 2001 it was 82770 P.S. Bydrawing our attention to the above details, it was contended that thescale of pay for both Senior Registrar and Consultant has beenprogressively increasing. Ex.P-31 also shows that the nextappointment of the deceased was Consultant in Anaesthetist, which shewould have reached in the year 2000-2001. The said document alsoshows that a salary for full time consultant Anaesthetist was 45740 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ P.S. per annum with raising annual income to the maximum of 59040P.S. This fact is also seen in Ex. P-5 in which it is found that theconsultant's maximum scale was 87280 P.S. in the year 2001. It isalso the case of the claimants that the deceased would have earnedmuch more than this sum during her life time. There is no disputethat the evidence of P.W.1 and the documents produced and markedthrough him amply proved the qualification, employment and earning ofthe deceased. 11. Mr. R. Gandhi, learned counsel appearing for theclaimants, submitted that as far as award of compensation in a fatalaccident case where the promotional prospects of the deceased areconcerned, the factors that have to be taken into account have beenlaid down by the Supreme Court in Manjushri v. B.L. Gupta, reportedin AIR 1977 S.C. 1158 and by drawing our attention to the oral andoverwhelming documentary evidence produced in this case, it wascontended that the deceased would have reached the maximum scale of87280 P.S. per annum as per Exs. P-31 and P-15. On the other hand,Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel for the TransportCorporation, contended that the structured formula under the amendedMotor Vehicles Act cannot be made applicable to the present claim inview of the fact that the amount claimed in the present applicationis more than what is contemplated under the structured formula underSection 165-A of the Amended Motor Vehicles Act. It is also his claimthat since the legal representatives are entitled to various benefitsfrom the Government due to the death of the deceased, the amountclaimed by the claimants are excessive and, in any event, theTribunal was not justified in granting such amount. The TransportCorporation has also produced and marked Exs. R-12 to R-14, R-16 toR-20 regarding the employment salary details of the deceased.However, P.W.1 has stoutly denied the stand taken by the TransportCorporation. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the claimants bypointing out that the Tribunal has not considered various documentsfiled on their side about the future earnings which may go upto 87820P.S. per year. It is contended that before the Tribunal it wasargued on the side of the Transport Corporation that the multiplierthat can be applied is 18 and not 23, as claimed by the claimants.In such a circumstance, according to Mr. R. Gandhi, the Tribunalought to have applied proper multiplier, namely, 18, which is alsoevident from the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Hisgrievance is that Tribunal took only 50 per cent of the total earningwithout any future earning. He also contended that the promotionalaspects have to be considered as per Munjushri v. B.L. Gupta [AIR1977 Supreme Court 1158]; Jokhi Ram v. Naresh Kanta [1978 ACJ 80];Prem Devi Pandey v. Dayual Singh [1976 ACJ 407]; Ritaben v. AhmedabadMunicipal Transport Services [2000(1) ACJ 153]; Pingala Devi v. GopalLal [1997 ACJ 1020]. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

13. Both the senior counsel very much relied on adecision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co., Ltd., v.Patricia Jean Mahajan, reported in [2002] 6 Supreme Court Cases 281.In that case, Dr. S, a person of Indian origin went to USA and becamean American national. He was a medical graduate. He establishedhimself in the medical profession in that country. While on a visitto India, on 3-2-1995 he was travelling in a car belonging to one ofhis brothers. The car was hit by a truck. S was injured in thataccident and succumbed to his injuries. He was aged 47-48 years. Heleft behind his widow and three children in USA and his parents, aged69/73, in India. His dependants filed a petition under Section 166,Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation in a sum of Rs.54 crores.According to the claimants, S had been providing good education tohis children and had also been sending a sum of Rs.8000 to hisparents in Delhi. The Accidents Claims Tribunal found the yearlycarry-home income of the deceased to be 3,09,204 dollars. Aftersetting apart 2/3rd amount, it held the amount of dependency to be1,03,068 dollars. It applied the multiplier of 7 to compute theamount of compensation and after deducting the amounts of benefit ofsocial security system/LIC and applying the exchange rate of Rs.30,awarded a sum of Rs.1.19 crores with interest @ 12% from the date offiling of the petition up to the date of payment. A learned SingleJudge of the High Court found the carry-home income of the deceasedto be 3,39,445 dollars and after deducting 1/3rd thereof, fixed theamount of dependency at 2,26,297 dollars. The learned Single Judgeapplied the multiplier of 10 and disallowed any deductions on accountof social security system. He maintained the same rate of interestbut applied the rate of exchange at Rs.47. Thus, the total amount ofcompensation came to Rs.10.38 crores. A Division Bench of the HighCourt applied the multiplier of 13 and the exchange rate of Rs.30 butmaintained the rest of the order passed by the Single Judge. TheDivision Bench took the view that in the matter of multiplier therewas no reason not to follow the Second Schedule to the Motor VehiclesAct. Thus, the amount of compensation together with interest came toabout Rs.6.12 crores. In the appeals before the Supreme Court, itwas contended that the amount of multiplicand was relevant and incase the same was a high amount, a lower multiplier couldappropriately be applied and in the present case the multiplier of 13was not appropriate. On the other hand, the claimants contended thatin no circumstances the amount of multiplicand could be a relevantconsideration for application of an appropriate multiplier. Theinsurer also contended that the amount received by the claimants onaccount of life insurance policy of the deceased and the allowancesreceived by his widow and children under the social security systemwere deductible from the amount of compensation. The claimantcontended that the exchange rate of Rs.47 prevalent at the time ofthe award and not the rate of Rs.30 ought to have been applied. 14. While considering the orders of the learned SingleJudge and the Division Bench, the Supreme Court has held: (para 19) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "19.....Looking to the Indian economy,fiscal and financial situation, the amount iscertainly a fabulous amount though in the backgroundof American conditions it may not be so. Therefore,where there is so much of disparity in the economicconditions and affluence of the two places viz. theplace to which the victim belongs and the place wherethe compensation is to be paid, a golden balance mustbe struck somewhere, to arrive at a reasonable andfair mesne. Looking by the Indian standards they maynot be much too overcompensated and similarly not verymuch undercompensated as well, in the background ofthe country where most of the dependent beneficiariesreside. Two of the dependants, namely, parents aged69/73 years live in India, but four of them are in theUnited States. Shri Soli J. Sorabjee submitted thatthe amount of multiplicand shall surely be relevantand in case it is a high amount, a lower multipliercan appropriately be applied. We find force in thissubmission. Considering all the facts and factors asindicated above, to us it appears that application ofmultiplier of 7 is definitely on the lower side. Somedeviation in the figure of multiplier would not meanthat there may be a wide difference between themultiplier applied and the scheduled multiplier whichin this case is 13. The difference between 7 and 13is too wide. As observed earlier, looking to the highamount of multiplicand and the ages of the dependantsand the fact that the parents are residing in India,in our view application of multiplier of 10 would bereasonable and would provide a fair compensation i.e.a purchase factor of 10 years. We accordingly holdthat multiplier of 10 as applied by the learned Singlejudge should be restored instead of multiplier of 13as applied by the Division Bench....."The above said principle of the Supreme Court is directly applicableto the case on hand. Here also, the deceased a person of Indianorigin went to U.K and secured a Government job, the documentsproduced and the statement of P.W.1 show that the deceased was highlyqualified person earning sizeable income. Though there is noclinching documentary evidence to show that the deceased wouldcontinue with the said employment till the age of retirement, some ofthe documents show that the contract was for a particular period (7years). However, as rightly argued by the learned senior counsel forthe claimants that considering her educational qualification andexperience, her position at the time of the accident, it would bepossible for her to earn more in future years. Though Mr. R. Gandhi,learned senior counsel for the claimants, vehemently argued that theTribunal was not justified in taking her contribution only to anextent of 50 per cent of her earnings, in the light of the discussion https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and conclusion of the Supreme Court, in the above referred case, andin view of the fact that the Indian economy, fiscal and financialsituation and the back ground of UK conditions, it cannot be claimedthat the standard of living and other expenses are similar in boththe places. Undoubtedly, there is much of disparity in the economicconditions and affluent of two places that is the place to which thevictim belongs and the place where the compensation is to be paid.If we consider these aspects and of the fact that in foreign country,particularly UK the extent for own maintenance and for education oftheir children etc., compared to our country is on the higher sideand by applying the principles laid down in the Supreme Court's case,we hold that the Tribunal is fully justified in scaling down 50 percent of her earnings and we agree with the said conclusion and rejectthe argument of the learned senior counsel for the claimants. 15. Likewise, though elaborate argument was advanced,the Tribunal has not considered her future prospects, earning power,capacity and accepted only the actual amount that she was getting atthe time of her death, as discussed earlier, it depends upon so manyfactors. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel forthe Transport Corporation, except income-tax returns-Exs.P-1 to P-3,there is no definite material or service particulars from theemployer concerned; accordingly we agree with the conclusion arrivedby the Tribunal and approve the multiplicand determined by theTribunal. 16. Now let us consider whether the multiplier, namely,10 adopted by the Tribunal is just and reasonable. Learned counselfor the claimants would submit that even before the Tribunal thestand of the Transport Corporation was that multiplier cannot exceed18 considering the age of the deceased and the Second Schedule to theMotor Vehicles Act. There is no dispute that if we apply the strictprovisions of the Act, namely, Second Schedule with reference to herage, the proper multiplier would be 17 : 18. However, as observed inthe Supreme Court's decision referred above, when higher multiplicandis taken only lower multiplier to be applied. Considering the factthat the deceased had left two minor children above the age of 4 ½years and one year at the time of the accident, had their father andhusband of the deceased is not alive, we could have considered longermultiplier as claimed by the claimants. Admittedly, in the presentcase, the first claimant being the husband of the deceased and fatherof the minor children-claimants 2 and 3, and also employed gettingincome decently, we are not inclined to adopt the multiplier in termsof Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. In the case before theSupreme Court, the deceased was aged about 47-48 years and was amedical graduate. Though the deceased was male in that case, thedeceased is a female in the case on hand. No doubt, she was also amedical graduate and highly qualified. Applying the said formula asenunciated by the Supreme Court, and considering the fact that thedeceased in the case on hand was aged about 38 years (proved bydocumentary evidence)and also taking note of the fact that the age of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the minor children (4 ½ years and 1 year) and also considering thefact that their father is employed by balancing both, we are of theview that multiplier 12 would be appropriate. The Tribunal hasalready fixed annual contribution of the deceased as Rs.7,24,596/-(rounded of to Rs.7,25,000/-) and by applying multiplier 12, thepecuniary loss is fixed at Rs.87,00,000/-. In addition to this, theTribunal has granted Rs.1,000/-towards transport charges; Rs.10,000/-towards funeral expenses for which there is no dispute and we confirmthe same. The Tribunal has also granted Rs.25,000/- towards loss oflove and affection in favour of claimants 2 and 3 which is alsoreasonable and acceptable. The Tribunal has not granted any amounttowards loss of consortium in favour of the first claimant, thehusband of the deceased. Considering the fact that he being 43 yearsand his wife being 38 years at the time of the accident, we grantRs.14,000/- towards consortium to the first claimant. 17. In the light of the foregoing discussions, inmodification of the amount granted by the Tribunal, we fix thecompensation as hereunder: Rs. i) Pecuniary loss 87,00,000 ii) Transport charges 1,000 iii) Funeral expenses 10,000 iv) Loss of love and affection 25,000 to the minor children v) Loss of consortium to 14,000 1st claimant-husband ---------- Total 87,50,000 ---------- 18. Though an argument was advanced, namely, that the rate ofinterest i.e., 9 per cent is excessive, considering the fact that theaccident occurred on 19-12-1994 and the Tribunal disposed of theclaim petitions on 31-12-2002, we are of the view that the interestat the rate of 9 per cent for the award amount is reasonable andacceptable and it requires no enhancement or reduction. Except theamount of Rs.14,000/- towards loss of consortium to the firstclaimant, the entire balance amount, namely, Rs.87,36,000/- arepayable only to the minor claimants 2 and 3. Both of them areentitled to share the amount equally. As observed by the Tribunal,the claimants 2 and 3 being minors, their amount shall be invested ina nationalized bank till they attain majority. Their father andguardian/first claimant, namely, Dr. P. Shanmugaraj is permitted towithdraw accrued interest once in six months directly from the Bankfor the welfare of the minor children. The Transport Corporation isdirected to deposit the enhanced amount within a period of eightweeks from to-day. No argument was advanced with regard to thequantum arrived in the other claim petitions. In view of our finding https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ on the negligence aspect, the Civil Revision Petition filed by theTransport Corporation is liable to be dismissed. 19. Under these circumstances, C.M.A.No. 532/2003 filedby the claimants for enhancement is allowed in part to the extentmentioned above. C.M.A.Nos. 1675 to 1677/2003 and C.R.P.No.1031/2003 filed by the Transport Corporation are dismissed. Nocosts. Connected C.M.Ps.,are closed. Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarR.B.To:- 1. The Prl. Subordinate Judge (in-charge) (M.A.C.T), Coimbatore.+2ccs to Mr.R.G.Narendhiran, Advocate Sr 18850 & 18851+1cc to Mr.S.Saravanan, Advocate Sr 19112+5ccs to Mr.L.G.Sahadevan,Advocate Sr 18858SMK (CO)km/10.5. CMA Nos.532,1675 to 1677 of 2003 and CRP No.1031/2003 and CMP Nos.10793 to 10795/2003 and 16352/2004.