The Management of Orchid Chemicalsand Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. State of Tamil Nadu

For 2nd Respondent :Mr.N.G.R.Prasad,for M/s.Row & ReddyO R D E RBy consent of both parties, the writ petition itself is taken upfor final disposal.2.Prayer in the writ petition is to quash the Government orderissued in G.O.(D)No.839 Labour and Employment Department dated5.12.2007 passed under Section 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947.3.The brief facts necessary for disposal of the writ petitionare as follows:(a)Petitioner is a duly registered Company under the CompaniesAct, 1956, manufacturing life saving antibiotics and pharmaceuticalproducts. It is a 100% export oriented company, earning huge foreignexchange for the Government of India and for the State of Tamil Nadu.Petitioner Company is having the in-house mechanism for redressal ofgrievances of the workers for settlement of disputes.(b)The second respondent Union is a Trade Union, defined underthe Trade Union Act, 1926. Petitioner Company has a manufacturingUnit at Alathur near Chennai, wherein about 1200 employees areemployed. According to the petitioner, in view of the harmony whichprevailed in the establishment, the workers did not feel thenecessity to have a Trade Union. However, some of the workers Forumand the Trade Union started creating problems to the petitionerCompany.(c)As the petitioner Company is manufacturing life saving drugsand pharmaceuticals and is earning huge foreign exchange for theCentral Government as well as to the State Government, it is a publicutility company, wherein strikes are prohibited in terms of theprovisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In December, 2006,some of the employees resorted to illegal strikes without giving anyprior notice and some employees resorted to acts of violencedestroying the properties of the company and said to have usedabusive remarks against loyal officers resulting in criminalcomplaint and action by the Police officials. Some of the employeesresorted to picketing and prevented the loyal workers, apart fromaffecting free ingress and egress of men and material.(d)On 5.4.2007, few other employees stopped work and createdindustrial unrest including switching of the refrigeration system.Pursuant to the said agitation, huge loss of around Rs.4 crores wassustained due to the disruption of production. On 5.4.2007, 45 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ employees were suspended. Since the violence was unabated, themanagement filed civil suit and got injunction against the employeesfrom preventing the loyal workers, who were reporting for duty andfrom obstructing the entry and exit of vehicles. At the instance ofthe Union the injunction was vacated, however injunction was restoredby this Court in C.R.P.Nos.1036 to 1038 of 2007. The attempt made bythe Employees Union to file SLP before the Supreme Court against theinjunction granted by this Court also ended in vain.(e)Petitioner management was repeatedly requesting theemployees to report back for work without prejudice to the right totake appropriate action in accordance with law. The said requesthaving not been considered by the workers at the instigation of theUnion, the management took firm decision to maintain discipline atany cost. According to the petitioner, some of the workers reportedfor duty.(f)On 26.7.2007, some employees came to the factory and theofficials of the Company informed that they would be permitted toreport for duty subject to giving letter of good conduct in futureand to undergo disciplinary proceeding. Only six employees reportedfor duty initially and at a later stage, 37 workers reported forduty. The other workers refused to give such letter assuring goodconduct in future. Therefore the management initiated disciplinaryproceedings against the striking employees, conducted enquiry andimposed punishment of dismissal from service and filed approvalpetitions under section 33(2)(b) before the appropriate authority.(g)The disputes raised by the Union was taken up forconciliation by the Conciliation Officer. Even though initially thepetitioner Company declined to take part in the proceeding,subsequently it participated in the proceeding and put forward theirstand before the Conciliation Officer. The conciliation officersadvised the petitioner Company to condone the participation inillegal strike and take the workers back in service. Petitionermanagement having not accepted the request, the Conciliationproceeding did not materialise and a failure report was submitted andthe first respondent referred the dispute along with connecteddisputes for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal, Chennai, byorder dated 5.12.2007 and simultaneously passed the impugned orderunder section 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by directingthe petitioner management to provide work.(h)The said order is challenged on the ground that severalemployees, who were dismissed from service for their provenmisconduct of participation in illegal strike and indulged in acts ofviolence in a public utility service had been ordered to be takenback in service even though their non-employment was not the subjectmatter referred for adjudication to the Tribunal. The power undersection 10-B can be invoked to keep the public utility service open https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and in a running condition, which will not in any way empower orenable the Government to reinstate the suspended/dismissed employeesby way of an interim relief. The stipulation to the maintenance ofconditions of service as an interim measure can only relate toindustrial disputes and the issue of non-employment being not adispute, no order for their reinstatement can be passed. Themaintenance of status-quo should be three months prior to the date ofreference and not the status-quo prevailed as on 26.7.2007. Theworkmen having not given the letter of good behaviour for theirfuture conduct and having been dismissed, cannot be allowed to berestored to their duty, notwithstanding their dismissal from serviceand the implementation of the impugned order not only is prejudicialto the establishment of the petitioner but also is prejudicial topublic interest.4. The second respondent Union filed counter affidavit statingthat the writ petition filed challenging the order under section 10-B, which is passed under the executive power of the Government onsubjective satisfaction is not maintainable. On merits of the caseit is stated that on 18.12.2006 the workmen registered the secondrespondent Trade Union and informed the same to the petitionermanagement. Immediately thereafter petitioner management transferredfour important office bearers of the Trade Union to far off places.The President of the Union was transferred to Aurangabad; GeneralSecretary was transferred to Hyderabad; Joint Secretary wastransferred to Valliyur - Nagercoil; and the Treasurer wastransferred to Uttaranchal, and the said transfer orders were passedonly to victimise the office bearers of the Trade Union. On20.12.2006 i.e., after the date of transfer orders, the Unionapproached the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Chennai, who issuedconciliation notice to the management asking them to appear beforehim on 26.12.2006. On 21.12.2006, petitioner management suspended 14workers and dismissed two workers without enquiry. On 22.12.2006,the management issued charge memo to 14 suspended workers. On27.12.2006 the management dismissed two more workers viz., thePresident and General Secretary of the Union without enquiry. Themanagement did not participate in the conciliation proceeding on26.12.2006, instead filed O.S.No.360 of 2006 and got an order ofinjunction restraining the workers from demonstrating within 100meters and also not to obstruct the ingress and egress of vehiclesand also not to prevent the loyal workmen from attending to the work.Hence the strike notice was issued by the Union on 2.1.2007 proposingto go on strike on or after 15 days. However, on the advise of theDeputy Commissioner of Labour, the strike was not resorted to. Theinjunction order was vacated on 13.3.2007, against which thepetitioner management filed CRP.Nos.1036 to 1038 of 2007 before thisCourt, which was allowed on 21.4.2007 and in SLP(C)No.9041 of 2007,notice was ordered. It is further stated in the counter affidavitthat the impugned order merely directs the petitioner management toprovide work to those who called off the strike on 26.7.2007 and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ exemption is granted to the petitioner management not to take backthe workers against whom criminal complaints were filed with police.On 26.7.2007, even after the workers called off the strike, themanagement did not allow the workers to take up the work. Most of theemployees were very much on duty on 26.7.2007 and they were notallowed to join duty since they refused to give undertaking. After26.7.2007, 147 workers were dismissed from service and prior to26.7.2007 only two workers were dismissed and other two workers wereterminated subsequently. As on 3.1.2008, 127 workers were kept undersuspension and 30 workers were given charge memos, out of which, 11workers are not in service. It is further stated in the counteraffidavit that the petitioner Company is treated as a public utilityservice, earning foreign exchange to the country, the Government wasright in directing the management to provide work to those who hadcalled off the strike on 26.7.2007, pending adjudication of thereference already made.5.First respondent filed counter affidavit stating that sincethe petitioner management failed to adhere to the conciliationsuggestions, the failure report was submitted and the workersnumbering about 265, even though reported for duty on 26.7.2007 aftercalling off the strike, petitioner company refused to take them backand therefore a failure report was submitted, pursuant to which areference was made under section 10(1) of the Industrial DisputesAct, 1947, through G.O(D)No.835 dated 5.12.2007 referring sevendemands to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication and thereafterG.O(D)No.839, dated 5.12.2007 was issued under section 10-B givingdirection and the Government is empowered to pass orders undersection 10-B for maintaining industrial peace in the establishment.The said order will cease to operate on the expiry of six months andit is only an interim measure. The impugned order is to provide workto all the workers who called off the strike on 26.7.2007, except tothose workmen against whom criminal complaints were filed with thepolice and it is only a tentative truce in an emergency situation andthe disputed issues are to be decided ultimately by the adjudicatoryforum. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that theimpugned order was passed for maintaining employment and industrialpeace and to prevent continuing industrial unrest in theestablishment, which is a public utility service.6.A reply affidavit was filed by the petitioner stating thatthe petitioner company had informed the workmen on 26.7.2007 thatthey would be permitted to work on condition that they give a letterof good conduct in future and the workmen numbering 37 reported backto work on giving such letter and rest of the workers having failedto give such letter, disciplinary actions were initiated andsuspension/dismissal orders have been passed. It is further statedthat disciplinary action was initiated against the striking workmen,pursuant to their violent action of causing damage to the propertyand danger to life, apart from causing loss of production and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ disturbance to peaceful atmosphere in the work spot and therefore theimpugned order ordering reinstatement of the said workmen is opposedto public interest.7.The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitionersubmitted that Section 10-B order is not warranted in this case as areference was made before the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication onseven issues and prior to the reference, several employees wereeither suspended or dismissed from service and as against thedismissal, no reference was made and by virtue of the impugned order,first respondent is forcing the petitioner management even to restorethe dismissed employees. The learned Senior Counsel also submittedthat the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Government is notwith reference to full facts and the dismissal orders could have beenbrought to the notice of the Government if an opportunity was givento the petitioner. According to the learned Senior Counsel theimpugned order is contrary to section 10-B(1) proviso and 10-B(3) bycontending that status-quo prior to three months from the date ofissue of the order can be ordered by the Government and by orderingreinstatement or restoring the dismissed employees, the same cannotbe compensated to the petitioner management, which is provided underSection 10-B(3) of the Act.8.The learned counsel appearing for the second respondentsubmitted that the management started victimising the office bearersof the Trade Union, the moment the union was registered and demandwas made. The office bearers were transferred to far of places,which shows victimisation attitude and ante-labour policies of thepetitioner management. The learned counsel further submitted that on26.7.2007 all the employees reported for duty and the petitionermanagement permitted the workmen to work, who gave letter ofundertaking and not allowed those employees to work, who have notgiven such undertaking. Therefore, the denial of employment toworkmen from 26.7.2007 is not justified. As the impugned order ispassed under section 10-B on subjective satisfaction of theGovernment, the same cannot be questioned in a writ petition. Thepower given to the Government under section 10-B is an emergencypower vested with the Government to maintain industrial peace in apublic utility company and the order passed will remain in force onlyfor six months and thereafter the parties will abide by the decisionof the Industrial Tribunal.9.The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for thefirst respondent reiterated the contentions raised in the counteraffidavit filed in the writ petition and stated that the power havingbeen exercised by the Government on subjective satisfaction takingnote of the entire background of the issue, the same cannot beinterfered with under Article 226 of Constitution of India. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10.I have considered the rival submissions made by the learnedSenior Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Counsel forthe respective respondents.11.The point in issue is whether the impugned order passedunder section 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is justifiedon the background of the case or not.12.Section 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (TamilNadu Act 36 of 1982) reads as follows:"10-B. Power to issue order regarding termsand conditions of service pending settlement ofdispute.- (1) Where an industrial dispute hasbeen referred by the State Government to a LabourCourt or a Tribunal under sub-section (1) ofsection 10 and if in the opinion of the StateGovernment, it is necessary or expedient so to dofor securing the public safety of convenience orthe maintenance of public order or supplies andservices essential to the life of the community orfor maintaining employment or industrial peace inthe establishment concerning which such referencehas been made, it may, by general or specialorder, make provision,-(a)for requiring the employers or workmenor both to observe such terms and conditions ofemployment as may be specified in the order or asmay be determined in accordance with the order,including payment of money by the employer to anyperson who is or has been a workman;(b)for requiring any public utility servicenot to close or remain closed and to work orcontinue to work on such terms and conditions asmay be specified in the order; and(c)for any incidental or supplementarymatter which appears to them to be necessary orexpedient for the purpose of the order:Provided that no order made under this sub-section shall require any employer to observeterms and conditions of employment less favourableto the workmen than those which were applicable tothem at any time within three months immediatelypreceding the date of the order. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, "public utility service" means-(i)any section of an industrialestablishment on the working of which the safetyof the establishment or the workmen employedtherein depends;(ii)any industry which supplies power, lightor water to the public;(iii) any industry which has been declared bythe State Government to be a public utilityservice for the purpose of this Act.(2)An order made under sub-section (1)shall cease to operate on the expiry of a periodof six months from the date of the order or on thedate of the award of the Labour Court or theTribunal, as the case may be, whichever isearlier.(3)Any money paid by an employer to anyperson in pursuance of an order under sub-section(1) may be deducted by that employer from out ofany monetary benefit to which such person becomesentitled under the provisions of any award passedby the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the casemay be."- Tamil Nadu Act 36 of 1982, S.2(w.e.f.15.8.1982)."13.Admittedly petitioner is a pharmaceuticals and life savingdrug manufacturing company and the manufactured drugs and antibioticsare intended for export to earn foreign exchange to the Governmentof India as well as to the Government of Tamil Nadu. Since it ismanufacturing drugs and antibiotics, admittedly it is a publicutility Company/industry and the non-production or closure willdefinitely affect the public interest. Hence it is beyond doubt thatthe petitioner Company is a public Utility company.14.From the pleadings of the parties it is seen that the wholedispute arose from 18.12.2006, the date on which the secondrespondent Union was registered as Trade Union and the Union informedthe list of office bearers to the petitioner management. It is alsoan admitted fact that office bearers of the Union were transferred toAurangabad, Hyderabad, Valliyur-Nagercoil and Uttaranchal. Due tothe said transfer, unrest among the workers emenated. There wasstrike for some time and all the workmen reported for duty on26.7.2007. It is also the definite case of the petitioner as well asthe second respondent Union that workmen, who gave letter of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ undertaking that they will behave properly in future, were permittedto rejoin duty on 26.7.2007 and such of those workmen who have notgiven the said letter of undertaking, were not permitted to joinduty. Thereafter some of the workmen were suspended and some weredismissed.15.Admittedly, the transfer of workmen, strike, not permittingthe workmen to join duty after the strike was over on 26.7.2007, wereall reported to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour for Conciliation.The management, even though participated in the conciliationproceedings, refused to accept the conciliatory efforts taken by theConciliation Officer and thereafter admittedly failure report wassubmitted to the Government. The Government after receiving thefailure report, referred seven issues for adjudication before theIndustrial Tribunal through G.O.(D)No.835 Labour and EmploymentDepartment, dated 5.12.2007. The issues referred before the LabourCourt for adjudication are as follows:1)Whether the transfer of the office bearers of the Unionis justified ?2)Whether the dismissal of the workmen viz., Srinivasaluand G.Veerasamy amounts to victimisation or not ?3)Whether the dismissal of P.Ramakoteeswara Rao andM.A.Kalaiselvan due to their activities in the LabourUnion is justified or not ?4)Whether the withholding of one day salary on 20.12.2006for 149 workmen is justified or not ?5)Whether the suspension of Balakonda Rayadu from17.1.2007 is justified and whether the claim of theUnion to restore him in service is justified ?6)Whether not-permitting the workmen, who called of theirstrike in spite of their reporting to duty on 26.7.2007is justified and whether they are entitled to berestored to duty ?7)Whether denial of employment to the workers, whenthey reported for duty on 26.7.2007, who have resortedto strike from 5.4.2007 is justified and whether adirection is to be issued to permit the workers toresume their work and whether salary and other benefitsare to be ordered for the period in which they were notallowed to work ? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ From the above issues referred to the Industrial Tribunal, it isevident that not permitting the workers to report for duty from26.7.2007 is also one of the specific issue referred for adjudication.16.Admittedly as on 26.7.2007, only two workers were dismissedand the management was willing to permit all other workers who arewilling to give undertaking for future good conduct. The learnedsenior counsel for the petitioner is not right in contending that byvirtue of the impugned order passed under section 10-B the dismissedworkers are ordered to be restored to service. Dismissal order toother workers having been passed subsequent to 26.7.2007, and thesaid workers also having been denied work from 26.7.2007 in spite ofreporting for duty, which is also one of the subject matter ofreference, the Government is well within its power to pass the orderstating that the management shall provide work to all the workers whocalled of the strike and reported for duty on 26.7.2007, except thoseworkmen against whom criminal complaints are filed with police by themanagement.17.The power of the Government to pass interim orders tomaintain industrial peace was considered by the Supreme Court in thedecision reported in AIR 1961 SC 420 (State of U.P. v. Basti SugarMills). Section 3(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,1947, which is akin to Section 10-B of the Tamil Nadu Act 36 of 1982was considered in that case. In paragraph 9, the Supreme Court heldthus,"9.We entirely agree with Mr.Pathak thatthe normal way of dealing with an industrialdispute under the Act would be to have it dealtwith judicially either by conciliation or byadjudication and that judicial process cannot becircumvent by resort to executive action. Theproceeding before a conciliator or an adjudicatoris, in a sense, a judicial proceeding becausetherein both the parties to the dispute would havethe opportunity of being heard and of placing therelevant material before the conciliator oradjudicator. But there may be an emergency andthe Government may have to act promptly "forsecuring the public safety or convenience or themaintenance of public order or supplies andservices essential to the life of the community ormaintaining employment." It was, therefore,necessary to arm it with additional powers fordealing with such an emergency. Clause (b) of S.3was apparently enacted for this purpose. An ordermade thereunder would be in the nature of atemporary or interim order as would be clear fromthe words "for such period as may be specified" https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appearing therein and from the second proviso toS.3. Under this proviso where an industrialdispute is referred for adjudication under cl.(d)an order made under cl.(b) cannot be enforcedafter the decision of the adjudicating authorityis announced by or with the consent of the StateGovernment. It would, therefore, follow from thisthat where the Government has made an executiveorder, as it did in this case, under cl.(b) ofS.3, it is open to the aggrieved party to move theGovernment to refer the industrial dispute forconciliation or adjudication under cl.(d) of S.3.Mr.Pathak, however, stated that under thissection, the Government has a discretion whetheror not to refer a dispute for conciliation oradjudication under cl.(d). But in our opinionwhere once the Government has acted under cl.(b)on the ground that it was in the public interestto do so, it would not be open to the Governmentto refuse to refer the dispute under cl.(d) forconciliation or adjudication. Mr.C.B.Agarwal, whoappeared for the State of Uttar Pradesh conceded,and we think rightly, that this would be so andadded that in case the State Government wasrecalcitrant it could be forced to do its duty bythe issue of a writ of mandamus by the High Courtunder Art.226 of the Constitution."(Emphasis supplied)It is further held in the said decision that Section 3(b) is to beavailed of in an acute emergency situation and resorting to the saidposition must depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the StateGovernment, upon which powers to act under section 3 have beenconveyed by the legislature and the order passed under the saidsection will be on temporary measure to meet the emergency situation.18.In the decision reported in 1978 (2) LLJ 412 (Basti SugarMills Co.Ltd. v. State of U.P.) also the very same section 3(b) ofthe Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was considered bythe Supreme Court. It is held therein that section 3(b) has beendesigned as an emergency provision to be exercised in an exhaustedphase of industrial collision and it is like a fire fighting measure.In paragraphs 25 to 27 the Supreme Court held thus,"25.The working class, though a weakerclass, when organised, is militant. Theirprivations are too desparate to stand delay.Policy formulation by Government takes time, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ involves consultation; adjudication involves longhearing and appeal upon appeal.26.The discussion of legal prophylaxis aspart of the dynamics of jurisprudence becomesrelevant at this stage. Necessity is the motherof tension; tension frays temper and maddened menturn violent. When both sides are psyched up intofransy, public safety, maintenance of essentialsupplies, people's employment and societal orderbecome casualties. A wise administrationanticipates and acts before the flames spread.Once the industrial war is sparked off, the use offorce becomes unavoidable and police force pittedagainst mob fury may mean blood and tears. AndIndian lives in free India, even though ofworkers, are more precious than the profits of thecorporate sector. Confronted by escalatingdisorder, the wise ruler cannot afford to wait forlethargic legal justice to deliver its verdict butarmed with crisis powers and anxious to arrest ablow-up, adopts administrative nostrums which givequick relief but do not frustrate ultimatejustice. Prophylactic processes are not the enemyof normative law. Socially oriented prompt actiontranquillise where drift, vacillation and inactionmay traumatize. Section 3 serves this limitedpurpose of legalising administrative interventionto prevent disorder without prejudice to judicialjustice which will eventually be allowed to takeits course. An order under S.3(b) isadministrative; a proceeding under the Bonus Actis judicial. The former manages a crisis, thelatter determines rights. Even when a directionunder the exigency power involve payments towardsbonus or other claim it never can possess finalityand is subject to judicial decision-except, ofcourse, where parties agree to settle theirclaims, and then the agreement gives it vitality.27.The jural scheme of S.3 is dual, eachoperating in its own stage and withoutcontradicting the power of the other. The firstsay, in crisis management, belongs to theadministrator the last word, in settlement ofsubstantive rights belongs to the Tribunal. Thepragmatic dichotomy of the law is flexible enoughnot to put all its peace-keeping eggs in thejudicial basket. Government acts when the troublebrews and when the storm has blown over judicial https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ technology takes over. There are no rigidcompartmentalisations. Sometimes, the judicialprocess itself has quick acting procedures.Likewise, sometimes the executive prefers toconsult before going into action. Under ourconstitutional order, guidelines are given by thestatute to ensure reasonableness in administrativeorders. And in a Government with social justiceas the watchward, value judgments are essential toexclude arbitrariness. So it is that theexecutive power under S.3 has the leading stringswrit right at the top. The power shall be usedonly for "public safety" or convenience or themaintenance of public order or supplies andservices essential to the life of the community orfor maintaining employment. It prevails for thenonce, produces (hopefully) tentative truce, andthen the judicial process decides decisively. Itis like an executive magistrate passing aprohibitory order regarding disputed possession orunruly assembly to prevent breach of the peace andmaking over to a judicial magistrate to hear anddecide who is in actual possession or whether therestriction on movement was right. Or, may be, itis like a magistrate quickly passing ordersregarding a possessory dispute leaving it to thecivil Court to adjudicate on valid title. No onecan argue that preventive magisterial power,admittedly provisionally and reasonably, isinconsistent with the civil judicial machinerywhich speaks finally."(Emphasis supplied)Thus, the power of the Government to issue appropriate orders to meetthe emergency situation for the maintenance of industrial peace in apublic utility company is well settled.19.From the pleadings, particularly from paragraph 14 of thereply affidavit filed by the petitioner it is seen that on 26.7.2007,the petitioner Company informed the workmen that they would bepermitted to work on condition if they give a letter of good conductin future. Therefore, it is evident that all the employees, who werenot dismissed till the said date have not committed any seriousmisconduct and that is why the petitioner management was willing torestore all the workmen who were willing to give letter of goodconduct in future. It is not the case of the petitioner managementthat workmen indulged in violence or strike after the said date viz.,26.7.2007. Hence the contention of the learned Senior Counsel thatby ordering restoration of the status-quo as on 26.7.2007, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government is ordering reinstatement of the workers, who weredismissed from service. Further, in the impugned order itself thereis a clause, which states that such of those workers against whomcriminal cases are registered, need not be taken back. If any workerhas indulged in criminal activity or vandalism or unruly scene,definitely the management would have lodged complaint against himbefore the Police and if complaints were already made before thePolice and criminal cases were registered, they need not be restoredto service. Hence there is no untold hardship given to thepetitioner management by virtue of the impugned order passed by theGovernment in exercise of emergency power with the sole object ofrestoring the industrial peace in a public utility company.20.The contention of the learned senior counsel for thepetitioner that under section 10-B of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, which was introduced through Tamil Nadu Act 36 of 1982 witheffect from 15.8.1982, the employees can be restored to the positionthree months prior to the date of order. Section 10-B(1)(c) onlycontemplates restoration of the status-quo which are less favourableto the workmen than which were applicable to them at any time withinthree months immediately preceding the date of the order. The saidproviso nowhere prohibits giving more favourable benefit to theworkmen prevailed beyond three months.21.The learned senior counsel for the petitioner also contendedthat as per Section 10-B(3) any money paid by an employer under sub-section (1) may be deducted by that employer from out of any monetarybenefit to which the employee is entitled under the provisions of anyaward. The said sub-section will not be applicable to this casesince status-quo as on 26.7.2007 is ordered and by virtue ofrestoration of the workmen in their original position, the petitionermanagement will extract work for which only salary will be paid andthe adjustment in future may not arise.22.The learned senior counsel for the petitioner also contendedthat the petitioner management is entitled to be heard before theimpugned order was passed. Similar contention was raised before aDivision Bench of this Court in which I was also a party, inW.A.No.777 of 2007 etc., batch, and by Judgment dated 10.12.2007, theDivision Bench held that the order passed under section 10-B is anadministrative order for which only subjective satisfaction isrequired and no notice need be issued. The Division Bench upheld theorder passed by the Government under Section 10-B of the IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947, and after extracting the Supreme Court decisionsin paragraphs 14 and 15 held as follows,"As power invested u/s 10-B of the Act isalmost similar to the power invested u/s 3 of theU.P.Industrial Disputes Act, in view of theSupreme Court decision in Basti Sugar Mills case https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (supra) also, we hold that the power u/s 10-B isalso an administrative order and, thereby, do notcall for prior notice or hearing before passingsuch order.15.Further, as for securing public safetyor maintaining of public order, or for industrialpeace in the establishment, it is open to theState to pass order u/s 10-B of the Act requiringthe employer or workmen or both to observe suchterms and conditions of employment as may bespecified in the order, it cannot be confined onlyto public utility service.In the present case, having noticed therelevant fact, including strike, closure, massagitation, road blockade agitation, politicalinvolvement in the matter and for maintainingpublic order and industrial peace, if the Statehas issued an order u/s 10-B, no interference iscalled for against such order."Hence the petitioner management is not entitled to be heard beforepassing the impugned order and the contention of the learned SeniorCounsel in that respect is rejected.23.In the light of the above referred statutory provision andthe decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, I am unable tosustain any of the grounds raised and no case is made out tointerfere in the impugned order of the Government dated 5.12.2007.Consequently the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Connectedmiscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. It is made clear thatthe findings given by me is only for the purpose of deciding theissue involved in this writ petition and the same shall not betreated as findings given on merits, on any one of the issuesreferred for adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.vr https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ToThe Secretary to Government,Labour and Employment Department,Fort St.George, Chennai - 600 009.+ 1 CC to Mr.M/s.Row Reddy Advocate SR NO.14194+ 1 CC to Mr.R.Parthiban Advocate SR NO.14264 Pre-Delivery Order inW.P.No.36790 of 2007VSV(CO)JJM(18/03/08)