Dr. Zubaida Begum & Ors. v. Indian Bank & Ors.

W.P.No.13456 of 20121.Mrs.S. Jyothi S. Shetty2. K. Sihivarama Shetty..Petitioners-Vs.-The Authorised OfficerUnion Bank of IndiaHaving its office atNO.583/584, Second FloorPooja ComplexAvenue RoadBangalore -560 002. ..RespondentsPrayer in W.P.No.15386 of 2012:- Writ petition filed under Article226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ of Mandamus directing the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai to dispose of I.A.No.1378 of 2009 in AIR 779 of 2009.Prayer in W.P.No.8099 of 2012:- Writ petition filed under Article 226of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the first respondent in I.A.No.1531 in M.A. A.I.R. No.989 of 2011 dated 23.3.2012 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.No.8381 of 2012:- Writ petition filed under Article 226of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the first respondent comprised in order dated 2.3.2012 passed in I.A.No.179 of2012 in AIR (SA) No.1017 of 2011, quash the same as illegal, unconstitutionl and consequently direct the first respondent to takeup appeal on record and dispose of the same in accordance with law.

Prayer in W.P.No.12970 of 2012:- Writ petition filed under Article226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the second respondent, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai in I.A.No.205 of 2012 inAIR 158 of 2012, quash its order dated 20.4.2012.Prayer in W.P.No.13456 of 2012:- Writ petition filed under Article226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ of Certiorari calling for the records pertaining to the order dated3.5.2012 in I.A.No.1220/2010 in A.I.R.NO.658 of 2010 on the file of Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and quash the same as illegal unlawful. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Mr.S. Sethuraman: For Petitioners in W.P.15386/2012 & Petitioners in W.P.No.13456/2012Mr.K.M.VijayanSenior Counselfor Mr.E.Vijay Anand: For Petitioner in W.P.No.8099/2012Mr.S.Ramesh: For Petitioner in W.P.No.8381/2012Mr.P.Raghunathan: For Petitioner in W.P.No.12970/2012Mr.Jayesh Doliafor M/s.Aiyer and Dolia : For R1 in W.P.No.15386/2012 For RR2 and 3 in W.P.No.8099/2012Mr.S.Parthasarathy: For R4 in W.P.No.8099/2012Senior Counselfor M/s.

N. S. ManoharanMr.N.V.Srinivasan: For Respondent in for M/s.N.V.S.Associates W.P.No.13456/2012Mr. OM. Prakash : For R2 in W.P.No.8381/2012for M/s. Ramalingam For R1 in W.P.No.12970/2012AssociatesTribunal: R2 in W.P.No.15386/2012 R1 in W.P.No.8099/2012 R1 in W.P.No.8381/2012 R2 in W.P.No.12970/2012COMMON ORDER K.K.SASIDHARAN, JIntroductory: The core issue raised in these batch of cases, is whether the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcementof Security Interest Act, 2002 (herienafter referred to as "SARFAESIAct") has power to condone the delay in filing second appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Lead case:2. Since the principal question is one and the same in all these writ petitions, W.P.No.13456 of 2012 is taken as the lead case to narrate the relevant facts. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.P.No.13456 of 20123.

The petitioners were the Directors of a Company by nameKohinoor Steel Private Limited. The petitioners were also the partners in a firm called "Varsha Metals". M/s. Kohinoor SteelPrivate Limited availed financial assistance from Union Bank of India, Bangalore. Since the unit failed to clear the loan outstanding, the Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 23December 2008, followed by a possession notice issued on 28 February,2009. The Bank thereafter issued a sale notice on 18 January 2010proposing to sell the secured assets on 20 February 2010.4. The sale notice dated 18 January 2010 was challenged by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal"), Bangalore in S.A.No.131 of 2010. The appeal was dismissed on 13 May 2010.5. The order dated 13 May 2010 was challenged by the petitioners before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred toas "Appellate Tribunal"), Chennai belatedly.

There was a delay of six days in preferring the appeal and this made the petitioners to file an application before the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay.6. The Appellate Tribunal was of the view that it has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. According to the AppellateTribunal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has already made the position clear that SARFAESI Act does not contain a provision conferring power on the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 18 of the Act. The application was accordingly dismissed. The said order dated 3 May 2010 in I.A.No.1220of 2010 is challenged in this writ petition.7. The applications preferred by the petitioners in other writ petitions were also dismissed solely on the ground that the AppellateTribunal has no power to condone the delay. Rival Contentions:8. Mr.K.M. Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner inW.P.No.8099 of 2012 made elaborate submissions with respect to the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to an appeal preferred before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of theSARFAESI Act.

The substantial contentions are as follows: (i) The SARFAESI Act has not expressly excluded the provisions of the Limitation Act. (ii) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would attract in case two requirements are satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision viz., https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (a) there must be a provision for a period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application and (b) the prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. If the above two requirements are satisfied, the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. (iii) In case the two primary requirements are satisfied, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed under the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

(iv) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions under Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (v) SARFAESI Act is admittedly a Special statute. Though thereis no express provision extending the provisions of the LimitationAct to an appeal preferred under Section 18 of the Act, the fact remains that the Limitation Act is not specifically excluded. Therefore, the Appellate Tribunal has power to extend the time for filing appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. (vi) Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act mandates that the claim in respect of the financial asset should be made within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act. However no such provision is found in the SARFAESI Act excluding the period of limitation in respect of an appeal under Section 18 of the Act.

(vii) Section 37 of the SARFAESI Act provides that the application of other laws are not barred. The other law would also include the Limitation Act. (viii) The right of appeal is a statutory right. Such a right cannot be curtailed by giving a narrow interpretation. (ix) The issue raised by the petitioner is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan v. CheppilatPuthanpuraiyil Aboobacker (1995 (5) SCC 5).(x) The provisions contained under the Limitation Act would apply automatically to determine the periods under the special law, in case there is no express exclusion of the application of Limitation Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

Mr.P.Raghunathan, learned counsel for the petitioner inW.P.No.12970 of 2012 would contend: (i) Though the Legislature had prescribed a particular period of limitation, no outer time limit was fixed restricting the discretion. The legislative intention is very clear that it was notin favour of excluding the provisions of the Limitation Act, in respect of an appeal preferred under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. (ii) The Limitation Act 1963 made a fundamental change in Section 29(2) of the Act. It is clear that in case the requisite condition for applicability to proceedings under the Special Act are attracted, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 would get attracted andas a result, Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to such proceedings, unless the Limitation Act is excluded expressly. Sincethere is no such express exclusion, the Appellate Tribunal was not correct in its observation that it has no power to condone the delay.

Mr.S.Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioner inW.P.No.8381 of 2012 would contend thus:SARFAESI Act is not a complete code by itself. ThereforeSection 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to a proceeding before the Appellate Tribunal.

Mr. S.Sethuraman, learned counsel for the petitioners inW.P.No.15386 of 2012 and 13456 of 2012 would contend :(i) Section 18(2) of SARFAESI Act provides that the AppellateTribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "RDDBFIAct"). The proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDDBFI Act gives discretion to the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of forty-five days prescribed by Sub-Section 3of Section 20. The legislative intention is therefore clear that the benefits of the provisions of the Limitation Act should be made applicable to a proceeding under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. (ii) The exclusion of the Limitation Act should be specific. The SARFAESI Act does not contain such a provision indicating express exclusion.

Mr.S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel for the fourth respondent in W.P.No. 8099 of 2012 would contend: The time limit for filing an appeal to an appellate court is thirty days both under the Schedule to the Limitation Act andSARFAESI Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that a different periodis prescribed under the local law so as to apply the provisions of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Limitation Act and more specifically under Section 29(2) of the Act. 13. Mr.Jayesh Dolia, learned counsel for the first respondent in W.PNo.15386 of 2012 would submit: (i) The Legislature consciously avoided the provisions of the Limitation Act to a proceeding before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act. The Court cannot extend the period by importing the provisions of the Limitation Act. (ii) The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the SARFAESI Actin Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311, which includes Section 18 of the Act. Therefore the issue cannot be re-agitated later on a different point. (iii) The Act was enacted to achieve a specific purpose. Theproceeding initiated under the SARFAESI Act should attain early finality. In case Section 5 of the Limitation Act is extended to an appeal under Section 18 of the Act, there would be no logical end to the proceeding. The Bank would not be in a position to sell the property on account of the pendency of belated appeals. Discussion:

SARFAESI Act is a "special law" enacted to enable the Banksand Financial Institutions to recover the dues without the intervention of Court. The Act contains various provisions enabling the Banks and Financial Institutions to declare the debt as a "non-performing asset", to call upon the borrower to pay the amount withina prescribed period and in case of failure to discharge the loan amount, to take possession of the secured assets and dispose of the same in any of the methods permitted without taking re-course to the legal proceedings.

Section 17 of the Act gives a right to an aggrieved to approach the Tribunal challenging the measures taken by the Bankunder sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Section 17 of the Actprescribes a time limit of forty five days from the date on which measures have been taken, to file an appeal.

Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act enables a person aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to file an appeal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order before the Appellate Tribunal. The provision reads as under: "

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17,may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as maybe prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PROVIDED that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower:PROVIDED FURTHER that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DebtsRecovery Tribunal, whichever is less:PROVIDED ALSO that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent.of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banksand Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)and rules made thereunder. "17. The appellate provision mandates that the appeal should befiled within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order passed by the Tribunal. The SARFAESI Act does not contain an express provision either extending the provisions of the Limitation Act orits exclusion.18. The Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted in supersession of the Limitation Act, 1908. The provisions of Limitation Act would apply to all Civil Proceedings and certain criminal proceedings unless the application thereof has been excluded either specifically or by necessary implication.

We are now mainly concerned with the following two provisions of the Limitation Act viz., Section 5 and Section 29(2). "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases -Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of OrderXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of1908) may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation - The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. " " 29. Savings: -(1) ......(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any sit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 5 to 24(inclusive shall apply only in so far, as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. "

The petitioners have taken up a specific contention that incase the provisions of the Limitation Act are not expressly excluded and the period of limitation prescribed under the Special Act isdifferent from the period that prescribed under the Schedule to the Limitation Act, then Section 29(2) would apply. In short, it is the contention of the petitioners that Sections 4 to 24 of the LimitationAct would apply automatically to determine the periods under SpecialLaw in case the provisions of the Limitation Act are not expressly excluded.

It is not in dispute that the Supreme Court in Mangu Ram v.Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 and Mukri Gopalan v.Cheppilat Puthanpuraiyil Aboobacker (1995 (5) SCC 5) observed that an express mention in the special law is necessary only for an exclusion.

The Supreme Court in the subsequent decisions by placing reliance on the Three Judge Bench decision in Hukumdev Narain Yadavv. L.N. Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133 made the position clear that in case https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the provisions of the Limitation Act were excluded by necessary implication in spite of the absence of an express provision, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be extended to enlarge the time prescribed under the Special Statutes. In fact in HukumdevNarain Yadav, the Court held that the words "expressly excluded"would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Actof which the operation is to be excluded. The Court observed that ifon an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred by the Limitation Act cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. It was also observed that evenin case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would still be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.

The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular ConstructionCo. (2001) 8 SCC 470 held that the words "exclusion" also includes"exclusion by necessary implication".

In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577, the Supreme Court held that the Court can condone the delay only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise.

The Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav case (1974 (2)SCC 133) and Popular Construction Company case (2001 (8) SCC 470)indicated the test to determine the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court was of the view that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act has to be considered taking into account the provisions of the Special law and not by placing reliance on the provisions of the Limitation Act.26. The decisions referred to above clearly shows that in case the provisions of the Special Act taken as a whole excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act either expressly or impliedly, the Courts cannot supplement the provisions of the Limitation Act to extend the period of limitation. In short, the provisions of the special Act as a whole should be examined with reference to the statement of objects and reasons.

The Supreme Court in Popular Construction Co. case also considered the history of the scheme of Arbitration and ConciliationAct, 1996 to decide as to whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act isapplicable to an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Court found that the object of enacting the new law was to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in Arbitration process. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ This made the Supreme Court to conclude that the Limitation Act has no application to a proceeding under Section 34 of the ArbitrationAct.

In order to consider the question as to whether Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is applicable to a proceeding under Section18 of the SARFAESI Act, necessarily we should look in to the scheme of the Special Law.

The Banks and Financial Institutions were wandering in the corridors of the Courts to recover the amount advanced to the borrowers. The banks faced immense difficulties in recovering the loans and enforcement of securities. The Civil Courts took considerable time to decide the matters involving Banks and financial institutions. The Civil Suits and the Execution Petitions preferred by the Banks also contributed tremendously to the problem of docket explosion. The Banks and Financial Institutions were not in aposition to recover the money in spite of conducting litigationsyears together. Even after getting a decree, the Banks found it difficult to execute the decree on account of the procedural delay. The banks were compelled to wait for years together to recover the public money. The slow recovery process resulted in denial of new loans. The difficulties faced by the Banks and FinancialInstitutions in the matter of recovering loans and enforcement of securities charged with them, made the Government of India to appointa committee headed by Shri.M.Narasimham. The Committee recommended the constitution of Special Tribunals with special powers in adjudication of disputes between the banks and borrowers. Thereafter, a Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri T. Tiwari was constituted to examine the legal and other difficulties faced by the Banks and to suggest remedial measures including changes in law. TheCommittee has also suggested setting up of Special Tribunals for recovery of amount due to banks and financial institutions by following a summary procedure. The Government on examination of the data provided by the Banks with respect to the pending litigationsfound that huge amount of public money was locked up in litigation. This made the parliament to enact the RDDBFI Act, 1993.

Section 19 of RDDBFI Act permits the Banks to file applications before the Tribunal for the purpose of issuing recovery certificates. The Tribunal was expected to decide the matter within aperiod of 180 days from the date of receipt of application. Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act provides for an appeal to the AppellateTribunal within a period of forty-five days from the date on which the copy of the order is received by the appellant. The proviso to Section 20(3) permits the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appealin case the Tribunal is of the opinion that the appellant has made out sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the statutory https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ period. Though RDDBFI Act was enacted with a view to constitute amachinery to achieve speedy recovery, still, it failed to give the desired results.

The problem of accruing non-performing assets attracted the attention of the Government once again and a need was felt to evolvea unique mechanism to recover the amount due to Banks and financial institutions. The Government was of the view that the Banks and Financial Institutions should be given power to sell the secured assets without the intervention of Courts. The reports submitted by the Committees headed by Mr.M.Narasimhan and Mr.Andhyarujinasuggested legislative measures to empower the Banks and financial institutions to recover the outstanding by treating the assets as"Non Performing Assets". The issue was thereafter considered by the Government with all its seriousness and ultimately the SARFAESI Actwas enacted. The Banks and Financial Institutions were given powers to recover the loan amount from chronic defaulters after declaring the debts as "Non Performing Assets" and without re-course to time consuming Court proceedings.

The validity of the SARFAESI Act was challenged before the Supreme Court on various grounds. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act and its provisions except that of sub-section (2)of Section 17 of the Act in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311. The condition prescribed under Section 17(2) regarding pre-deposit to file an appeal was found onerous, oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 214 of the Constitution of India and accordingly sub-section (2) of Section17 of the Act was declared ultravires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The observation made by the Supreme Court in MardiaChemicals Ltd. gives a clear indication that the RDDBFI Act on account of various reasons has not given the expected results and this only prompted the parliament to legislate another special statute, which was described as a draconian law by the petitioners before the Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd.

The proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the RDDBFIAct gives a discretion to the appellate authority to extend the time for filing statutory appeal. On the other hand, while enacting theSARFAESI Act, the parliament very consciously excluded the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section 18 of the Act. The Legislature was aware of the factual position that in spite of constituting Special Tribunals to recover the public money, the Banks and financial institutions were not in a position to achieve the results on account of the time taken to complete the original and appellate proceedings and the ultimate execution proceedings. The Legislature therefore wanted a fast track https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ method and machinery to recover the dues within a reasonable time. The failure to make a provision to extend the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot therefore be treated as an omission.

The intention of the legislature to complete the entire legal proceeding within a specified period is evident from sub-section (5) of Section 17. This provision gives a mandate to the Tribunal to dispose of the application as expeditiously as possible and in any case within sixty days from the date of initiation of such appeal. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 17 is an ultimatum to the Tribunal to complete the proceedings within the outer time limit of four months from the date of registration of the appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act. 36. The right of appeal is nothing but a statutory right. Thesaid right can be regulated by imposing appropriate conditions. Whenthe right of appeal is circumscribed by a condition that it should befiled within thirty days, it cannot be said that the condition is bad or onerous. The Law of Limitation is not to defeat the right. It is only to curtail the right beyond a particular time. Thelitigation should come to a finality at a particular point of time. In case appeals are entertained after considerable time by invoking the provisions of the Limitation Act, the very purpose of enacting some of the stringent acts in the financial sector, would lose its significance.

The Supreme Court in Popat and Kotecha Property v. StateBank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510, indicated the object and principles underlying the provisions of Limitation Act. TheSupreme Court said: "9. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Theobject of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Thelaw of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finislitium (it is for the general welfare that aperiod be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive forlegislatively fixed period of time. (See N.Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy)"

The right of appeal should not be abused by recalcitrant to prosecute frivolous appeals. In case Section 5 of the Limitation Actis extended to an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, appeals could be filed belatedly to revive dead matters, so as to prevent the Banks from invoking the provisions of the Act to realise the dues. That was not the intention of the Parliament while framingSARFAESI Act.39. The learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.15386 of2012 by placing reliance on sub-section (2) of Section 18 of theSARFAESI Act contended that by virtue of this provision, the Appellate Tribunal has to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of RDDBFI Act. According to the learned counsel, RDDBFI Act contains a specific provision for condoning the delay andas such, the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

The Chief Manager Asset Recovery Management Branch Welling Estate No.55, Ethiraj Salai Chennai-600 008.

The Registrar The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal Spencer Plaza, Chennai.

The General Manager (Asset Recovery Section) Indian Bank No.244 to 260 Avvai Shanmugam Salai Royapettah, Chennai.

The Authorised Officer cum Chief Manager Indian Bank Tallakulam Branch No.73, Alagar Kovil Main Road Madurai-625 020.

The Authorised Officer State Bank of India Stressed Assets Management Branch Red Cross Building, II Floor, 32, Montieth Road Egmore, Chennai-600 008.

The Authorised Officer Union Bank of India Having its office at NO.583/584, Second Floor Pooja Complex Avenue Road Bangalore -560 002. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

The RegistrarThe Debts Recover Appellate Tribunal4th floor Indian Bank BuildingEthiraj Salai, Egmore, Chennai-81 cc to M/s. Aiyar and Dolia, Advocate, Sr. 516622 ccs to Mr.S. Sethukumar, Advocate, Sr. 52067, 520662 ccs to Mr.N.s. Manoharan, Advocate, Sr. 518381 cc to Mr. E. Vijay Anand, Advocate, sr. 517231 cc to Mr.s. Ramesh, Advocate, Sr. 517544 ccs to M/s. Ramalingam & Associate, Advocate, sr. 51818, 518191 cc to Mr.P. Raghunathan, Advocate, Sr. 51664W.P.Nos.15386, 8099, 8381, 12970, 13456 of 2012 & connected Mps.VD (CO)kk 10/9