V.Muthu & Ors. v. Labour Court & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 2.12.2011CORAM:THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALANWrit Petition Nos.16436 and 21160 of 2008V.Muthu.. Petitioner in W.P.No.16436 of 2008R.Balasubramanian .. Petitioner in W.P.No.21160 of 2008Vs.1. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Cuddalore.2. The President, Palampoondi Village, Sathampadi Post, Gingee Taluk, Villupuram District. .. Respondents in W.P.No.16436 of 20081. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Cuddalore.2. The President, Melsithamur Panchayat, Gingee Taluk, Villupuram District. .. Respondents in W.P.No.21160 of 2008Writ Petition No.16436 of 2008 filed under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ ofCertiorarified Mandmaus, to call for the records relating to theorder of the first respondent in C.P.No.23 of 2007, dated 11.6.2008and quash the same and further direct the first respondent to computethe claim petition without following the period of limitation.Writ Petition No.21160 of 2008 filed under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ ofCertiorarified Mandmaus, to call for the records relating to theorder of the first respondent in C.P.No.2 of 2007, dated 11.6.2008and quash the same and further direct the first respondent to computethe claim petition without following the period of limitation.For petitioners: Mr.K.Vasudevan in both the WPs. For respondents:R-1 Court in both the Writ Petitions : R-2 notice Served-- No appearance in W.P.No.16436/2008 : Mr.C.Prabhakaran for Mr.T.Seenivasan in W.P.No.21160/2008 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ORDERThe employees of the second respondent-Village Panchayats, raisedthe question as to whether the first respondent-Labour Court canreject the claim of the petitioners-employees seeking forcompassionate appointment on the ground of delay alone, withoutconsidering the merits of the case, vide impugned orders dated11.6.2008 in C.P.Nos.23 and 2 of 2007, respectively, which have beencalled in question, seeking to quash the same and also to direct thefirst respondent-Labour Court to compute the claim petitions(computation petitions) without following the period of limitation.2. The case of the petitioners in both the writ petitions are asfollows:(a) The petitioners were working as Pump Operators in the secondrespondent-Panchayat and served for more than 34 years and 15 yearsrespectively, without any adverse remarks. They claim that though theGovernment passed various orders from time to time extending certainbenefits to the Pump Operators, the same have not been paid to themby the second respondent-Panchayat at any time. (b) As per the Government Orders in G.O.Ms.No.449, Labour andEmployment Department, dated 6.6.1977, the Government fixed theminimum wages to the Pump Operators and Sanitary Workers, and thesame was not implemented by the heads of the Departments on theground that the petitioners were not eligible for the minimum wages.It appears that one T.R.Ramanath, the Secretary of the South ArcotDistrict Municipal Panchayat Workers' Union, Gingee, VillupuramDistrict, has filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.11902 of 1995 and thisCourt, by order dated 18.9.1995, disposed of the said Writ Petitionwith certain observations.(c) The petitioners have filed Claim Petitions under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for shot, 'the ID Act')before the first respondent-Labour Court. The first respondent-LabourCourt, while computing their claim, passed the impugned orders,stating that they have no claim towards their dues from the secondrespondent-Panchayat (employers) within a period of three years fromthe date when the wages become due, without going through theprovisions of Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. 3. In these Writ Petitions, the petitioners challenge theimpugned orders passed by the first respondent-Labour Court on theground that there is no period of limitation while computing theclaim amounts and no time limit has been prescribed for filing thepetitions under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act, which primarily dealswith the computation of wages due under the settlement or award, andif the wages are paid by the employer to the employee, the employerssuffer no loss and the employees-workmen (petitioners) could utilisethe money, which is rightfully due to them. The legislative policy https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appears to be that even though the workmen does not come to the Courtimmediately on the accrual of wages or even within the period oflimitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, theirright should not be defeated. The workmen's money is lying in thetrust with the employer and it could be recovered at any point oftime, as there is no third party right accrued, and therefore, noperiod of limitation has been prescribed for claiming the wages, andhence, the impugned orders passed by the first respondent-LabourCourt are liable to be set aside. Hence, the petitioners have filedthese writ petitions to quash the impugned orders.4. No counter affidavit has been filed by the second respondent-Panchayat before this Court. In the counter affidavit filed beforethe first respondent-Labour Court, the second respondent-Panchayatstook a stand that the claim petitions were not maintainable, as thepetitioners were only part-time employees and further that theGovernment Orders are not applicable to them, and the claim should bemade as and when it has become due and the arrears cannot be claimed,and therefore, the claim petitions filed by the petitioners are hitby delay and latches, and hence, the second respondent-Panchayatprayed for dismissal of the claim petitions.5. Mr.K.Vasudevan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-employees, in his submissions, strenuously contended that theimpugned orders passed by the first respondent-Labour Court arecontrary to the object of the provisions of the ID Act, andparticularly, when the claim under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act ismade, it is incumbent upon the first respondent-Labour Court tocompute the wages due under the settlement or award, if the same arenot paid by the employer to the employee for a long time, and whenthe employer suffers no loss, the Court has to compute the amountsdue under wages and pass an award, but on the contrary, in thepresent case, the first respondent-Labour Court dismissed the claimpetitions on the sole ground of delay, and therefore, the impugnedorders are liable to be set aside.6. In support of his submissions, learned counsel appearing forthe petitioners-employees relied on the following decisions of theSupreme Court:(a) 1963 (2) LLJ (SC) 608 = AIR 1964 SC 752= 1964 SCR (3)709: (Bombay Gas Co. Vs. Gopal Bhiva):"In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bearin mind that though the legislature knew how the problem ofrecovery of wages had been tackled by the Payment of WagesAct and how limitation had been prescribed in that behalf, ithas omitted to make any provision for limitation in enactingS.33C(2). The failure of the legislature to make anyprovision for limitation cannot, in our opinion, be deemed tobe an accidental omission. In the circumstances, it would be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ legitimate to infer that legislature deliberately did notprovide for any limitation under S.33C(2). It may have beenthought that the employees who are entitled to take thebenefit of S.33C(2) may not always be conscious of theirrights and it would not be right to put the restriction oflimitation in respect of claim which they may have to makeunder the said provision. Besides, even if the analogy ofexecution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well-known that a decree passed under the Code of Civil Procedureis capable of execution within twelve years, provided ofcourse it is kept alive by taking steps in aid of executionfrom time to time as required by Art.182 of the LimitationAct; so that the test of one year or six months' limitationprescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as auniform and universal test in respect of all kinds ofexecution claims. It seems to us that where the legislaturehas made no provision for limitation, it would not be open tothe Courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds offairness or justice. The words of S.33C(2) are plain andunambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court togive effect to the said provision without any considerationsof limitation. Mr.Kolah no doubt emphasised the fact thatsuch belated claims made on a large scale may causeconsiderable inconvenience to the employer, but that is aconsideration which the legislature may take into account,and if the legislature feels that fair play and justicerequire that some limitations should be prescribed, it mayproceed to do so. In the absence of any provision, however,the Labour Court cannot import any such consideration indealing with the applications made under S.33C(2)."(b) 1968 (1) LLJ (SC) 6 = AIR 1968 SC 218 = 1968 SCR (1) 140(East India Coal Co. Vs. Rameshwar):"These applications were made in 1962 though theyrelated to claims for the years commencing from 1948 andonwards. The contention therefore was that part of theseclaims, at any rate, must be held to be barred either bylimitation or by reason of laches on the part of the workmen.The answer to this contention is clearly provided in the caseof Bombay Gas Company (Bombay Gas Co. Vs. Gopal Bhiva = 1963(2) LLJ 608 = AIR 1964 SC 752= 1964 SCR (3) 709) where adistinction was drawn between considerations which wouldprevail in an industrial adjudication and those which mustprevail in a case filed under a statutory provision such asS.33C(2). This court pointed out there that whereas anindustrial dispute is entertained on grounds of socialjustice and therefore a Tribunal would in such a case take https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ into consideration factors such as delay or laches, suchconsiderations are irrelevant to claims made under astatutory provision unless such provision lays down anyperiod of limitation. The Court held that there is nojustification in inducting a period of limitation provided inthe Limitation Act into the provisions of S.33C(2) which donot lay down any limitation and that such a provision canonly be made by legislature if it thought fit and not by thecourt on an analogy or any other such consideration. It is amatter of some significance that though the legislatureamended Section 33C by Act 36 of 1964 and introducedlimitation in the section, it did so by means of a provisoonly in respect of claims made under sub-sec.(1) but did notprovide any limitation for claims under sub-section (2). Inview of this fact and the decision in Bombay Gas Company'scase (Bombay Gas Co. Vs. Gopal Bhiva = 1963 (2) LLJ 608 = AIR1964 SC 752= 1964 SCR (3) 709) Sri.Gokhale conceded that hecould not press the contention that the present claims werebarred by limitation or laches."and(c) AIR 1970 SC 209 = 1969 (2) SCC 199 = 1970 SCR (1) 396:(Nityananda.M.Joshi Vs. Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia) :"3. In our view Article 137 (of the Limitation Act) onlycontemplates applications to Courts. In the Third Division ofthe Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, all the otherapplications mentioned in the various articles areapplications filed in a court. Further S.4 of the LimitationAct, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribedperiod for any application expires on a holiday and the onlycontingency contemplated is "when the court is closed". Againunder S.5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit anapplication after the prescribed period has expired if thecourt is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient causefor not preferring the application. It seems to us that thescheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only dealswith applications to courts, and that the Labour Court is nota court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963." 7. On the other hand, Mr.C.Prabhakaran, learned counsel,representing Mr.T.Seenivasan, learned counsel on record for thesecond respondent-Panchayat (employer) in W.P.No.21160 of 2008contended that the petitioner in W.P.No.21160 of 2008 has filed theclaim petition after 13 years the amount became due, and therefore, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ it is a belated claim, and hence, the claim petition is notmaintainable and the first respondent-Labour Court considered theoral and documentary evidence, and rightly rejected the claim of thepetitioner. As per the provisions of the ID Act, the claim has to bemade within a period of 3 years from the date when the amountaccrues, and the first respondent-Labour Court, while partly allowingthe claim petition, ordered payment of the amount retrospectively,i.e. three years from the date of claim petition, which is notsustainable and the same is liable to be dismissed.8. On the above background of pleadings, I have heard thesubmissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side, andperused the records and the impugned orders, and given thoughtfulconsideration to the case on hand.9. Admittedly, the petitioners were the employees under thesecond respondent-Panchayat (employer) and worked for 34 years and 15years respectively.10. As per the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.449, Labour andEmployment Department, dated 6.6.1979, the Government fixed theminimum wages to the Pump Operators and Sanitary Workers, and thesame was not implemented by the heads of the Departments on theground that the petitioners were not eligible for the minimum wages.It appears that one T.R.Ramanath, the Secretary of the South ArcotDistrict Municipal Panchayat Workers' Union, Gingee, VillupuramDistrict, has filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.11902 of 1995 and thisCourt, by order dated 18.9.1995, disposed of the said Writ Petition,observing as follows:"The petitioner is a Joint Secretary of the Union.Though nothing is stated abut the members of the Unionin the affidavit, learned counsel at the Bar stated thatthe Union has membership numbering 40,000. The prayermade in the writ petition is for a direction to theState Government and the Director of Rural Developmentto implement G.O.Ms.No.449, dated 6.6.1977. In theaffidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, it isstated that by the said GO, minimum wages of SanitaryWorkers and Watchman were fixed at Rs.100/- per monthand for Pump Operators at Rs.150/- plus D.A. That GO, itis stated, has not been given effect to for the lasteighteen years. The petitioner has not sought any legalremedy in the interval. According to the petitioner, theCourt's jurisdiction has been invoked for the first timeafter 18 years after the G.O. was issued and theimplementation of which is now sought for. Evenaccording to the petitioner, several events had accruedsubsequent to the issue of the GO. According to thepetitioner, there was some agitation in the year 1987and the discussion are said to have taken place in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ year 1989.2. At this distance of time, when admittedly the GOhas not been implemented for 18 years and several eventshad occurred thereafter and when the matter was also sodiscussed among the parties, it is not possible to issuea Writ of Mandamus to implement that order. It is,however, open to the petitioner and members of theAssociation of which they are said to be the officebearers, to make appropriate claims before the LabourCourt under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial DisputesAct to the extent to which they are entitled to claimthe benefits under law. 3. The writ petition is disposed of with the aboveobservations." 11. In the above background, the petitioners have made theirclaim by filing computation (claim) petitions before the firstrespondent-Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act, however,the said claim petitions were partly allowed extending the benefitsonly for a period of three years from the date of filing of the claimpetitions and for the earlier period as sought for by the petitionersin the Claim Petitions, it was denied by the first respondent-LabourCourt on the ground that the claim was belated, and hence, anyclaim made after three years from the date when it becomes due,cannot be allowed, and therefore, the first respondent-Labour Courtpartly allowed the claim for the period of three years from the dateof filing of the claim petitions, and dismissed the claim petitionson the ground of limitation for the earlier period as sought for bythe petitioners-employees (workmen before the Labour Court).12. In this regard, it is worthwhile to quote Section 33-C(2) ofthe I.D. Act, as follows:"Section 33-C: Recovery of money due from an employer--....(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from theemployer any money or any benefit which is capable ofbeing computed in terms of money and if any questionarises as to the amount of money due or as to the amountat which such benefit should be computed, then thequestion may, subject to any rules that may be made underthis Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may bespecified in this behalf by the appropriate Governmentwithin a period not exceeding three months:Provided that where the presiding officer of a LabourCourt considers it necessary or expedient so to do, hemay, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend suchperiod by such further period as he may think fit."13. It is seen from the said order dated 18.9.1995 passed by this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court in W.P.No.11902 of 1995 that the delay therein had beenexplained by the petitioner before this Court in respect of the claimfor implementation of G.O.Ms.No.449, dated 6.6.1977, Labour andEmployment Department, after 18 years and the petitioner therein hasexplained the delay by mentioning about the happenings of someagitation in the year 1987 and the discussion said to have takenplace in the year 1989 and therefore, this Court has considered theaspect of delay and directed the petitioner therein and the membersof the Association, of which, they are said to be the office bearers,to make appropriate claims before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act.14. That being the order of this Court in the said W.P.No.11902of 1995, the first respondent herein (Labour Court) could haveconsidered the delay in filing the claim petitions, which has beenproperly explained by the petitioners-employees before the firstrespondent-Labour Court, and it could have taken sympathetic viewof the matter for consideration of their belated claim and thoughnecessary/relevant documents have not been marked as exhibits beforethe first respondent-Labour Court, the delay has been properlyexplained by the petitioners-employees to the satisfaction of theCourt and the delay has also been properly explained even in theaffidavit filed in support of these Writ Petitions, coupled with theother documents filed in support of the Writ Petitions in the typedset of papers. 15. It also appears that the claim for wages by the petitioners-employees is based the Government Orders marked as exhibits on theside of the petitioners-employees. The benefits enunciated in theseGovernment Orders accrue to the petitioners/employees and the samehas to be paid if they are otherwise eligible. If that is so, thefirst respondent-Labour Court, ought to have taken into account thescheme of the provisions of the ID Act, based on the legislativepolicy and even if the petitioners-workmen do not come to the Courtimmediately on the accrual of the wages or even within a period oflimitation prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, theirright could not be defeated or deprived on the ground of limitationalone. The petitioners-workmen's money is lying in the trust of thesecond respondent-Panchayat (employer) and therefore, the period oflimitation cannot be a legal impediment to reject their claim. Thewages are not a bounty paid by the employer, but it is only theirentitlement after they have duly put in their blood-shedding effortsin their employment, as per the provisions of the ID Act.16. It is seen from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in1963 (2) LLJ (SC) 608 = AIR 1964 SC 752= 1964 SCR (3) 709: (BombayGas Co. Vs. Gopal Bhiva) (cited supra), relied on by the learnedcounsel for the petitioners-employees, that though the Legislatureknew how the problem of recovery of wages had been tackled by thePayment of Wages Act and how the limitation had been prescribed in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that behalf, it has omitted to make any provision for limitation inenacting Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act; the failure of theLegislature to make any provision for limitation, could not be deemedto be an accidental omission; in the circumstances, it would belegitimate to infer that the Legislature deliberately did not providefor any limitation under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act and it mayhave thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefitof Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act, may not always be conscious oftheir rights and it would not be right to put the restriction oflimitation in respect of the claim, which they have made to make thesaid provision; where the Legislature has not made any provision forlimitation period, it would not be open to the Courts to introduceany such limitation on the ground of fairness of justice. A plainand own reading of Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act makes it clear thatit would be the duty of the Labour Courts to give effect to the saidprovisions of the I.D. Act, without consideration of the limitationperiod and take a sympathetic view in the facts and circumstances ofthe case and award the claim amounts as per law.17. The above legal principles have not been taken note of by thefirst respondent-Labour Court. The first respondent-Labour Courtshall not deny the benefits claimed by the petitioners-employeesbased on the Government Orders marked before the first respondent-Labour Court, apart from the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.449,Labour and Employment Department, dated 6.6.1979. It is the duty ofthe Labour Court to look into the merits of the case and analyse uponthe petitioners' legal entitlement and consider their claim in thelight of the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court fromtime to time and in the absence of any claim by third party regardingtheir accrued rights, the amount should have been ordered to havebeen paid and the money is pending before the employer in trust andthe amount could be recovered by the employees at any point in theabsence of the Legislature's prescription for limitation in theprovisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Act, and therefore, the viewtaken by the first respondent-Labour Court to reject the claim of thepetitioners based on the limitation so as to deprive them of theirlegitimate wages accrued, is not legally justifiable and theconclusions arrived at by the first respondent-Labour Court areagainst the principles/rules of law and natural justice and the sameis arbitrary, capricious and unjust in the eye of law, and hence, theimpugned orders of the first respondent-Labour Court are liable to beset aside on this narrow compass.18. Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are allowed, setting asidethe impugned orders of the first respondent-Labour Court insofar asdenial of wages from the date actually it accrued, is concerned andthe impugned orders of the Labour Court are confirmed in respect ofthe claim granted for the period of three years from the date ofclaim petitions. The matter is remanded to the first respondent-Labour Court for fresh consideration by conducting de-novo trial, to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ compute the wages of the petitioners herein, from the date actuallyit accrued as claimed in the claim petitions filed by thepetitioners, excluding the period of three years from the date ofclaim petitions, as already awarded by the first respondent-LabourCourt in the impugned orders, and pass appropriate orders to reap thebenefits of the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act, byletting in additional/fresh oral and documentary evidence, apart fromconsidering the oral and documentary evidence let in already, and byfollowing the procedures contemplated under law, keeping in mind theabovesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and dispose of the ClaimPetitions as expeditiously as possible. The amounts awarded by thefirst respondent-Labour Court for the period of three years from thedate of claim petitions, shall be paid to the petitioners by thesecond respondent-Panchayats, as expeditiously as possible. No costs.Sd/-Asst. Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.csTo1. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Cuddalore.2. The President, Palampoondi Village, Sathampadi Post, Gingee Taluk, Villupuram District. 3. The President, Melsithamur Panchayat, Gingee Taluk, Villupuram District. 1 cc To Mr.K.Vasudevan, Advocate Sr 74157W.P.Nos.16436 and 21160 of 2008mg[co]gp/10.1