J.Lakshmi Priya v. Krishnakumar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 17.2.2009Coram:THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIAC.R.P.(PD).No.724 of 2006andC.M.P.No.6977 2006J.Lakshmi Priya... Petitioner/1st Respondent vs.

Krishnakumar 2. Janardhanan... Respondents /Petitioner and 2nd Respondent This civil revision petition is filed under Article 227 of theconstitution of India, against the order dated 6.2.2006 passed inI.A.No.10512 of 2005 in HMOP No.124 of 2004 by the PrincipalSubordinate Judge, Chengalpattu. For Petitioner : No appearanceFor Respondents : No appearanceORDERInveighing the order dated 6.2.2006 passed in I.A.No.10512 of2005 in HMOP No.124 of 2004 by the Principal Subordinate Court, Chengalpattu, this civil revision petition is focussed.

Succinctly and precisely the long and short of the facts, which are absolutely necessary for the disposal of this revisionpetition, would run thus:-The first respondent herein filed the H.M.O.P.No.124 of 2004before the Principal Sub Judge, Chengalpattu, under Section 12(1)(a)and 12(1)(e) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, seeking the followingrelief: to declare that the marriage took place between thepetitioner and the first respondent on 5.9.2003 at Subamangala Kalyana Mandapam (Opp to CSI Church) TholkapiyarStreet, Pammal, Chennai-75 as per Hibndu rites is null andvoid. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ While so, during the pendency of the said petition, the same firstrespondent filed the I.A.No.No.10512 of 2005 seeking to amend the O.P.so as to incorporate the alternative prayer for divorce. Afterhearing both sides, the lower Court allowed the I.A. Beingdisconcerted by and dissatisfied with the said order, this revision isfocussed by the respondent in the O.P. on various grounds inter aliathus:the lower Court committed error in allowingcontradictory stands to be taken by the first respondentherein; at the first instance the first respondent has comeforward with the case that the marriage itself is null andvoid, however, in the I.A.he has come forward with the casethat the divorce might be granted in his favour on theground of cruelty.

Despite printing the names of both sides, no one appeared.

Perused the available records including the order of the lowerCourt, which would highlight that the lower Court, after consideringthe pros and cons of the matter, was of the opinion that thealternative prayer for divorce could be permitted to be added in theH.M.O.P.5. The gist and kernal of the case of the first respondent in theoriginal HMOP was that without the voluntary consent of the petitionerherein, the marriage was solemnised, as she was not in a stable stateof mind; she was taking, at the relevant time, treatment for hermental illness in various hospitals. However, in the I.A., he praysfor including the alternative prayer for divorce, based on cruelty. The grounds of cruelty were found set out in the original petitionitself, which the trial Court took into account while allowing theapplication.

I am of the considered opinion that the first respondentshould be given the liberty of seeking alternative prayer. Simplybecause he asked for alternative prayer, the revision petitionercannot dub or label it as an attempt on the part of the firstrespondent to change the entire cause of action in the O.P. In fact, seeking such alternative relief would avoid multiplicity ofproceedings also. Hence, I could see no infirmity in the order passedby the lower Court.