S. Ganapathy v. V. Pandiramaiah

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDated : 03..07..2009C O R A MThe Honourable Mrs. Justice Prabha SridevanandThe Honourable Mr. Justice C.T. SelvamWrit Appeal Nos.2381 and 2382 of 20041.S. Ganapathy2.B. Krishnamoorthy3.A. Anthony Muthuraj4.P. Devadoss5.A. Chellamuthu6.C. Raj7.T.S. Prakash Babu8.R. Rajendran.. Appellants in both the W.As/9.P. KannaiyasamiRespondents 3 to 11 versus1.V. Pandiramaiah2.T. Murugan3.N. Sethuraman4.Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.,Rep. by its Chairman cum Managing Director,Kilpauk, Chennai-10.5.The Chairman cum Managing Director,Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.,No.42, Thambusamy Road,.. Respondents in W.A.No.2381/04Kilpauk, Chennai-10. /Petitioners & Respondents 1 & 21.Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies CorporationEmployees Union (Reg. No.325/CDT),Rep. by its General Secretary,No.42, Thambusamy Road,Kilpauk, Chennai-10.2.Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.,Rep. by its Chairman cum Managing Director,No.42, Thambusamy Road,Kilpauk, Chennai-10. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

3.The Chairman cum Managing Director,Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.,No.42, Thambusamy Road,.. Respondents inKilpauk, Chennai-10.W.A. No.2382/2004Prayer : W.A. No.2381 of 2004 filed under Clause 15 of theLetters Patent against the order of a learned single Judgeof this Court dated 17.4.2004 passed in W.P. No.9087 of2001. Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitutionof india to issue a writ of certiorari call for the recordsof the first and second respondents relating to theproceedings of the second respondent bearing No.E7/53562/97dated.15.3.2001 and quash the same.W.A. No.2382 of 2004 filed against the order of alearned single Judge of this Court dated 17.4.2004 passedin W.P. No.16013 of 2001.Petition filed under Article 226of the Constitution of india to issue a writ of certioraricall for the records of the first and second respondentsrelating to the proceedings of the second respondentbearing No.E7/53562/97 dated.15.3.2001 and quash the same.For Appellants : Mr. N.R. Chandran, Senior Counsel for Mr. R. Kannan For Respondents-1 to 3 : Ms. Ramapriya GopalakrishnanFor Respondents-4 & 5: Mr. V. Selvanayagam J U D G M E N TPrabha Sridevan, J.The appellants herein have been fighting a long battle at leastfrom 1984, when they first came to this Court with a writ petition.The appellants and the contesting respondents are employees of theTamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation ('Corporation' for short). Theappellants were originally Assistant Quality Inspectors ('AQIs' forshort). They were ousted from service, but re-employed in a lowergrade as Junior Assistants, without following the last-come-first-gorule, while their juniors were retained as AQIs. AQIs belong to theTechnical Wing of the Corporation, while Junior Assistants belong tothe Administrative Wing. Therefore, they prayed for quashing theorder rejecting their request to reckon their services as AQIs forfuture promotions and other benefits. 2. Their grievance was that when their juniors, who werecontinuing as AQIs, enjoyed career advancements, they were laggingbehind. Writ Petition Nos.2707, 2708 and 2904 of 1984 were filed by https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appellants 3, 4 and 9 herein respectively, and were disposed of on23.4.1992. This Court found that before dealing with the controversy,it should be ascertained whether in fact there was any discriminationand the writ petitioners were directed to file their respectiverepresentations before the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of theCorporation, who in turn, was directed to give notice to all personsconcerned and after affording opportunity, and to decide the matterincluding the question whether there was any violation of the last-come-first-go rule and to restore the seniority properly. 3. An enquiry was duly held on 2.2.1994. At the enquiry, thewrit petitioners cited the names of their juniors S. Sankara Pandian,K. Guru Rajan, P. Parthiban, Mohana Sundaram, C. Rajendran andKaruppaswamy, who were retained in their services as AQIs, while thewrit petitioners had been ousted. They also cited the names of thoseMill Technical Assistants who were given the benefits of Assistantsby taking into account the service that they had rendered earlier,viz., K. Ramalingam and K. Shanmugam etc. The Enquiry Officerconducted the enquiry and submitted the enquiry report on 25.11.1993.Thereupon, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, by proceedings inRc.No.E7/44183/92 dated 2.2.1994, considered and held that thesuggestion of the Enquiry Officer that the services of the writpetitioners must be regularized in the cadre of Assistant from thedate of their first appointment was reasonable and just. Therefore,there was an order that the service rendered by them in the cadre ofJunior Assistant will be computed as Assistant for the purpose ofqualifying service, seniority, probation etc., but they will not beeligible for arrears of pay and allowances. This order waschallenged in Writ Petition No.4329 of 1997 by the Tamil Nadu CivilSupplies Corporation Employees Union and respondents 1 to 3 (in W.A.No.2381 of 2004). The respondent in the above writ petition was theTamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation, represented by the SeniorRegional Manager and eleven others, including the appellants who hadfiled Nos.2707, 2708 and 2904 of 1984. According to the Union andthe other writ petitioners, the impugned order, which gave therespondent/employees the 47th position, had superseded hundreds ofpersons who were senior to them by reason of having greater length ofservice in the Administrative Wing. On 31.7.1998, this writ petitionwas disposed of by this Court, setting aside the enquiry report onthe ground that the Corporation had misconstrued the directions givenby this Court, which were not a carte blanche to the respondents todo whatever they liked, ignoring the legitimate expectation of thoseinitially appointed to the Administrative Wing, in the name ofrendering justice. The Court directed that the Corporation shouldagain hold a fresh enquiry in terms of the order passed in W.P.No.2707 of 1984 mentioned earlier, after giving notice to allconcerned, particularly the AQIs who had continued in service, thoughjuniors, and all those in the Administrative Wing who are likely tobe affected. Thereafter, an order was passed on 9.4.1999 after an https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ enquiry, during which more than 50 persons were heard. By thisorder, again the seniority of the appellants herein was fixed bytaking into account their earlier service. 4. At once, a contempt application was filed by the Union andthe three respondents, attacking the order passed on 9.4.1999 asblatant contempt of the order dated 31.7.1998. Apprehending punitiveaction, immediately an order was passed on 9.12.1999, by which theorder dated 9.4.1999 was withdrawn and a fresh order was passed andtherefore, the contempt petition was closed. By this order, theappellants were reverted with immediate effect. This order waschallenged in W.P. No.20017 of 1999. On 15.6.2000, on the request ofone Boominathan, a seniority list was published by the Corporation.In the meantime, the Corporation as well as the appellants herein,had preferred an appeal against the order passed on 31.7.1998 in W.P.No.4239 of 1997. On 17.11.2000, the Division Bench heard W.A.No.1494 of 1998 and W.A. No.123 of 1999, which was against the orderpassed in W.P. No.4329 of 1997 and W.P. No.20017 of 1999, which wasagainst the reversion order dated 9.12.1999. The Division Bench,after taking note of the chronological sequence of events and theproceedings mentioned above, found that the order dated 9.12.1999 waswithout notice to the appellants and therefore, the benefits, rightsand advantages which they had got by the earlier order dated 9.4.1999had been taken away. Therefore, the Division Bench set aside theorder dated 9.12.1999 and again directed the parties to put forththeir respective contentions before the Corporation, which wasdirected to pass orders within a period of four months. 5. On 15.3.2001, again an order was passed, which was in favourof the appellants herein. Again, this order was challenged byrespondents 1 to 3 by filing the writ petitions, out of which thepresent writ appeals have arisen. The learned single Judge was of theopinion that the impugned order was illegal in all respects andallowed the writ petition, again setting aside the order, in favourof the appellants. Therefore, the appellants are once again beforeus, having been thwarted repeatedly.6. It is interesting to see that every time the Corporation wasasked to pass an order, the order was that the appellants herein whohad been ousted and had in fact been singled out for ousting and hadsuffered injustice and that injustice had to be set right.7. Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for theappellants initially suggested, without prejudice to the rights ofthe appellants, that if three respondents could come forward withsome amicable solution by which their mutual rights could beadjusted, which would not in any way put the appellants to loss, theappellants were willing to consider it since at present only some ofthe appellants are still in service. But the counsel for the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respondents submitted that the restoration of seniority to thesepersons would affect hundreds of employees. Therefore, we decided tohear the matter on merits.8. The learned senior counsel submitted that all along, thisCourt had decided the issue on the assumption in 1975 that theQuality Control and Administrative Wings were water tightcompartments between which internal movements were impossible, butthis was wrong. It is only subsequently that the service had beendivided into two wings – one Quality Control and the otherAdministrative Wing. Initially, the class of employees were dividedonly according to the scale of pay and therefore, there were reallyno such water tight divisions which prevented movement from theTechnical Wing to the Administrative Wing. Learned senior counselsubmitted that if so, then for no fault of theirs, when they wereousted for want of vacancy and subsequently re-employed, but demoted,i.e., taken back in a lower cadre. It is to redress this injusticethat the Corporation had recognized the fact that they were not thejuniormost to be ousted, if ouster was necessary because of lack ofvacancy, and the fact that others similarly placed like K. Shanmugamof Thanjavur Branch, had been given the benefit of taking intoaccount his service prior to his being inducted in the AdministrativeWing, and decided that the same treatment could be given to theappellants. Learned senior counsel also submitted that no one cansay that a person from the Quality Control Wing cannot move to theAdministrative Wing when in fact the appellants had been brought fromthe Technical Wing into the Administrative Wing. In fact, even theorder dated 9.12.1999 did not push back the appellants to theTechnical Wing, but it retained them in the Administrative Wing,although only on a lower level. Learned senior counsel, therefore,submitted that the well considered order passed by the Corporationcould have been interfered with only if it was perverse orirrational. But if it was one of the possible or plausible andreasonable views, then interference was not warranted.9. Ms. Ramapriya Gopalakrishnan, learned counsel appearing forthe contesting respondents submitted that it is not correct to statethat there were no water tight compartments separating the TechnicalWing and the Administrative Wing. In fact, on facts, the learnedsingle Judge had found that it was so and if once that fact isestablished, then the case of the appellants must be rejected.Learned counsel produced a chart to show that the respondents hadbeen serving in the Corporation two years prior to the date ofappointment of the appellants and therefore, to push the appellantsabove them at the 47th stage, while the respondents were to languishat the 450th stage, would really cause havoc. Learned counselsubmitted that once the earlier orders had been set aside as illegalby this Court, the Corporation cannot and shall not pass the sameorder repeatedly in the face of the specific directions of this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court.10. The 1976 Service Rules of the Corporation have been enclosedin the typed set of papers. In 1977, the appellants were ousted andre-appointed in 1977 and therefore, admittedly the 1976 Service Rulesalone apply. The Service Rules show that the classification of staffwill be graded into the following five classes :Class I – Employees on grades with an initial basic pay ofRs.500 and above.Class II – Employees on grades with an initial basic pay ofRs.300 and above but below Rs.500.Class III – Employees on grades with an initial basic pay ofRs.180 and above but below Rs.300.Class IV – Employees on grades with an initial basic pay ofRs.140 and above but below Rs.180.Class V – Employees on grades with an initial basic pay belowRs.140.Though Annexure-II of the 1976 Service Rules shows the avenues ofpromotion, and from Assistant Quality Inspector, one is promoted toQuality Inspector and then to Assistant Manager (Quality Control) toManager (Quality Control) and the Manager (Administration), Manager(Marketing) and Manager (Marketing Control) may be promoted to SeniorManager and from Junior Assistant to Office Assistant, Superintendent(Office), Assistant Manager (Office Godown), Deputy Manager, Manager(Distribution) and Manager (Administration). But the stand of theCorporation is that there were no water tight compartments betweenthe Technical Wing and the Administrative Wing.11. Whereas, we find that in the 1989 Service Regulations, whiledefining promotion, it is clearly stated that promotion meansappointment to the next higher class or category of the same wing,but however, employees in the Administrative Wing and Accounts Wingwere interchangeable. And, the "Classification Of Staff" inAnnexure-I of the 1989 Service Regulations, in direct contrast to the"Classification Of Staff" in the 1976 Service Rules, divides it intoAdministrative Wing, Accounts Wing, Construction Wing, QualityControl Wing and Mechanical Engineering Wing. Therefore, it is clearthat in 1976, the classification of staff was on the basis of pay andnot on the basis of the nature of duties performed by them. And,Clause 5 which relates to appointments in the 1976 Service Rulesshows that appointments will be as per Annexure-I. It does not speakof the individuals remaining in the same wing, if they have beenappointed in one wing, as we find in the 1989 Service Regulations. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ For AQI, the scale of pay is Rs.250-10-300-15-450. The method ofrecruitment is by direct recruitment and the qualification is aDegree in Science, preferably with Botany/Chemistry as the mainsubject. The appellants were working as AQIs when they were ousted.They were re-employed as Junior Assistants. For a Junior Assistant,the scale of pay is Rs.210-5-245-10-325. The appointment is bydirect recruitment and the qualification is PUC Pass. For anAssistant, the scale of pay is Rs.250-10-300-15-450, which is thesame as that of AQIs and for a person who is directly recruited as anAssistant, the qualification is possession of First or Second ClassDegree. Therefore, when they were ousted and then re-employed, theappellants should rightly have been taken as Assistants, which is thescale of pay to which they belong and since they also possess thequalification required for being recruited as AQIs. This is exactlythe reasoning of the Corporation. Instead, they were appointed asJunior Assistants on a lower scale of pay. When they made therepresentation, the Corporation saw the illegality and set right theerror. Of course, before they set it right, they ought to have heardthe parties who might be aggrieved by the order giving the appellantsthe credit of the years that they had worked as AQIs and any orderspassed in the absence of such persons would necessarily have to beset aside and that is why twice this Court had directed theCorporation to hear all parties concerned and pass orders.12. We will again examine the orders passed by this Court andthe orders passed by the Corporation chronologically. First, we willexamine whether there is in fact a deliberate disobedience to thisCourt's directions. The first order dated 23.4.1992 gives adirection to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation togive notice to "all persons concerned" and afford opportunity ofbeing heard to them and decide whether the action was violation ofthe 'last-come-first-go' rule. The learned single Judge held that itis well settled that in every case of retrenchment or termination onthe ground of loss of work, the last-come-first-go rule along has tobe followed, for otherwise, if juniors are retained in service andseniors are removed, it shall be a discrimination. This order becamefinal. Therefore, even today, this mandate of examining whether theousting of the appellants was in violation of the last-come-first-gorule stands. The Corporation has recorded in its order and in itscounter that it had in fact violated the rule and therefore, restoredthe seniority. So in fact, the Corporation had obeyed the firstorder of this Court. 13. On 2.2.1994, therefore, the Chairman-cum- Managing Directorordered the service of the appellants rendered in the cadre of JuniorAssistants to be computed as Assistants for the purpose of qualifyingservice. We have already seen above that when they were taken in theAdministrative Wing, they had been on the same scale of pay asAssistants, which is higher than the Junior Assistants. On https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

31.7.1998, this Court quashed this order and directed the Corporationto hold a fresh enquiry in terms of the order mentioned earlier,i.e., on 23.4.1992 and also to hear all those in the AdministrativeWing who are likely to be affected prejudicially by any benefit beinggiven to the appellants in the Administrative Wing. Then, a detailedorder was passed on 9.4.1999, setting out the background of the case,giving the appellants the seniority by taking into account theservices rendered by them in the Quality Control Wing. This order wasagain in favour of the appellants. Immediately,a contempt applicationwas filed. On 9.12.1999, without hearing anybody, hurriedly an orderwas passed superseding the order dated 9.4.1999. Thereupon, thecontempt application was closed. On 30.1.2000, the reversion orderwas passed reverting the appellants. On 17.11.2000, the DivisionBench quashed the order dated 9.12.1999 and directed the maintenanceof status quo prior to 9.12.1999 and again directed the Corporationto consider the contentions of the parties and to pass orders. Thenan order on 15.3.2001 was passed, again in favour of the appellants.This has been set aside by the learned single Judge, whose judgmentis challenged herein.14. We must remember one factor. When this Court on 9.12.1998,directed the Corporation to pass orders after hearing everybody andthe Corporation accordingly passed orders on 9.4.1999, which perhapswas in favour of the appellants again, that at best would have givenrise to a fresh cause of action to the respondents; it is not an actof contempt. A direction to pass orders means that the authoritiesof the Corporation shall exercise their discretion and pass orders.The Corporation still had the right to decide how the seniority hasto be fixed. In any event, a contempt application was filed andfearing contempt, an illegal order was passed without hearing theappellants who had been battling for over a decade. While discussingthe manner in which contempt applications have to be dealt with, theSupreme Court in Director of Education vs. Ved Prakash Joshi, (2005)6 S.C.C. 98, following an earlier decision in K.G. Derasari v. Unionof India, (2001) 10 S.C.C. 496, observed as follows :"7. While dealing with an application for contempt,the Court is really concerned with the question whether theearlier decision which has received its finality had beencomplied with or not. It would not be permissible for acourt to examine the correctness of the earlier decisionwhich had not been assailed and to take a view differentthan what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar viewwas taken in K.G. Derasari v. Union of India. The courtexercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concernedwith the question of contumacious conduct of the party whois alleged to have committed default in complying with thedirections in the judgment or order. If there was no https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for theparty concerned to approach the higher court if accordingto him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question hasnecessarily to be agitated before the higher court. Thecourt exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take uponitself power to decide the original proceedings in a mannernot dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order.Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed. Flouting anorder of the court would render the party liable forcontempt. While dealing with an application for contempt,the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-complianceof which is alleged. In other words, it cannot say whatshould not have been done or what should have been done. Itcannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot testcorrectness or otherwise of the order or give additionaldirections or delete any direction. That would beexercising review jurisdiction while dealing with anapplication for initiation of contempt proceedings. Thesame would be impermissible and indefensible."15. When the Division Bench set aside the order dated 9.12.1999in W.P. No.20017 of 1998, the legal consequence is that the orderdated 9.4.1999 got restored. Because, that was set aside by orderdated 9.12.1999. Now, the order dated 9.4.1999 till date has notbeen challenged. However, pursuant to the directions of the DivisionBench, an order has been passed on 15.3.2001, almost on the lines ofthe order dated 9.4.1999. Therefore, we had examined both the ordersdated 15.3.2001 and 9.4.1999 and we find that cogent reasons havebeen given for restoring the seniority of the appellants and therelevant paragraphs will be extracted hereinbelow.16. The order passed by the Corporation reveals the followingfacts :(a)The fact that the appellants who as Technical Assistants wereterminated from the service of the Corporation on the ground ofwant of vacancy in the Quality Control Wing and that thetermination would amount to retrenchment and one of theprocedures to be followed in such cases of termination is thelast-come-first-go rule.(b)That there was a clear violation of the last-come-first-go ruleand the appellants who were seniors had been terminated, whileretaining other juniors in service.(c)That one K. Shanmugam who was working as AQI in Thanjavur Regionwas terminated from service for want of vacancy and he waspromoted as Assistant, computing his entire service from thedate of first appointment in the Quality Control Wing.(d)That there was no difference between the case of Thiru. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Shanmugam and others and the appellants herein.(e)That the appellants as Technical Assistants were in the scale ofpay of Rs.250-10-300-15-450, which is the same as the scale ofpay of the Assistants and when their services were terminatedfor want of vacancy in the Quality Control Wing and they werere-appointed in the Administrative Wing, they should have beenappointed only on the same scale of pay, and to demote them forno fault of theirs was not proper.(f)In the Service Rules framed on 1.6.1973, the earlier servicerules were in force during the time of their re-appointment inthe Administrative Wing, there was neither separate classifiedcategories nor prohibition of appointment from one wing toanother wing. Such a right is implied and inherent in theCorporation.(g)That it is only in the Service Rules which came into forcesubsequently that provided for separate avenues for promotionfor persons working in the Administrative Wing and QualityControl Wing and it cannot in any way stand in the way of theCorporation to grant the benefit of service to those whoseservices were terminated for want of vacancy and re-appointed inthe Administrative Wing.So, for the aforesaid reasons, the decision was taken. 17. It is well settled that sitting in Article 226 of theConstitution, we have to examine whether the decision was takencorrectly and not examine whether the right decision was taken. Weare not sitting in appeal. Of course, we can test the correctness ofthe decision, if the decision is totally perverse or shocking orviolative of the principles of natural justice. But, if that is onereasonable perspective of looking at things, then we cannot correctit merely because we hold a different view – vide Director ofEducation, Uttaranchal vs. Ved Prakash Joshi, (2005) 6 S.C.C. 98. InState of Uttar Pradesh vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 S.C.C. 714, theSupreme Court held as follows :"28. The scope and extent of power of the judicialreview of the High Court contained in Article 226 of theConstitution of India would vary from case to case, thenature of the order, the relevant statute as also the otherrelevant factors including the nature of power exercised bythe public authorities, namely, whether the power isstatutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power ofjudicial review is not intended to assume a supervisoryrole or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is notintended either to review governance under the rule of lawnor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State.Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicativedisposition may not strictly fall for consideration beforea judicial review court. The limited scope of judicialreview, succinctly put, is:(i) Courts, while exercising the power of judicialreview, do not sit in appeal over the decisions ofadministrative bodies.(ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie onlyon certain well-defined grounds.(iii) An order passed by an administrative authorityexercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered injudicial review unless it is shown that exercise ofdiscretion itself is perverse or illegal.(iv) A mere wrong decision without anything more isnot enough to attract the power of judicial review; thesupervisory jurisdiction conferred on a court is limited toseeing that the Tribunal functions within the limits of itsauthority and that its decisions do not occasionmiscarriage of justice.(v) The courts cannot be called upon to undertake thegovernment duties and functions. The court shall notordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State.Social and economic belief of a judge should not be invokedas a substitute for the judgment of the legislative bodies.(See Ira Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 US 113 : 24 L Ed 77(1876)....32. Prof. Bernard Schwartz in his celebrated book(Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., Little Brown Company, 1991)dealing with the present status of judicial review in theAmerican context, summarised as under:“If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turnedinto little more than media for the transmission of casesto the courts. That would destroy the values of agencies,created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquiredthrough continuous administration in the complicatedfields. At the same time, court should not rubber-stampagencies; the scope of judicial enquiry must not be sorestricted that it prevents full enquiry into the action oflegality. If that question cannot be properly explored bythe judge, the right to review becomes meaningless ... inthe final analysis, the scope of review depends on theindividual judge’s estimate of the justice of the case.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

18. The Corporation has been consistently holding the view thatat the relevant point of time, the two services, viz., TechnicalService and Administrative Service was not divided in water tightcompartments. It has consistently held that it had done injustice tothese three by sending them to a lower scale of pay. We have seenthe 1976 Service Rules and it divides the employees only according tothe pay scales. The learned single Judge, on a re-appreciation ofevidence, had decided that the two services were divided into watertight compartments. If there had been such a division, theappellants cannot be fitted in the Administrative Wing even as JuniorAssistants. The learned single Judge held that the originalappointment of the appellants was temporary, so they had no vestedright. But we find that even Pandiramaiah was appointed temporarilyon a consolidated pay. But we find in the order of the Corporationthat they were originally appointed on a basic pay of Rs.250/- andwere ousted to "disbandment of ports" in Madurai Region. So, it isclear that the ports to which they had been appointed had beendisbanded. The Corporation, therefore, was of the opinion that whenthe posts were abandoned, the appellants who were seniors in the samecategory ought to have been accommodated and the juniors should have'gone out'. But this basic rule was violated. The Corporation wasalso of the opinion since at the time of their re-appointment in theAdministrative Wing, "neither there was any separate classifiedcategories nor prohibition of such appointment from one wing toanother wing", they were senior to the respondents. If so, givingthem their seniority on the basis of the scale of pay that they wereearning before the ouster cannot be said to be in any way injuringany legitimate right of the persons in the Administrative Wing.19. For all the reasons stated above, the writ appeals areallowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, W.A.M.P.No.4388 of 2004 is closed. Sd/- Asst. Registrar / True Copy / Sub.Asst Registrar ab ToThe Chairman cum Managing Director,Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.,No.42, Thambusamy Road,Kilpauk, Chennai-10.+ 2 cc to Mr.R.Kannan,Advocate,SR.28167+ 2 cc to M/s.RamaPriya,Advocate,SR.28303,28304W.As.2381 & 2382 of 2004CU(CO)EM/9.7.09