M. Rani Munirathinam v. The State of Tamil Nadu

O R D E RThe writ petition challenges the G.O.(D)No.426,Municipal Administration and Water Supply (TP2) Department, dated12.9.2007 passed by the first respondent. By the said impugnedOrder, the Government by exercise of its power under Section 40-Aof the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 (hereinafterreferred to as the "Act") and accepting the resolution passed bythe Councillors of Pallipattu Town Panchayat by way of "NoConfidence Motion" against the petitioner, being the Presidentdirects the removal of the writ petitioner as Chairman ofPallipattu Town Panchayat, Tiruvellur District from the office ofthe Chairman of the said Town Panchayat. Originally the petitionerwas elected as a Ward Councillor of No.1, Pallipattu TownPanchayat and thereafter, she was elected by majority of wardmembers as Town Panchayat President, which was allowed for ladiesquota on 28.10.2006. There are totally 15 members in the TownPanchayat.2. It is the case of the petitioner that the VicePresident of the Town Panchayat in order to bring one Mrs.UshaRani as President had obtained signatures from 10 members bythreat and force and moved a No Confidence Motion by giving aletter on 21.6.2007. It was pursuant to the said letter stated tohave been signed by 10 members, presented to the secondrespondent, the Assistant Director of Town Panchayats, the secondrespondent has issued a notice under Section 40-B of the Actintimating the members about the convening of a meeting on4.7.2007. Since as required under the Act, 15 clear days noticewas not there, the said meeting stood cancelled and another noticewas issued by the second respondent on 3.7.2007 convening ameeting of the Panchayat on 19.7.2007. On 19.7.2007, the Panchayatmeeting is stated to have been held and a motion for removing thepetitioner from the post of President is stated to have beencarried out. It was on 27.8.2007, the petitioner moved this Courtby filing the writ petition in W.P.No.27629 of 2007 challengingthe meeting called for by the second respondent dated 3.7.2007 onthe basis that the second meeting is not contemplated under theAct. Notice of motion was ordered by this Court on 22.8.2007 andan order of interim injunction passed restraining the firstrespondent, the State of Tamil Nadu from passing further orderspursuant to the meeting held on 19.7.2007 for the purpose ofremoval of the President of the Pallipattu Town Panchayat.Initially, the order of injunction was granted for two weeks andthat was extended by another two weeks on 6.9.2007. On 25.9.2007,this Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petitioner to give a representation to the first respondent. It isthe case of the petitioner that as per the direction, thepetitioner has given a representation to the first respondent on8.10.2007 and the first respondent has not passed any order. Inthe meantime, the impugned G.O., came to be passed on 12.9.2007 byvirtue of the powers conferred under Section 40-A of the Act byaccepting the resolution of the Panchayat dated 19.7.2007 orderingremoval of the petitioner from the Chairmanship and that G.O., isnow being challenged. It is also relevant to point out that in themeantime, certain amendments were incorporated into the Act,especially relating to Section 40-A. One of the provisions of theamendment by way Ordinance is that any motion expressing want ofconfidence in the chairman or vice-chairman made under Section 40-A and pending before any officer, authority or the Government, asthe case may be, as provided in Section 40-A, immediately beforethe commencement of this Ordinance, shall abate. The petitionerchallenges the G.O., mainly on the ground that the second noticeissued by the second respondent on 3.7.2007 calling for Panchayatmeeting is not contemplated under the Act. That apart, on22.8.2007, when this Court has passed an order of interiminjunction restraining the first respondent, the Government is notempowered in passing any further orders pursuant to the meeting ofthe Panchayat held on 19.7.2007 and particularly when theinjunction was in force. It was during that time, the G.O., cameto be passed on 12.9.2007 and therefore, the G.O., is to betreated as non est since the Government Order is against the orderof this Court.3. The second respondent has filed a counter affidavit.The main defence raised by the second respondent is that passingof the Government Order is pursuant to the resolution of thePanchayat dated 19.7.2007. At the time, when the meeting wascalled, there was no order restraining the Panchayat fromproceeding with the meeting and therefore, the resolution passedby the Panchayat is deemed to be in existence and in that event,the natural consequence for the Government is to issuenotification under Section 40-A(12) of the Act. Therefore, thereis nothing wrong in the notification and the Government Orderissued by the Government. 4. Further, it is the case of the Government that whenonce the Gazette Notification is issued, it is expected to beknown to every one and the petitioner cannot take refuge under acover stated to have been posted on 1.11.2007, even thoughGovernment Order is dated 12.9.2007 and according to the firstrespondent, the petitioner is well aware of the Notificationissued even on 12.9.2007 itself. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5. It is also the case of the first and secondrespondents that in the earlier writ petition ultimately, thedecision was not in favour of the petitioner but only thepetitioner was directed to give a representation to theGovernment, the first respondent and therefore, the pendency ofthe injunction application or even an injunction order cannot bedeemed to be a bar for the Government to exercise its statutoryfunction invoking the provisions of the Act. 6. The councillors who have brought the resolution formotion also filed an intervening application. They have alsofiled an affidavit to the effect that issuing of GazetteNotification under Section 40-A(12) of the Act is a naturalconsequence of the resolution passed by the Panchayat meeting on19.7.2007 and on that day, when the Panchayat passed a resolution,there was no impediment on the part of the Panchayat in passingsuch a resolution and it is not even the case of the petitionerthat any force has been used for the purpose of getting resolutionpassed and therefore, the impugned notification should be heldvalid. It is also the further case of the interveners that theGovernment has caused publication on 12.9.2007 not only in respectof the petitioner but also the chairman of four other panchayats.Therefore, it can never be held as if a mala fide act onlyagainst the petitioner.7. Mr. S.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel appearingfor the petitioner would submit that while it is true that themeeting was held on 19.7.2007 and in any event assuming that aresolution was passed on 19.7.2007, when once the Court order isin existence restraining the Government, namely, the firstrespondent from passing any consequential order pursuant to theresolution of the Panchayat dated 19.7.2007, naturally suchconsequential order passed by the Government in disobedience ofthe order of injunction passed by this court should be deemed tobe non-est in eye of law. According to the learned Senior Counsel,the G.O., dated 12.9.2007, the date on which the injunction was inforce, should be ignored. If that being the legal position even itshould be presumed that pursuant to the resolution passed by thePanchayat on 19.7.2007, the Government has not taken any furtheraction in notifying the said proceedings. According to the learnedsenior counsel, the resolution only remains without any furtheraction of issuing notification and therefore, proceedings aredeemed to be pending. In the meantime, the amendment has comeinto effect to the Act, which makes it very clear that theresolution should abate. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

8. The learned Senior Counsel has relied upon thejudgments in SURJIT SINGH AND OTHERS VS. HARBANS SINGH AND OTHERSreported in 1995-6 Supreme Court Cases 50 to substantiate hiscontention that any action taken by the party during the pendencyof the restraint order of the Court should be deemed to be a non-est. 9. On the other hand, Mr.I.Paranthaman, learnedAdditional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents hasproduced the entire files relating to the said resolution andother files. His submission is that as far as the Government'sconduct in passing the notification is concerned, it is astatutory duty which has been performed and therefore, it cannotbe said that the Government is favouring a group of persons, andwhat all the Government has done is only pursuant to theresolution passed by the Panchayat on 19.7.2007. Further, thefactum of injunction came to the notice of the Government only on14.9.2007 by which time all process for issuing the impugnednotification were completed and notification issued.10. The learned Additional Government Pleader for therespondents has relied upon various decisions in support of hiscontention namely, in PULIN DAS KAKATI VS. RAJENDRA NATH HAZARIKAreported in AIR 1972 GAUHATI 25 ( V 59 C 8), in BALAKRUSHNABEHERA AND ANOTHER VS. SATYA PRAKASH DASH reported in 2007 AIR SCW6630 and in NIAZ MOHAMMAD AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF HARYANA ANDOTHERS reported in 1994-6 SUPREME COURT CASES 332.11. It is true that while going through the files, it isrevealed that till 14.9.2007, the order of interim injunctionpassed by this court was not brought to the notice of the firstrespondent and therefore, the contention of Mr.I.Paranthaman,learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents is thatthe Government has passed the G.O., without any mala fideintention, and in any event it remains a fact that injunction wasin force on the date of the Government Order and the injunctionorder was passed after hearing the counsel for the Government.12. Mr. V.Raghavachari learned counsel for theinterveners while reiterating the contents of the affidavit filedby the interveners would submit that what is done by theGovernment is a statutory function and nobody can find fault withthem. The learned counsel has relied on various judgmentsespecially in JAISINGH VITHOBA GIRASE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ANDOTHERS reported in AIR 2000 BOMBAY 317, in MANUJUSNA KADAM VS.GOVERNMENT OF A.P. reported in AIR 1998 ANDHRA PRADESH 195, inSAMALA JAYARAMAIAH VS. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH reported in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ AIR 1998 ANDHRA PRADESH 205 apart from 1999 (9) SUPREME COURTCASES 16 (MAHARAHA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SHAHDEO VS. STATE OFBIHAR AND OTHERS to show that there is absolutely lack ofjurisdiction in this case and usurpation of any jurisdiction wouldamount to revival of an illegal order.13. Heard Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counselappearing for the petitioner, Mr.I.Paranthaman, learned AdditionalGovernment Pleader appearing for the respondents andMr.V.Raghavachari, learned counsel appearing for the intervenersand also perused the entire records including the files producedby the learned Additional Government Pleader.14. Section 40-A of the Act as it stood before theOrdinance came into effect is in the following terms:-Section 40-A. Motion of no-confidence in Chairmanor vice-chairman:- (1) Subject to the provisionsof this section, a motion expressing want ofconfidence in the chairman or vice-chairman may bemade in accordance with the procedure laid downherein.(2) Written notice of intention to make the motionin such form as may be fixed by the StateGovernment, signed by such number of councillorsas shall constitute not less than one half of thesanctioned strength of the council, together witha copy of the motion which is proposed to be made,shall be delivered by any two of the councillor,signing the notice in person together, to theRegional Director of Municipal Administration.(3) The Regional Director of MunicipalAdministration shall then convene a meeting forthe consideration of the motion, to be held at themunicipal office, at a time appointed by him whichshall not be later than thirty days from the dateon which the notice under sub-section (2) wasdelivered to him. He shall give to the councillorsnotice of not less than fifteen clear days of suchmeeting and of the time appointed therefor.(4) The Regional Director of MunicipalAdministration shall preside at the meetingconvened under this section, and no other personshall preside there at. If within half an hourafter the time appointed for the meeting RegionalDirector of Municipal Administration is notpresent to preside at the meeting, the meetingshall stand adjourned to a time to be appointedand notified to the councillors by the RegionalDirector of Municipal Administration under sub- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ section (5).(5) If the Regional Director of MunicipalAdministration is unable to preside at themeeting, he may, after recording his reasons inwriting, adjourn the meetingv to such other timeas he may appoint. The date so appointed shall notbe later than thirty days from the date appointedfor the meeting under sub-section (3), Notice ofnot less than seven clear days shall be given tothe councillors of the time appointed for theadjourned meeting.(6) Save as provided in sub-sections (4)(5) ameeting convened for the purpose of considering amotion under this section, shall not for anyreasons be adjourned.(7) As soon as the meeting convened under thissection has commenced, the Regional Director ofMunicipal Administration shall read to the councilthe motion for the consideration of which it hasbeen convened, and declare it to be open fordebates.(8) No debate on any motion under this sectionshall be adjourned.(9) Such debate shall automatically terminate onthe expiry of two hours from the time appointedfor the commencement of the meeting, if it is notconcluded earlier. Upon the conclusion of thedebate or upon the expiry of the said period oftwo hours, as the case may be, the motion shall beput to the vote of the council.(10) The Regional Director of MunicipalAdministration shall not speak on the merits ofthe motion, nor shall he be entitled to votethereon.(11) A copy of the minutes of the meeting togetherwith a copy of the motion and the result of thevoting thereon shall forthwith on the terminationof the meeting be forwarded by the RegionalDirector of Municipal Administration to the StateGovernment.(12) If the motion is carried with the support ofnot less than three-fifth of the sanctionedstrength of the council, the State Governmentshall, by notification, remove the chairman orvice-chairman.(13) If the motion is not carried by such amajority as aforesaid, or if the meeting cannot beheld for want of a quorum, no notice of anysubsequent motion expressing want of confidence in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the same chairman or vice-chairman shall bereceived until after the expiry of six months fromthe date of the meeting.(14) No notice of a motion under this sectionshall be received within six months of theassumption of office by a chairman or vice-chairman."15. Therefore, section 40-A of the Act, as it stoodbefore the amendment, which came into effect on 4.10.2007empowered the Panchayat to move no confidence motion against thechairman or vice-chairman by way of a motion signed by not lessthan one half of the sanctioned strength and the same having beenpresented by minimum two councillors to the Regional Director ofMunicipal Administration. As per sub-section 12, the motioncarried out by not less than three-fifth of the sanctionedstrength of the council has to be notified by the State Governmentby which the removal of the chairman or vice-chairman comes intoeffect. It is also stated in Section 40-A (13) that if suchresolution was not passed for want of a quorum, no notice of anysubsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the samechairman or vice-chairman shall be received until after the expiryof six months from the date of the meeting. 16. Some amendments were incorporated under Section 40-Aof the Act relating to i) submission of motion, which was originally by half of thesanctioned strength of the council is now made as three-fifth ofthe total number of members of the councilii) in respect of carrying out a motion, it was three-fifth of thesanctioned strength and the same has been made as four-fifth ofthe sanctioned strength. Likewise, in respect of the disability inmoving further motion as contemplated under Section 40-A (13),instead of six months, the same has been increased to one year.Likewise there is a consequential change under Section 40-A (14)also. The said amendment by way of Ordinance has come into effectfrom 4.10.2007.17. It is true that when a no confidence motion wasmoved against the petitioner, out of the total number ofcouncillors namely, 15, 10 councillors have signed in the same andit is also not in dispute that minimum requirement of twocouncillors have presented the same before the second respondentand it is also not in dispute that a resolution has been carriedout on 19.7.2007 in the meeting of the Panchayat which wasconvened. Even though the contention raised as a point that thereis no right on the part of the second respondent to issue a secondnotice, the same is not insisted at this stage and therefore, theissue is left open. It is relevant to point out that originally https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ notice was given on 25.6.2007 for convening a meeting on 4.7.2007.Probably after finding that 15 clear days were not available, thesaid meeting was not convened. It is clear that a notice was givenon 3.7.2007 and that notice is under the provisions of the Act bygiving 15 days and the meeting was held and the resolution wascarried out. It remains a fact that on the date of resolutionnamely 19.7.2007, the petitioner has not moved the Court and thepetitioner has ultimately approached this Court on 22.8.2007 byfiling the writ petition in W.P.No.27629 of 2007. That writpetition was filed challenging the notice given by the secondrespondent on 3.7.2007 convening the meeting on 19.7.2007. Pendingthe writ petition, the petitioner filed an interim applicationpraying for interim injunction restraining the first respondentState Government from passing any further orders. It is not indispute that on 22.8.2007, this Court has passed an order ofinterim injunction restraining the State Government namely, thefirst respondent from passing any further orders pursuant to themeeting held on 19.7.2007 for the purpose of removal of thePresident of the Pallipattu Town Panchayat and that order ofinjunction was subsequently extended on 6.9.2007 for another twoweeks i.e. upto 20.9.2007. It is in between this time when theorder of injunction was in force, the impugned G.O came to bepassed on 12.9.2007. Therefore, the question to be decided is asto whether the impugned Government Order, which was passed on12.9.2007, at the time when the injunction order was workingagainst the first respondent, the Government was competent to passsuch order or such notification issued by the Government is validin law. If the G.O passed on 12.9.2007 is not valid due to reasonof the pendency of injunction against the first respondent forpassing notification or orders, then it is only natural that theresolution of the Panchayat passed on 19.7.2007 remains notnotified. As enumerated above, the resolution passed by thePanachayat on 19.7.2007 comes into effect after notification iseffected under Section 40-A(12) of the Act and that notificationis issued by the Government.18. In SURJIT SINGH AND OTHERS VS. HARBANS SINGH ANDOTHERS reported in 1995-6 SUPREME COURT CASES 50, the SupremeCourt had an occasion to decide about the validity of anyalienation or assignment made in defiance of the Court's orderirrespective of whether it was of the property per se or of thedecree pertaining assignment as non est. The Supreme Court hasultimately held that when the Court intends a particular state ofaffairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state ofaffairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumedto exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Supreme Court hasfurther held that in such circumstances, it is the duty of theCourt and also the right to treat the alienation or assignment ashaving not taken place at all for its purposes. The relevant https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ portion of the Supreme Court in this regard is para-4, which readsas follows:-" 4. As said before, the assignment is by means ofa registered deed. The assignment had taken placeafter the passing of the preliminary decree inwhich Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share.His right to property to that extent stoodestablished. A decree relating to immovableproperty worth more than hundred rupees, if beingassigned, was required to be registered. That hasinstantly been done. It is per se property, for itrelates to the immovable property involved in thesuit. It clearly and squarely fell within theambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did notmake any appreciable difference whether propertyper se had been alienated or a decree pertainingto that property. In defiance of the restraintorder, the alienation/assignment was made. If wewere to let it go as such, it would defeat theends of justice and the prevalent public policy.When the Court intends a particular state ofaffairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis,that state of affairs is not only required to bemaintained, but it is presumed to exist till theCourt orders otherwise. The Court, in thesecircumstances has the duty, as also the right, totreat the alienation/assignment as having nottaken place at all for its purposes. Once that isso, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondentsherein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties onthe basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by thetrial Court as parties to the suit, indisobedience of its orders. The principles of lispendens are altogether on a different footing. Wedo not propose to examine their involvementpresently. All what is emphasised is that theassignees in the present facts and circumstanceshad no cause to be impleaded as parties to thesuit. On that basis, there was no cause for goinginto the question of interpretation of paragraphs13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path treatedby the courts below was, in our view, out of theirbounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the threeorders of the courts below and reject theapplication of the assignees for impleadment underOrder 22 Rule 10 CPC." (emphasis supplied) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

19. Therefore, it is clear that when once an order ofinjunction is in operation against the first respondent, it can besafely presumed that the notification issued by the firstrespondent on 12.9.2007, has to be ignored and has to be treatedas non-est in eye of law.20. The judgments referred to by Mr.I.Paranthaman,learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents on theface of it have no relevance to the facts of this case at all. 21. In PULIN DAS KAKATI VS. RAJENDRA NATH HAZARIKAreported in AIR 1972 GAUHATI 25 ( V 59 C 8), the Gauhati HighCourt had to deal with Order 3 Rule 5 of CPC, wherein notice topleader regarding presumption as to its communication to party washeld to be rebuttable and not conclusive. 22. In MARIYAPPA VS. RAMAKRISHNA RAO reported in 1999CRI L.J. 1378, the Karnataka High Court was dealing about thecivil contempt case, wherein the plea of ignorance of order ofinterim stay was considered. On the fact of the said case, theKarnataka High Court has held that the sale deed was executed bythe power of attorney agent on the same day of passing of order ofinterim stay without knowledge of the same and the Power ofattorney holder was not impleaded. In that context, the KarnatakaHigh court has held that there was no deliberate disobedience ofthe Court order.23. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court inBALAKRUSHNA BEHERA AND ANOTHER VS. SATYA PRAKASH DASH reported in2007 AIR SCW 6630. That was relating to the publication of resultsby the University. As per the direction of the Court, theUniversity has published the results and while dealing with it,the Supreme Court has held that there was no willful disobedienceeven though there was some delay in executing the same.24. The judgment of the Supreme Court in BALWANT SINGHVS. MOOL CHAND reported in AIR 1971 SUPREME COURT 129 is notapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.That was a case, wherein the Supreme Court had an occasion to dealabout the exparte interim order granted in favour of thepetitioner, which was likely to affect the third parties interestand causing the grave injustice to the non-petitioners by holdingthat under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court hasto correct such injustice. Equally, the judgments relied upon byMr.V.Raghavachari, learned counsel for the interveners have norelevance to the facts and circumstances of the present case. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

25. In JAISINGH VITHOBA GIRASE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRAreported in AIR 2000 BOMBAY 317, wherein the Bombay High Court hadan occasion to decide about an election of the chairman and ViceChairman under Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing(Regulation) Act, 1964. That was also a case where no confidencemotion against Chairman under Section 23-A of the Act was movedand the Division Bench of the Maharashtra High Court has held thatSection 23-A are the regulating procedure for expressing noconfidence against Chairman and Vice-Chairman as a complete theCode in itself and there is no abdication of powers and the powersvested with the Collector is not unguided power and that does notsuffer from excessive delegation.26. It is relevant to point out that under theprovisions of the said Act, there is no similar provision as thatof the notification by the Government about the no confidencemotion contemplated under Section 40-A(12) of the DistrictMunicipalities Act. Likewise, even in two other cases relating tothe Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, which were alsorelating to no confidence motion moved against the Chairman ofZilla Parishad, the same was the issue. A careful reading of thosejudgments show that in those cases, there are no provisions forthe purpose of the resolution to be passed by the Panchayat andnotified by the Government. 27. The next judgment, which is relied upon byMr.V.Raghavachari, learned counsel for the interveners relates tothe tenancy laws under the Bihar Land Reforms Act decided by theSupreme Court. That was the case in MAHARAJA CHITAMANI SARAN NATHSHAHDEO VS. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS reported in 1999 – 8 SUPREMECOURT CASES 16. The Supreme Court has held that though the Actvests no powers on Board of Revenue, order of member of the Boarddirecting action to be taken for refund of excess compensationpaid was held to be valid and proper holding that if such anorder passed by the Member of Board, who has actually nojurisdiction to set aside such an order, then it will amount torevival of an invalid order of compensation to the appellant. 28. Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for theinterveners heavily relied upon the said judgment of the SupremeCourt to show that if notification of the Government is set aside,it means that the Panchayat, which has got legal right to passresolution and which has in fact passed a resolution on 19.7.2007in accordance with law will be invalid and it will amount tomaking a valid act of the Panchayat as invalid, particularly whenthe said resolution of the Panchayat dated 19.7.2007 was notchallenged. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

29. As enumerated above, under the provisions of the Act,there is a specific provision under Section 40-A(12) stating thatany resolution passed by the Panchayat will have to be notified bythe Government to the effect that the Chairman or President isremoved. Therefore, it is clear that it is as on the date ofnotification removal comes into effect. Since on the said dateimpugned G.O., the order of injunction was in force, the impugnedorder has to be ignored and therefore, it should be presumed thatit is only a resolution of the Panchayat dated 19.7.2007, which isin existence, which will be operative only if it is properlynotified as per Section 40-A (12) of the Act. In the meantime byadvent of the amendment by way of Ordinance which has come intoeffect, from 4.10.2007 under Section 40-A pending proceedings arestated to be abated. Therefore, in my considered opinion when oncethe impugned G.O., is to go, since it will be treated as non estin law, it should be presumed that the resolution of the Panchayatdated 19.7.2007 remains before it is notified, the amendment hascome into effect and therefore the resolution of the Panchayatdated 19.7.2007 pending notification deemed to be abated.30. In view of the same, the writ petition is allowed.Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Nocosts.KbSd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarTo1. The Secretary to Government The State of Tamil Nadu Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department Fort St. George Chennai – 600 009.2. The Assistant Director of Town Panchayats Collector Office Complex Tiruvellur Region, Tiruvellur. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

3. The Executive Office (Incharge) Pallipattu Town Panchayat Pallipattu Thiruvellur District.•1 cc to Mr. R. Bharathkumar, Advocate SR No. 69454•2 ccs to Mr. V. Raghavachari, Advocate SR No. 69498•1 cc to Mr. Government Pleader SR No. 69594BS(CO)SR/23.11.2007W.P.No.34715 of 2007