Haripriya Rayaningar v. The Secretary to Government, Department of Revenue, Government of Tamil nadu

24.The Urban Land Owner filed a petition under section 33 ofthe Principal Act on 3.7.1981 before the Special Commissioner andCommissioner of Land Reforms, Chennai, 2nd respondent stating that the3rd respondent had failed to note that 519.881 Sq.mts. is covered by aroad, while computing the excess vacant land. The copy of appealpetition was communicated to the Assistant Commissioner, MylaporeUrban Land Ceiling, Chennai, 3rd respondent on 13.8.1981 for a report.After examining the records, the Special Commissioner andCommissioner of Land Reforms, Chennai, 2nd respondent dismissed theappeal petition, vide Proceedings No. D.Dis.32639/81, dated25.9.1982, since 250 Sq.mts had already been treated as pathway andthe Government had already granted exemption for pathway of 269.881Sq.fts under Section 21(1)(b) of the Principal Act, videG.O.Ms.No.2576, dated 14.11.1980. Hence, the computation of excessvacant land by the Competent Authority was confirmed as correct.Thereafter, further action was pursued by the 3rd respondent toacquire excess of vacant of 641 sq.mts. under sections 9 to 11 of thePrincipal Act.25.Thereafter, notification under section 11(1) of thePrincipal Act was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette No.4 Part VI Sec.I dated 3.2.1982. The notification under section '11(3)of the Principal Act vesting the land with Government was issued on12.10.1982 and was published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette No. 43Dated 10.11.1982, in Part VI(l)/1224/82 (Page No.559). Then noticeunder section 11(5) of the Principal Act was issued on 27.11.1982. Onreceipt of the above notice, the Urban Land owner filed a WritPetition in W.P.No.10810/82 before this Court and stay was granted on28.12.1982. When the Writ petition was pending, the Urban Land ownerfiled an appeal petition under section 33 of the Principal Act beforethe 2nd respondent on 10.9.1986 stating that she was ready to'surrender' the same extent of excess vacant land in the rear portionof the land 'instead of front portion'. The offer made by the landto surrender the rear portion of the land was accepted. The abovepetition was allowed by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner ofLand Reforms in proceedings No.33122/86 dated 14.11.1986, oncondition that the urban land owner should withdraw the Writ Petition.26.Subsequently, as per the proceedings of the thirdrespondent, in his letter No.A2/SRA/327/78, dated 24.07.1987, anerrata to the notifications under sections 11(1) and 11(3) of thePrincipal Act was also issued and published in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette No.22 dated 10.6.1987 to read the acquired asR.S.No.3847/96, instead of R.S.No.3847/95. Notice under Section 11(5) of the Principal Act was issued on 14.07.1987 to surrender theexcess land, within 30 days and it was acknowledged by the land owneron 04.08.1987. Accordingly, the Writ petition was dismissed as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ withdrawn, vide order of this Court, dated 18.4.1988 and the landowner surrendered the land on 29.04.1988. Possession of excess vacantland was taken over and handed over by the Special Deputy Tahsildar,Office of the 3rd respondent to the Revenue Inspector of Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk on 29.4.1988. The Urban Land owner had also signedthe Land Delivery Receipt. 27.After taking over possession, notice under section 12(1) ofthe Principal Act was issued on 31.08.1988 and served on the landowner on 27.09.1988, regarding payment of land value under section 12(6) of the Principal Act. The amount was claimed and paid to theUrban Land owner periodically. The amount sanctioned under section 12(6) of the Principal Act, was calculated at Rs.50/- per Sq. mt. andfor 641 Sq.metres the total amount came to Rs.32,050/- and paid asfollows:PaymentdetailAmount Interest TotalDisbursed onInitialpayment (25%of amount8012.5--8012.5025.04.891st Instalment1602.50166.751769.2525.04.892nd Instalment1602.50134.601737.1025.04.893rdInstalment1602.50125.001727.5025.04.894thInstalment1602.50115.401717.9025.04.895th Instalment1602.50105.401707.6525.04.896th Instalment1602.5095.601698.1025.04.89Differenceamount ofinterest6394/-10.11.198910357.507th Instalment1602.50865.352467.85 or246804.05.90 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ PaymentdetailAmount Interest TotalDisbursed on8thInstalment1602.50769.202371.70 or237212.05.919th Instalment1602.50673.052275.55 or227624.09.9210thInstalment1602.50576.902179.40 or217918.01.9411thInstalment1602.50480.752083.25 or208307.02.9412thInstalment1602.50384.601987.10 or198727.05.9513thInstalment1602.50384.601987.10 or198701.02.9614thInstalment1602.5035.801638.30 or163831.03.9715thInstalment1602.5096.001698.50 or1699Kept in R.D.,on 29.11.0428.The excess vacant land of 641 Sq.metres in R.S.No.3847/96 was acquired and handed over possession to the RevenueDepartment on 29.4.88 itself. The land value for taken over byGovernment was .also paid in instalments and almost completed. TheUrban Land Owner received 25% and the 14 Annual instalments. The lastand the final 15th instalment of land value was kept in RevenueDeposit. The excess vacant land was allotted to the Tamil Nadu AdiDravidar Housing Development Corporation vide G.O.Ms.No.778, Revenue,Dated 27.5.1991, for developing housing for the poor and necessaryentries have also been made in T.S.L.R., extract in the name of theallottee, Viz., Tamil Nadu Adi Dravidar Housing and DevelopmentCorporation. The allottee had also remitted the land value to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government on 18.09.1991 itself. The Collector of Chennai inproceedings No.J2/33707/91, dated 27.5.1991 granted permission to theallottee to enter upon the above land, pending payment of land value.The allottee had paid a sum of Rs.44,870/- on 8.9.1991 and physicalpossession of the land was handed over by the Firka RevenueInspector-III, Office of the Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk,representing the Collector, on 18.12.1991 to the Junior Engineer onbehalf of the allottee Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing DevelopmentCorporation and they continue to be in possession. 29.The allottee has applied to the M.M.D.A., on 20.6.1994 forreclassification of the site from Primary Residential to MixedResidential use zone. As per Gazette Notification published in TamilNadu Government Gazette No. 34 dated 31.8.1994, the land wasreclassified as 'Mixed residential". The land is now registered inthe name of allottee Department as per the Revenue records (PermanentLand Register), Agency which is possession of the land and kept aname board also in the lane and necessary entries have also been madein Permanent Land Register in the name of allottee Department and thephysical possession of the land was transferred to them. Hence, thecontention of the petitioners that possession of the land was nottaken and handedover to the Corporation is false. No proceedingswere pending on the date of commencement of the Repeal Act, whichcame into force on 16.06.1999 and thereafter, Sections 3(2) and 4 ofthe Repeal Act, are applicable to the facts of this case.30.The petitioners, Tmt.Haripriya Rayaninger and two othersclaiming themselves to be the sisters and brother of the erstwhileUrban Land owners have filed this Writ petition, after a lapse ofmore than 20 years from the. date of taking over possession of theexcess vacant land by the Revenue authorities and handing over ofland to the allottee viz. Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing DevelopmentCorporation (TAHDCO). The Writ Petition filed by them is purely anafter thought, time barred and liable to be dismissed in limine. 31.There is no bona fide in the action of the petitioners andit is intended to take away the land acquired and vested in theGovernment and thereafter, allotted to the Corporation. The landowner has surrendered and delivered possession in 1988, signed theLand Delivery Receipt on her free will and accord, and received thecompensation amount as determined under Section 12 of the PrincipalAct. 32.The petitioners are not the land owners and that the urbanland owner had already handed over physical possession of the excessvacant land and received the amount payable under section 12(6) of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Principal Act. Out of 3907 Sq.mts., owned by Urban Land Owner,641 Sq.mts. only was acquired from Urban Land Owner. As per theprovisions of the Principal Act, brothers/sisters of the land ownercould not be considered as family members of the Urban Land Owner andthey are not entitled to claim any right over the lands acquiredsince it was taken over by Government. The petitioners being thesisters and brother of land owner cannot claim right over the urbanland and they have no locus-standi to file the Writ Petition,especially, when all the proceedings were completed and Urban LandOwner had surrendered possession of the land and accepted paymentfor the land in instalments, except the last instalment.33.The petitioners have stated that the will of her sisterlate Rangamma Gayatri Devi was probated by this court inO.P.No.175/2001. The Principal Act came into force with effect from03.08.1976 and the excess vacant land was acquired and possession washanded over on 29.4.88 to the Revenue Department. Moreover as perSection 6 of the Principal Act, transfer of land is in contraventionof the provisions of the Principal Act and shall be deemed to be nulland void and that the will probated in 2001, long after the take overof possession and its allotment to Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida HousingDevelopment Corporation in 1991, would not clothe any right to thepetitioners under the Repeal Act, to claim restoration of possession.The contention of the petitioners that they are beneficiaries of theWill probated, after 13 years from the date of taking over possessionis of no relevance to the case.34.Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Tamil Nadu Act 20 of 1999) (hereafterreferred to as " the Repeal Act") is not applicable to the case. Inthis case, the land was vested on the Government with effect from05.11.1982 and physical possession was taken over and handed over tothe Revenue Authorities on 29.04.1988. The land was allotted toTamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation, videG.O.Ms.No.778, Revenue, Dated 27.5.1991 and possession was taken bythem on 18.12.1991.35.Since no proceedings were pending at the time ofcommencement of the Repeal Act, action taken in this case is saved asper Section 3(1) (a) of the Repeal Act, which came into force from16.06.1999, which provides, that the repeal of the Principal Actshall not affect the land vested in the Government and possession ofwhich was already taken over by the Revenue Department. Hence,sections 3(2) and 4 of the Repeal Act are not applicable to thiscase. In this case, the entire acquisition proceedings as per thePrincipal Act were completed well before introduction of the RepealAct, ie., on 16.6.1999. As no proceedings were pending on the date of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Repeal Act, i.e., 16.06.1999, the contention of the petitioners thatin view of the Repeal Act, the land can be restored is untenable.36.One Mrs.Janet Christine De Penning of Cenetoph Road filedWrit petition No.46961/2002 against C.M.D.A. Corporation of Chennaiand Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation objectingto the construction of the building alleging violation of law anddevelopment rules. This Court in its judgement dated 21.10.2003 hasdisposed of the above Writ Petition with the observation that it isfor the 1st Respondent (C.M.D.A.) to consider the application of 3rdRespondent (Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation),if the same is permissible. The allottee has remitted necessarycharges to the C.M.D.A. for the approval of building plan. Theallottee-Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation hadobtained Permanent Land Register Extract from Taluk Office Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk vide TK/b/33414/2007, Dated 17.12.07 which showsthat the land in question stands registered in the name of theCorporation. 37.The allottee has also obtained Encumbrance Certificate fromSub-Registrar's office which also shows that the land is owned by theCorporation (vide EC.NO.15/2010). Hence, the contention of thepetitioners that patta stands in the name of their sister as theowner of the land is not acceptable and deserves to be rejected. 38.The Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporationapplied to the Corporation of Chennai for issue planning permissionfor construction of buildings and remitted necessary charges to theCorporation of Chennai in the year 2005. It shows that the land is inphysical possession of the allottee. No proceedings were pendingunder the Principal Act on the date of commencement of the RepealAct, as the excess vacant land was acquired as early as 1988 and wasallotted to the Tamil Nadu Adi Drayida Housing DevelopmentCorporation and they took possession on 18.12.1991 itself, while theRepeal Act came into force in 1999 only. 39.The allottee has obtained permission from CMDA to put upconstruction and after calling for tenders, construction work is inprogress and therefore, the contention that steps are being takenonly in November' 2009 to take possession from the petitioners isfalse and baseless. 40.The further contention that surrender proceedings werepending with the authorities on the date of commencement of theRepeal Act and stood abated as per Section 4 of the Act and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ therefore, the contention of the petitioners that they have the rightto seek restoration, deserves to be rejected.41.Restoration of the land to the petitioners would notarise, since actual physical possession of the land was already takenover as early as 29.4.1988, after following the procedure. Thetransaction relation to taking over the land from the petitioners andhanding over to the Corporation are valid, the question ofimcompetency does not arise at all. The land is in possession ofallottee Viz. Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporationfrom 18.12.1991. Even if the lands remain vacant, as on 16.06.1999,once possession is taken and when no proceedings were pending on thedate of Repeal Act, the petitioners have no right to seek forrestoration. The action taken under the Principal Act, is saved asper section 3(l)(a) of the Repeal Act which provides that the repealof Principal Act, shall not affect the land vested with Government,under Section 11(3) of the Principal Act, once possession of the samewas taken over and handed over to Revenue Department. As possessionhas been surrendered and taken, the provisions of Repeal Act wouldnot lend any support to the case of the petitioners.42.After strictly following the provisions of the PrincipalAct, the land was taken over and handed over to the Revenueauthorities on 29.4.88. The Special Deputy Tahsildar, Office of the3rd respondent has handed over possession and the Revenue Inspector,Mylapore Triplicane Taluk, who took over possession, were authorizedpersons of the respective Departments. Moreover, the land ownerherself signed the Land Delivery receipt at the time handing overpossession. The land value under section 12 (6) of the Principal Actwas paid at 25% initially and balance in 14 annual instalments. TheUrban Land Owner received the payments except the last instalmentwhich was kept under Revenue Deposit and hence the possession takenis perfectly valid in law.43.Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court inW.P.No.11334 of 2006, dated 02.11.2009 [R.R.Nadham -vs- State ofTamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary to Government, RevenueDepartment], wherein, this Court, held that "physical possession ofthe land handed over by the Assistant Grade Revenue Inspector, (ULC)Poonamalleee and taken over by the Revenue Inspector, Ambattur andthe consequential Land Delivery Receipt duly signed by both theauthorities, as valid and further held that the authorities hadfollowed the procedure, before taking over possession of the land,which cannot, at any stage, be found fault with. This Court alsoobserved that the possession of the petitioner therein, if any, hasto be treated only as an encroachment on the Government land.Section 4 of the Repeal Act cannot be made applicable to this case, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the reason being, no proceedings were pending immediately before thecommencement of the Act, before any Court, Tribunal or any authority.Therefore, the possession, which was taken by the authorities wayback on 19.1.1984 had become final. As such, there shall not be anyabatement of proceedings as contemplated under the said proviso".44.Placing reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court inTamilnadu Housing Board Vs. L.Chandrasekaran (Dead) by Lrs. andothers, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 786 and Smt.Sulochana ChandrakanthGalande Vs. Pune Municipal Transport and others reported in CDJ 2010SCC 660 and this Court in Tamilnadu Housing Board Vs. S.Gajendran andanother dated 16.02.2010, CDJ MHC 1637 and G.R. Concrete Blocks Pvt.Ltd., represented by its Managing Partner Vs. State of Tamilnadu,Represented by Deputy Secretary to Government of Tamilnadu and Othersreported in 2010 (3) MLJ 643, Mr.K.Murali, learned GovernmentAdvocate appearing for the State submitted that once the land isvested in the government and physical possession is taken, it is freefrom all encumbrances and the land owner has no legal right toquestion as to how the land has to be used or whether the land isused for the purpose, for which, it was acquired or for any otherpurpose. He also submitted that once the land is acquired andpossession is taken by the Government, all rights are forfeited andno re-conveyance can be claimed on any account, even on the groundsof usage of the lands for a different purpose. He submitted that thewrit petition is not maintainable on the ground of latches andestoppel, in view of the conduct of the land owner, in surrenderingthe land and receiving the compensation amount. The respondents haveprayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 45.The fourth respondent, Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar HousingDevelopment Corporation has submitted that the Government ofTamilnadu had allotted the subject site to the Corporation by theRevenue Department in G.O.M.S.No.770, dated 27-05-1991. They hadtaken physical possession of the site, by due process of law andhence the provisions of Section 2 of the TN ULC & R Repeal Act ,1999will not apply to their case. The Collector, vide his proceedings inJ2/33707/91, dated 28-05-1991, permitted them to enter upon the site,after taking an undertaking, dated 30-05-1991.46.He further submitted that the Corporation had sought for azone reclassification of the site, as early as on 30.08.1991. Theyhad paid the consideration for the land fixed by the Collector asearly as on 08-09-1991 and thereafter, the subject site was handedover to them, as early as 18-12-1991 and they had taken physicalpossession of the same, on the same day itself. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

47.He also submitted that Thasildar, Mylapore-TriplicaneTaluk, vide his letter, dated 28-01-2008, has stated that the landrecords in respect of the land has been registered in the name of the4th respondent herein, viz, The Tamil Nadu Adi Dravidar HousingDevelopment Corporation. The MMDA, vide its letter, dated 20-07-1994, has intimated the reclassification of the land from "PrimeResidential Zone to Mixed Residential Zone". The records in the Sub-registrar office in respect of the land has been incorporated inDoc.No.1/2010.48.Learned counsel for the fourth respondent has furthersubmitted that they are a corporation created by the Government ofTamil Nadu, to uplift the poor downtrodden people belonging to AdiDravida and Scheduled Tribes, by sponsoring welfare measures. Thecorporation is not an individual, but an institution incorporated topursue developmental activities. The corporation has observed allprocedures at every stage and commenced construction and at the timeof filing counter affidavit, has reached the roof level ready, forthe completion of the concrete slab. They have already spentsubstantial amounts towards construction and huge sums have beenreleased to the contractor towards the construction. A series ofphotographs were produced in support of his contention. He furthersubmitted that the lands were already taken physical possession bythem as early as 18-12-1991 and the records clearly reveal the same.Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused thematerials available on record.49.Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Repeal Act, 1999 deals with the Savings Clause, whichstates as follows:"(1) The Repeal of the Principal Act shall notaffect:-(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of section 11, possession of which has beentaken over by the State Government or any person dulyauthorised by the State Government in this behalf or bythe competent authority.(b) the validity of any order granting exemptionunder sub-section (1) of Section 21 or any action takenthereunder.(2) Where:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (a) any land is deemed to have vested in theState Government under sub-Section (3) of Section 11 ofthe Principal Act but possession of which has not beentaken over by the State Government or any person dulyauthorised by the State Government in this behalf or bythe competent authority; and(b) any amount has been paid by the StateGovernment with respect to such land, then, such landshall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any,has been refunded to the State Government."50.As per Section 4 of the Repealing Act, all proceedingsrelating to any order made or purported to be made under thePrincipal Act pending immediately before the commencement of the Act,before any Court, Tribunal or other authority shall abate. Provisoto the said Section states that the above said Section shall notapply to the proceedings relating to Sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 15-Band 16 of the Principal Act, insofar as such proceedings arerelatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by theState Government or any person duly authorised by the StateGovernment in this behalf or by the competent authority. 51.Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, reads as follows:"(1) As soon as may be after the service of thefinal statement under section 10 on the personconcerned, the competent authority shal cause anotification giving the particulars of the vacantland held by such person in excess of the ceilinglimit and starting that-(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by theState Government; and(ii) the claims of all persons interested insuch vacant land may be made by them personally or bytheir agents giving particulars of the nature oftheir interests of such land, to be published for theinformation of the general public in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette,and in such other manner as may beprescribed. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (2) After considering the claims of the personsinterested in the vacant land, made to the competentauthority in pursuance of the notification publisedunder sub-Section (1), the competent authority shaldetermine the nature and extent of such claims andpass such orders as it deems fit.(3) At any time after the publication of thenotification under sub-section (1) the competentauthority may, by notification in the Tamil naduGovernment Gazette declare that the excess vacantland referred to in the notification published undersub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date asmay be specified in the declaration, be deemed tohave been acquired by the State Government and uponthe publication of such declaration, such land shallbe deemed to have vested absolutely in the StateGovernment free from all encumbrances with effectfrom the date so specified. (4) During the period commencing on the date ofpublication of the notification under sub-section (1)and ending with the date specified in the declarationmade under sub-Section (3):-(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale,mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacantland (including any part thereof) specified in thenotification aforesaid and any such transfer made incontravention of this provision shall be deemed to benull and void; and (ii) no person shall alter or cause to bealtered the use of such excess vacant land.(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the StateGovernment under sub-Section (3), the competentauthority may, by notice in writing, order any personwho may be in possession of it to surrender or deliverpossession thereof to the State Government or to anyperson duly authorised by the State Government in thisbehalf within thirty days of the service of thenotice.(6) If any person refuses or fails to complywith an order made under sub-section (5), thecompetent authority may take possession of the vacantland or cause it to be given to the State Government https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ or to any person duly authorised by the StateGovernment in this behalf and may for that purpose usesuch force as may be necessary."52.Material on record shows that a statement under Section 7(1) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, wassubmitted by the petitioner’s sister on 13.07.1978. Thereafter, theBoard of Revenue in proceedings in (ULC & ULT) I2/57507/79, dated04.05.1980, had recommended that exemption may be granted to theapplicant to retain an extent of 269.881 Sq.mts or 270 Sq.mts ascommon pathway, subject to the condition that the user would not bedisturbed and the remaining extent of 641.219 Sq.mts may be acquiredunder the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1978. 53.Accepting the recommendation of the Board of Revenue, inexercise of the powers conferred by Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) ofSection 21 of the Act, the Government have issued G.O.Ms.No.2576,Revenue Department, dated 14.11.1980, exempting vacant land of269.881 Sq.mts., to be used as a common pathway, under the provisionsof Chapter III of the said Act, subject to the condition that theexempted land should not be transferred by way of sale, gift, etc.,and that the users should not be disturbed at any time. Theremaining excess vacant land of 641.219 Sq.mts in R.S.No.3847/1 ofMylapore Village would be acquired under Section 9 to 11 of the saidAct.54.Thereafter, a notice, dated 12.02.1981, under Sub-Section 4of Section 9 of the Act read with Rule 8(3) of the Tamil Nadu UrbanLand (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1978, has been issued to theland owner to make objections if any. Being aggrieved byG.O.Ms.No.2576, Revenue Department, dated 14.11.1980, thepetitioners’ sister filed W.P.No.2033 of 1981 to quash the same. Thesaid Writ Petition has been dismissed on 10.04.1981. Thereafter, astatement, dated 04.07.1981, has been issued, setting out the detailsof the land exempted and the details of vacant land to besurrendered. As per the statement, 641 Sq.mts in Survey No.3847/1 hadto be surrendered. Accordingly, a notification, dated 03.02.1982under Section 11(1) of the Act, was published in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette by the competent authority of Urban Land Ceilingand Assistant Commissioner, Urban land Tax, Mylapore. Details of theland acquired as per the notification are as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Excess vacant land held by Thirumathi Rangamma GayathriDeviForm V[See rule 10(1)]Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 11(A2/SRA 327/78)No.VI(1)/78/82I, P.Nataraja, Competent authority of Urban LandCeiling, Mylapre, hereby notify that the vacant landheld by the person noted below has been determined asvacant land held by such person in excess of ceilinglimit:-StateUrbanagglo-merationTalukVillageR.S./T.S. No.,ofotherindentifi-cationExtent ofexcess vacantland Hec AcresSq.mtsDescription ofidentityof thelandsName oftheperson/persons whois/areholdingthe land Otherpersons,if any,claimingintereston thelandwith thenatureofinterestof suchpersonsTamilNaduMadrasMylaporeTriplicaneMylapore3847/95Block760 0 641Urbanvacantland Boundaries:-North byR.S.No.3847/1East byR.S.No.3847/1South byR.S.No.3847/96and3847/79andWest byR.S.No.3847/1ThirumathiRangammaGayathridevi...It is hereby notified that the above vacant landis to be acquired by the State Government and that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ claims of all persons interested in the land may bemade by them personally or by their agents givingparticulars of the nature of the interest in such landetc., within thirty days from the date of publicationof this notification in the Tamil Nadu GovernmentGazettee. P. NATARAJAN, Competent Authority for Urban Land Ceiling and Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Mylapore.Madras, 24th December, 198055.Being aggrieved by the Gazettee notification, thepetitioners’ sister preferred an appeal under Section 33 of the Act. After considering the arguments of the learned counsel for thepetitioners’ sister and the records, the Commissioner of LandReforms, in his proceedings in D.Dis.No.32639/81, dated 25.09.1982,dismissed the appeal. After dismissal of the appeal, a notificationunder Section 11(3) of the Act has been published in the GovernmentGazettee on 10.11.1982 and the details are as follows:Acquisition of excess vacant land held by ThirumathiRangamma Gayathri Devi(A2/SRA 327/78)FORM VI.[See rule 10(2).]NOTIFICATION DECLARING THE ACQUISITION OF EXCESS VACANTLAND UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 11.VI(1)/1224/82.Under sub-Section (3) of Section 11 of the Tamil NaduUrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (TamilNadu Act 24 of 1978) R.Pakkeerisamy, Competent Authorityof Urban Land Ceiling, Mylapore at Madras-600 004,hereby declare that the excess vacant land referred toin the schedule below and having been published undersub-section (1) of Section 11 of the said Act asnotification No.VI(1)/78/82, dated 3rd February 1982 inPart VI-Section 1 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dated the 3rd February 1982 at page 41 shall, witheffect on and from the 5th November 1982 be deemed tohave been acquired by the State Government and that suchland shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in theState Government and that such land shall be deemed tohave vested absolutely in the State Government free fromencumbrances with effect on and from the date specifiedabove.SCHEDULE Particulars of the extent and identity of the landsacquiredStateUrbanagglo-merationTalukVillageR.S./T.S. No.,ofotherindentifi-cationExtent ofexcess vacantland Hec AcresSq.mtsDescription ofidentityof thelandsName oftheperson/persons whois/areholdingthe land Otherpersons,if any,claimingintereston thelandwith thenatureofinterestof suchpersonsTamilNaduMadrasMylaporeTriplicaneMylapore3847/95Block 760 0 641Urbanvacantland Boundaries:-North byR.S.No.3847-1East byR.S.No.3847-1South byR.S.No.3846/96and 3847-79 West byR.S.No.3847/1 ofMylaporeThirumathiRangammaGayathridevi...R.PAKKERISAMYCompetent Authority,Urban Land Ceiling, Mylapore.Madras, 12th October, 1982 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

56.Thereafter, Form VII notice under Section 11(5) of the Actread with Rule 10(4) of the Rules, dated 277.11.1982, has been issuedto the petitioner’s sister, to surrender possession of the excessland and the same is extracted hereunder:FORM VII[See rule 10(3) ]Form of notice under sub-Section (5) of Section 11regarding surrender or delivery of possession of excessvacant land acquired under sub-section (3) of section11.Thirumathi Rangamma Gayathri Devi, No.29, Sir C.V.RamanRoad, Alwarpet, Madras 600 018. Please take notice that the vacant land/lands specifiedin the Schedule below is/are vested with the StateGovernment under sub-Section (3) of Section 11 of theTamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,1978, with effect on and from the 05.11.1982. You arerequested to surrender or deliver possession of thesaid land/lands to the Tahsildar, Mylapore-TriplicaneTaluk, Madras 600 004, within thirty days of theservice of this notice.2. If this order is not complied with, the saidland/lands will be taken possession of by the authoritymentioned above, after using such force as may benecessarily.If there are any constructions, they may be removedbefore the date fixed above. If they are not removed bythe owner, they will be removed by the officerauthorized in this behalf to take possession of thesaid land, who shall sell them and keep the proceedsthereof in deposit in the name of the person, afterdeducting the land of removal and other incidentalcharges.Signed/-Competent Authority, Urban Land Tax, Mylapore, Madras 600 014. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

57.At this juncture, the petitioners’ sister has written aletter, dated 19.09.1986, to the Director, Urban and Land Ceilingand Urban Land Tax Act, Ezhilagam, Madras-5, intending to surrenderan extent of 641 Sq.mts in Survey No.3847/1 of Mylapore Village ofthe rear portion as indicated in the plan annexed to the said letter. In the said letter, the petitioners’ sister has categoricallyexpressed her willingness to surrender the portion marked in the planand permitted the competent authority to take possession of the same,immediately and process the other modes of payment of compensation. The extract of the letter is reproduced hereunder:Dated: 19.09.1986From Tmt.Rangamma Gayatri Devi, No.29, Sir C.V.Raman Road, Madras-18.To The Director, Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax Act, Ezhilagam, Madras-5.Sir, Sub:Tamil nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978-- Madras Urban Agglomeration – Mylapore Village – R.S.No.3847/1, -- Rangamma Gayadri Devi -- Excess land determined – Regarding.I am the owner of the land in R.S.No.3847/1 ofMylapore Village measuring an extent of 3907.8 Sq.Mts.By order dated 07.04.1981, the Competent authority haddetermined the excess vacant land of an extent of 641Sq.mts to be acquired under the Act and had also sent aplan indicating the area to be acquired. The Xerox copyof the said plan is enclosed. From the plan it could beseen that the mode laid as per the directions of theCommissioner, Corporation of madras in their letter,dated 14.10.1979 in W.DC.No.LA-2/1948 and the area thatit is left out in the Eastern side is neither useful norbeneficial to the owner or the proposed taking over. In https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ order to abviate the difficulty I am prepared tosurrender an extent of the same area in the back portionof the same land as indicated in the plan annexed. Irequest that you may be pleased to pass an orderdirecting me to surrender the portion marked in the planand direct the competent authority to take possession ofthe same immediately and process the other modes ofpayment of compensation etc., in due course. Commonpassage for all the users is also annexed in the planand the passage could be used by all including the planto be authenticated of the proposal is asserted. W.P.,will be withdrawn.Yours faithfully,Signed/-(RANGAMMA GAYADRI DEVI)58.In the above said letter, petitioners’ sister has alsoagreed to withdraw W.P.No.10810 of 1982, challenging the order of thecompetent authority, dated 07.04.1981, issued under Section 10(1) ofthe Act and the order, dated 25.09.1982, dismissing the appeal underSection 33 of the Act by the Commissioner and Land RevenueDepartment, Chennai, upholding the declaration of excess land.59.Material on record further disclose that after the issuanceof the notification under Section 11(3) of the Act and published inthe Government Gazettee on 10.11.1982, the petitioners’ sister filedanother appeal petition under Section 33 of the Act. W.P.No.10810 of1982, challenging the earlier orders, dated 07.04.1981 and25.09.1982, was already pending. During the pendency of the appeal,the land owner, in her letter petition, dated 19.09.1986, expressedher desire to surrender 641 Sq.mts, in the rear portion (thatchedportion) as shown in the sketch furnished by her and she did notinsist on her earlier objections. She has also stated that the areathat was left out on the Eastern side, would not be useful to her andhence, she had requested to permit her to surrender the same area inthe rear portion marked in the sketch. 60.Considering her request and the declaration in the letterthat W.P.No.10810 of 1982, challenging the acquisition proceedings,would be withdrawn, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of LandReforms, the appellate authority, by accepting the voluntary offer ofthe urban land owner for surrendering the area measuring 641 Sq.mts.,in the rear portion marked in the sketch, allowed the appeal, byorder, dated 14.11.1986, subject to the use of passage. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Accordingly, the competent authority for the Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) , issued an eratta, dated 24th April, 1987 to thenotification issued under Sections 11(1) and 11(3) of the Act inGovernment Gazettee No.22, dated 10.06.1987. The revisednotification under Sections 11(1) and 11(3) of the Act, is extractedhereunder:Excess vacant land held by Thirumathi Rangamma GayathriDevi(A2/SRA 327/78.)Eratta:- The following errata are issued to the 11(1)and 11(3) notification published at pages 41 and 559 ofTamil Nadu Government Gazette, Part VI – Section 1,dated 3rd Febraury, 1982 and 10th November 1982,respectively:-In column (5), for “3847-95 Block 76”, read “3487-96Block 76”In Column (7), for “urban vacant land boundaries:-North by R.S.No.3847-1, east by R.S.No.3847-1, South byR.S.Nos.3847-96 and 3847-79 and west by R.S.No.3847-1”,read “urban vacant land boundaries-north byR.S.No.3846-2, east by R.S.No.3847-82, south byR.S.Nos.3847-97 and 98 and west by R.S.No.3847-1”.P.CHELLIAHCompetent Authority (Urban land Ceiling).Madras-14,24th April 1987.61.Thereafter, a notice under Section 11(5) read with Rule 10(3), in Form VII has been issued to the urban land owner throughregistered post, dated 14.7.1987 to surrender or deliver possessionof the land measuring 641 Sq.mts, within 30 days from the date ofreceipt of notice. When W.P.No.10810 of 1982 came up for hearing on18th April, 1988, the urban land owner had withdrawn the writ petitionand accordingly, it came to be dismissed. Following the same, on29.04.1988, the Urban Land Owner herself has come forward tosurrender the vacant possession to the Sub-Divisional Tahsildar,No.2, Urban Land Ceiling, Mylapore and signed the Land DeliveryRegister. Thereafter, the Urban Land Officer, has accepted handing https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ over possession of the excess land of 641 Sq.mts. 62.Thus, it could be seen from the sequence of events from thedate of submission of the statement under Section 7(1) of the Act,dated 13.10.1978, the excess vacant land to be acquired had beendetermined in the year 1981 itself and accordingly, gazetteenotifications under Sections 10 and 11 of the Principal Act have beenissued. Notice under Section 11(5) of the Act, dated 04.12.1982, hasbeen issued to the land owner to surrender 641 Sq.mts of land and onreceipt of the same, though a writ petition was filed by her,challenging the determination of the excess vacant land, she herself,by her letter, dated 19.09.1986, had voluntarily come forward toexchange the excess vacant land and annexed a sketch also, bysurrendering the same to the Urban Land Authorities.63.It is also evident that accepting her surrender of land,the appellate authority, viz., the Special Commissioner andCommissioner of Land Reforms, in his letter, dated 14.11.1986,hasacquired 641 Sq.mts of land as excess land.64.Material on record shows that petitioners’ sister has alsosurrendered an extent of 851 Sq.mts., in Re-Survey No.3847/97, andpossession of the said land has been taken over by the JuniorEngineer, Division 126, and it reads as follows:CORPORATION OF MADRASI, the undersigned owner of land in R.S.No.3847/97,Mylapore, Madras hereby certify that I have personallyhandedover and I, the undersigned officer of theCorporation of Madras, certify that I have taken over,on this 26th day of August, 1988 the piece of landdescribed as follows:Municipal Division : 126Street: Cenotoph Road II StreetRe-survey No.3847/97Area 853.5 Sq.mtsNumber of demarcation stonesReference to Correspondence: PPA.No.D5/1/87Signed name in full:Official designation in full: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Signed/-Signed, name in fullOfficial designation in fullTo be made out in duplicate, and copies to be retainedby both officers for submission to the heads of thedepartments.Handed over Taken OverSigned/- Signed/-Owner J.E. Div:1 26 65.Thereafter, the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax,Mylapore, Chennai, in his proceedings in A2/SRA 327/78, dated10.04.1989, has requested petitioners’ sister to receive the chequesfor Rs.8,012.50 and Rs.10,387.50 for the payment of 25% of the totalamount of Rs.32,050/- and six instalments amount payable underSection 12(3) of the Act, 1978, for the excess vacant land of 641Sq.mts., acquired from her under Sections 9 to 11 of the PrincipalAct in R.S.No.3847/96 of Block No.76 of Mylapore Village. Thepetitioners' sister was also cautioned that if she fails to turn upwithin 10 days from the date of receipt of the said order, the saidamount would be kept in revenue deposit, which would bear nointerest. Accepting the compensation, petitioner’s sister hasauthorized her advocate, Sri.T.S.Ramu, to receive the cheque and shehas also issued a stamp receipt, which reads as follows:“Received a sum of Rs.6,694/- (Rupees sixthousand six hundred and ninety four only) by means ofcheque No.185460, dated 27.10.1989 drawn on the S.B.I.,Thousand Lights from the competent authority, UrbanLand Ceiling, Mylapore, Madras, being the difference ofinterest amount for the instalments payable to mefurther excess vacant land acquired in R.S.No.3847/96of Block No.76 of Mylapore Village.(Stamped signature specimen)The cheque may kindly be handed over to my Advocate Sri.T.S.Ramu, B.Sc., M.L.,” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Subsequently, by letter, dated 14.09.1992, she had authorised anotherAdvocate, to receive the cheque, being the IXth instalment for thebalance of amount and accordingly, issued the stamp receipt for theamount. 66.Proceedings in Rc.No.2259/98(A1), dated .11.2004, issued bythe Assistant Commissioner, Urban land Tax, Mylapore, shows that asum of Rs.1,052/- (Rupees one thousand and fifty two only) being the15th instalments in respect of the land acquired, measuring 641Sq.mts., from the holdings of Smt.Rangamma Gayatri Devi, petitioners'sister, was not received, inspite of repeated letters and therefore,the said amount had been ordered to be kept in revenue deposit. Though the petitioners have submitted that the excess vacant land of641 Sq.mts in the rear side of the land in Survey No.3847/96surrendered by their sister and that the competent authority has nottaken possession of the same, in terms of Section 11(6) of the Act,material on record categorically prove that erstwhile land owner,Smt.Rangamma Gayatri Devi, herself had voluntarily surrendered theland and signed the land delivery register and handed over possessionto the Sub Divisional Tahsildar-III, Urban Land Tax.67.Though the petitioners have contended that 11(6) notice hasnot been issued and possession was not taken in the manner asprovided in the Principal Act, not even a scrap of paper has beenproduced before this Court by them to prove that there was anyobjection for taking over possession of the excess land. It shouldbe noticed that though Section 11(6) contemplates use of minimumforce, exercise of power under Section 11(6) would arise, only ifthere is any objection from the occupants or the land owner fromtaking over possession by the competent authorities. Otherwise,exercise of power under Section 11(6) is uncalled for. Moreover, inthe case on hand, the erstwhile land owner herself has come forwardto surrender 641 Sq.mts of land, in lieu of some other land in herletter, dated 19.09.1986 and accordingly, accepting the same, theappellate authority, viz., Special Commissioner and Commissioner ofLand Reforms, in his order, dated 14.11.1986 by accepting thesurrender, granted exemption. It should be noted that exemption ofthe alternative land, would not have been granted, but for thesurrender of 641.219 Sq.mts., of land.68.Material on record further shows that, after theacquisition of land, the Secretary to Government, Adi-Dravidar andTribunal Welfare Department, has reported that the office of theTamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation Office(TADHDCO) was located in a private building, paying huge rents and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ therefore, they have requested the Government to allot the land,measuring 641 Sq.mts., in Survey No.3847/96 of Mylapore village, toaccommodate TAHDCO. The Government have accepted the proposal and inexercise of powers under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Act read with Rule 23 of the Tamil NaduUrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, have issued orders inG.O.Ms.No.778, Revenue Department, dated 27th May 1991, allotting theabove said extent of land to the 4th respondent-Corporation, subjectto the conditions stated in the above said Government Order, whichreads as follows:“(i) The Collector of Madras is requested topermit the Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing DevelopmentCorporation to enter upon the said lands pending paymentof land value, after obtaining an undertaking that itwill abide by the conditions imposed by the Government.(ii) The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation, Madras, shouldutilize the land for the purpose specified within aperiod of two years from the date of taking possessionof the land. The lands shall not be utilized for anypurpose other than the said purpose.(iii) The lands allotted shall not be transferredby way of sale, gift, mortgage, lease or otherwise toany person or institution.(iv) The land value shall be paid within 30 daysfrom the date of receipt of orders fixing the landvalue.(v) If the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation, Madras failsto remit the amount within a period of thirty days, theallotment is liable be cancelled, without assigning anyreason.(vi) The possession of the lands shall be handedover by the Collector of Madras to the ManagingDirector, Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing DevelopmentCorporation, Madras, on remittance of value of land.(vii) In the event of Managing Director, TamilNadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation,Madras not complying with any of the above conditions ofallotment, the Government shall after giving anopportunity to them to be heard in the matter, cancelthe allotment and the lands shall re-vest to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government free from all encumbrances. No compensationshall be payable in respect of any building or othersuperstructure constructed on such lands, re-vesting tothe Government under this clause. (viii) The order allotting the said lands to theTuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited,Madras in G.O.Ms.No.170, Revenue, dated 01.02.1990 arehereby cancelled.” (emphasis supplied)69.Section 18 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1978, deals with the power to enter upon any vacantland and it reads as follows:"The competent authority or any person acting theorders of the competent authority may, subject to anyrules made in this behalf and at such reasonable time asmay be prescribed, enter upon any vacant land or anyother land on which there is a building with suchassistance as the competent authority or such personconsiders necessary and make survey and takemeasurements thereof and do any other act which thecompetent authority or such person considers necessaryfor carrying out the puposes of this Act."70.Pursuant to the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.778, RevenueDepartment, dated 27th May 1991, the Collector of Madras, in hisproceedings No.J2/33707/91, dated 28.05.1991, has permitted the 4threspondent-Corporation to enter upon the land, after giving anundertaking as stipulated in the Government Order. Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation has also furnished anundertaking along with the Managing Director’s letter, dated30.05.1991, addressed to the District Collector, Chengalpattu,stating that they would abide by the conditions of the Government, inallotment of the land.71.Proceedings of the District Collector, Chennai, dated28.05.1991, granting permission to the Tamil Nadu Adi-DravidarHousing Development Corporation to enter upon the land is extractedas follows:“In the G.O., cited, the Government have allottedland measuring 641 Sq.mts in S.No.3847/96 of MylaporeVillage, Madras to Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar HousingDevelopment Corporation to put up office buildingssubject to certain conditions. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2. The Government have also permitted the TamilNadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation toenter upon the said lands pending payment of the landvalue. The possession of the lands shall be handed overto the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Adi-DravidarHousing Development Corporation, Madras, on remittanceof the value of the land.3. Accordingly, permission is hereby granted tothe above Corporation to enter upon the above lands,pending payment of land value after giving anundertaking that the TAHDCO will abide by the conditionsimposed by the Government.”(emphasis supplied)72.After taking permission to enter upon, the General Manager,of the fourth respondent-Corporation, has issued instructions, dated03.06.1991 to the Executive Engineer/T/Madras Division and copymarked to Assistant Executive Engineer/T/Madras Division, to providefollowing things at once,“(1) Provide a Name Board at suitable place,indicating that the site is for the construction TAHDCOHead Office.(2) Prepare estimate for providing temporarySection Office at site under consideration.(3) Clearing the site.(4) Prepare the plan approval, so as to hand overthe same to the MMDA."(emphasis supplied)73.Thereafter, by letter No.D2/4696/89, dated 05.06.1991,the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing DevelopmentCorporation, has brought to the notice of the Member Secretary,Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, Madras, that the siteallotted to the Corporation, had been classified as “PrimaryResidential” and that it should be re-classified as “MixedResidential”, so that the Corporation can build its own officebuilding. Thereafter, a request has been made to the CMDA by thefourth respondent-Corporation. Since the CMDA, by their letter,dated 11.07.1991, had requested the Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar HousingDevelopment Corporation, to re-submit their proposals through thelocal body concerned with relevant documents, the Managing Director,Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporation, by hisletter, dated 30.08.1991, has requested the Commissioner of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Corporation, Chennai, to forward the necessary proposals for re-classification of the land from residential use to commercialpurpose. The fourth respondent-Corporation has also remitted a sum ofRs.44,870/-, being the value of 641 Sq.mts of land allotted to themon 08.09.1991.74.After remitting the entire value of 641 Sq.mts. of land,the Firka Surveyor, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, Madras, has handedoverthe entire extent of land to the Junior Engineer, TAHDCO, MadrasSection, dated 18.12.1991. The transfer of charge certificate isextracted hereunder:TRANSFER OF CHARGE CERTIFICATEI, Thiru. E.A.Narayanan, Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, Madras-600 028, handed over the landmentioned below to-day the 18th day of December 1991 and I,Thiru.R.Rathinasamy, I.A.S., Managing Director, TAHDCO,No.18, 4th Cross Street, Arms Road, Kilpauk, Madras-10,taken over the land mentioned below on this 18th day ofDecember 1991.District: Madras Taluk: Mylapore-TriplicaneVillage: Mylapore Ground Sq.fts.R.S.No.3847 Area : 2 2103Sub-Division: 96Block No: 76BOUNDARIES FOR THE LANDNorth by: 3846/2 East by : 3847/82South by: 3847/97 and 98 West by: 3847/1Structures: Nil Trees: Nil(G.O.Ms.No.778, Rev., dated 27.05.1991)75.Materials on record further disclose that pursuant to thedecision taken by the CMDA, the Government have also issued GazetteNotification No.34, dated 31.08.1994, as follows:“S.Nos.3847-96 of Mylapore Village, Madrasdistrict Classified as “Primary Residential use zone” isnow reclassified as “Mixed Residential use zone” as perthis notification.”Appropriate notice has also been issued by the Member Secretary,CMDA, Chennai, in Na.Ko.No.R1/8792/93, dated 11.11.1994. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

76.In the year 2001, the Commissioner, Adi-Dravidar Welfare,Chennai, has invited the attention of the Managing Director, TAHDCO,Chennai, that the Government in G.O.Ms.No.32, Adi Dravidar and TribalWelfare Department, dated 20.02.1992, had sanctioned a sum of Rs.50Lakhs for the construction of Leather Training cum Procurement Centreduring the year 1991-92 and that it was kept unutilized and that theyhave also written to the Government of India, through Government ofTamil Nadu, for getting necessary concurrence for utilisation of theabove funds and since it would take some time, directed the ManagingDirector, TAHDCO, to proceed with the construction of the LeatherTraining cum Procurement Centre, in the site proposed by theCorporation, pending concurrence from the Government of India. 77.In furtherance of the above, the Executive Engineer,TAHDCO, Chennai, (incharge), in his letter, dated 28.08.2002, hasinformed the General Manger (Tech), TAHDCO, that the site forconstruction of Leather Training cum Procurement Centre at Chennaihas been handed over to the contractor on 28.08.2002 itself. To thateffect, the Contractor has also issued a charge paper, stating thatthey have taken over the site for construction. Subsequently, on25.11.2002, the Managing Director, TAHDCO, was permitted to pay thelicence fee to the Corporation of Chennai, Works Department.78.Material on record further shows that subsequently, oneMs.Janet Christine De Penning, has filed a writ petition inW.P.No.4696 of 2002, for a Mandamus, forbearing (1) The Chairman,Chennai Metropolitan Development Corporation, Chennai, (2) TheCommissioner, Corporation of Chennai, Chennai and (3) The Tamil NaduAdi-Dravidar Housing and Development Corporation, Tamil Nadu HousingBoard Commercial Complex, Chennai, respondents 1 to 3, frompermitting, allowing or proceeding with any construction or usingsuch construction in violation of the Development Control Rulesframed under the Town and Country Planning Act and from furtherproceeding with any construction on Cenotaph Road 2nd Lane, withoutsubmitting necessary plans to the first and second respondent thereinand obtaining necessary sanctions, as enjoined under Section 56 ofthe Town and Country Planning Act, 1972. A detailed counter affidavithas been filed by the fourth respondent-Corporation therein. By anorder, dated 21.10.2003, this Court has disposed of the WritPetition, with an observation that, “it is for the first respondenttherein to consider the application of the Corporation, if the sameis permissible.” Thereafter, the TAHDCO has remitted a sum ofRs.1,01,600/- towards building licence fee and scrutiny fees on07.01.2005. By letter No.C4/17672/2007, dated 21.0.2008, the MemberSecretary, CMDA, has granted permission to put up construction of theLeather Training cum Procurement Centre. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

79.Material on record further disclose that the Tahsildar,Mylapore-Triplicane Division, Chennai, has informed the ExecutiveEngineer, TAHDCO, that mutation has also been effected in theregisters. Pursuant to the request made by the Managing Director ofthe Housing Corporation, the Inspector General of Registration,Chennai, in his Letter No.63966/C1/2009, dated 22.12.2009, hasreplied that when the acquisition order was passed by the Government,the order copy shall be appended in Book-I File Volume maintained inthe Office of the Sub-Registrar and it shall be a indexed underSection 89(7) of the Registration Act. The Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, Chennai, in his letter No.Rc/B1/29281/09, dated23.12.2009, addressed to the Sub-Registrar, Tripline, Chennai-5, hasalso requested the Registration Department to make necessary entries.The contents of the above said letter is re-produced hereunder:“With reference to the above, I enclose herewithcopy of Permanent Land Register maintained in the Officeof the Tahsildar, Mylapore Triplicane Taluk, Chennai-28,in respect of Mylapore Village, Block No.76,T.S.No.3847/96 measuring an extent of two grounds 2101Sq.fts. The PLR shows the name of the Occupier as “TamilNadu Adi Dravidar Housing Development Corporation” asper G.O.Ms.No.778, (Revenue Department), dated27.05.1991, and TK/B1/33414-07, dated 17.12.2007. I request that necessary entries may be recordedin he records of in the Registration Department.”80.The name of the Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing DevelopmentCorporation has been registered as an occupier in the Permanent LandRegister of the Government land in Block No.76. A Certificate ofEncumbrance, dated 05.01.2006 has also been issued. 81.Thus, it could be seen that before the Tamil Nadu UrbanLand (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, came to be passed on16.09.1999, possession of the land has been taken over by the UrbanLand Authorities and handed over to the Revenue Authorities, who inturn have handedover the same to the Junior Engineer, TAHDCO, MadrasSection and that all the proceedings have been completed, except thereceipt of one instalment, which was directed to be kept in Revenueaccount.82.The contention of the learned counsel for the petitionersthat possession of the excess vacant land had not been taken over bythe competent authority in accordance in law, is without any basisand the further contention that the petitioners were in possessionand only recently TAHDCO had entered into possession, is not proved https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ by production of any valid materials. As stated supra, absolutely,there is no evidence to show that at any point of time, the erstwhileland owner, late Rangamma Gayatri Devi, had objected to taking overof the possession of the land and on the contrary, she herself hadvoluntarily surrendered the land.83.Thus, it could be seen from the materials produced by theTamil Nadu Adi Dravidar Housing Development Corporation that nosooner, they were permitted to enter upon the land by the DistrictCollector, Chennai and that they have remitted the value of the landto the Government and as per the directions of the General Manager ofthe Corporation, put up a Sign Board in the site, stating that theland is in possession of the Corporation since 1991.VESTING84.The terms "vest" and "vested absolutely" have been usedboth under the Principal as well as the Repealing Act and in thelight of submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners thaton refund of compensation amount, received either in part or full, bythe land owner to the Government, the land owner is entitled to getback possession and of the contention that the entire compensationamount must be paid before taking over possession, though the excessland is vested in the government and taking over possession by thegovernment, does not confer any right to retain the land, it isnecessary to consider the meaning of the term 'vest' used in thePrincipal Act and the Repealing Act, in the context and the object ofthe enactments.85.The word 'vest' as defined in Chamber's Twentieth CenturyDictionary reads as follows:"To settle, secure, or put in fixed right ofpossession; to endow, to descend, devolve or totake effect, as a right."86.In Concise Oxford Dictionary, "vest" means, "Conferformally on him an immediate fixed right of present or futurepossession of it (vested rights, interest, estate, etc., possessionof which is determinately fixed in a person and is subject to nocontingency); (of property right etc.) vest in (person) came to him." 87.Wharton's Law Lexicon gives the following meaning of theterm "vest" :--"(1) Either to place in possession; to makepossessor of or; to give an absolute interest inproperty when a named period or event occurs. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (2) of a right or interest. Its coming into thepossession of any one; ensuring to the benefit of anyone."88.Meaning of the word, "vest", as per the Stroud's JudicialDictionary is as follows:"(1) "To vest", generally means to give theproperty in,(2) "vest" in the absence of a context, isusually taken to mean vest in interest rather thanvest in possession."89.In P. Ramanata Aiyer's Law Lexicon has given the meaning ofthe word 'vest' as under:--"To place in possession to take possession of; totake an interest in property when a named period orevent occurs."90.In F. & V. Merchants Union v. Improvement Trust, Delhireported in AIR 1957 SC 344, the Supreme Court explained the word,"vest" as follows:"The word "Vest" has not got a fixed connotation,meaning in all cases that the property is owned by thepersons or the authority in whom it vests. It may vestin title or it may vest in possession, or it may vest ina limited sense, as indicated in the context in which itmay have been used in a particular piece oflegislation."(emphasis supplied)91.The Supreme Court in the above reported judgment, atParagraph 19, further explained that,"19. That the word “vest” is a word of variable importis shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. Forexample, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of theorder of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiverfor the property of the insolvent and further providesthat “such property shall thereupon vest in suchreceiver”. The property vests in the receiver for thepurpose of administering the estate of the insolvent forthe payment of his debts after realising his assets. Theproperty of the insolvent vests in the receiver not forall purposes but only for the purpose of the InsolvencyAct and the receiver has no interest of his own in theproperty. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), provide that theproperty so acquired, upon the happening of certainevents, shall “vest absolutely in the Government free fromall encumbrances”. In the cases contemplated by Sections16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property ofGovernment without any conditions or limitations either asto title or possession. The legislature has made it clearthat the vesting of the property is not for any limitedpurpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that theword “vest” has not got a fixed connotation, meaning inall cases that the property is owned by the person or theauthority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or itmay vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense,as indicated in the context in which it may have been usedin a particular piece of legislation. The provisions ofthe Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or streetor square or other land vesting in a municipality or otherlocal body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean thatownership has passed to any of them."(emphasissupplied)92.In the case of Municipal Committee v. Ramkaran Ganeshilal[AIR 1958 MP 355], the Madhya Pradesh High Court, while interpretingthe term 'vest' occurring in Sections 38 and 57 of the CentralProvinces and Berar Municipalities Act (2 of 1992), held the word'vest' has only a limited effect. 93.In the case of Mrs.Daya Wansi v. New Delhi MunicipalCommittee [AIR 1982 Delhi 534], the Division Bench of Delhi HighCourt, while interpreting the term 'vest', as synonymous with'title', held that,"Under the terms of the lease deed the land vests inthe lessor, ie., the President of India. "Vesting" is aword which has many meanings. The word "vest" has severalmeanings with reference to the context in which it is used.Ordinarily vesting means, "having obtained an absolute andindefeasible right as contra distinguished from not havingso obtained it (Richardson or Robertson, 1862 (6) LT 75(76) per Lord Cranworth). The word "vest" has no fixedconnotation. It may vest in title, or it may vest inpossession, or it may vest in a limited sense. It willdepend on the context in which it is used in a particularpiece of legislation. It appears to us that the word'vest' as used in S.193(2) means vesting in the sense oftitle. It means that where the property is owned by theGovernment, Government consent must be obtained. Withoutthe consent of the Government the plan may not besanctioned. The section uses the expression 'vest' in a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ sense synonymous with title. It is concerned with thetitle."(emphasis supplied)94.The word "vest" used in Andra Pradesh (Andra Area) Inam(Abolition and Conversion) into Ryotiwari Act, 1956, (37 of 1956),came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in VatticherukuruVillage Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu reported in 1991Supp (II) SCC 228. After extracting the dictionary meaning of theword 'vest', 'vesting', the Supreme Court held that, the word "vest"bears variable colour, taking its content from the context, in whichit came to be used. At paragraph 10 of the judgment, the SupremeCourt held that,"10. The word ‘vest’ clothes varied colours from thecontext and situation in which the word came to be used ina statute or rule. Chamber’s Mid-Century Dictionary at p.1230 defines ‘vesting’ in the legal sense “to settle,secure, or put in fixed right of possession; to endow, todescend, devolve or to take effect, as a right”. InBlack’s Law Dictionary, (5th edn. at p. 1401) the meaningof the word ‘vest’ is given as : “to give an immediate,fixed right of present or future enjoyment; to accrue to;to be fixed; to take effect; to clothe with possession; todeliver full possession of land or of an estate; to giveseisin; to enfeoff”. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, (4thedn., Vol. 5 at p. 2938), the word ‘vested’ was defined inseveral senses. At p. 2940 in item 12 it is stated thus“as to the interest acquired by public bodies, created fora particular purpose, in works such as embankments whichare ‘vested’ in them by statute”, see Port of LondonAuthority v. Canvey Island Commissioners in which it washeld that the statutory vesting was to construct the seawall against inundation or damages etc. and did notacquire fee simple. Item 4 at p. 2939, the word ‘vest’, inthe absence of a context, is usually taken to mean “vestin interest rather than vest in possession”. In item 8 to‘vest’, “generally means to give the property in”. Thusthe word ‘vest’ bears variable colour taking its contentfrom the context in which it came to be used. Take forinstance the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.By operation of Sections 16 and 17 thereof the property soacquired shall vest absolutely in the government free fromall encumbrances. Thereby, absolute right, title andinterest is vested in the government without anylimitation divesting the pre-existing rights of itsowner."(emphasis supplied)95.The word 'Vest' came up for consideration in M. IsmailFaruqui (Dr) v. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 360. The https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, with reference to Section 3 ofthe Acquisition of Certain Areas at Ayodhya Act, 1993, at Paragraph21, held as follows:"21. Section 3 provides for acquisition of rights inrelation to the ‘area’ defined in Section 2(a). It says thaton and from the commencement of this Act the right, titleand interest in relation to the area shall, by virtue ofthis Act, stand transferred to, and vest in, the CentralGovernment. It is well-settled that the meaning of ‘vest’takes colour from the context in which it is used and it isnot necessarily the same in every provision or in everycontext. In Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., reported in 1977(1) SCC 155 , it was held: (SCR p.1081 : SCC pp.164-65, para16)“Is such a construction of ‘vesting’ in twodifferent senses in the same section, sound? Yes.It is, because ‘vesting’ is a word of slipperyimport and has many meanings. The context controlsthe text and the purpose and scheme project theparticular semantic shade or nuance of meaning.That is why even definition clauses allowthemselves to be modified by contextualcompulsions.”The meaning of ‘vest’ in Section 3 and in Section 6 is ofsignificance in the context of the constitutional validity ofthe statute. It can vary in different parts of the statute oreven the same section, depending on the context of its use."96.In R.Shanmugam and others Vs. State of Tamilnadurepresented by its Secretary, Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment, Chennai and others, reported in 2006(4) CTC 290, aDivision Bench of this Court, dealing with the word, "Vest" employedin Section 72 of the Housing Board Act, at Paragraph 16, held that,"16. Coming to the word "vest" employed in Section 72of Housing Board Act, again the said word must be construedin the context it is used. The object of the Act is onlyto enable the Board to frame a Housing or ImprovementScheme and execute such scheme. In the above context, theword "vesting" may relate to title or possession or somelimited purpose of disposing of the same as contemplatedunder Section 72. As the Board has also the power to sellor dispose of the plots/flats as the case may be, the word"vesting" employed in Section 72 shall be construed to meanand include only the purpose of discharging its functionsunder the scheme. Such power of vesting cannot be equatedto the power of vesting of the land in Government under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 16 of the Central Act, where the lands acquiredshall vest absolutely in Government free from allencumbrances."(emphasis supplied)97.Sub-Sections 3 and 4 of Section 11 of the Principal Actstates that once a notification is issued under sub-Section 1 ofSection 11 of the Act, declaring excess land, and a date is specifiedin the declaration, the excess lands would be deemed to have beenacquired by the State Government and upon publication of thedeclaration, such land shall be deemed to have been vested absolutelyin the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect fromthe date so specified and as per sub-Section 4 of Section 11 of thePrincipal Act, during the period commencing on the date of publicationof the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the datespecified in the declaration made under sub-Section (3), (i) no personshall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise anyexcess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in thenotification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention ofthis provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and (ii) no personshall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land.98."Encumbrance" actually means the burden caused by an act oromission of man and not that created by nature. It means a burden orcharge upon the property or a claim or lien on the land. It means alegal liability on the property. Thus, it constitutes a burden on thetitle, while diminishes the value of the land. It may be a mortgageor a deed of trust or a lien of an easement. An encumbrance, thus,must be a charge on the property. It must run with the property.Reference can be made to Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwarji RattanjiMistri reported in AIR 1955 SC 298, H.P.Seb v. Shiv.K.Sharma reportedin 2005 (2) SCC 164 and AI Champdany Industries Ltd., v. OfficialLiquidator reported in 2009 (4) SCC 486. 99.The expression "free from all encumbrances" used in Section16 of 1894 Act (Land Acquisition Act) has been explained by the ApexCourt in State of H.P., v. Tarsem Singh reported in 2001 (8) SCC 104,as wholly unqualified and would empass the extinguishing of "allrights, title and interest, including easementary rights, when thetitle vests in the State. A combined reading of sub-Sections 3 and 4of Section 11 of the Act and the restrictions placed on the land ownernot to sell, mortgage, gift or otherwise of any excess land, includingany part thereof, and the further prohibition that no person shallalter or cause to be altered the use of such vacant land and making ofany such transfer, in contravention of the provision as null and void,makes it abundantly clear that the moment, the excess land is vestedin the government, under Section 11(3) of the Principal Act, theright, title and interest, in relation to the excess land held by theland owner by operation of law, stands transferred to the Governmentand the land owner shall not deal with the property in any manner,whatsoever, including alteration. Insofar as taking over possession https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is concerned, if there is any objection or protest from the landowner, the government is empowered to use such force as required.Upto Section 11(3)of the Principal Act, what is divested from theland owner is his right, title or interest in relation to the excessland declared.100.Section 3(1) of the Repeal Act shall not affect, wherethere is, (1) vesting of the land under Section 11(3) of the Act, (2)possession of which has been taken over by the State Government orany person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf orby the competent authority, (3) the validity of any order grantingexemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of any action takenthereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contraryand (4) any payment made thereof.101.Section 3(2) of the Repeal Act comes into operation when,(1) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government undersub-Section (3) of Section 11 of the Principal Act; (2) butpossession of which has not been taken over by the State Governmentor any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalfor by the competent authority; (3) any amount has been paid by theState Government with respect to such land; and (4) such land shallnot be restored unless the amount paid has been refunded to the StateGovernment.102.The important difference between Sections 3(1) and 3(2)is that, if possession is still retained by the land owner andcompensation amount had been paid by the Government, with respect tosuch land, then such land shall not be restored, unless the amountpaid not is refunded to the State Government. Thus it could be seenthat if possession is not taken over by the State Government, thenthe word "restore" used in Section 3(b)(2) refers only to vesting ofthe title and not physical possession.103.The Repeal Act will not have any effect on the PrincipalAct, if possession is not taken. It may be one thing to contend thatthe actual taking over possession is not in accordance with thestatutory provisions and therefore, it would be still open to theland owner to contend that the Court can examine the aspect as towhether taking over possession is valid or not. It is altogether adifferent thing to contend that in all cases, where possession hasalready been taken over in accordance with law, there exists a rightfor restoration of the land, on payment of any amount received, byway of compensation. 104.A conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the RepealingAct, 1999, would make it abundantly clear that the proceedingsrelating to any order or purported to be made under the Principal https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Act, immediately before the commencement of the Repealing Act, beforeany Court, Tribunal or any authority shall abate, if possession isnot taken over by the Government.105.Once the land is vested in the State Government, as perSection 11(3), the title is vested with the Government by operationof law, free from all encumbrances and that the title to the land canbe restored subject to the refund of the compensation amountreceived, if any. But once, payment of compensation commences, aftertaking over possession, then the land owner loses his claim forrestoration and the proceedings under Section 12 of the Act follows.By virtue of Section 4 of the Repeal Act, it is saved. Inotherwords, after vesting under Section 11(3) of the Act and paymentof compensation under Section 12 of the Act, whether it is in theprocess or completed, there is no statutory right for restoration ofphysical possession of the land taken over by the Government. 106.In the case on hand, it should be noticed that the landhad been surrendered on 29.04.1988 and physical possession had beentaken over and the allottee has been given possession by theCollector of Chennai, to enter upon and thereafter, on payment ofland value, possession has been taken over by the allottee, thedetails of which have been discussed in the earlier paragraphs. Theorders of the competent authority have been accepted by the landowner, without any protest and the compensation amount awarded from1989 had been received by the land owner without any protest, tillthe last payment, before which, she died. Having knowledge of thesurrender of land in the year 1988 and when the land owner herselfhad quietly received the compensation amount, it is not open to thepetitioners, after 22 years, to contend that the possession has notbeen taken over by the Government. 107.The word "restore" which occur in Section 11(3) of thePrincipal Act, has to be understood only in the context of restoring"vesting" of title, interest or rights in the excess land and not inthe context of restoring possession, because, if possession had beentaken over, then nothing remains to be adjudicated under the PrincipalAct and as per Section 4 of the Repeal Act, Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14of the Principal Act, would continue to operate and shall not abate. POSSESSION:108.Much is argued about possession and therefore, it isnecessary to consider the case laws on this aspect. 109.In Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D.Bhagwat reported in AIR1975 SC 1767, Hon'ble Justice P.N.Bhagavathi, while dealing with a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ question as to how possession has to be taken by the authorities,under Land Acquision Act, in his supporting judgment has held that,"when the Government proceeds to take possession of theland acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,it must take actual possession of the land, since allinterests in the land are sought to be acquired by it.There can be no question of taking 'symbolical'possession in the sense understood by judicial decisionsunder the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possessionmerely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as anecessary condition of vesting of the land in theGovernment is the taking of actual possession of theland. How such possession may be taken would depend onthe nature of the land. Such possession would have to betaken as the nature of the land admits of. There can beno hard and fast rule lying down what act would besufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. Weshould not, therefore, be taken as laying down anabsolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the'pot and making a declaration by beat of drum orotherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking ofpossession of land in every case. But here, in ouropinion, since the land was laying fallow and there wasno crop on it at the material time, the act of theTahsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the landfor the purpose of determining what part was waste andarable and should, therefore, be taken possession of anddetermining its extent, was sufficient to constitutetaking of possession. It appears that the appellant wasnot present when this was done by the Tahsildar, but thepresence of the owner or the occupant of the land is notnecessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It isalso not strictly necessary as a matter of legalrequirement that notice should be given to the owner orthe occupant of the land that possession would be takenat a particular time, though it may be desirable wherepossible, to give such notice before possession is takenby the authorities, as that would eliminate thepossibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction oftaking of mere paper possession, without the occupant orthe owner ever coming to know of it."(Emphasis supplied)110.The Hon'ble Justice Untwalia in his separate judgment,whose conclusion was agreed by other learned Judges, held that,"When a public notice under s. 9(1) of the Act ispublished at a convenient place or near the land to be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ taken that Government intends to take possession,ordinarily there would be no question of resisting orimpeding the taking of possession. Delivery of possessionby the owner is not required and the Collector canenforce surrender under s. 47 if impeded. On takingpossession either under s. 16 or s. 17(1), the land vestsabsolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.Therefore, in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Actfor acquisition of land all interests are wiped out, andhence, the taking of possession must be taking actualpossession on the spot and not symbolical possession; andsurely it cannot be a possession merely onpaper..........As to the mode of taking possession, the Act issilent. Unless possession is taken by the writtenagreement of the party concerned the mode of takingpossession obviously would be for the authority to goupon the land and do some act which would indicate thatthe authority has taken possession of the land. It may bein the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwiseor by hanging a written declaration on the spot thatpossession has been taken. The presence of the owner orthe occupant is not necessary to effectuate the taking ofpossession."(emphasis supplied)111.In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A.Viswam (Dead) reported inJT 1996 (2) 549 (SC) = 1996 SCALE (2) 418, the Supreme Courtconsidered the case, arising out of Land Acquisition Act. One of thecontentions raised therein was that possession was not taken over bythe Land Acquisition Officer from the respondents therein. Afterconsidering the statutory provisions, the Supreme Court held asfollows:"It is true that normally possession is ninetimes the title. If that principle is extended to publicacquisition by illegal squatting, erstwhile owner hascompensation as well as possession of the land byencroachment upon its erstwhile land and claim that heremained in possession. Such construction would defeatthe public purpose."(emphasis supplied)112.In the said decision, the Supreme Court further observedas follows:-"Would it be possible for the appellant, withoutdelivery of possession to the Housing Board, toconstruct such massive constructions and leave out onlythis part of the land bearing survey No.140/4, which wasset a part for public purpose, namely, public amenity of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ part? The making of the plan would emerge only after theland is taken possession and demarcation thereof is madeand constructions are carried out. It is erroneous tobelieve that possession still remained with therespondents and the LAO had not taken possession only ofthis piece of land. It is not the case of the respondentthat he resisted taking possession of the land by LAOand thereafter the LAO took no action to have himdispossessed."(emphasis supplied)113.In the present case, the land owner, Smt.Rangamma GayatriDevi, has received the compensation amount, except the last instalmentand after obtaining sanction from the CMDA and Corporation, the fourthrespondent-Corporation has also raised construction. The photographsproduced before this Court, support their case that possession is withthem. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board'scase, squarely applies to the facts of this case.114.In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v.State of Punjab reported in 1996 (4) SCC 212, at Paragraph 4, held asfollows:"4. It is seen that entire gamut of theacquisition proceedings stood completed by 17.4.1976by which date possession of the land had been taken.No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellantstill retained their possession. It is now wellsettled legal position that it is difficult to takephysical possession of the land under compulsoryacquisition. The normal mode of taking possession isdrafting the panchnama in the Presence of panchas andtaking possession and giving delivery to thebeneficiaries is the accepted mode of takingpossession of the land. Subsequent thereto, theretention of possession would tantamount only toillegal or unlawful possession."(emphasis supplied)115.In Larsen & Toubro Ltd., v. State of Gujarat and Ors.,reported in 1998 (4) SCC 387, mode of taking of possession of landalso considered. Possession of the Company was recorded in revenuepapers. It was held that, "possession was handed over to the Companypanchnama was supported by revenue entries, it was notopen to the High Court to convert itself into arevenue Court and to hold that in spite of panchnamaand revenue record, actual physical possession of theacquired land had not been handed over to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ acquiring body, that is the Company."(emphasis supplied)116.In the above reported judgment, the Apex Court, atParagraph 13, further held that,"13. It was not disputed that in the revenuerecords it was L&T Ltd. who was shown in possession ofthe land. Affidavits of the panchas filed in the HighCourt which contained statements contrary to what wasrecorded in Panchnama and against the revenue entriesquite meaningless and in our opinion the High Court.unnecessarily put undue reliance on the same. The HighCourt could not convert itself into a revenue court andhold that in spite of the panchnama and the revenuerecords actual physical possession of the acquired landhad not been handed over to the acquiring body. The HighCourt, in our opinion, has not correctly analysed thetwo judgments of this Court in Balmokand KhatriEducational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab[1996 (4) SCC 212] and Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D.Bhagwat, to come to the conclusion that actual physicalpossession of the land was not taken over by the State."(emphasis supplied)117.In Smt.Angoori Devi Vs. State of U.P and others,reported in JT 2000 (Suppl.1) SC 295, the Supreme Court was calledupon to decide the interpretation of different provisions of theUrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, repealed by Act 15 of 1999,which was adopted by the State of U.P., by a resolution. In view ofthe provisions contained in Section 3 of the Repealing Act 1999, andthe fact that the possession of the vacant land had not been takenover by the state Government and having regard to Section 4 of theRepealing Act, the Apex Court held that all proceedings under thePrincipal Act must be held to have abated.118.A reading of Smt.Angoori Devi's case, makes it explicitthat if possession of the land is not taken over, then by virtue ofthe Repealing Act, all proceedings are abated. Therefore, theconverse is that, if possession is taken over, then not allproceedings would abate, but some proceedings would still be alive,and that they are covered by Section 4 of the Repealing Act.119.In Ramakrishna Reddy v. Addl. Revenue Divisional Officersreported in AIR 2000 SC 2723, the Supreme Court considered a casewhere there was a surrender of lands, by the land owners, under theAndra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, (1 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of 1973) and the payment of compensation thereon. After consideringthe statutory provisions, the Apex Court, at Paragraph 19, held asfollows:"19. From the conspectus of the relevant provisionsin the Act and the Rules noted in the preceding paragraphit is clear that the surplus land which is surrendered ordeemed to have been surrendered shall vest in the State oncommunication of the order passed by the Revenue DivisionalOfficer to take over possession of such land to theowner/holder/occupier of the said land. The word'thereupon' in Section 11 refers to such order of theRevenue Divisional Officer. The order in Form 'IX' and themanner in which the said order will be served on the ownerare prescribed in sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 8. Theprovisions incorporated in sub-rules (3) to (7) of the saidrule are steps to be taken after the surplus land hasvested in the State. Vesting of the surplus land in theState is not dependent on taking over physical possessionof the land which may be immediately after the vesting orsometimes subsequent thereto. It is our considered viewthat this conclusion emanates from a harmoniousconstruction of the provisions in Section 11 and Rule 8 andit is in accord with the object and purpose of the Act." (emphasis supplied)120.In an unreported judgment in the Special Commissioner,Revenue Secretary to Government, Chennai and two others Vs. N.Kannan,[W.A.No.1133 of 2002 dated 10.06.2002], the Division Bench havingregard to Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)Repealing Act, 1999, held that "Section 4 says only such action bywhich the excess land holder has been deprived of his possession andvested the property with the Government. But in so far as theproceedings before any Authority/Tribunal etc., arising under the Act,the legislative policy expressly states that such proceedings shallabate. Such abatement will enure to the benefit of the party who hasfiled a declaration and as such the question of the appellateauthority hearing the appeal does not arise at all, as the orderholding the first respondent as excess land owner under the Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, had become non-est in law. In the abovecase, a proceeding pending before the appellate authority was declaredas abated. Hence, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts ofthis case. 121.In Alliend Metal Fabricators Pvt. Ltd., represented by itsManaging Director Vs. The Secretary to Government Revenue Department,Government of Tamilnadu reported in 2002 (2) CTC 716, this Court heldas follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "The Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act has been repealed by the repealing Act(Act 20 of 1999) and all proceedings also having beendeclared to have abated. As held by the Supreme Courtin the case of Angoori Devi Vs. State of U.P., JT 2000Supp 1 (SC) 295, if the possession of the land had notbeen taken prior to the repeal, such possession cannotbe taken thereafter and no proceedings can bethereafter initiated under the repealed enactment.During the pendency of this writ petition thepetitioner had the benefit of an interim orderprotecting his possession. It is also not the case ofthe respondents that they have taken possession."122.In C.V.Narasimhan represented by his Power Agent Vs. TheGovernment of Tamilnadu represented by its Secretary, RevenueDepartment, reported in 2002-2-L.W.764, wherein, this Court held asfollows:It is clear that the repealed Act gives certain rightto the owners of the land where the physical possessionof such land continues to be with the owner. Thestatutory vesting is of no relevance. In the case onhand, the petitioner claims to be in possession of thedisputed land. When sub-section (2) of Section 3 of therepealed Act specifically makes a provision to refundthe compensation and retain possession if possessionremains with the land owner. Hence it is for the firstrespondent to consider the question of physicalpossession and decide the issue.(emphasis supplied)123.Relying on paragraph No.10 of the Judgment in Mrs.AyeshaHaque, represented by her power agent Vs. State of Tamilnadurepresented by its Secretary to Government, Revenue Department,Chennai, and two others, reported in 2003 W.L.R 193, learned counselfor the petitioners submitted that if possession had not been takenin accordance with the provisions of the Act, then the wholeproceedings are vitiated. In Paragraph No.10 of the said judgment,this Court held as follows:In this case, though orders have been passed,declaring the land as excess, there are two factswhich would militate against the continuedapplicability of the Ceiling Act. Firstly, thepossession remains with the petitioner and thereforeno complete vesting has taken place in favour of theState Government. Secondly, as against the orderpassed by the third respondent, an appeal has beenfiled before the Principal Commissioner, the secondrespondent herein, and therefore the proceedings https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ declaring the excess land cannot be stated to havebecome final. Therefore, I am inclined to hold thatSection 3 of Act 20 of 1999 cannot apply and in termsof Section 4, the proceedings have to be held asabated."(emphasis supplied)124.In an unreported judgment in S.Ramasamy Vs. State ofTamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department,Chennai, and three others in W.P.No.6641 of 1997 dated 09.09.2004,the petitioner therein challenged the order of confirming the noticeissued under Section 9(5) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1978, as well as the allotment of lands to theDirector of Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department in G.O.Ms.No.27dated 13.01.1995. It was mainly contended that by virtue of theRepealing Act 20/1999, the whole proceedings were non-est in law oreven if a notice under Section 11(5) of the Act was issued, in viewof the fact that possession continued with the petitioner, theproceedings would stand abated. Per contra, the respondent hadcontended that in view of the fact that, subsequent to Section 11(5)notification, the appeal had been filed after four long years and inthe meantime, lands in question were allotted to the VigilanceDepartment under the abovesaid Government Order and possession hadalready been taken. At Paragraph 10, this Court has held as follows:"On a perusal of the counter affidavit filed onbehalf of the respondents also there is no specialaverment to the effect as to how the physicalpossession of the land was taken on 30.10.1991, byfollowing the procedure prescribed under the provisionsof the Act in such circumstances, it will have to benecessarily held that though the declaration underSection 11(3) of the Act came to be issued on07.03.1991, the possession after issuance of 11(5)notice had not been validly taken as contemplated underthe provisions of the Act."(emphasis supplied)125.On the plea of not taking actual physical possession ofthe land as required under law, learned counsel for the petitionersalso invited to paragraph No.13 of the unreported judgment inVijayakumar and five others Vs. the Principal Commissioner andCommissioner for Land Reforms, Chennai, in W.P.No.22553 of 2003 dated09.09.2004, wherein, this Court held as follows:"13. Thereafter, possession of the lands is stated tohave been taken. By proceedings dated 20.01.1998, theAssistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax has sent acommunication to the Tahsildar, Tambaram Taluk stating thatthe notice under Section 11(5) of the Act was served by wayof affixure. The date on which the affixture was made is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ left blank. And the Tahsildar has directed to instruct theFirka Revenue Inspector and Village Administrative Officerto take possession of the excess vacant land immediately.On 12.03.1998, the Deputy Tahsildar (Urban Land Ceilinjg)submits a report that the excess land was taken fromTmt.Nagalakshmi Ammal and at that time, the land was vacantand possession thereof was taken on 12.03.1998. Of course,there is a land delivery receipt in which the name of theurban land owner is shows as Nagalakshmi Ammal, the motherof the petitioners and the details of structures, if any,is shown to be vacant. The Deputy Tahsildar (Urban LandCeiling) has affixed a stamp over the words, "handed overby" the adjacent to that the Revenue Inspector has signed.In the order of the second respondent, there is a clearmention of a dilapidated building in Survey No.14/2A.Whereas, the land delivery receipt which is purported to bethe record of taking delivery shows that the land isvacant. It is clear that there was no actual taking ofpossession."(emphasis supplied)126.In the above judgment, it could be seen from the LandDelivery Receipt, that the property was shown as vacant land,whereas, there was a building in a dilapidated condition. In view ofthe glaring difference in the description of the property said tohave been in possession, this Court had come to the conclusion thatactual possession had not been taken. The said judgment would notlend any support to the case of the petitioners. 127.Taking this Court through an unreported judgment inSukumar Ramanan Vs. the Competent authority of Urban Land Ceiling andAssistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Chennai, in W.P.No.27432 of2004, dated 04.11.2004, learned counsel for the petitioners submittedthat in the above case, the Court found that the land in question wasallotted to the Housing Board, the land continued to remain inpossession of the land owner.128.In the abovesaid judgment, the proceedings initiatedunder the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978,were challenged on the ground that possession of the land continuedwith the petitioner. Though it was contended that the land wasallotted to the Housing Board, this Court on perusal of the report ofthe Assistant Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation), found that the land allotted to the Housing Board wasnot used by the Board and it remained vacant. Besides, it wascovered by compound walls on all sides confirming that the petitionerwas in possession of the lands. On this factual finding and in theabsence of any other acceptable material documents on record to provethat the possession of the land was taken over by the Urban LandCeiling authorities or the department to which, the lands were https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ allotted, the Court quashed the proceedings.129.Referring to a decision in K.R.Kothandaraman vs. theSpecial Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Ceiling and UrbanLand Tax and another [2005 – 4 L.W. 299], the learned counsel for thepetitioners has submitted that the contention of the respondentstherein that symbolic delivery of possession must be taken, aspossession of the respondent has been rejected. In the above case,even though it was claimed by the respondent therein that possessionhad been taken, since the Urban Land Authorities had demanded paymentof tax and received such payment from the various occupants, thisCourt held that the above act clearly militates against the case ofthe respondents that possession had been taken in a manner known tolaw. The Court also observed that the fact that the petitionertherein was continuing in physical possession was also not challengedin any manner in the counter. 130.There is no quarrel over the point that symbolicpossession is not intended under the Principal Act, when use of suchforce was permissible to take actual physical possession, ifnecessary. In the absence of any counter regarding rentention ofpossession by the land owner, in the above case, this Court hasrejected the case of the government. This judgment is not applicableto the facts of this case.131.In W.P.No.14368 of 2002, dated 24.03.2005 [Dr.T.AzizuddinVs. The Government of Tamilnadu, Represented by its Secretary,Revenue Department and The Assistant Commissioner (Urban Land Tax)],the wife of the writ petitioner Smt.Mahboob Bi, purchasedagricultural lands, an extent of 2.05 acres comprised in S.F.No.387/1in Zamin Pallavam village by a sale deed, dated 05.02.1962. Anextent of 1750 sq.meters of the said land was declared as surplus on28.05.1983, under Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceilingand Regulation) Act, 1977. In terms of section 11(3) of the saidAct, the excess land absolutely vested with the State Government freefrom all encumbrances. The competent authority (ULT) by order dated12.05.1988, fixed the compensation payable at Rs.17,500/-. A WritPetition was filed in W.P.No.5630 of 1989, questioning the orderspassed by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.1375 Revenue dated 05.06.1980,determining the zonal value. The said writ petition came to beallowed on 10.02.1995, with a direction to the respondents therein tohear the petitioners therein fully regarding the fixation of theamount. Questioning the said order, a Writ Appeal was also filed inW.A.No.613/1995, which was dismissed on 19.09.2001.132.In the mean time, after passing of the orders in WritPetition and before the said Writ Appeal was disposed of, Tamil NaduUrban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Act 20/1999)came to be enacted. By virtue of the said Act, all proceedings that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ were pending and where no possession was taken, were deemed asabated. Claiming that possession was not taken, not only on the date(16.06.1999) when the Repealing Act came into force, the petitionerapproached this Court by way of another Writ Petition for a directionto the respondents to restore the land in question to the petitionerand in accordance with the provisions of Act 20 of 1999. In theabove case, it was the contention of the petitioner that he was notissued with a Notice under Section 11(5) of the Act, beforepossession was taken and no physical possession was taken before theRepealing Act. 133.Per contra, the Government, on the basis of the records,contended that the possession of land in question was taken over on15.10.1985, after serving Notice on the owner. While considering themode and whether possession was taken prior to the introduction ofthe Repealing Act, this Court on facts has recorded as follows:"From the Communication of the Assistant Commissioner(ULT) dated 21.05.1985 at page 189 of the file, it is seenthat Notice under Section 11(5) of the Act was alreadyissued and inspite of acknowledgement by the petitioner on24.08.1983, she has not handed over possession. Even afterone year and six months lapsed, she did not hand overpossession and hence, the Deputy Tahsildar No.II wasrequested to hand over possession to the Tahsildar,Saidapet to carry out the change in the village and talukrecords. At page 193 it is seen that there is anendorsement stating that "the above extent of vacant landdeclared by me and taken possession of the above land bythe Revenue Inspector". The said land delivery receiptcontains the name of Tmt. Mahaboob Bee. From this it isclear that though notice was served in the addressbelonging to the petitioner and the same was acknowledgedby one Naazirunissa, wife of the petitioner did not delivervacant possession for almost all the period of one year andsix months and thereafter only possession was taken interms of sub-section 6 of Section 11.(emphasis supplied)134.Following the judgment of Supreme Court in Gunwantal v. State ofM.P., reported in 1972 (2) SCC 194, this Court held that possessionhad already been taken and therefore, the petitioner therein was notentitled for the relief sought for. It could be seen from the abovejudgment that this Court has accepted the mode of taking overpossession by the revenue authority and the consequential LandDelivery Receipt, containing the name of the petitioner.135.The decision of the learned Single Judge was challengedin Writ Appeal No.2752 of 2005, dated 22.07.2009. LegalRepresentatives of the deceased inter alia contended that service of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ notice under Section 11(5) of the Act, was not effected in accordancewith law and that possession as per Section 11(6) of the Act, was nottaken by the Government, as there is no evidence to show thatpossession was actually taken. It was further contended that thewords "restoration" and "dealt with in any manner or taken by theGovernment" should not be construed as taken possession or being inpossession, but it restricts only in so far as the entitlement of theGovernment to deal with the property upon vesting under Section 11(3)of the Act. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader hassubmitted that it is not as if the Government had not taken steps topay the compensation. After the dismissal of Writ Appeal No.613 of1995, the Government had issued notice to the land owner and inresponse to that, the appellant had sought for time and thereafter,wrote to the Government that in view of the Repeal Act, allproceedings were abated and approached this Court by filing thesecond writ petition. In such circumstances, it was pleaded that theGovernment could not proceed further in the matter of awardingcompensation. The learned Special Government Pleader has alsosubmitted that use of police force is not necessary in all cases andit has to be used only when the land owner refuses to comply with thenotice under Section 11(5) of the Act. Therefore, it was contended onbehalf of the Government that merely because, the Government did notuse police force to take possession that would not mean thatpossession was not taken. On the facts of the case, it was noticedby the Division Bench that by proceedings, dated 20.05.1983, thecompetent authority (ULC) has declared that the excess vacant land inSurvey No. 387/1A measuring 1750 sq.mt in Pallavaram Village shall beacquired under the provisions of the Act and that on 12.05.1988, thecompensation was calculated. The first appellant's wife therein, whowas the original owner, was directed to appear in person to receivethe compensation and immediately thereafter, a Writ Petition inW.P.No.5630 of 1989 was filed. Pending the writ petition, theoriginal owner Tmt.Mahboob Bi died and her husband and children werebrought on record. W.P.No.5630 of 1989 related only to the questionof compensation. However, while dealing with the facts, the learnedSingle Judge observed that "original petitioner's lands were acquiredin 1983 as stated earlier, possession was actually taken in 1985".The above Writ Petitions were allowed, directing the competentauthority not only to determine the amount payable to the petitioner,but also to pay a reasonable interest on such amount. Subsequently,they made a complaint to the Inspector of Police that actual physicalpossession had not been taken and an application was made by thehusband of the original owner, for setting aside the order of thecompetent authority (ULC) in view of the Repeal Act. Aggrieved by theorder made in W.P. No. 5630 of 1989, the Government filed W.A.No.613of 1995 and final orders were passed on 19.09.2001. No attempt wasmade by the husband of the original owner, challenging the findingrecorded in the Writ Petition No.5630 of 1989 that possessionactually taken over is not correct and all the proceedings includingproceedings, by which compensation was determined, stands abated. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

136.In the above unreported judgment made in W.A.No.2752 of2005, dated 22.07.2009, possession was taken over and Land DeliveryReceipt was recorded and thereafter, the area had been checked andthe actual excess land had been demarcated. The Revenue Records alsostood in the name of the Government and subsequently, the appellanttherein sent a letter, dated 11.11.1998 to the Government of TamilNadu, stating that they were not aware as to how Government had dealtwith the land taken over from them. On these facts, the DivisionBench held that, "Here, not only there is a finding/observation ofthis Court in the earlier writ petition, but the subsequentcorrespondence emanating from the appellant also indicatesthat possession was indeed taken. ........when the landsare lying vacant and there is no resistance, it is notnecessary for the State to unnecessarily use police force." (emphasis supplied)137.In Sosamma Thampy Vs. The Assistant Commissioner (ULT)and others reported in 2006 (3) L.W. 50, the finding of the Court wasthat the respondents were not in a position to show from the recordsthat actual possession of the lands in question had been taken overby the Government or that any compensation was paid to the land ownerfor the lands sought to be acquired. Therefore, on that basis, thisCourt held that the proceedings initiated by the respondents foracquiring the lands of the land owner under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, stood abated on the passing ofthe Repealing Act 20 of 1999.139.In view of the specific finding recorded in the presentcase, regarding taking over possession, the above decision inappositeto the facts of ths case.140.In S.Subramamium Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, represented byits Secretary, Revenue Department, Chennai, reported in 2006 (3) L.W.445, at paragraph No.4, this Court held as follows:It is clearly noted that in Section 2 of the Repeal Actthat the 1978 Act has been repealed. Therefore, nothingis saved except for what is expressly stated above inSection 3. Furthermore, Section 4 of the Repeal Actstates that all proceedings relating to any order made orpurported to be made under the Principal Act, pendingimmediately before the commencement of this Act beforeany Court, Tribunal or any other Authority, shall abateand the said provision also contains a proviso whichstates as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "Provided that this section shall not apply to theproceedings relating to Sections 12, 13, 14, 15, 15-B and16 of the Principal Act in so far as such proceedings arerelated to the land possession of which has been takenover by the State Government or any person dulyauthorised by the State Government in this behalf or bythe competent authority."(emphasis supplied)141. In C.N.Chandran and others Vs. the Government of TamilNadu represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Chennai,reported in (2006) 3 MLJ 1050, this Court held as follows:"As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for thepetitioners, Section 3 of the Repeal Act should not beread in isolation, it should be read with Section 4 ofthe Repeal Act. Section 4 of the Repeal Actcontemplates that all proceedings relating to any ordermade or purported to be made under the Principal Actpending immediately before the commencement of the Act,before any Court, Tribunal or any authority shall abate,which means that any orders passed by the authoritiesincluding the impugned notifications issued underSection 11(3) of the Act, against which any proceedingis pending before any Court, Tribunal or any authorityshall abate. It means that if the possession has notbeen taken over by the Government, even after an orderis passed under Section 11(3) of the Act, theproceedings must be held to have abated. Theproceedings must be held to have abated. The possessionof the petitioners is asserted by the learned seniorcounsel for the petitioners and it is also apparent fromthe document mentioned above and also from the interimorders passed by this Court. It is also not in disputethat no compensation was paid to the petitioners." (emphasis supplied)In this case, two documents, viz., Chitta and Adangal were producedbefore the Court to prove that the petitioner therein, continued toremain with the possession of the lands and no compensation amountwas paid.142.In P.T Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public Charitable Trust Vs.State of U.P. and others, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 325, a challengewas made to the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1976. The prescribed authority declared an area of4314.60 sq.mt of land as surplus. When the same was challenged inappeal, the appellate authority rejected the appeal. Thereafter, awrit petition was filed in the High Court and that the same was alsodismissed. While testing the correctness of the dismissal order, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Supreme Court granted an order of status-quo in respect of possessionof the surplus land. By Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) RepealAct, 1999, the Principal Act 33 of 1976 was repealed and that thelegislature of the State of U.P., had also adopted the same, by aresolution under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India and theRepealing Act came into effect from 18.03.1999. The appellant beforethe Supreme Court filed a supplementary affidavit dated 31.10.1999,praying that the proceedings be declared as abated. The State didnot choose to file any reply. As there was nothing on record toindicate that the State had taken possession over the surplus landand finding that there was no counter affidavit about the possessionof land stated to have been maintained by the appellant therein andhaving regard to Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)Repeal Act, 1999, the Apex Court declared the proceedings as abated.In this case, there was no record to substantiate that possession wastaken over.143.In Saramathi v. Principal Commissioner reported in 2007(4) CTC 14], there was no documentary proof of taking over actualphysical possession prior to the Repealing Act, i.e., Act 22 of 1999,dated 16.06.1999.144.In M/s.Sri Vittal Combines, registered partnership firmrepresented by its partner Vs. the Commissioner and Secretary(Revenue), Government of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2007 – 4 L.W 349,this Court held as follows:"Court is of the considered view that once it isfound that the actual possession of the land in questionhad not been taken over by the State Government or by anyperson authorised by the State Government, the possessionwould continue to vest with the petitioner, even if a finaldecision had not been taken, under Section 21 of the Act1978 – Decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court areto the effect that if the actual possession of the land inquestion has not been taken over by the Government or bythe concerned authority, and if due compensation had notbeen paid, all pending proceedings with regard to the landin question would abate and the land in question wouldcontinue to vest with the petitioner."(emphasis supplied)145.The above judgment clearly states that the right of theland owner subsists only when possession is not taken over by theGovernment. In the present case filed by the beneficiaries,compensation amount has been determined and received by the landowner, almost in full, except the last payment, which was kept inrevenue deposit, because of her death and refused to be received bythe legal heirs to the estate of Mrs.Rangamma Gayadri Devi, the landowner. Once possession of the land is taken, proceedings under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 12 of the Act, continues to operate and it is saved bySection 4 of the Repeal Act.146.In Mukarram Ali Khan Vs. State of U.P and others,reported in 2007 (4) L.W 797, having regard to the undisputedposition that the State had not taken possession of the land, theproceedings initiated under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,was declared as abated.147.In V.Gurnathan represented by the Power Agent Vs.Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax and Ceiling, Tambaram area,Chennai and others, reported in (2007) 5 MLJ 103, this Court held asfollows:"Respondents could not produce any record to showthat actual possession of the land in question had beentaken and due compensation paid. From the records placedbefore this Court, it is seen that the lands in questionhad been taken and handed over to Firka Revenue Inspector,Alandur, on 30.06.1993. According to the provisions of theRepeal Act 20 of 1999 and based on their interpretation, asfound in a series of decisions of this Court, it is clearthat mere vesting of the land in the Government is notsufficient. It should be shown that actual possession wastaken over. Taking of actual possession of the land and thepayment of compensation thereafter, are the crucialfactors. If such taking over of possession and payment ofcompensation is not shown to have been done, allproceedings pending with regard to the lands in question,ought to be taken as abated on coming into the force of theTamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act(20 of 1999)."(Emphasis supplied)148.In the above reported case, the Court has held that themere vesting is not sufficient and this Court has not given credenceto the certificate of the Firka Revenue Inspector, for effectingtaking over possession.149.In Saraswathi and another Vs. Principal Commissioner &Commissioner of Land Reforms, Chennai and others, reported in (2007)5 MLJ 1240, wherein, it was contended by the respondents therein thaton 23.10.1992, possession was taken over by them. Even assuming thatthe possession was taken by the respondents, the Court held that itwas nothing but only a paper possession.150.In Tessy John Vs. Principal Commissioner and Commissionerof Land Reforms Chennai and others, reported in (2008) 1 MLJ 838,this Court held that when the acquisition proceedings were notinitiated against the real land owner and that when the real ownerwas not served with proper notices in terms of the Tamil Nadu UrbanLand (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, the entire exercise of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ acquisition is an exercise in futility and it would also amount todeprivation of the property of real owner by misusing the powervested under the Act. Though a contention has been made thatphysical possession of the property acquired has not been taken overfrom the land owner and she continued to be in possession andenjoyment of the said property, the very initiation of theacquisition proceedings was found to be erroneous. Except to theissue relating to taking over possession, the judgment is notapplicable to the case on hand.151.In Special Civil Application No.26301 of 2007, dated16.07.2008 [Govindbhai Naranbahi Patel Vs. State of Gujarat], thepetitioner therein challenged an order dated 30.08.2006, passed bythe Principal Secretary, Urban Land Tribunal refusing to entertain anappeal of the petitioner on merits, on the ground that after therepeal of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, with effectfrom 30.06.1999, no appeal is maintainable. The judgment rendered inthe above case is brief and the same is extracted hereunder."Undisputed facts emerging from the pleadings are thatthe petitioner filed declaration in terms of the UrbanLand (Ceiling and Regulation) Act before the competentauthority, who, by his order dated 15.07.1987 declaredthat the petitioner was holding total 1350.50 sq.mtr ofurban land. After granting one unit to him, therefore,the petitioner was holding excess vacant land to theextent of 355.50 sq.mtrs. This order was never challengedby the petitioner right till the year 2006. Not onlythat, from undisputed averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent No.3, it emerges that theorder of the competent authority was fully implemented.It is stated that notification under Section 10(1) of theAct was issued on 08.01.1988 inviting objections.Notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was issued on24.11.19888. By notice dated 19.08.1989 issued underSection 10(5) of the Act, the land holder was asked tosurrender excess vacant land to the Government. An orderunder Section 10(6) of the Act was made on 21.06.1990 andpossession of the land was taken from the petitioner on30.06.1990 by drawing Panchnama. Thereafter, compensationunder Section 11 of the Act was fixed by order dated01.09.1992 and the same was also served on thepetitioner. It also stated in the affidavit that thecompensation so fixed by the Government has been dulypaid way back in the year 1995 which has been accepted bythe petitioner without any protest.In view of the above undisputed facts, I do notfind any possibility of entertaining the petition. Thepetitioner has, not having challenged the order of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ competent authority in the year 1987, cannot seek toreopen the issues after nearly 20 years, that too, afterhaving accepted the compensation without any protest inthe year 1995."(Emphasis supplied)152.In the above reported case, possession was taken over bydrawing Panchnama and compensation was also received without anyprotest. After 20 years, the land owner challenged the proceedings.153.Whether subsequent purchasers or persons, who claim anyright by virtue of transfers effected after the commencement of thePrincipal Act, can challenge the proceedings of the authorities underthe Land Ceiling Act.154.On the aspect that, if there is a purchase of property,after coming into force of the Land Ceiling Act, making it invalid,as per Section 6 of the Act and whether notice has to be given beforetaking over actual possession, a Division Bench of this Court in M/s.Sree. Jayalakshmi Brick Industries represented by its Proprietor Vs.the Special Commissioner and Government of Tamil Nadu represented byits Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Chennai, reported in2009 (4) L.W 819, held that in view of the expression "any person whomay be in possession" used in Section 11(5) of the Act, notice oughtto have been served on the person in possession to surrender ordeliver vacant possession and symbolic possession is not sufficientand when actual taking over possession under the provisions of theAct has not been done, the proceedings are abated.155.In this context, it would be relevant to extract theviews of another Division Bench in S.Balasubramaniam and another Vs.the Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Reforms, Chennai,reported in (2009) 4 L.W 826 on the above aspect. In the abovereported judgment, the appellants therein, had purchased lands in1989 and 1993 respectively, after the publication of the notificationunder Section 11(1) of the Act. Dealing with the issue, as towhether purchaser's have any right over the property, purchased afterthe notification and whether they can maintain a Writ Petition, theDivision Bench held as follows:"The sale in favour of the appellants is null andvoid as per Section 6 of the Act, which provides that noperson who is holding vacant lands in excess of the ceilinglimit immediately before the commencement of the Act, shalltransfer such land by whatever mode of transfer until hehas furnished the statement under Section 7 andnotification under Section 11(1) has been published. Asthe sales effected in 1989 and 1993 are clearly inviolation of Section 6 and are therefore null and void noright to flow from such void transactions." (Emphasis supplied) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

156.Facts of the reported case further disclose that theappellants therein had waited from 18.05.1990 till February 2005, toassert their rights and that there was laches on their part.Applying the latter judgment, S.Balasubramaniam's case to the presentcase, as transfer of property by any mode is prohibited, after theissuance of Section 11(3) notification, this Court is of the viewthat the Will said to have been executed by the Land Owner andprobated in the year 2001, after surrendering possession in the year1988, will not clothe any right to the petitioners to maintain a writpetition, after nearly 22 years. 157.In W.P.No.11334 of 2006, dated 02.11.2009 [R.R.Nadham-vs- State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary to Government,Revenue Department], this Court, held that "physical possession ofthe land handed over by the Assistant Grade Revenue Inspector, (ULC)Poonamalleee and taken over by the Revenue Inspector, Ambattur andthe consequential Land Delivery Receipt duly signed by both theauthorities, as valid and further held that the authorities hadfollowed the procedure, before taking over possession of the land,which cannot, at any stage, be found fault with. This Court alsoobserved that the possession of the petitioner therein, if any, hasto be treated only as an encroachment on the Government land.Section 4 of the Repeal Act cannot be made applicable to this case,the reason being, no proceedings were pending immediately before thecommencement of the Act, before any Court, Tribunal or any authority.Therefore, the possession, which was taken by the authorities wayback on 19.1.1984 had become final. As such, there shall not be anyabatement of proceedings as contemplated under the said proviso".158.In most of the cases relied on by the learned counsel forthe petitioners, there were no records available for the respondentstherein to prove that possession of excess lands had been taken over,after preparing Panchanama or memo signed by the official belongingto the Revenue Department in the presence of the land owner nor therewere cases of surrender of possession. In the case on hand, the landowner, sister of the petitioners' had surrendered the excess land on29.04.1988 and also signed the Land Delivery Register and thereafter,physical possession has been taken.159.Reading of Section 3 of the Repealing Act makes it clearthat "taking over possession of the land" is the most relevant factorfor the purpose of deciding as to whether all actions taken under thePrincipal Act are abated or not, and also to decide as to whether theland owner has any subsisting right under the Repealing Act, 1999, toseek for re-conveyance of title, when the excess land vest in theGovernment, if possession of the same, had not been taken over by theGovernment. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

160.Reading of Section 4 of the Repeal Act, makes it clearthat in cases, where possession has already been taken over by theauthorities, all proceedings relating to any order made or purportedto be made under the Principal Act, pending immediately before thecommencement of the Act, before any Court, Tribunal or otherauthority shall abate.161.A conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the RepealingAct, 1999 and its effect is that, any action taken under thePrincipal Act, 1978, would abate, except in respect of cases, wherepossession has already been taken over by the Government and inrespect of cases, where possession has not been taken over, but theland is deemed to have been vested with the Government under Section11(3) of the Principal Act and where the compensation amount alreadypaid, had not been refunded, then that is also saved. 162.As stated supra, as per Section 11(3) of the PrincipalAct, "vesting" means, vesting of right, title and interest, inrelation to the excess land declared, free from all encumbrances inthe Government. Section 11(3) does not speak about possession. Thatis why, Section 3 of the Repeal Act, specifically states that, (1)Land should be vested, (2) Compensation should have been paid, (3)The amount received has been refunded, and (4) Restoration of land ispermissible, if physical possession had not been taken. It should benoted that in the Principal Act, vesting is followed by possession.If physical possession had already been taken over by the Government,or any person duly authorised by the State Government, in this behalfor by the competent authority, then what follows is only payment ofcompensation, whether partially paid or fully paid before taking overpossession and payment of compensation under the Principal Act, doesnot get abated, in terms of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. 163.Legislature has conceived a difficulty that in cases,where vesting is done by passing of an order under Section 11(3) ofthe Principal Act, there would be still be objection from the landowners to vacate and therefore, the authorities were empowered to usesuch power to vacate them to take actual physical possession. 164.The question of taking over possession under Section 11(6) of the Principal Act, would arise only only when the land ownerfails to surrender or deliver possession and if any person refuses orfails to comply with the notice issued under sub-Section 5 of Section11 of the Principal Act, then the competent authority may takepossession of the vacant land and for that purpose, use such force asmay be necessary.165.Thus, it is evident that once statutory vesting iscompleted, as per Sub-Section 11(3) of the Principal Act, thenecessity to take possession arises and if the possession is takenover, either by voluntary surrender or any other recognised mode https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ under law, then the acquisition is completed, except to the extent ofpayment of compensation, if not fully made prior to taking over.Once possession is taken over, then it cannot be contended thatrestoration of the land is permissible on payment of compensationalready received by the land owner, whether partly or in full.166.The expression "surrender" or "delivery of possession"used in Section 11(5) of the Principal Act, reflects the intention ofthe land owner to surrender/extinguish his rights to the property inall forms, including his right, title or interest and by such act ofsurrendering the land, he forfeits all his rights to the land,declared as surplus.167.Reading of Section 3 of the Repealing Act would clearlyindicate that the legislature has set out two categories of landowners. (1) Whose lands are vested in the Government and possessionof which is taken over and the other, land deemed to have beenvested, but possession not taken over, inspite of a declaration madeunder Section 11(3) of the Principal Act. In the former, ifcompensation had been paid either in part or full, the acquisition ofthe land by the Government to distribute the same in the manner setforth in the Principal Act is completed and if any compensationamount remains unpaid, vesting and taking over possession are savedand by virtue of Sections 4 of the Repeal Act and Section 12 of thePrincipal Act, determination and payment of compensation are notabated. 168.Whereas, in the case of latter, where possession is nottaken over and even if compensation is paid in part or full, the landowner may seek for restoration of his rights over the property,though it is vested in the Government, after issuance of a notice,specifying the date under Section 11(3) of the Principal Act,provided the land owner, had refunded the compensation amount. Asbetween the two categories, taking over possession is the mostimportant event, which decides the rights of the land owner under theRepealing Act. If possession is not taken over by the Governmentbefore the Repealing Act, i.e., 16.06.1999, no action can be takenthereafter under Section 11(6) of the Principal Act and therefore insuch circumstances, mere vesting of the land with the Government willnot serve any purpose and the competent authority cannot exercise anypower under the Principal Act to take possession as per Section 11(6)of the Principal Act, as it has been repealed.169.The object of the Repealing Act is to give finality tocertain proceedings initiated and completed under the Principal Act.The provisions of the Repealing Act makes it clear that the landswhich had been vested and possession taken over cannot be reverted tothe land owner, even if the compensation amount is not paid in full.If, the arguments of the petitioners are to be accepted, then everypart and parcel of land, where possession has taken over by the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government for the purpose of utilisation in terms of the objects ofthe Ceiling Act have to be returned, thereby making Section 3 of theRepealing Act as redundant and meaningless. Then all dead matterscan be resurrected. 170.Whenever action is taken under the provisions of thePrincipal Act 1978 to declare excess land in possession of the landowner and to take possession and if the land owner comes forward tosurrender a portion or the entire extent of land, then the intentionof the land owner is to surrender both title and possession with thegovernment without demur and to forfeit of all his rights, title orinterest, including possession, in relation to the excess land, iscompleted and if there is a consent by the government or thecompetent authority, accepting surrender or delivery of possession,then possession is immediately transferred to the government, inwhich event, the necessity to issue a notice, under Section 11(6) ofthe Act, does not arise at all. As stated supra, it is not the caseof the petitioners that when their sister surrendered the rearportion of the land in Survey No.3847/96, to an extent of 641 sq.mts,the authorities refused to accept the offer. On the other hand, theauthorities have readily accepted the surrender of the rear portionof the land, in lieu of the extent of land sought to be acquired andaccordingly, issued errata to Sections 11(1) and 11(3) notifications,as per the directions of the 3rd Respondent, in his letterNo.A2/SRA.327/78, dated 24.04.1987 and it was also published in TamilNadu Government Gazette No.22 dated 10.6.1987. Thereafter, the Urbanland Owner has signed the Land Delivery Register on 29.04.2008.171.Thus, it is evident that surrender of land by operationof law and by taking over actual physical possession, have beencompleted as early as on 29.04.1988 itself. If the Government, afteracquiring the land, have allotted the same to some other person andpermitted such persons to enter upon the land before the Repeal Act,came into force, then surrender of the land and delivery ofpossession in all respects is completed. Thereafter, all rights,title or interest in relation to the land are extinguished andforfeited, except to the extent of payment of compensation, if any,by the Government for the value of the land. In view of the above,once the land is surrendered on the free will and accord of the landowner, then there is no question of contending that possession hasnot been taken over by the authorities. 172.Reading of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, makes it clearthat Repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect:- (a) the vesting ofany vacant land under Sub-Section (3) of Section 11, possession ofwhich has been taken over by the State Government or any person dulyauthorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competentauthority. (b) the validity of any order granting exemption undersub-section (1) of Section 11 of any action taken thereunder https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

173.In the case on hand, after surrender of land, Section 11(5) notice has been issued and the land owner had surrenderedpossession on 29.04.1988 and thereafter, possession has been takenover and the name of the land owner has been substituted as TamilNadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation (TAHDCO) in thePermanent Land Register. It is well settled that when officialfunctions are discharged as per the procedure, presumption is drawnas to the correctness of the entries in the Land Register and nofurther material is required to prove that possession is not takenover by the authorities.174.In the case on hand, admittedly, the petitioners' sisterhad not filed any claim for re-conveyance of the land after thechange of ownership effected in the Land Register. No prejudice hasbeen caused to the erstwhile land owner. The offer made by her to theGovernment to take the rear portion of the lands has been accepted bythe Government and the conduct of the land owner in receiving thecompensation amount periodically would impel this Court to concludethere was absolutely no protest in any manner to handover possessionand to receive compensation amount. The consequential allotment ofthe land to Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation(TAHDCO) and the further endorsement in the revenue records amplyprove that possession of the land had been taken over by theGovernment in the year 1988 itself and in such circumstances, thepetitioners have no right to seek for restoration of possession ofthe land in question by virtue of Section 3 of the Repealing Act,1999. 175.At this juncture, it is also pertinent to note that inthe same manner the land owner had earlier surrendered 853.5 Sq.mts.,in R.S.No.3847/97, to the Junior Engineer, Corporation of Madras.When the petitioners have accepted the mode of surrender of the aboveextent of land to the Junior Engineer, Division No.126, Corporationof Chennai, by way of a letter, dated 26.08.1988 is stated to beaccepted and when the same mode has been followed by the land owner,in respect of 641 Sq.mts., in S.No.3847/1 and possession was taken bythe Urban Land Officer, and recorded in the Land Delivery Registerand signed by her, following her letter, dated 19.09.1986, this Courtis unable to understand, as to how the mode of surrender and takingover possession, can be questioned at this length of time, when theland owner herself had not made any protest of taking over the excessland from 1988 to 2000, when she died.COMPENSATION:176.One of the contentions raised in this writ petition isthat the entire compensation amount has to be given before takingover possession, otherwise, the whole proceedings are vitiated. Theplea has been made on the basis of observations made in few decisions https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of this Court. Whether payment of full compensation amount is arequirement before taking over possession. On this issue, it isrelevant to consider the decisions and the statutory provisions.177.Placing reliance on a decision of the Apex Court inM/s.Rayala Corporation Pvt Ltd., Vs. the Director of Enforcement,New Delhi, reported in AIR 1970 SC 494, learned counsel for thepetitioners submitted that once an Act is repealed unless it is savedby any Saving Clause in the provisions of the Repealing Act, furtherproceedings cannot be taken under the Principal Act and therefore,when full compensation amount has not been paid by the Government, byvirtue of Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,the entire proceedings are to be declared as abated.178.In this context, he has cited a decision of the SupremeCourt in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd., and another Vs. Union ofIndia and others, reported in (2000) 2 MLJ 141 SC, where, it hasbeen held that when a provision is omitted and another case isintroduced without a Saving Clause, then the pending proceedingsinitiated under the omitted provision would lapse.179.Placing reliance on a judgment in Mothi S.Rajamma and twoothers Vs. the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Chennai,in W.P.Nos.16898 to 16900 of 1999, dated 31.07.2002, learned counselfor the petitioners submitted that it is for the respondents toestablish that the compensation was paid before possession was takenover by the State Government or any other person authorised by theState Government. He also drew the attention to this Court inparagraph No.10 of the abovesaid judgment, wherein, it was observedthat if the lands had been allotted to Civil Supplies Department inthe year 1985, there would have been some improvement to the propertyand on the basis of the above observation, submitted that, onlyrecently the Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing Development Corporationhave entered into the lands declared as surplus in 1988 and therespondents have not taken the actual physical possession as per theprocedure contemplated under Tamilnadu Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1978. 180.As elaborated earlier, possession in the present case hadbeen taken on 29.04.1988 itself and if the lands are lying vacant forsometime, the same does not give any cause of action to contend thatpossession had not been taken. Once the land is allotted by theGovernment, it is left to the allottee to use the land for any publicpurpose and when it is put to actual use is not the concern of theland owner. 190.In A.Joseph Louis and another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu,represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Chennai, reportedin (2004) 3 L.W. 208, at paragraph No.5, this Court held as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "A combined reading of Section 3(1) and 3(2) of theRepealing Act makes it clear that unless possession hadalready been taken after payment of entire compensation,the State Government would not have jurisdiction to retainthe land. On the other hand, if the compensation had beenpaid by the Government the person is allowed paid by theGovernment the person is allowed to take possession of theland provided to refund the amount received. Since in thepresent case neither possession had been taken notcompensation had been paid, there is no jurisdiction forthe State Government or for any authority to pass impugnedorder."191.Though the learned Judge has observed that unlesspossession had already been taken, after payment of entirecompensation, the State Government will not have jurisdiction toretain the land, in the said judgment, there is no reference to thecontinuation of the proceedings under Section 12 of the PrincipalAct, where, after vesting under Section 11(3) of the Act, payment cancontinue for a long time, even after taking over possession and it isnot necessary that full compensation amount has to be paid beforetaking over possession.192.In Simpson and General Finance Company Limited., Vs.State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, RevenueDepartment, Chennai, and another, reported in 2006-4-L.W. 787, thewrit petitioner therein, had challenged the proceedings of theAssistant Commissioner (ULT) Madhavaram, and consequently, to forbearthe respondents therein, or any other officers or subordinates underthem from interfering with the lawful possession of the petitioner inrespect of the lands declared as excess vacant lands under the TamilNadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, as repealed byRepeal Act, 1999. It was submitted that a notice dated 14.06.2000issued by the Assistant Commissioner (ULT) Mahhavaram, Chennai, the2nd respondent therein, calling upon the writ petitioner therein, toappear for an enquiry with details of utilisation of excess vacantland as not valid in law, after the Repeal Act came into force. Itwas further contended that the petitioner company had applied forexemption of their excess lands held by it to an extent of 1,38,970sq.mts, in the said village under Section 20(1) (a) of the Tamil NaduUrban Land Ceiling Act, 1978, and that the Government videG.O.Ms.No.215, dated 18.03.1998 had granted exemption which wasperiodically extended upto 17.03.2003. It was further contended thatas per the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999, any person who hasbeen in possession on the date of the Repeal Act which came intoforce i.e., 16.06.1999 falls outside the purview of the Act, 1978.According to the petitioner therein, the extent of vacant land hadbeen fully utilised. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

193.Per contra, the Government had contended that exemptiongranted with certain conditions were not complied with by thepetitioner with the result, the excess land vests with the Governmentautomatically and hence, the Repeal Act cannot be made applicable.It was further contended that Section 21(1) of the Act cannot be readseparately and it should be read along with Section 21(2) of the Actand once Section 21(1) is saved, Section 21(2) provide forconsequential action in case of default in complying with theconditions and therefore the Government was empowered to send acommunication withdrawing exemption. On the facts of the case, thisCourt at paragraph Nos.9, 11 and 12 held as follows:"9. Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) of Repeal Actwould reveal that the compensation must have been paidand possession been taken pursuant to that Section 3(2) (b) also provides 'then such land shall berestored unless the amount paid, if any, shall berefunded to the State Government "which makes it clearthat even in cases where compensation is paid by theGovernment, the owner is allowed to take possession ofthe land, but that can be done only after the amountis refunded to the State Government.11.Section 3(1) (b) of the 1999 Actcontemplates that the Repeal Act shall not affect thevalidity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 22 or any "action takenthereunder". The words "validity of any ordergranting exemption" under Section 21(1) of the Act,1978, denotes that the exemption and conditionsimposed therein, are unaffected by Repeal Act. Thewords "action taken thereunder" means that all or anyaction if any taken against the person who obtainedexemption for violation of such conditions prior tothe repeal Act is not affected. In this case,admittedly, the State Government has not initiated anyaction prior to repeal Act. The impugnedcommunication dated 13.03.2003 is one issued by thesecond respondent, that too, admittedly after theRepeal Act came into force.12."Saving Clause" is used to preserve fromdestruction certain rights remedies or privilegesalready existing not that it gives any new right. Theassumption is that legislature enact laws withcomplete knowledge of existing laws pertaining to thesame subject. The failure to add saving clauseindicates that the intent was not to save the existinglegislature. In this case, Section 21(2) was notsaved in the repeal Act. In view of the fact that no https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ action has been taken by the State Government for thealleged violation of conditions imposed while grantingexemption prior to the repeal Act and also the factthat Section 21(2) is not saved, it is not even opento the State Government to take any action for thealleged violation of conditions, even if any. Theimpugned notice is issued only by the 2nd respondent,which is admittedly after the Repeal Act came intoforce. It is also a fact that neither compensation ispaid to the petitioner nor the lands were taken priorto the Repeal Act. In view of the same, either the 1strespondent or the 2nd respondent has jurisdiction toinitiate any action against the petitioner's lands,hence, I hold that the impugned communication isillegal and without any authority of law and the sameis quashed accordingly." (emphasis supplied)194.In the above reported judgment, the Division Bench, onfacts, found that neither the compensation amount was paid norpossession was taken before the Repeal Act and therefore, held thatthe impugned communication issued, after the Repeal Act, came intoforce, as without jurisdiction. The Division Bench, at Paragraph 9,held that,"9. Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act says that theRepeal Act not affect vesting of any vacant land undersub-section (3) of Section 11, possession of which hasbeen taken over by the State Government or any person,duly authorised by the State Government in his behalfor by the competent authority. Section 3(1)(b) saysthat the Repeal Act not affect the validity of anyorder granting exemption under sub-section (1) ofSection 21 or any action taken thereunder. Section 3(2)(a) contemplates that the Repeal Act shall notaffect where any land is deemed to be vested in theState Government under sub-section 3 of Section 11 ofAct 1978 but possession of which has not been takenover by the State Government or any person dulyauthorised by the State Government in his behalf or bythe competent authority. The Section 3(2)(b) of theAct says that any amount has been paid by the StateGovernment with respect to such land, then, such landshall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any,has been refunded to the State Government. A jointreading of Section 3(1) and Section 3(2) of the RepealAct would reveal that the compensation must have beenpaid and possession been taken pursuant to that.Section 3(2)(b) also provides "then such land shall notbe restored unless the amount paid, if any, shall be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ refunded to the State Government" which makes it clearthat even in cases where compensation is paid by theGovernment, the owner is allowed to take possession ofthe land, but that can be done only after the amount isrefunded to the State Government."195.Though the Division Bench has held that even compensationamount is paid and possession taken, still the land owner is entitledto seek restoration of possession, this Court is inclined to applythe interpretation made in judgment of the Supreme Court in AngooriDevi's case (stated supra) and the Division Bench judgment of thisCourt in Writ Appeal No.2752 of 2005, dated 22.07.2009[Dr.T.Azizuddin (died) vs. The Government of Tamilnadu], stated supra.196.In an unreported decision in N.S.Jaya Vs. the RevenueSecretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, and three others, inW.P.Nos.39713 and 39714 of 2002, dated 06.02.2009, one N.S.Ramaswami,brother of the petitioner was the owner of the lands. The Governmentacquired lands in Survey No.214/2 under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation), Act, 1978. As he was a bachelor, he wasallowed to retain some portion of land in Survey No.214/2. He diedon 21.02.1987 and thereafter the petitioner succeeded to his estateas his sole legal heir. According to her, physical possession of theland was not taken over and mere vesting of right in the Governmentwill not give any right to the respondents therein, to retain thelands in question. It was also contended that the petitioner and herlate brother did not receive the entire amount of compensation andthe last payment of Rs.1151/- had been received by the petitionerfrom the Assistant Commissioner, Mylapore, on 22.12.1996.197.On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that theUrban Land owner himself had surrendered the excess land andaccordingly he had received 25% of the amount payable under Section12(6) of the Act, as possession was already handed over as early ason 23.02.1982 and therefore, the petitioner has no locus-standi tomake a claim to get back possession of the land in question. It wasalso submitted that full amount of compensation for the surplus landacquired under the Act, has been paid vide Cheques dated 06.11.1996and that on 24.01.1997. However, the petitioner inter-alia contendedthat, as physical possession of the land was not taken, she isentitled to protection under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978.198.After considering a catena of decisions, a learned singleJudge, observed that though the petitioner had claimed that therespondents had not taken actual physical possession of the land inquestion and that the compensation payable to the petitioner for thelands said to have been acquired by the respondents, had not beenpaid to the petitioner in full, the learned counsel for therespondents therein was not in a position to refute the claim made by https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the petitioner with the support of original records. The learnedJudge has also observed that even though the respondents therein, hadclaimed that possession of the land had been taken over and that thesame was allotted to All India Service Officers Co-operative HousingSociety by way of G.O.Ms.No.26, Revenue, dated 08.01.1993, therespondents were not in a position to substantiate the said claim.199.In this unreported case also, the finding of the Courtis that the respondents were not in a position to substantiate theirplea of taking over possession, with the support of original recordsand hence, the Court has quashed the proceedings. The said judgmentis not applicable to the present case, for the simple reason that therespondents therein were not able to substantiate the claim of takingover possession and in such circumstances alone, the judgment hasbeen rendered.200.In Natwarbhai Magainbhai Patel v. Collector and Ors.,reported in 1996 (5) SCC 498, the contention of the land owner wasthat the land was not immediately put to use, for which, acquisitionwas done. The Supreme Court held that,"In what manner the lands require to be utilisedhas been regulated under the provisions of the act. It isnot a condition, under the Act, that payment ofcompensation be made before utilisation of the land ofwhich the petitioner was erswhile owner. Under thesecircumstances, we do not find any illegality in the orderpassed by the High Court in Special Civil AppealNo.4093/93 on May 15, 1995. The Special Leave Petition isaccordingly dismissed."201.The payment of compensation before taking over ofphysical possession or before utilisation of the land is not acondition precedent.202.Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act makes it clear thateven though possession is not taken over by the government, butcompensation amount paid if any can be refunded to seek forrestoration of the rights, on account of vesting of title, rights orinterest in the government, in relation to the excess land, deemed tohave been vested in the government free from all encumbrances underSection 11(3) of the Principal Act, and therefore, if compensationhad already been paid either in part or full, the land owner isentitled to seek for restoration of the divested rights, on paymentof compensation amount, provided he retains possession. As per thedecision of Smt.Angoori Devi's case, all proceedings are abated oncepossession is taken and Repeal Act does not confer any right on theland owner to seek for restoration of physical possession of theland. If physical possession is also meant to be restored to theland owner, after the payment of compensation if any, in part or full https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ then Section 4 of the Repeal Act would become redundant and otiose.That is not the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Smt. AngooriDevi's case. 203.The interpretation of an enactment should serve thepurpose for which it is enacted and not to make the provisionsredundant. Provisions contained in Section 3 of the Repealing Acthas considered and saved two categories of acquisition (1) wherelands have been vested in the Government and possession taken,whether compensation paid or not and (2) where lands have been deemedto have been vested in the government and compensation paid, butpossession not taken over by government and the land owners, notcoming forward to refund the compensation amount. 204.If the land owners, whose lands are vested, butpossession not taken over, prior to the Repealing Act, come forwardto seek for restoration of the vested rights and refund thecompensation received, either in part or full, then their rights areprotected under the Repeal Act. 205.Vesting of land in the government comes into operation,the moment 11(3) notification is published, specifying a date in thedeclaration. As per section 12 of the Principal Act, (1) where anyvacant land is deemed to have been acquired by the Government undersub-section (3) of Section 11, the State government shall pay to theperson or the persons having any interest therein, the compensationamount for the value of excess land. The method of determination isprovided in Section 12 of the Principal Act. Sub-Section (6) ofSection 12 states that the competent authority may order in writing,determine the amount to be paid in accordance with the provisions ofSection 12, as also the person, or, where there are several personsinterested in the land, the persons to whom it shall be paid andproportion if any. Sub-Section 7 of Section 12 states that, "beforedetermining the amount to be paid, every person interested shall begiven an opportunity to state his case as to the amount to be paid tohim." As per Sub-Section 8 of the said Section, the competentauthority shall dispose of every case for determination of the amountto be paid as expeditiously as possible and in any case within suchperiod as may be prescribed. Rule 11 of the Tamilnadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1978, deals with determination of theamount and disposal of cases by the competent authority under Sub-Sections 7 and 8 of Section 12. Rule 11 reads that, (1) everycase for determination of the amount to be paid to the person orpersons having any interest in any vacant land shall be disposed ofby the competent authority within six months from the date on whichsuch vacant land is deemed to have been acquired by the StateGovernment. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

206.The mode of payment of the compensation is provided inSection 16 of the Principal Act and it reads as follows:"(1) The State Government shall, within a period ofsix months from the date of the order of the competentauthority determining the amount to be paid under Section12 or, in a case where an appeal has been preferred againstsuch order under Section 13 or where a revision has beenpreferred under Section 15, within a period of six monthsfrom the date of the final order of the appellate orrevisional authority, pay the amount referred to in Section12 to the person or persons entitled thereto."207.By Act 48/94, the government have made the followingamendment to Section 16 of the Principal Act and the amending Actreads as follows:"(1) This Act may be called the Tamilnadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulations) Amendment Act, 1994.(2) In Section 16 of the Tamilnadu Urban Land(Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1978, for sub-section 2 thefollowing sub-section shall be substituted, namely:-"(2)(a) If the amount payable is twenty five thousandrupees or below, it shall be paid in cash forthwith.(b) If the amount payable exceeds twenty fivethousand rupees, the first twenty five thousand shall bepaid in cash forthwith and the balance shall, during aperiod of fifteen years, be paid in cash in annualinstalments carrying an interest at the rate of six percentper annum with effect from the date on which the vacantland is deemed to have been acquired by the StateGovernment under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of thePrincipal Act."208.Reading of the statutory provisions makes it explicitthat the moment a notification is issued under sub-section (3) ofSection 11 of the Principal Act, the competent authority has todetermine the compensation amount as expeditiously as possible and inany case, within a period of six months from the date on which, thevacant land is deemed to have been acquired by the State governmentor in a case, where an appeal has been preferred against such orderunder Section 13 or where a revision has been preferred under Section15 to the Special Appellate Tribunal within a period of six monthsfrom the date of final order of the appellate or the revisionalauthority, as he case may be, pay the amount, referred to Section 12to the person or persons entitled thereto. Section 13 deals with anappeal against an order made under Section 12 of the Act. Thus, it https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is evident from the statutory provisions that the proceedings fordetermination of the compensation amount is independent of the actiontaken by the competent authority for taking over possession underSub-Sections 5 and 6 of Section 11 of the Principal Act.209.As per sub-section 11(5), possession of excess land hasto be surrendered or delivered to the State Government, within thirtydays of the service of notice under Section 11(5) and if any personrefuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5),the competent authority may take possession of vacant land or causeit to be given to the State government or to any person dulyauthorised by the State government in this behalf and may for thatpurpose use such force as may be necessary. The provisions of thePrincipal Act makes it mandatory on the part of the competentauthority to take possession of the excess land immediately after 11(3) notification is issued, i.e., immediately after vesting of theland in the government, whereas, the time limit for determination ofthe compensation is within six months from the date on which thevacant land is deemed to have been acquired by the government or in acase, where an appeal or revision has been preferred, within a periodof six months from the date of order of the appellate or revisionalauthority as the case may be. If the amount payable exceeds twentyfive thousand, the first twenty five thousand shall be paid forthwithand the balance, during a period of fifteen years, be paid in cash.Section 11(3) of the Principal Act reads as follows:"(3) At any time after the publication of thenotification under sub-section (1) the competent authoritymay, by notification in the Tamil nadu Government Gazettedeclare that the excess vacant land referred to in thenotification published under sub-section (1) shall, witheffect from such date as may be specified in thedeclaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the StateGovernment and upon the publication of such declaration,such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in theState Government free from all encumbrances with effectfrom the date so specified." 210.Therefore, payment of compensation determined underSection 12 of the Principal Act is independent of the action takenunder Sub-Section 5 and 6 of the section 11 of the Act and if theamount exceeds twenty five thousand, the period of payment may evenextend for a period of fifteen years, in which event, the delayedpayment carries six percent interest. When the statutory provisionscontemplate determination and payment of compensation, after vestingunder Sub-Section 3 of Section 11, and continued payment underSections 12 and 16 of the Principal Act, even after taking overpossession, for which act, the time stipulated is immediately after30 days, after 11(5) notice, the contention of the petitioners that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Principal Act contemplates entire compensation amount to be paidbefore the taking over possession of the land, is contrary to thestatutory provisions. In view of the statutory provisions, thedecisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner,wherein only observations have been made, without there being anyspecific issue raised and answered, would not lend any support to thecase of the petitioners. Therefore, it is the considered view ofthis Court that the provisions of the Principal Act do no contemplateand stipulate any condition precedent that, before taking overphysical possession of the land, the entire compensation amount hasto be paid. That is why the Repealing Act has been drafted in such away, that where possession is taken, provisions under Sections 11 to14 would not abate, by virtue of Section 4 of the Repealing Act.That is why as per Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act, even if thecompensation amount has been paid, before taking over physicalpossession, the deemed vesting would be saved, under the Repeal Act,if the land owner does not come forward to refund the compensationamount, which would clearly show that taking over possession isindependent of determination and payment of compensation as perSections 12 and 16 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Principalrules.USER OF THE LAND:211.Whether the taken over lands should be utilisedimmediately before the Repeal Act and if not, whether the acquisitionproceedings are vitiated is another point to be answered.212.Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that as theland alleged to have been surrendered by the petitioners' sister wasnot put to use immediately for the purpose for which it was acquiredand therefore, an inference has to be drawn to the effect that thepossession was not taken over, prior to 16.06.1999, the date onwhich, the Repealing Act came into force. 213.In Tamilnadu Housing Board Vs. L.Chandrasekaran (Dead) byLrs. and others, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 786, a part of the land ofthe respondents therein were acquired by the Government of Tamilnadufor Ambattur Neighbourhood Scheme. A Notification under Section 4(1)of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued on 23.10.1975 anddeclaration under Section 6 was issued on 02.11.1978. Afterfinalisation of the acquisition proceedings, the respondents werepaid compensation in lieu of their land. Some of the land ownersincluding one Mr.A.S.Naidu, challenged the acquisition proceedings byfiling writ petitions. The High Court quashed the declaration issuedunder Section 6 leaving the preliminary notification intact. Notsatisfied with this, Mr.A.S.Naidu and others filed Special LeavePetitions (Civil) in 1988. During the pendency of the Special LeavePetitions, the Act was amended by Tamilnadu Land Acquisition(Amendment) Act 16 of 1997, in terms of which, a declaration under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 6 was required to be published within three years from thedate of preliminary notification. This Court took notice of theamendment made by the State Legislature and held that in view of theearlier order, such publication under Section 6 of the Act, cannotnow by made and hence, proceeded to quash the acquisition withliberty to the State Government to issue a fresh preliminarynotification.214.One of the land owners, who had not challenged theacquisition proceedings filed a Writ petition in 1997 for issuance ofa direction to the Tamilnadu Housing Board to certify that theacquired land was no longer needed for the purpose for which it wasacquired. A Single Judge allowed the writ petition and held that thepetitioner, the erstwhile land owner, was entitled to get a no-objection certificate. The Writ Appeal preferred by the appellantBoard was disposed of by a Division Bench holding that the writpetitioner therein was entitled to make a representation for re-conveyance of the acquired land in accordance with Section 48-B ofthe Land Acquisition Act. 215.In furtherance of the directions given by the DivisionBench of this Court, the erstwhile land owner submitted arepresentation to the Secretary, Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment, Chennai, with a request to reconvey the land acquiredfrom him, in terms of Section 48-B of the Act. The State Governmentforwarded the representation to the appellant Board for its comments.The latter sent a report mentioning therein that the land acquiredwas proposed to be utilised for allotment of housing plots toeconomically weaker section of the people and for construction ofmulti storied flats for higher income group. After considering thereport, the State Government rejected the representation of the landowner. 216.Being aggrieved by the communication, the erstwhileland owner filed a Writ Petition and prayed that the State Governmentmay be directed to release his land, because the same had not beenutilised for the purpose enumerated in the notification issued underSection 4 of the Act. A similar writ petition was also filed. Alearned Single Judge dismissed both the writ petitions by separateorders holding that the Government is empowered to decide whetherthe acquired land is no longer required for the purpose for which itwas acquired or for any other public purpose and the decision takenin that regard cannot be nullified by the Court unless it is shown tobe totally arbitrary or mala fide. The learned Judge sustained theorder made by the State Government, in the light of the reportsubmitted by the Housing Board.217.On appeal, the Division Bench, reversed the saiddecision and directed the Board to re-convey the land to the landowner, subject to depositing the amount of compensation together with https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ interest. While setting aside the decision, the Supreme Court atParagraph Nos.27 to 29, held as follows:"27. There is one more reason why the impugnedjudgment deserves to be set aside. Undisputedly, the landof the respondents forms part of large chunk which wasacquired for execution of the housing scheme. The reportsent by the appellant Board to the State Government showsthat the purpose for which the land was acquired is stillsubsisting. The respondents had neither pleaded before theHigh Court nor was any material produced by them to showthat the report which formed basis of the Government'sdecision not to entertain their prayer for reconveyance ofthe land was vitiated by mala fides or that any extraneousor irrelevant factor had influenced the decision-makingprocess or that there was violation of the rules of naturaljustice. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Courtcould not have exercised the power of judicial review andindirectly annulled the decision contained in communicationdated 18.03.1999.28. It need no emphasis that in exercise of powerunder Section 48-B of the Act, the Government can releasethe acquired land only till the same continues to vest init and that too if it is satisfied that the acquired landis not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired orfor any other public purpose. To put it differently, ifthe acquired or for any other public purpose. To put itdifferently, if the acquired land has already beentransferred to other agency, the Government cannot exercisepower under Section 48-B of the Act and reconvey the sameto the original owner. In any case, the Government cannotbe compelled to reconvey the land to the original owner ifthe same can be utilised for any public purpose other thanthe one for which it was acquired.29. Before concluding, we may notice the judgment ofthis Court in T.N. Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal (2007(9) SCC 255). The question considered in that case waswhether the Division Bench of the High Court could directrelease of the acquired land which had been transferred tothe appellant Board. While setting aside the impugnedorder, this Court observed : (SCC pp.261-62, paras 13-16)."13. It is clearly pleaded by the State and the TamilNadu Housing Board that the scheme had not beensuspended or abandoned and that the lands acquired arevery much needed for the implementation of the schemeand the steps in that regard have already been taken.In the light of this position, it is not open to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court to assume that the project has been abandonedmerely because another piece of land in the adjacentvillage had been released from acquisition in thelight of orders of the Court. It could not be assumedthat the whole of the project had been abandoned orhas become unworkable. It depends upon the purpose forwhich the land is acquired. As we see it, we find noimpediment in the lands in question being utilised forthe purpose of putting up a multi-stories buildingcontaining small flats, intended as the public purposewhen the acquisition was notified. Therefore, the HighCourt clearly erred in proceeding as if the schemestood abandoned. This was an unwarranted assumption onthe part of the Court, which has no foundation in thepleadings and materials produced in the case. TheCourt should have alteast insisted on production ofmaterials to substantiate a claim of abandonment.14. We have already noticed that in the writpetition, there are no sufficient allegationsjustifying interference by the Court. Mere claim ofpossession by the writ petitioners is not a foundationon which the relief now granted could have been restedeither by the learned Single Judge or by the DivisionBench of the High Court. On the materials, no right torelief has been established by the writ petitioner.15. We may also notice that once a piece of landhas been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,the land becomes the property of the State. The Statecan dispose of the property thereafter or convey it toanyone, if the land is not needed for the purpose forwhich it was acquired, only for the market value thatmay be fetched for the property as on the date ofconveyance. The doctrine of public trust would disablethe State from giving back the property for anythingless than the market value. In State of Kerala v. M.Bhaskaran Pillai (1997 (5) SCC 432, in a similarsituation this Court observed: (SCC p.433, para 4)'4.... The question emerges whether the Governmentcan assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It issettled law that if the land is acquired for a publicpurpose, after the public purpose was achieved, therest of the land could be used for any other publicpurpose. In case there is no other public purpose forwhich the land is needed, then instead of disposal byway of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should beput to public auction and the amount fetched in thepublic auction can be better utilised for the public https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of theConstitution. In the present case, what we find isthat the executive order is not in consonance with theprovisions of the Act and is, therefore, invalid.Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is welljustified in declaring the executive order as invalid.Whatever assignment is made, should be for a publicpurpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government shouldbe sold only through the public auctions so that thepublic also gets benefited by getting a highervalue'."(emphasis supplied)218.In The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v.S.Gajendran reported in 2010 (3) MLJ 643, the first respondenttherein sought for re-conveyance of the land from the Housing Boardon the ground that the lands have not been utilised for the purposefor which, it was acquired and therefore, the Housing Board is boundto re-convey the land to the original owner under Section 48-B of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894. A representation for re-conveyance wasmade and since no orders were passed, a Mandamus was sought for.Following the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court inW.A.No.2430 of 1999, a learned Single Judge directed re-conveyance.Challenging the same, the Housing Board preferred an appeal,contending inter alia that the land was vested with the Tamil NaduHousing Board, after finalisation of the acquisition proceedings inthe year 1985 and utilised for construction of houses, by approvinglayout and therefore, prayed to set aside the order of the learnedSingle Judge. 219.After considering the statutory provisions under Section16-B of the Land Acquisition Act, relating to forfeiture of land bythe Government and the rights of the land owner under Section 48-B ofthe Land Acquisition Act, the Division Bench in the reportedjudgment, observed as follows:"8. It is not in dispute that the Housing Board wasgiven possession after finalising the acquisitionproceedings in the year 1985. Till date the Housing Boardis not divested of the said land by the Government due toany reason, much less, not utilising the said land for thepurpose for which it was acquired. It is the specific caseof the appellant Housing Board that the entire landacquired for the Housing Scheme was utilised and layout wasalso prepared and approved as early as in the year 1988 andlands are used for the purpose for which it was acquired,except the school site. Admittedly the first respondent hasnot questioned the land acquisition proceedings and as suchacquisition of his land has become final. It is also notthe case of the first respondent that possession of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ land was not handed over to the appellant as early as inthe year 1985.9. On the above said admitted facts, it is evidentthat the first respondent's land acquired in the year 1982is vested with the appellant from the year 1985. Section16B of the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act,1996, clearly states that if the possession is handed overto the requisitioning body and if the land is not utilised,it is open to the Government by an order forfeiting thelands as penalty and thereafter the land vests in theGovernment in Revenue Department, free from allencumbrances. Section 16B reads as follows:16B. Land to be forfeited in certaincases.- Where the Government are satisfied thatthe land acquired under this Act for any publicpurpose as referred to in Sub-section (1) ofSection 4 not used for the purpose for which itwas acquired, they may, by an order, forfeit theland as penalty and the land shall vest in theGovernment in Revenue Department free from allencumbrances:Provided that no order under this section,shall be made unless the person or authorityaggrieved has had a reasonable opportunity ofbeing heard.10. It is not the case of the first respondent thatthe second respondent Government forfeited the land fromthe Tamil Nadu Housing Board due to the alleged non-utilisation of the land. In such circumstances, the firstrespondent cannot approach the Government for re-conveyanceof the land under Section 48B of the Land Acquisition Act,1894. Re-conveyance of the land under Section 48B can beconsidered by the Government only if the land is inpossession of the Government and once possession is handedover to the requisitioning body viz., the Tamil NaduHousing Board, the Government loses its right to considerre-conveyance request made, if any, by the erstwhile landowners. Section 48B of the Act reads as follows:48B. Transfer of land to original owner incertain cases.- Where the Government aresatisfied that the land vest in the Governmentunder this Act is not required for the purposefor which it was acquired, or for any otherpublic purpose, the Government may transfer suchland to the original owner who is willing to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ repay the amount paid to him under this Act forthe acquisition of such land inclusive of theamount referred to in Sub-section (1A) and (2) ofSection 23, if any, paid under this Act.12. The contention of the appellant that the firstrespondent has no enforceable right for seeking directionto re-convey the land by the second respondent is also wellfounded. Writ of mandamus cannot be issued merely because aperson is praying for. One must establish the right firstand then he must seek for the prayer to enforce the saidright. If there is failure of duty by the authorities orinaction, one can approach the Court for mandamus. The saidposition is well settled by in series of decisions.(a) In the decision reported in (1996) 9 SCC 309(State of U.P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors.) inparagraph 10, the Apex Court held as follows:10. ...Under the Constitution a mandamus can beissued by the court when the applicantestablishes that he has a legal right to theperformance of legal duty by the party againstwhom the mandamus is sought and the said rightwas subsisting on the date of the petition....(b) In the decision reported in (2004) 2 SCC 150(Union of India v. S.B. Vohra) the Supreme Court consideredthe said issue and held that 'for issuing a writ ofmandamus in favour of a person, the person claiming, mustestablish his legal right in himself. Then only a writ ofmandamus could be issued against a person, who has a legalduty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so.(c) In the decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC 280(Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain) inparagraphs 11 and 12 the Supreme Court held thus,11. The principles on which a writ ofmandamus can be issued have been stated as underin The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies byF.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.:Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is ahighly prerogative writ, usually issuing out ofthe highest court of general jurisdiction, in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ name of the sovereignty, directed to any naturalperson, corporation or inferior court within thejurisdiction, requiring them to do someparticular thing therein specified, and whichappertains to their office or duty. Generallyspeaking, it may be said that mandamus is asummary writ, issuing from the proper court,commanding the official or board to which it isaddressed to perform some specific legal duty towhich the party applying for the writ is entitledof legal right to have performed.Note 192.-Mandamus is, subject to theexercise of a sound judicial discretion, theappropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive,specific and ministerial duty presently existingand imposed by law upon officers and others whorefuse or neglect to perform such duty, whenthere is no other adequate and specific legalremedy and without which there would be a failureof justice. The chief function of the writ is tocompel the performance of public dutiesprescribed by statute, and to keep subordinateand inferior bodies and tribunals exercisingpublic functions within their jurisdictions. Itis not necessary, however, that the duty beimposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for theenforcement of a common law duty.Note 196.-Mandamus is not a writ of right.Its issuance unquestionably lies in the soundjudicial discretion of the court, subject alwaysto the well-settled principles which have beenestablished by the courts. An action in mandamusis not governed by the principles of ordinarylitigation where the matters alleged on one sideand not denied on the other are taken as true,and judgment pronounced thereon as of course.While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, itsissuance is largely controlled by equitableprinciples. Before granting the writ the courtmay, and should, look to the larger publicinterest which may be concerned-an interest whichprivate litigants are apt to overlook whenstriving for private ends. The court should actin view of all the existing facts, and with dueregard to the consequences which will result. Itis in every case a discretion dependent upon allthe surrounding facts and circumstances.Note 206.- ... The correct rule is thatmandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ discretionary and the party upon whom the dutyrests has exercised his discretion reasonably andwithin his jurisdiction, that is, upon factssufficient to support his action.12. These very principles have been adoptedin our country. In Bihar Eastern GangeticFishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singhafter referring to the earlier decisions inLekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, RaiShivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College andUmakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar this Courtobserved as follows in para 15 of the Reports(SCC): (Sipahi Singh case, SCC pp. 152-53)15. ... There is abundant authorityin favour of the proposition that awrit of mandamus can be granted only ina case where there is a statutory dutyimposed upon the officer concerned andthere is a failure on the part of thatofficer to discharge the statutoryobligation. The chief function of awrit is to compel performance of publicduties prescribed by statute and tokeep subordinate tribunals and officersexercising public functions within thelimit of their jurisdiction. Itfollows, therefore, that in order thatmandamus may issue to compel theauthorities to do something, it must beshown that there is a statute whichimposes a legal duty and the aggrievedparty has a legal right under thestatute to enforce its performance....In the instant case, it has not beenshown by Respondent 1 that there is anystatute or rule having the force of lawwhich casts a duty on Respondents 2 to4 which they failed to perform. Allthat is sought to be enforced is anobligation flowing from a contractwhich, as already indicated, is alsonot binding and enforceable.Accordingly, we are clearly of theopinion that Respondent 1 was notentitled to apply for grant of a writof mandamus under Article 226 the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Constitution and the High Court was notcompetent to issue the same.Therefore, in order that a writ ofmandamus may be issued, there must be alegal right with the party asking forthe writ to compel the performance ofsome statutory duty cast upon theauthorities...."18. It need no emphasis that in exercise of powerunder Section 48B of the Act, the Government can releasethe acquired land only till the same continues to vest init and that too if it is satisfied that the acquired landis not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired orfor any other public purpose. To put it differently, if theacquired land has already been transferred to other agency,the Government cannot exercise power under Section 48B ofthe Act and reconvey the same to the original owner. In anycase, the Government cannot be compelled to reconvey theland to the original owner if the same can be utilized forany public purpose other than the one for which it wasacquired.19. Before concluding, we may notice the judgment ofthis Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal(2007 (9) SCC 255). The question considered in that casewas whether the Division Bench of the High Court coulddirect release of the acquired land which had beentransferred to the appellant-Board. While setting aside theimpugned order, this Court observed:It is clearly pleaded by the State and theTamil Nadu Housing Board that the scheme had notbeen suspended or abandoned and that the landsacquired are very much needed for theimplementation of the scheme and the steps inthat regard have already been taken. In the lightof this position, it is not open to the Court toassume that the project has been abandoned merelybecause another piece of land in the adjacentvillage had been released from acquisition in thelight of orders of the Court. It could not beassumed that the whole of the project had beenabandoned or has become unworkable. It dependsupon the purpose for which the land is acquired.As we see it, we find no impediment in the landsin question being utilised for the purpose ofputting up a multi-storied building containingsmall flats, intended as the public purpose when https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the acquisition was notified. Therefore, the HighCourt clearly erred in proceeding as if thescheme stood abandoned. This was an unwarrantedassumption on the part of the Court, which has nofoundation in the pleadings and the materialsproduced in the case. The Court should have atleast insisted on production of materials tosubstantiate a claim of abandonment.We have already noticed that in the writ petition, thereare no sufficient allegations justifying interference bythe Court. Mere claim of possession by the writ petitionersis not a foundation on which the relief now granted couldhave been rested either by the learned single Judge or bythe Division Bench of the High Court. On the materials, noright to relief has been established by the writpetitioners.We may also notice that once a piece of land has beenduly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the landbecomes the property of the State. The State can dispose ofthe property thereafter or convey it to anyone, if the landis not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired,only for the market value that may be fetched for theproperty as on the date of conveyance. The doctrine ofpublic trust would disable the State from giving back theproperty for anything less than the market value. In Stateof Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC 432 in asimilar situation, this Court observed: (SCC p.433, para 4)"The question emerges whether the Governmentcan assign the land to the erstwhile owners ? Itis settled law that if the land is acquired for apublic purpose, after the public purpose wasachieved, the rest of the land could be used forany other public purpose. In case there is noother public purpose for which the land isneeded, then instead of disposal by way of saleto the erstwhile owner, the land should be put topublic auction and the amount fetched in thepublic auction can be better utilised for thepublic purpose envisaged in the DirectivePrinciples of the Constitution. In the presentcase, what we find is that the executive order isnot in consonance with the provision of the Actand is, therefore, invalid. Under thesecircumstances, the Division Bench is welljustified in declaring the executive order asinvalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of theGovernment should be sold only through the publicauctions so that the public also gets benefitedby getting a higher value."Section 48B introduced into the Act in the State of TamilNadu is an exception to this rule. Such a provision has tobe strictly construed and strict compliance with its termsinsisted upon. Whether such a provision can be challengedfor its validity, we are not called upon to decide here."(emphasis supplied)220.In a recent decision in Smt.Sulochana Chandrakant Galandev. Pune Municipal Transport and Ors., reported in 2010 (8) SCC 467,the suit land was acquired under the Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1976, in the years 1978-1979 and its possession wastaken and handed over to Pune Municipal Transport for establishing abus depot and staff quarters. In the year 1988, the bus depot wasconstructed on a part of the suit land, however, the appellantpreferred a revision under Section 34 of the Act, 1976, contendingthat the land ought not to have been acquired under the Act, 1976, onthe ground that on the date of commencement of the Act, 1976, i.e.17.2.1976, the suit land was not within the limits of urban area. Thesaid application was allowed by the Revision Authority. Aggrievedby the same, the Pure Municipal Transport has filed a writ petitionin W.P.No.1018 of 1999, before the High Court of Maharashtra and thesaid writ petition was allowed, in spite of the fact that the Act,1976 stood repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) RepealAct, 1999 with effect from 18.03.1999. The said decision waschallenged before the Supreme Court. 221.One of the main contention of the land owner was thatoriginally, the land was allotted to Pune Municipal Transport forestablishing a bus depot, though the land was earmarked forresidential purposes and thus, it was not permissible for theauthority to change the user of the land. It was also contended thatif the land is vested in the State free from all encumbrances withoutany authority of law, the land owner is entitled to possessionthereof. Per contra, the Pune Municipal Transport and the respondentstherein submitted that the order passed by the prescribed authority,dated 23.05.1979 attained finality as it was not challenged by theappellant by filing an appeal under Section 12 before the Urban LandTribunal, though the Act, 1976, also provides for a second appeal tothe High Court. It was also submitted that the land owner-appellantcould not maintain the Revision after expiry of about two decades.On the aspect of vesting, it was submitted that the land, after beingdeclared surplus under the Act, 1976, was acquired under Section 10 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the Act, 1976, and it vested in the State absolutely free from allencumbrances. The land once vested cannot be divested. After vestingthe land in the State, in case, the State authority allots the landto any other department or corporation for a specific purpose, itdoes not loose the competence to change the user of the land and incase, it is changed, the original land owner cannot be heard raisingany grievances whatsoever. The Act, 1976, stood repealed, but thisfact would have no bearing on this case for the reason thatpossession of the suit land had been taken in 1979 itself.222.On the above pleadings, the Supreme Court, afterconsidering the definition of the words, "vesting" in Fruit &Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust reported inAIR 1957 SC 344, "Encumbrance" in Collector of Bomboy v. NusserwanjiRattanji Mistri & Ors., reported in AIR 1955 SC 298, H.P. StateElectricity Board & Ors., v. Shiv K. Sharma & Ors., reported in AIR2005 SC 954, and AI Champdany Industries Ltd., v. Official Liquidator& Anr., reported in 2009 (4) SCC 486 and "free from all encumbrances"used in Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, explained inState of H.P., v. Tarsem Singh & Ors., reported in AIR 2001 SC 3431and the catena of decisions on the point that the land vested in theState absolutely free from all encumbrances and it cannot bedivested, at Paragraph 13, held that, "13. So far as the change of user is concerned, it isa settled legal proposition that once land vests in theState free from all encumbrances, there cannot be any rideron the power of the State Government to change user of theland in the manner it chooses."223.After considering the various decisions on the aboveissue, at Paragraphs 16, the Supreme Court further held that,"16. In view of the above, the law can besummarised that once the land is acquired, it vestsin the State free from all encumbrances. It is notthe concern of the land owner how his land is usedand whether the land is being used for the purposefor which it was acquired or for any other purpose.He becomes persona non grata once the land vests inthe State. He has a right to get compensation onlyfor the same. The person interested cannot claim theright of restoration of land on any ground,whatsoever." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

224.On the aspect of delay in filing the Revision Petition inthe year 1998, after nearly two decades of acquisition in the year1979, after extracting various decisions, at Paragraph 24, the ApexCourt held that,"24. If some person has taken a relief from the Court byfiling a Writ Petition immediately after the cause ofaction had arisen, petitioners cannot take the benefitthereof resorting to legal proceedings belatedly. Theycannot take any benefit thereof at such a belated stage forthe reason that they cannot be permitted to take theimpetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligentperson."225.Ultimately, at Paragraps 31 to 34, the Apex Court held asfollows:"31. Undoubtedly, the Act, 1976, stood repealed bythe Act 1999. However, it has no bearing on this case forthe reason that proceeding pending in any Court relating tothe Act, 1976, stood abated, provided the possession of theland had not been taken from the owner. Therefore, in acase, where the possession has been taken, the repeal ofthe Act would not confer any benefit on the owner of theland. [Vide Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya Public CharitableTrust v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2000) 6 SCC 325; GhasiteyLal Sahu and Anr. v. Competent Authority (2004) 13 SCC 452;and Mukarram Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.(2007) 11 SCC 90].32. From the above, the following factual situationemerges:(I) The land was declared surplus under the Act,1976, and acquired in 1979.(II) Possession of the land was taken in 1979 by theState of Maharashtra and it was handed over to PMT forconstruction of the residential quarters for the staff.(III) Appellant has not stated anywhere in thepleadings as to whether any amount/compensation as providedunder the Act, 1976, had been received/accepted by her. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (IV) Appellant, for the reason best known to her, didnot file appeal before the Land Tribunal, though Act, 1976provides for two appeals.(V) Appellant woke up from deep-slumber only afterfive years of the judgment of this Court in Atia MohammadiBegum (supra) and filed revision under Section 34 of theAct, 1976, in 1998.(VI) The State Government allowed the revisionwithout taking into consideration the point of delay;rather it relied upon its own circulars.(VII) The State Government did not consider theconsequences and particularly the issue of dis-possessionof the appellant from the land in dispute in 1978 itself.(VIII) The judgment in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra)has been over-ruled by this Court in N. Audikesava Reddy(supra).33. Therefore, the law, as exists today, is that theland in dispute could be subjected to the provisions of theAct, 1976, with effect from 17.5.1976, i.e. the date onwhich the suit land came within the limits of the MunicipalCorporation. The Act stood repealed in 1999, but theproceedings pending in any court would stand abatedprovided the tenure-holder was in possession of the land onthe date of the commencement of the Act 1999. The HighCourt has taken note of the fact that the appellant'srevision had been entertained only on the basis of thejudgment of this Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra),which stood over-ruled by the subsequent judgment in N.Audikesava Reddy (supra).34. The aforesaid factual position makes it clearthat the appellant is not entitled for any reliefwhatsoever as per the law, as it exists today. The landonce vested in the State cannot be divested. Once the landis vested in the State it has a right to change the user.The appellant cannot be heard raising grievance on eitherof these issues." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

226. Reverting back to the case on hand, from the pleadingsand material on record, it is evident that they were aware that thelands were surrendered in the year 1988 itself. It is theircontention that though an extent of 641 Sq.mts of land wassurrendered, the lands were not taken over and used for the purpose.On the contra, pleadings disclose that immediately after thesurrender, the authorities under the Land Ceiling Act, have acceptedthe same. Accordingly, errata to Sections 11(1) and 11(3)notifications were issued by the 3rd Respondent in his LetterNo.A2/SRA.327/78, dated 24.04.1987 and it was also published in TamilNadu Government Gazette No.22 dated 10.6.1987. Possession of theland was handed over to the Revenue Department on 29.4.88, afterfollowing the procedures as laid down under the Principal Act.Necessary changes were also made in the Revenue records andregistered in the name of Tamil Nadu Adi-Dravidar Housing DevelopmentCorporation. Thus, the subsequent of events and the action taken bythe Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation (TAHDCO)supports that possession had been taken over by the Government and itis under construction and in such circumstances, it is impossible toretore possession to the land owners. 227.What is intended under Sections 11(4) and 11(6) of thePrincipal Act is taking over vacant land, i.e., in the as is wherecondition, without any alteration. But physical possession of theland by the government is contemplated. After taking over physicalpossession, what is stated under the Principal Act, as per Section24, is, "it shall be competent for the State Government to allot, byorder, in excess of the ceiling limit any vacant land which is deemedto have been acquired by the State Government under this Act or whichhas been, or is acquired by the State Government under any other law,or which otherwise belongs to the State Government under any otherlaw, or which otherwise belongs to the State Government, to anyperson for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, anyindustry or for providing residential accommodation of such type asmay be approved by the State Government to the employees of anyindustry and it shall be lawful for such person to hold such land inexcess of the ceiling limit." Neither the Principal Act nor theRepealing Act contemplate that the land declared as excess land andacquired by the government should immediately be put to use for,which it was acquired or the allottee should immediately utilise theland for the purpose for which it was allotted. 228.In a given case, where possession of any excess land istaken on 14.06.1999 and allotted to a corporation or agency on15.06.1999, it cannot be contended that the excess land allotted tothe corporation or any agency, has not utilised the land for thepurpose of acquisition and therefore, the whole acquisitionproceedings are abated. What is relevant for consideration iswhether possession has been taken before the commencement of theRepealing Act and handed over to the corporation or agency before the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ commencement of the Repealing Act and whether the allottee has takenover possession. The usage of the land, before the commencement ofthe Repealing Act is irrelevant, in view of the decision in Smt.Angoori Devi's case. Even if the lands remain vacant, after theRepeal Act, it is for the Government or the allottee to use the land,for the purpose, for which, the lands are allotted, the Principal Actcontemplates possession of vacant land and merely because, it waskept vacant for sometime, till the allottee utilises the land, thatwill not confer any right to seek for re-conveyance. It is for theconcern of the Government and not the concern of the land owner, asto how and when the acquired land has to be used. In the light ofthe judgment stated supra, the further contention that the entirecontempensation amount was not paid before the land was taken overand therefore, the whole proceedings are abated also cannot beapproved.DELAY AND LATCHES229.After 1988, when possession was taken, the land owner hadnot made any claim for re-conveyance of the land, by refunding thecompensation amount, before the date of Repeal Act, i.e., 16.06.1999,nor she had objected to taking over possession. The petitioners wereaware that surrender of land was made in 1988. On the aspect as towhether, a person approaches the Court, is entitled to relief underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India, if there is latches adinordinate delay on his part, this Court deems it fit to considerfollowing decisions.230.Latches or reasonable time are not defined under anyStatute or Rules. "Latches" or "Lashes" is an old french word forslackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it meansneglect to do what in the law should have been done for anunreasonable or unexplained length of time. What could be the latchesin one case might not constitute in another. The latches to non-suit,an aggrieved person person from challenging the acquisitionproceedings should be inferred from the conduct of the land owner oran interested person and that there should be a passive inaction for areasonable length of time. What is reasonable time has not beenexplained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon thefacts and circumstances of each case. 231.The words "reasonable time", as explained in Veerayeeammalv. Seeniammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134, at Paragraph 13, is asfollows:"13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima faciemeaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances ofwhich the person concerned is called upon to actreasonably knows or ought to know as to what wasreasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies inits conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of theindividual and the time and circumstances in which hethinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time”is to be so much time as is necessary, under thecircumstances, to do conveniently what the contract orduty requires should be done in a particular case. Inother words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. InP. Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon it is defined tomean: “A reasonable time, looking at all thecircumstances of the case; a reasonable timeunder ordinary circumstances; as soon ascircumstances will permit; so much time as isnecessary under the circumstances, convenientlyto do what the contract requires should bedone; some more protracted space than‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly,and properly, and reasonably be allowed orrequired, having regard to the nature of theact or duty and to the attending circumstances;all these convey more or less the same idea.” 232.The statement of law has also been summarized inHalsbury's Laws of England, Para 911 , pg. 395 as follows:"In determining whether there has been suchdelay as to amount to laches, the chief points tobe considered are:(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part;and ii) any change of position that hasoccurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not meanstanding by while the violation of a right is inprogress, but assent after the violation has beencompleted and the claimant has become aware ofit. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedywhere, by his conduct, he has done that whichmight fairly be regarded as equivalent to awaiver of it; or where by his conduct andneglect, though not waiving the remedy, he hasput the other party in a position in which itwould not be reasonable to place him if theremedy were afterwards to be asserted. In suchcases lapse of time and delay are most material.Upon these considerations rests the doctrine oflaches." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

233.In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC1006, the Supreme Court held that it is not either unreasonable delaydenies to the petitioner the discretionary extraordinary remedy ofmandamus, certiorari or any other relief. 234.In State of M.P., v. Nandlal Jaismal reported in 1986 (4)SCC 566, the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 24, held as follows:"24. Now, it is well settled that the power of theHigh Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court inthe exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assistthe tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and thelethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of thepetitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is notsatisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline tointervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writjurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches ordelay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Courtdoes not ordinarily permit a belated resort to theextraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction becauseit is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenienceand bring in its train new injustices. The rights of thirdparties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction isexercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonabledelay, it may have the effect of inflicting not onlyhardship and inconvenience but also injustice on thirdparties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court isinvoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation ofthird party rights in the meanwhile is an important factorwhich always weighs the High Court in deciding whether ornot to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think itnecessary to burden this judgment with reference tovarious decisions of this Court where it has beenemphasised time and again that where there is inordinateand unexplained delay and third party rights are createdin the intervening period, the High Court would decline tointerfere, even if the State action complained of isunconstitutional or illegal. .........Of course, this ruleof laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be castin a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases wheredespite delay and creation of third party rights the HighCourt may still in the exercise of its discretioninterfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, suchcases where the demand of justice is so compelling thatthe High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite ofdelay or creation of third party rights would by theirvery nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would bea matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so asto promote justice and not to defeat it." (emphasis supplied)235.M/s.Rup Diamonds and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,reported in (1989) 2 SCC 356, wherein their Lordships observed thatthose people who were sitting on the fence till somebody else took upthe matter to the court for refund of duty, cannot be given thebenefit. In that context, Their Lordships held as follows:"Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they hadnot pursued for several years. Petitioners were notvigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to siton the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided.Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of onewhere a law had been declared unconstitutional and void bya court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paidunder the compulsion of a law later so declared void.There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay inpreferring the present writ petition which is broughtafter a year after the first rejection. As observed by theCourt in Durga Prashad case, the exchange position of thiscountry and the policy of the government regardinginternational trade varies from year to year. In thesematters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved byorders of the government should approach the High Courtafter exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule ororder with utmost expedition. Therefore, these delays aresufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere.If a right of appeal is available, this order rejectingthe writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case inany such appeal."236.In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC1991, the Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for theacquired land was claimed belatedly and at Paragraphs 12, 18 and 21,held as follows:"12. How a person who alleges against the State ofdeprivation of his legal right, can get relief ofcompensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction ofthe High Court under article 226 of the Constitution eventhough, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficultto comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of thisCourt that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, isentitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy becauseof laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like.Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief underArticle 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthyconduct for getting such relief, where the State againstwhich relief is sought is a welfare State, is alsodifficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought underArticle 226 of the Constitution by a person against thewelfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongfulexecutive action, the need to explain laches or undue delayon his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, bemore stringent than in other cases, for the reason that theState due to laches or undue delay on the part of theperson seeking relief, may not be able to show that theexecutive action complained of was legal or correct forwant of records pertaining to the action or for theofficers who were responsible for such action not beingavailable later on. Further, where granting of relief isclaimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executiveaction, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequerof the State or in damage to other public interest, theHigh Court before granting such relief is required tosatisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of acitizen or any other person in approaching for relief underArticle 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation ofhis legal right, was wholly justified in the facts andcircumstances, instead of ignoring the same or lenientlyconsidering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking reliefagainst the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, bethey citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary reliefobtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the HighCourt that the facts and circumstances of the case clearlyjustified the laches or undue delay on their part inapproaching the Court for grant of such discretionaryrelief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to acitizen or any other person under Article 226 of theConstitution against any person including the State withoutconsidering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches orundue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so grantedbecomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted inrespect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by theState.18. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conductof a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England forobtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grantof such relief was explained succinctly by Sir BarnesPeacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. ProsperArmstrong (1874) 5 PC 221) thus :"Now the doctrine of latches in Courts ofEquity is not an arbitrary or a technicaldoctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ give a remedy, either because the party has, byhis conduct, done that which might fairly beregarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or whereby his conduct and neglect he has, though perhapsnot waiving that remedy, yet put the other partyin a situation, in which it would not bereasonable to place him if the remedy wereafterwards to be asserted, in either of thesecases, lapse of time and delay are most material.But in every case, if an argument against relief,which otherwise would be just, is founded uponmere delay, that delay of course not amounting toa bar by any statute or limitations, the validityof that defence must be tried upon principlessubstantially equitable. Two circumstances, alwaysimportant in such cases, are, the length of thedelay and the nature of the acts done during theinterval, which might affect either party andcause a balance of Justice or injustice in takingthe one course or the other, so far as it relatesto the remedy."21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of itspower vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues adirection, order or writ for granting relief to a personincluding a citizen without considering his disentitlementof such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of unduedelay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction,order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not madejudiciously and reasonably in exercise of its soundjudicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily."237.In State of Rajasthan v. D.R.Laxmi reported in 1996 (6)SCC 445, the Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void,if the party does not approach the Court within a reasonable time,which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated oracquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercisedin a reasonable manner. 238.In Jagdish Lal and Ors.,v. State of Haryana and Ors.,reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 : AIR 1997 SC 2366, this Court reaffirmedthe rule if a person choses to sit over the matter and then woke upafter the decision of the Court, then such person cannot stand tobenefit. In that case it was observed as follows:"The delay disentitles a party todiscretionary relief under Article 226 or Article32 of the Constitution. The appellants keptsleeping over their rights for long and woke up https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ when they had the impetus from Vir Pal SinghChauhan case. The appellants' desperate attemptto redo the seniority is not amenable to judicialreview at this belated stage."239.In Larsen and Toubro Ltd., v. State of Gujarat reported in1998 (4) SCC 387, the Supreme Court held that a writ petitionchallenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of theCentral Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay andlaches, if the challenge is not made within a reasonable time. 240.In the case of Government of W.B., v. Tarun K.Roy andOrs., reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347, Their Lordships considered delayas serious factor and have not granted relief. It was observed asfollows:"The respondents furthermore are not even entitledto any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches ontheir part in filing the writ petition. The first two writpetitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein therespondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. Inbetween 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had beendecided, but one way or the other, even the matter hadbeen considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea ofdelay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a groundfor denying the relief to the other persons similarlysituated would operate against the respondents.Furthermore, the other employees not being before thisCourt although they are ventilating their grievancesbefore appropriate courts of law, no order should bepassed which would prejudice their cause. In such asituation, we are not prepared to make any observationonly for the purpose of grant of some relief to therespondents to which they are not legally entitled to soas to deprive others there from who may be found to beentitled thereto by a court of law."241.In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singhreported in AIR 2007 SC 924, the Supreme Court, after considering acatena of decisions on the aspect of delay, at Paragraph 13, held asfollows:"13........Therefore, whenever it appears that theclaimants lost time or while away and did not rise to theoccasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then insuch cases, the Court should be very slow in granting therelief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be takeninto consideration the question of acquiescence or waiveron the part of the incumbent whether other parties aregoing to be prejudiced if the relief is granted." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

242.Merely because in the registration department, mutationhas not been effected before the Repeal Act, that would not clotheany right to the petitioners to seek for any relief under the RepealAct, as mutation in the registration department, is only aconsequential Act. On that score, it cannot be contended thatphysical possession has not been taken over. 243.Once the rights of the land owner has reached finality,the request of the petitioners is nothing but an attempt to resurrecta dead matter on the premise of a probate of a will, said to havebeen executed by the erstwhile land owner and probated in the year2001, after nearly 23 years of surrendering possession. The WritPetition is devoid of merits in all respects.244.Record of proceedings shows that this Court, in M.P.No.3of 2010, by an order, dated 18.08.2010, directed status-quo to bemaintained. The interim order is vacated.245.In view of the above discussion, the Writ Petition isdismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MiscellaneousPetitions are also closed.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarskmTo1. The Secretary to Government, Department of Revenue, Government of Tamil nadu, Secretariat, Chennai 600 009.2. The Special Commissioner & Commissioner of Land Reforms, Chepauk, Chennai 600 005.3. The Assistant Commissioner, Mylapore ULC, No.345, Arcot Road, Kodambakkam, Chennai 600 024. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

4.The Managing Director,Tamil Nadu Adi Dravida Housing Development Corporation Tamil Nadu Housing Board Shipping Complex,Thirumangalam, Chennai-101.1 cc To Mr.R.Subramanian, Advocate, SR.809443 cc To Mr.P.Subba Reddy, Advocate, SR.80952W.P.No.250 of 2010SR(CO)PMK.15.11.2010.