T.K.Ayub v. Mohammed Hanif

allowed on 5.7.1990 and against that, the revision petitioner hereinpreferred C.R.P.No.2160 of 1990 before this Court and on 19.4.1996,this Court allowed the said C.R.P. and set aside the order of arrestpassed in E.P.No.17 of 1990. Furthermore, the petitioner has averredthat with the knowledge of the decree-holders (the respondentsherein), the revision petitioner raised crops other than paddy, asagreed in the lease deed and hence, the decree-holders are estoppedby law of acquiescence. The revision petitioner herein prayed forallowing E.A.No.157 of 1999 and for dismissing E.P.No.237 of 1998 inO.S.No.50 of 1977, stating that the decree itself is nullity.3. The respondents herein, the decree-holders, resisted theE.A by stating that the respondents herein have filed the suit forbare injunction restraining the revision petitioner/defendant fromraising the crops other than paddy and after contest, the decree hasbeen passed and no appeal was filed and it is final and binding onboth parties. In pursuance of the same, the E.A. is not maintainable.Furthermore, the respondents/decree-holders stated that they filedanother E.P.No.279 of 1980 for attachment of the crops raised inviolation of the decree of injunction and also to restore the land inits original status, and the said E.P.No.279 of 1980 was allowed. Inthe course of the subsequent E.P. filed by the respondents herein inE.P.No.17 of 1990, since the executing court found violation,E.P.No.17 of 1990 was allowed, against which, C.R.P.No.2160 of 1990was filed by the revision petitioner herein, before this Court andthis Court held that the order of arrest of the judgment-debtor(revision petitioner herein) after nine years, is harsh and not inaccordance with law and the order of arrest in the E.P. was setaside. There is no question of applicability of law of acquiescenceor requirement of any notice as is claimed in the E.A. Therespondents prayed for dismissal of the E.A. 4. The learned Judge of the Executing Court, after consideringthe evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and R.W.1 and Ex.P-1, dismissed theE.A., stating that the E.A. is not barred by the principle ofacquiescence. Against the said order, the present C.R.P. has beenfiled by the petitioner-cultivating tenant.5. During the course of the arguments in the C.R.P., learnedcounsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant, would contend that thedecree itself is non-est in the eye of law and admittedly, therevision petitioner himself is a cultivating tenant, and since theCivil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, any decreepassed is non-est in the eye of law, and the decree itself is nullityand void-ab-initio. He relied on Section 8 of the PondicherryCultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1970 (Act No. 9 of 1971), whichdeals with bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. The said Act cameinto force on 10.4.1971 and after that only, the suit in O.S.No.50 of1977 was filed and the suit was decreed on 21.6.1977. Learned counselfor the revision petitioner-cultivating tenant further contended that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as per Section 3 of the said Act, which deals with the landlords notto evict cultivating tenants, only two grounds are envisaged forevicting the tenant. Learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivatingtenant further submitted that to decide the manner of enjoyment ofthe property, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. The condition notto raise crops other than paddy, is an unconscionable condition andit is opposed to public policy. To substantiate the same, learnedcounsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the SupremeCourt reported in 1998 (5) SCC 87 (Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer Vs.Hari Om Sharma). He also relied upon the decision of the SupremeCourt reported in 1993 (2) SCC 507 (Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka Vs.Jasjit Singh) and submitted that even in execution proceedings, thedecree can be challenged. Learned counsel further submitted that thepetitioner was in possession of the property in pursuance of theunregistered lease deed and subsequently, after expiry of the period,his possession could only be termed as 'tenant in holding over' andso, the condition imposed in the lease deed will not bind thepetitioner-cultivating tenant. He also relied upon other decisions ofthis Court in support of his contentions.6. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/decree-holderswould contend that since the suit itself is for bare injunction, theCivil Court has jurisdiction. Learned Senior Counsel furthersubmitted that as per the lease deed, the petitioner-cultivatingtenant agreed to raise only paddy and since he was violating theterms and conditions of lease, the suit has been filed and decree ofinjunction has been obtained and the judgment and decree in the suithave become final, as no appeal was preferred. Learned Senior Counselfor the respondents/decree-holders further relied upon one of thedecisions of this Court relating to the parties who agreed to raisedouble-crop, but the petitioner-cultivating tenant raised only singlecrop, which will cause injury to the land, and hence, therespondents/decree-holders (plaintiffs-land owners) are entitled tofile application for eviction. He relied upon various decisions insupport of his contentions and prayed for dismissal of the E.A./C.R.P.7. Now this Court has to decide as to whether the argument ofthe learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant that theCivil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, is fair andwhether the decree itself is non-est in the eye of law.8. The admitted facts are as follows:The property in question belongs to the respondents/decree-holders. The revision petitioner is the cultivating tenant. As perthe lease deed, the revision petitioner/cultivating tenant isrestricted from cultivating any other crop except paddy. Since thepetitioner-cultivating tenant, attempted to raise crops other thanpaddy, the respondents came forward with the suit in O.S.No.50 of1977. After contest, the suit was decreed. Even then, the petitioner-cultivating tenant raised crops other than paddy and the respondents https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ herein, as decree-holders, filed E.P.No.279 of 1980, in which, theysought for attachment of the crops for violating the decree ofinjunction granted in O.S.No.50 of 1977 and also sought for restoringthe land to its original status by removing the crops other thanpaddy and the said E.P. was allowed. Against the same, the petitionerherein preferred appeal in C.M.A.No.5 of 1981, before the PrincipalDistrict Court, Pondicherry and during the pendency of the saidC.M.A, the respondents/decree-holders made an endorsement to thefollowing effect: "The respondent submit that the part of theprayer in E.P.No.279/80 in O.S.No.50/77 for to takesteps to restore the lands to the previous status byremoval of sugarcane crops and direct recovery ofexpenses incurred for the respondent is not for thetime being pressed without prejudice to the relief andconditions and other remedies available to therespondent/decree holders."The revision petitioner-cultivating tenant also made an endorsementas follows:"In view of the endorsement made by therespondents that they will not press the second reliefin E.P.No.279/80 regarding restoration of the suitproperty by removing all crops other than paddy isgiven up and as such this appeal in respect of the Irelief of arrest and detention in Civil Prison is notpressed."In view of the said endorsements, the C.M.A. was allowed inpart setting aside the order to restore the land to its originalstatus by removing the crops other than paddy and the C.M.A. wasdismissed in respect of the relief of attachment of the property. Butsubsequently, the respondents herein filed another E.P. in E.P.No.17of 1990, in which arrest has been ordered for committing contempt,and as against the same, the petitioner herein preferredC.R.P.No.2160 of 1990 before this Court and the said C.R.P. wasallowed and the order of arrest passed in the E.P. was set aside.Subsequently, the present E.P. in E.P.No.237 of 1998 has been filedby the respondents herein. During the pendency of the present E.P.,the petitioner herein filed E.A.No.157 of 1999 in E.P.No.237 of 1998,under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C., questioning thevalidity of the decree, stating that the Civil Court has nojurisdiction to pass the decree and only the Revenue Court is havingjurisdiction to entertain such a petition.9. In the abovesaid circumstances, this Court has to considerwhether the petitioner-cultivating tenant, is competent to challengethe decree in the E.P. proceedings. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10. Before proceeding to consider the citations relied on byboth parties, it is appropriate to consider the relevant provisionsof the Pondicherry Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1970 (Act No.9of 1971). Learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant wouldcontend that the preamble of the said Act reads that, "An Act for theprotection from the eviction of the cultivating tenants and mattersincidental thereto in certain areas in the Union Territory ofPondicherry". So, learned counsel submits that to protect theinterest of the cultivating tenants, the said Act has been enactedand it is a special provision. There is no quarrel over this argumentof the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the preamble of thesaid Act, as noted above, it is stated that, "... protection fromeviction ...", i.e. protection from eviction of the cultivatingtenants. In such circumstances, the argument advanced by learnedcounsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant that the suit for bareinjunction restraining the petitioner herein/cultivatingtenant/defendant from raising the crops other than paddy, before aCivil Court, is not maintainable, is an unacceptable one. 11. It is appropriate to consider Section 8 of the PondicherryCultivating Tenants Protection Act, which reads as follows:"Section 8: Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts: NoCivil Court shall, except to the extent specified in sub-section (3) of section 3, have jurisdiction in respect ofany matter which the Revenue Court is empowered by orunder this Act to determine and no injunction shall begranted by any Court in respect of any action taken or tobe taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or underthis Act."In such circumstances, Section 3(3) of the said Act isnecessary for the discussion in this case, which reads as follows:"Section 3: Landlords not to evict the cultivatingtenants:(1) ...(2) ...(3) (a) A cultivating tenant may deposit in Courtthe rent or, if the rent be payable in kind, its marketvalue on the date of deposit, to the account of thelandlord--(i) in the case of rent accrued due subsequent tothe 31st March, 1970 within such time as may beprescribed;(ii) in the case of rent accrued due after thecommencement of this Act, within a month after the date onwhich the rent accrued due.(b) (i) The court shall cause notice of thedeposit to be issued to the landlord and determine, aftera summary inquiry, whether the amount deposited represent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the correct amount of rent due from the cultivating tenantand if the Court finds that any further sum is due, itshall allow the cultivating tenants such time as it mayconsider just and reasonable having regard to the relativecircumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant,for depositing such further sum inclusive of such costs asthe court may allow.(ii) If the Court adjudges that no further sum isdue, or if the cultivating tenant deposits within the timeallowed such further sum as is ordered by the Court, thecultivating tenant shall be deemed to have been paid therent within the period specified in the last foregoingsub-section.(iii) If, having been ordered to deposit a furthersum, the cultivating tenant fails to do so within the timeso allowed by the Court, the landlord may evict thecultivating tenant as provided in sub-section(4).Explanation.--The expression "Court" in this sub-sectionmeans the Court which passed the decree or order foreviction or where there is no such decree or order, theRevenue Court."12. As per Section 3(3) of the said Act, only the RevenueCourt is having jurisdiction to order eviction of the tenant from theproperty, if there is no such decree or order for eviction by Court.There is no quarrel over the said proposition. But in this case, itis a suit for bare injunction. As per Section 8 of the said Act,there is bar for the Civil Court to entertain suits in respect of theprayer of injunction.13. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider thedecisions relied on by the learned counsel for both sides.14. Learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating would relyupon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1993 (2) SCC 507(Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh), in which the ApexCourt held as follows:"18. It is settled law that a decree passed by acourt without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on thegrounds on which the decree made which goes to the root ofits jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a coramnon judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity andis non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it issought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for aright, even at the stage of execution or in collateralproceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the veryauthority of the court to pass decree which cannot be curedby consent or waiver of the party. In Bahadur Singh v. MuniSubrat Dass (1969 (2) SCR 432) an eviction petition wasfiled under the Rent Control Act on the ground of nuisance. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The dispute was referred to arbitration. An award was madedirecting the tenant to run the workshop up to a specifiedtime and thereafter to remove the machinery and to delivervacant possession to the landlord. The award was signed bythe arbitrators, the tenant and the landlord. It was filedin the court. A judgment and decree were passed in terms ofthe award. On expiry of the time and when the tenant did notremove the machinery nor delivered vacant possession,execution was levied under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act.It was held that a decree passed in contravention of Delhiand Ajmer Rent Control Act was void and the landlord couldnot execute the decree. The same view was reiterated inKaushalya Devi (Smt) v. K.L. Bansal (1969 (1) SCC 59 : AIR1970 SC 838). In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal (1970 (3) SCC181 : AIR 1970 SC 794) a compromise dehors grounds foreviction was arrived at between the parties under Section 13of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. A decree in termsthereof was passed. The possession was not delivered andexecution was laid. It was held that the decree was nullityand, therefore, the tenant could not be evicted. In SushilKumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead) through his Lrs.(1990 (1) SCC 193 : JT 1989 (Suppl) SC 329) the civil courtdecreed eviction but the building was governed by HaryanaUrban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (11 of 1973). Itwas held that the decree was without jurisdiction and itsnullity can be raised in execution. In Union of India v.Ajit Mehta and Associates, Pune (AIR 1990 Bom 45: 1989 (3)Bom.C.R. 535) a Division Bench to which Sawant, J. as hethen was, a member was to consider whether the validity ofthe award could be questioned on jurisdictional issue underSection 30 of the Arbitration Act. The Division Bench heldthat Clause 70 of the contract provided that the ChiefEngineer shall appoint an engineer officer to be solearbitrator and unless both parties agree in writing such areference shall not take place until after completion of theworks or termination or determination of the contract.Pursuant to this contract under Section 8 of the Act, anarbitrator was appointed and award was made. Its validitywas questioned under Section 30 thereof. The Division Benchconsidering the scope of Sections 8 and 20(4) of the Act andon review of the case-law held that Section 8 cannot beinvoked for appointment of an arbitrator unilaterally butSection 20(4) of the Act can be availed of in suchcircumstances. Therefore, the very appointment of thearbitrator without consent of both parties was held voidbeing without jurisdiction. The arbitrator so appointedinherently lacked jurisdiction and hence the award made bysuch arbitrator is non est. In Ghellabhai case (GhellabhaiAtmaram Vs. Nandubai (ILR 21 Bom 336), Sir C.Farran, Kt.,C.J. of Bombay High Court held that the probate court alone https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is to determine whether probate of an alleged will shallissue to the executor named in it and that the executor hasno power to refer the question of execution of will toarbitration. It was also held that the executor havingpropounded a will and applied for probate, a caveat wasfiled denying the execution of the alleged will, and thematter was duly registered as a suit, the executor and thecaveatrix subsequently cannot refer the dispute toarbitration, signing a submission paper, but such an awardmade pursuant thereto was held to be without jurisdiction."15. Relying on the said decision, learned counsel for thepetitioner-cultivating tenant submitted that the decree passedwithout jurisdiction, is nullity and is non-est in the eye of law andthe question of validity of the decree can be raised even at thestage of execution proceedings. Relying on the said decision, hefurther submitted that when the statute does not confer jurisdictionon a Tribunal, no Court can confer jurisdiction on it even on thebasis of the consent of the parties. 16. It is true that if the decree has been passed by a Court,which is not having jurisdiction, it is non-est in the eye of law andit can be challenged even in the execution proceedings. In suchcircumstances, this Court has to decide in this case as to whetherthe Civil Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit andgrant decree and whether such decree is nullity in law. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant,also relied upon the following decisions: (a) 1982 (2) MLJ 381 (Madras High Court): (Ponnuswamy Vs.District Revenue Officer. North Arcot):"9. In the civil suit also which has given rise tothe second appeal, the finding is that the 4th respondentcontinued to be in possession of the property and that theplea of surrender by him to the appellants, namely the writpetitioners, is not true. However, the suit itself is notmaintainable in view of the ratio in the Full Bench decision.(Periathambi Gounder v. The District Revenue Officer-(1980) 2MLJ 89 : ILR (1980) 2 Mad. 255 : 93 LW 169 : AIR 1980 Mad180). In the present suit, the plaintiff (Masilamani) hasprayed for a declaration that he is a cultivating tenant andfor injunction restraining the defendants/appellants(Ponnusami and Gnanamoorthy) who are petitioners in the writpetition, from disturbing his possession. Such a suit is notmaintainable. Ismail,J., as he then was, has enumeratedinstances where a civil suit will not be maintainable videPeriathambi Gounder Vs. District Revenue Officer ((1980) 2MLJ 89 : ILR (1980) 2 Mad. 255 : 93 LW 169 : AIR 1980 Mad180): https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "Similarly, if the cultivating tenant files asuit for declaration that he is the cultivating tenant ofthe land in question and as a consequential relief praysfor recovery of possession from the land-owner-defendantor for an injunction, the primary relief being one ofdeclaration of his status as a cultivating tenant, theother reliefs being consequential, the civil Court maynot have jurisdiction to decide the controversy withreference to which the primary relief is prayed for."....." (b) AIR 1984 Madras 235 (Pankajam and others VS.Chinnaswamy Naidu):"The plaintiff in the instant case prayed fora declaration of his right to enjoy the suitproperties as a cultivating tenant and for apermanent injunction restraining the defendants andothers from interfering with his peaceful possessionand enjoyment of the properties. It was not disputed;that Sec.16-A would prohibit the Civil Court fromgranting the declaration prayed for.Held that the consequential relief ofinjunction depends upon the adjudication withreference to the status of the respondent and whenthat cannot be done by the Civil Court, theconsequential relief also cannot be granted." 18. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/decree-holdersrelied on the following decisions: (a) AIR 1981 Madras 354 (V.S.Alwar Vs. Gurusamy Thevar):"It is no doubt fundamental that the executing Courtcannot go behind the decree. But it is also fundamental thatit is open to a judgment debtor to resist execution on theground that the judgment against him is a nullity. Theexecuting Court can very well decline to execute a decree ifit is satisfied that it is a nullity. When it does so, it isnot to be regarded as going behind the decree, for thesimple reason that there is no decree at all to go behind.""The ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction underSection 16-A is not dependent upon the actual pre-existenceof an order of the Record Officer or even the actualpendency of certain proceedings before the Record Officer.On the contrary, the section declares a bar in general termsin matters of the kind and nature described in the Section.The bar, therefore, operates irrespective of whether aRecord Officer has entered upon his task or not. Thesection, in general terms, bars the Civil Courts fromexercising jurisdiction in the kind of matters which theRecord Officer or other statutory authorities are empoweredto decide under the Act. In these events, the fact that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ judgment debtor happened to obtain a declaration from theRecord Officer only subsequent to the decree of the CivilCourt is not, therefore, to the point. Indeed, he may nothave applied to the Record Officer at all for a declaration.Yet, even in such a case, it is open to him to invoke thestatutory bar in order to urge that the decree passedagainst him earlier is a nullity because it is a decreepassed in contravention of Section 16-A.""17. I, however, do not fancy this construction ofthe statutory provisions which tends to exclude the civilcourt's jurisdiction even from matters which might only fallincidentally within the scope of the power of the RecordOfficer. I reject the construction on the principle thatwhatever function the doctrine of implied powers can have onthe ambit of the exercise of the power as such, it cannotdefeat the other basic tenet of our legal system which isthat statutes ousting the jurisdiction of courts must bestrictly construed. It is in this respect that the decisionof the Full Bench is important and attains its fulleststature. The judgment accepts the existence in the RecordOfficer of implied or ancillary powers, but, at the sametime, it does not allow their existence to rob the courts oftheir jurisdiction beyond what the strict construction ofthe bar under Section 16-A warrants. With respect, the FullBench must be held to have struck a golden mean amidst aclash of principles, by sagaciously holding that both theRecord Officer and the civil court would have concurrentjurisdiction in respect of such ancillary issues as mayarise, in the making up the record of tenancy rights on theone hand and in the adjudication of civil suits, on theother. Thereby the learned Judges of the Full Bench havefurthered the statutory purpose of bringing into being anauthentic record of tenancy rights in this State and at thesame time, they have also circumscribed the ouster of thecivil court's jurisdiction to the barest minimum consistentwith the language of the exclusory provision in Section 16-A. With respect, therefore, I apply the Full Bench ruling tothe present case and hold that the decree for permanentinjunction passed against the judgment debtor is not anullity, but a valid decree rendered in the legitimateexercise of the Court's jurisdiction." (emphasissupplied) (b) 93 LW 169 (FB) (Madras High Court)=1980 (II)M.L.J. 89 (FB) (Madras High Court): (Periathambi Gounder Vs.The District Revenue Officer, Coimbatore):"Under these circumstances, S.16-A of the Act didnot in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court inrespect of suits or proceedings validly instituted beforethe coming into force of the said section and pending on the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ date when the said section came into force, whether in theoriginal Court or in the appellate or revisional Court.""24. This S.16-A came up for consideration before aBench of this Court in Muniyandi v. Rajangam Iyer (1976 (1)MLJ 344 : (1976) I.L.R. 1 Mad. 201 : 89 LW 249 : AIR 1976Mad. 287) already referred to. That matter came before aBench on a reference made by N.S.Ramaswami,J. In that case,the Court had to decide in O.S.No.547 of 1971 on the file ofthe Court of the District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru, whether aparticular person was a cultivating tenant or not. That suitwas dismissed on the ground that S.16-A barred the CivilCourt's jurisdiction to decide the matter. But the dismissalof the suit was taken up in appeal in A.S.86 of 1974 and thelearned Subordinate Judge of Thanjavur on 11th February, 1975allowed the appeal and remanded the matter with a directionthat the matter should be disposed of afresh. Against thesaid order of remand, an appeal, AAO.213 of 1975, waspreferred to this Court. The appellant claimed that he was acultivating tenant entitled to the protection of the TamilNadu Act 25 of 1955, that in view of the provisionscontained in the Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction togo into the question whether a particular party was acultivating tenant or not, that question could be decidedonly by the hierarchy of officers under the Act, that theRecord Officer under the Act had already entered theappellant as a cultivating tenant and that therefore theCivil Court had to accept the position that the appellantwas a cultivating tenant. On behalf of the respondent-landlord, the contention was that under the provisions ofthe Act, the Record Officer was only to prepare a registergiving the name or names of the cultivating tenants, thatthere was no specific provision in the said Act authorisinganyone to decide the question whether a particular party wasor was not a cultivating tenant and that, therefore, theCivil Court's jurisdiction to entertain such a question wasnot ousted. After referring to the provisions of the Actbefore its amendment by the Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 1972, theBench observed--"As the Act stood originally before Act 34 of1972 there was no specific bar of the Civil Court'sjurisdiction, to decide any matter which the RecordOfficer or the District Collector or other officer hasto decide. We need not stop to consider whether havingregard to the scheme, of the Act indicating matters tobe decided, the officers who have the authority todecide any further remedies by way of appeal andrevision, the Civil Court's jurisdiction, by necessaryimplication, would stand excluded in respect of matterswhich those officers have to decide". https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ After the above observation, the Bench extractedS.16-A of the Act, as introduced by the Tamil Nadu Act 34of 1972 and proceeded to state--"The section admits of no doubt that a CivilCourt has no jurisdiction to decide any matter whichthe Record Officer, District Collector or otherofficer or authority empowered by or under the Actshould determine. The Court is also forbidden fromgranting injunction in respect of any action taken orto be taken by such authority or officer, in pursuanceof any power conferred by or under the Act. We aretold that what led N.S.Ramaswami,J, to make thereference to a Division Bench was a consideration ofthe latter part of S.15. Apparently he thought if anentry in the approved record of tenancy rights shouldbe presumed to be true and correct until the contrarywas proved or a new entry was lawfully substitutedtherefor, to that extent the Civil Court'sjurisdiction should not be taken to have beenexcluded. In other words, evidently his impression wasthat a certain area of Civil Court's jurisdiction wasstill available and the ambit of S.16-A should be readaccordingly. We are of opinion that S.15 is notjurisdiction section. It only provides for a rule ofevidence, namely, presumption of correctness ofentries in the approved record of tenancy rights. Thispresumption cannot, of course, be rebutted until thecontrary is proved or a new entry is lawfullysubstituted therefor. The words 'until the contrary isproved' and the words 'or a new entry is lawfullysubstituted therefor' are to be read with reference tothe provisions of the Act. This is not indicative ofan area of jurisdiction still left with the Court todecide any matter which is entirely within thejurisdiction of the officers, who are empowered by orunder the Act to decide. As a matter of fact, S.5 aswe have already indicated, provides for notificationof entries in the approved record of tenancy rightsand if a decision of the Record Officer is taken up inappeal and a direction is given for modification, S.8provides for amendment to be made in the record oftenancy rights according to the appellate decision.Something applies also to a revision order. The Act,therefore, indicates and provides for the remedy tocorrect the record by following the procedure laiddown. Until the contrary is proved or a new entry islawfully substituted therefor, the entry, shall bepresumed to be correct. It is perfectly clear and hasnothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The language of S.16A, as indicated by us,admits of no doubt that the Civil Court's jurisdictionis expressly excluded in respect of any matter whichthe Record Officer, District Collector or the officer,empowered by or under the Act has to determine." "35. The next aspect to be considered, is theascertainment of the ambit, amplitude and the extent of theinterdict imposed by S.16-A of the Act on the exercise ofthe jurisdiction by a Civil Court. We have already extractedS.16-A. Two things are clear from the language of thesection. One is, the interdict is on the jurisdiction of thematters which by or under the Act have to be determined bythe Record Officer, the District Collector or other officeror authority empowered by the Act. The section itself doesnot enumerate as to what those matters are. The second is,the interdict is not on any particular proceedings in theCivil Court, but only on the exercise of the jurisdiction inrespect of these matters. Controversies that come before acourt or a tribunal cannot be either pigeon-holed or put instrait-jackets. They may be of different varieties as wellas different standards. For the purpose of deciding the maincontroversy, the court or the Tribunal may have incidentallyto decide a number of subsidiary questions or controversies.Therefore, when the section itself does not enumerate thematters in respect of which the jurisdiction of the CivilCourt is ousted, one will have to ascertain the said matterswith reference to the other provisions of the Act conferringpower or jurisdiction on the authorities functioning underthe Act. Similarly, a suit or proceeding in a civil courtmay involve the determination of several matters, some ofwhich may be within the jurisdiction of the authoritiesfunctioning under the Act and some others outside thejurisdiction. In such a case the suit or proceeding as suchcannot fail unless it is of such a nature that it can beterminated solely on the determination of the matter fallingwithin the jurisdiction of the authorities functioning underAct. Since the section itself does not bar the institutionof the suit or a proceeding, it is unnecessary to labour onthe second aspect any further.""38. .... .... However, one other point that wasurged before this Court was that S.16-A of the Act excludedthe jurisdiction of the civil court and the question as towhether the first respondent was a cultivating tenant inrespect of the said lands could not be gone into in thatsuit, as it was a matter to be decided exclusively by theauthorities constituted under the Act and in support of thatcontention reliance was placed on the Bench decision of thisCourt in Muniyandi v. Rajangam Iyer (1976-1-MLJ 344 = 89 LW249) referred to already. After referring to the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ decision, this Court in the judgment in the second appealreferred to above observed--" .. ...On the pleadings in the case, there are threepossibilities. Firstly, the plaintiff in the suitmight have been in possession of the suit lands on thedate of suit and he may be a cultivating tenantentitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Act 25 of1955. If this is the real position, an injunction mustissue in favour of the plaintiff. Secondly, theplaintiff might have been in possession of the suitlands on the date of suit but he might not be acultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of theAct. Even in such a case the plaintiff is, entitled toan injunction by virtue of his having been inpossession of the suit property on the date of suit,as he is entitled to continue in possession untilduly evicted by the true owner. The third possibilityis the plaintiff might not have been in possession ofthe suit lands on the date of suit. In such a casewhether he is a cultivating tenant entitled to thebenefits of the Act or not, the suit must fail.Therefore, if the plaintiff is in a position to getan order of injunction even without establishing hisstatus as a cultivating tenant, the suit cannot bethrown out merely because it raises an incidentalquestion as to whether the plaintiff is a cultivatingtenant or not. I am, therefore, of the view that theCivil Court's jurisdiction to entertain this suit forinjunction cannot be said to have been taken awayunder S.16-A of the Tamil Nadu Act X of 1969". (emphasis supplied) 19. Before considering the above citations, it is appropriateto mention that Section 16-A of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands(Record of Tenancy Rights) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1960), asamended by the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Land (Record of TenancyRights)(Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 1972) = Section 8of the Pondicherry Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (No.9 of 1971).The above decisions relied on both sides, pertain to Section 16-Aof the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act.For declaring the tenant as a cultivating tenant and also forevicting a cultivating tenant, the Revenue authorities are onlycompetent persons. In pursuance of the above tenancy laws, theRevenue Court alone is having jurisdiction in respect of declaringand recording the tenant as a cultivating tenant and evict thecultivating tenant. The Civil Court is estopped in the above aspects.But, if the suit is filed for bare injunction, the Civil Court hasjurisdiction to entertain the same. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

20. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court, reported in93 LW 169 (cited supra), has been relied upon in the other decisions.In the said Full Bench decision, the facts are that while the suitwas pending for eviction, the Act came into existence. But as per thedecision reported in AIR 1981 Madras 354 (cited supra), it was heldthat, "it is no doubt fundamental that the executing Court cannot gobehind the decree", and it was further held, "... the existence inthe Record Officer of implied or ancillary powers, but at the sametime, it does not allow their existence to rob the Courts of thejurisdiction beyond what the strict construction of the bar underSection 16-A warrants" and in that decision, this Court came to theconclusion that passing of decree of permanent injunction againstthe defendant is not barred. 21. As per the decision reported in 1982 (2) MLJ 381 (citedsupra), the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit fordeclaration that the plaintiff is a cultivating tenant and forinjunction restraining the defendant from disturbing his possession.In the decision reported in AIR 1984 Madras 235 (cited supra), it wasalso a case for declaration of the tenant as a cultivating tenant andin such circumstances, it was held by this Court in that decisionthat as per the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of TenancyRights) Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted fordeclaration of the tenant as a cultivating tenant and to record hisname as a cultivating tenant. Both the said decisions, i.e. 1982 (2)MLJ 381 and AIR 1984 Madras 235, relied on by learned counsel forthe petitioner, are not applicable to the facts of the present case.In the present case, the suit was filed for bare injunctionrestraining the petitioner-defendant-cultivating tenant from raisingany other crop except paddy. Hence, the Civil Court alone hasjurisdiction to entertain the suit, since the suit was for bareinjunction.22. Learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant,further submitted that though in the lease deed, there was acondition directing the tenant not to cultivate any other crop exceptpaddy, but, because of monsoon failure, the petitioner-cultivatingtenant was not in a position to raise paddy and so, he was unable topay the lease amount to the respondents-landlords-decree-holders, andsince the petitioner has not paid the lease amount, the petitioner-cultivating tenant was facing the eviction proceedings. To pay thelease amount, the petitioner-cultivating tenant ought to havecultivated paddy in the land, and because of water scarcity, thepetitioner raised the crops other than paddy. It is the contention ofthe learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant, that therestriction imposed by the respondents-landlords from raising anyother crop except paddy, is an unconscionable condition and it isopposed to public policy. To substantiate the same, learned counselfor the petitioner-cultivating tenant relied upon the decision https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reported in 1998 (5) SCC 87 (Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer Vs. Hari OmSharma), in which, an unconscionable condition was relied upon by theparties and the Supreme Court observed as follows: "8. Learned counsel for the appellant attempted tocontend that when the respondent was promoted in stop-gaparrangement as Junior Engineer I, he had given anundertaking to the appellant that on the basis of stop-gaparrangement, he would not claim promotion as of right norwould he claim any benefit pertaining to that post. Theargument, to say the least, is preposterous. Apart from thefact that the Government in its capacity as a modelemployer cannot be permitted to raise such an argument, theundertaking which is said to constitute an agreementbetween the parties cannot be enforced at law. Therespondent being an employee of the appellant had to breakhis period of stagnation although, as we have foundearlier, he was the only person amongst the non-diploma-holders available for promotion to the post of JuniorEngineer I and was, therefore, likely to be considered forpromotion in his own right. An agreement that if a personis promoted to the higher post or put to officiate on thatpost or, as in the instant case, a stop-gap arrangement ismade to place him on the higher post, he would not claimhigher salary or other attendant benefits would be contraryto law and also against public policy. It would, therefore,be unenforceable in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act,1872." 23. In the present case, the suit has been filed by therespondents/landlords/plaintiffs and the petitioner/cultivatingtenant/defendant, filed the written statement and contested the suitand the decree was passed by the Court below. But the petitioner-cultivating tenant has not raised any such plea of unconscionablecondition, before the trial Court, and even after passing of thejudgment and decree, the petitioner-defendant has not challenged thesame by way of appeal. After obtaining the judgment and decree,admittedly, the respondents/decree-holders, filed two ExecutionPetitions, both in 1980 and 1990 in E.P.Nos.279 of 1980 and 17 of1990 and even in the said Execution Petitions, the petitioner-defendant-cultivating tenant, has not raised such a plea ofunconscionable condition. Only at the time of filing of the presentthird Execution Petition in E.P.No.237 of 1998, the petitioner-cultivating tenant has raised such a plea. In the abovecircumstances, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1998 (5)SCC 87 (cited supra), in which, the Government has obtained anundertaking from the employee before he was promoted to higher post,and so, it is opposed to public policy, is not applicable to thefacts of the case. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

24. At this juncture, the learned Senior Counsel for therespondents/decree-holders contended that if the petitioner-cultivating tenant admittedly accepted the condition imposed by therespondents/landlords/decree-holders, for raising the single crop,and as he failed to raise the single crop, it caused prejudice to thelandlords and so, the petitioner-cultivating tenant is entitled tobe evicted. Because the petitioner-defendant-cultivating tenant,raised a crop other than paddy, which caused injury to the property,the respondents-landlords were forced to file the suit for permanentinjunction and obtained a decree and sought for execution of thesame, and hence, learned Senior Counsel for therespondents/landlords/decree-holders, submits that the conditionimposed in the lease deed is not opposed to public policy. Learnedcounsel for the respondents/decree-holders relied on the followingdecisions: (a) AIR 1981 Madras 170 (Rethinam Vs. Kuppuswami): "Where the tenant deliberately did not raise two crops inall the double crop lands and such non-cultivation of twocrops was injurious to the land, the eviction of the tenanton such ground could be made." (b) 1983 (1) MLJ 246 (Madras High Court): (KrishnamurthyIyer Vs. Ramaiah Konar):"Held, that the raising of cocoanut trees in doublecrop nanja lands involves the digging of pits and when thecocoanut trees grow up they are deeply embedded in the soiland the soil is thus rendered less fertile and unfit forpaddy cultivation. In other words it will be in the nature ofan act which is injurious to the land. While the raising ofcocoanut trees by itself is an act which is injurious to thelands the further digging up of a pond for purpose ofirrigating the cocoanut saplings would also be an act whichis really destructive of an injurious to the land. Theadmitted digging up of the pond by the respondent and usingthe earth therefrom for the purpose of providing a kalamwould undoubtedly attract Section 3(2)(b) as well as Section3(2)(c) of the Act." (c) 1995 (1) MLJ 237: (Madras High Court) (SubramaniamVs. Ammani Ammal):"Admittedly, in the present case, the tenant has dugup a pit in the land in question and used the earth formanufacturing bricks. The Commissioner who inspected the landin question made enquiries with regard to the bricks presentthere and filed his report. In the report, it is stated thatthe tenant has manufactured 35,000 bricks out of the earthdug out from the land in question and 32,000 bricks were soldby him and remaining bricks were available there. The reportfiled by the Commissioner was not considered by the Revenue https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court. Further, it is not the case that the respondent/tenantdid not dig any pit but his case is that even after 1982, thelandlord received the rent from him which would show that thelandlord had condoned the act of injury caused by the tenantto the land in question. This is the reason given by theRevenue Court without any basis. In the decision reported in1976 SC 49, it was stated that even though the injury wascaused to the land earlier, that would not absolve the tenantfrom evicting from the land in question under Sec.3(2)(a) and(b) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act.Thus, the landlord proved that the injury to the land wascaused by the tenant in 1982, as contemplated under Sec.3(2)(b) and (c) of Act XXV of 1955. Therefore, the tenant isliable to be evicted under Sec.3(2)(b) and (c) of the Act XXVof 1955." 25. The decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel forthe respondents/decree-holders, reported in 1995 (1) MLJ 237 (citedsupra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In thatdecision, the cultivable land has been used for manufacturing thebricks out of the earth dug out from the land in question, and so, itis naturally causing injuries to the land. But in the present case,admittedly, the petitioner herein has raised sugar-cane crops, otherthan the cash crop paddy. In such circumstances, that citation is notapplicable to the case.26. Moreover, the decision reported in 1983 (1) MLJ 246 (citedsupra) is also not applicable, because, the tenant in the said case,planted cocoanut saplings in the property, i.e. double-crop nanjalands, and the cocoanut saplings are deeply implanted in the soil andthe soil was thus rendered less fertile and unfit for paddycultivation. But in the present case, there is no such allegation.Admittedly, the petitioner has raised sugar-cane crops, whichconsumed only less water than paddy. 27. In view of the decision reported in AIR 1981 Madras 170(cited supra), when once the petitioner-cultivating tenant hasaccepted the lease condition and agreed that he will not raise anyother crop except paddy, but he has raised other crops and hence, itis causing injuries to the land, and so, therespondents/landlords/decree-holders are entitled to file the suitfor injunction before the Civil Court and the Civil Court also haspassed a decree and in such circumstances, the respondents/decree-holders have every right to execute the decree, if there is anyviolation or disobedience of the decree passed by the trial Court.Since the revision petitioner-cultivating tenant, has raised sugar-cane crops, other than paddy, the respondents/decree-holders havecome forward with the execution petition. In those circumstances, thetrial Court is having jurisdiction to pass decree and as per thedecisions discussed in the earlier paragraphs of this order, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ decree is valid and binding on the parties. Moreover, the revisionpetitioner-cultivating tenant-defendant has not questioned thevalidity of the decree by way of appeal and since he committeddisobedience, the respondents/decree-holders have filed the E.P.Under those circumstances, I do not find any merit in the CivilRevision Petition challenging the impugned order passed in the E.A.filed by the petitioner herein.28. Furthermore, learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant, would contend that the condition imposed in thelease deed will not bind the tenant after expiry of the period oflease mentioned in the lease deed, and since the lease deed is forthe term of one year, which already expired before the filing of thesuit itself, the petitioner-cultivating tenant, could only be termedas "tenant in holding over".29. The "tenant in holding over" is a creature of bilateraland consensual act and it does not come into existence by a mereunilateral intendment or declaration of one of the parties. Section116 of the Transfer of Property Act is based upon the considerationof justice, equity and good conscience, and in the absence ofanything to the contrary, its provisions are applicable even to casesnot governed by the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, where a lessee ofthe agricultural land holds over after the expiry of the lease, heholds, subject to all the covenants in the expired lease that areapplicable to the new situation. So, the petitioner herein is inpossession and abiding the conditions imposed in the lease.Therefore, he ought not to have raised any other crop except paddy.So, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant, that the lease itself was for one year, and afterthe expiry of the lease period, the petitioner-cultivating tenant, isonly a "tenant in holding over", and so, the terms and conditionsimposed in the lease deed do not bind the petitioner-cultivatingtenant, does not merit acceptance.30. Learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant,would further contend that after the expiry of the terms andconditions mentioned in the lease deed, the petitioner is only astatutory tenant, and so, he is not governed by the terms andconditions of the lease deed. 31. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer the meaningof 'statutory tenant' as per "The Law Lexicon", by P.Ramanatha Aiyar,2nd Edition, 1997 (Extensively Revised and enlarged) Reprint 2001,which defines the 'statutory tenant' as a tenant continuing inpossession of a rented land or building after his termination of thetenancy. 32. In the present case, the revision petitioner was declaredas a cultivating tenant and in the abovesaid circumstances, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that thepetitioner-cultivating tenant, is a statutory tenant, does not meritacceptance.33. As already discussed in the earlier paragraphs of thisorder, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit forbare injunction. Moreover, as per Section 8 of the PondicherryCultivating Tenants Protection Act, the Civil Court's jurisdiction toentertain Civil Suit for injunction, is not barred. In suchcircumstances, there is no decree passed superseding the provisionsof the said Act, and so, the argument advanced by learned counselfor the petitioner-cultivating tenant that the decree passedrestraining the petitioner from cultivating any other crop exceptpaddy, is nullity, unenforceable and unexecutable, does not meritacceptance.34. The learned counsel for the petitioner-cultivating tenant,further contended that the Executing Court has committed error inrejecting the plea of acquiescence. After the decree was passed,since the petitioner-cultivating tenant, committed disobedience ofthe decree passed by the trial Court, earlier two Execution Petitionshave already been filed. In such circumstances, the plea ofacquiescence raised by the petitioner, does not merit acceptance, andit will not in any way affect the execution of the decree.35. In view of the foregoing discussion, the decree passed bythe trial Court restraining the revision petitioner/cultivatingtenant/defendant from raising any other crop except paddy, which ishaving jurisdiction to entertain the suit, is valid in law. TheExecuting Court has come to the correct conclusion that the E.A.filed by the petitioner-cultivating tenant under Section 47 read with151 C.P.C., is devoid of merits. The Civil Revision Petition is alsoliable to be dismissed as devoid of merits.36. In the result:(a) The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.(b) The impugned order passed in the E.A. is confirmed.(c) C.M.P. is closed.(d) No costs.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ csTo1. The Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry.2. The Section Officer,V.R.Section, High Court, Madras -104.1 cc To Mr.T.R.Rajaraman, Advocate, SR.19689.1 cc To Mr.T.P.Manoharan, Advocate, SR.19325.C.R.P.(NPD).No.2328 of 2004 GV(CO)RVL 30.03.2010