B.K.Gunasekaran v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.

For Petitioner in W.P.No.14682/09 :Mr.N.R.Chandran S.C. for Mr.R.Natarajan For Petitioner in W.P.No.12044/09 :Mr.K.V.Venkatapathy S.C.for Mr.MA.Gouthaman For Petitioner in W.P.No.20807/08 :Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam andMr.D.Ferdinand for M/s.B.F.S.Legal For Respondents in all W.Ps. :Mr.P.Subramanian Addl. Govt. Pleader for RR1-3COMMON ORDERBy consent the Writ Petitions are taken up for disposal. Since,the petitioner in all the three writ petitions is the same person andthe issue involved in all the three writ petitions raised a commonquestion, they are disposed of by a common order.2. The prayer in the Writ Petition No.14682/2009 is to quashthe charge memo issued to the petitioner dated 18.10.2004.W.P.No.12044/2004 has been filed to quash the charge memo dated30.01.2004 and W.P.No.20807/2008 was filed challenging the chargememo dated 21.09.2006.3. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition couldbe briefly set down as hereunder. While, the petitioner wasfunctioning as Assistant Inspector General of Registration,Coimbatore, the charge memo dated 18.10.2004 came to be issuedcontaining two sets of charged. Both the charges related to a releasedeed presented for registration before the Joint Sub Registrar IICentral Madras, in document No.561/2001 dated 20.06.2001 and theallegation in the first charge was that such document ought to havebeen treated as conveyance and the appropriate Stamp Duty to becollected is 13% and this has been pointed out in the audit reportdated 19.02.2003 and such audit report was approved by the InspectorGeneral of Registration and that the petitioner being the DistrictRegistrar (Administration) at Chennai during the relevant time oughtto have exercised the powers under Section 33 (A) of the India StampAct (hereinafter referred to "as the Act") and failure to do so is inviolation of Rule 20(1) of the Conduct Rules. The second article ofcharge also pertains to the same allegation by stating that onaccount of the petitioner, that has been loss of Stamp Duty to theextent of Rs.2,97,810/-. The petitioner submitted his explanation tothe charge on 02.02.2005. The petitioner's explanation being that hejoined as Assistant Inspector General of Registration central Chennaion 31.07.2002, held additional charge of Audit Department between10.12.2002 to 06.06.2004 and the said document No.561/2001 waspresented for registration on 20.06.2001 and on that date, he wasnot holding charge and the concerned Sub-Registrar found that thedocument was a release deed between blood brothers and also Co-ownersof an ancestral property and the releasor released his Co-parceneryright of un-divided share in favour of the other Co-parcener and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ therefore the concerned Sub-Registrar treated the transaction underArticle 55(A) as a release deed and not as a deed of conveyance ascontemplated under Article 23 of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act.Therefore, it was contended that the question of taking action underSection 33-A does not arise. 4. An enquiry officer was appointed to enquire into the chargesand a report was submitted on 08.06.2005 holding that the petitionerfailed to invoke the power under Section 33-A Indian Stamp Act. Theallegation in the charge memo, which is impugned in W.P.No.12044/2009pertains to an allegation that during his tenure as DistrictRegistrar, Vellore from 31.03.1997 to 31.07.2002, he has inspectedseveral buildings and during the year 2001 in respect of 10documents, which were registered before the Sub-Registrar,Vaniyambadi, it was alleged that the petitioner had calculated thevalue of the building at a lower rate and therefore, the same hascaused loss to the Government. The petitioner is stated to havepromptly submitted his reply to the charge memo and an enquiryofficer was appointed, who in turn directed a sub-enquiry officer tosubmit a report and based on such report came to a conclusion thatthe charges are proved. In fact the case of the petitioner itself isbased on a circular issued by the Inspector General of Registrationdated 14.06.2004, which is to the effect that re-inspection ofbuildings has to be completed within a period of three months, but inthe instant case, the sub-enquiry officer re-inspected the buildingswithout notice to the petitioner after a period of nearly four yearsfrom the date on which the petitioner inspected the buildings.Thereafter, the petitioner has submitted representations on29.08.2005, 13.10.2005, 27.03.2006, 05.12.2006, 19.02.2007,22.06.2007, 24.07.2007 and 05.05.2008 requesting for copies of thedeposition, the copy of the inspection report of the sub-enquiryofficer, the calculation sheet, which was the basis of the revisedcalculation, the deposition given by the petitioner, the depositiongiven by the District Registrar, Vellore (Administration) and suchother documents. In spite of all these representations, thepetitioner was not favoured with the reply and therefore, thepetitioner filed W.P.No.20842/2008, challenging the charge memo dated30.01.2004, and the enquiry officer's report dated 13.04.2005. ThisCourt by order dated 27.01.2009 disposed of the writ petition with adirection to the second respondent to furnish copies of the documentssought for by the petitioner within two weeks and on receipt of thesame. The petitioner would be entitled to submit his objections andthereafter the competent authority shall pass final orders. ThisCourt also fixed time limit within which the same has to be compliedwith. The petitioner submitted representation on 16.02.2009 and11.02.2009 requesting for the copies of the documents and alsoenclosed the copy of the order passed by this Court. However, thecopies were not furnished and the second respondent had stated thatthe documents are not available. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5. Therefore, the petitioner filed W.P.No.12044/2009 to quashthe charge memo dated 30.01.2004. The petitioner was also servedwith the another charge memo dated 21.09.2006, which also related toa release deed, which was registered by the Joint Sub-Registrarcentral Chennai, wherein document No.969/2003 under Article 55(D) asa release deed. The allegation in the charge is that when thepetitioner was as District Registrar, while conducting inspectionfailed to take into consideration the Audit Objection dated14.06.2006, which pointed out that a sum of Rs.47,33,468 ought tohave been collected as Stamp Duty in respect of the said document.The petitioner submitted his explanation on 23.11.2006 and thereafterthere has been no further proceedings and therefore filedW.P.No.20807/2008 challenging the charge memo dated 21.09.2006.6. Thus based on the above factual background, the petitioner isbefore this Court challenging the three charge memos served againstthe petitioner. 7. Mr.N.R.Chandran, learned Senior counsel andMr.K.V.Venkatapathy, learned Senior counsel and P.V.Balasubramaniam,learned counsels appearing for the petitioner would raise the commonlegal issue based on which the impugned charge memo is liable to beset aside. It is contended that the power exercised by theregistering authorities under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act,the Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder are quasi-judicial powers and adjudicatory in nature and if there is any errorin the violation or assessment or discharge of such quasi-judicialpower, the same cannot be a basis for a disciplinary proceedings inthe absence of proof of any motive or bad intention. The learnedSenior counsels would therefore submit the allegation in the chargememo itself is regards the matter as to whether the petitioner oughtto have exercised the statutory power under Section 33 (A) of the Actfor recovery of deficit stamp duty and such power being a quasi-judicial power, since a decision has to be arrived at whether properStamp Duty payable under the Act in respect of such instrument hasnot been paid or has been insufficiently paid and based on acertificate of the Registrar of District could be recovered from theperson liable to pay the Stamp Duty. Therefore, it is contended thatfailure to exercise such statutory power, which is in the nature of aquasi-judicial power can hardly be a ground for initiation ofdisciplinary proceedings. In support of such contention, the learnedSenior counsels referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Courtin Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and Others – (1999)7 SCC 409, and the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of thisCourt in The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of CommercialTaxes, Chennai and another Vs. N.Sivasamy, Commercial Tax Officer,(Under suspension), Chennai and another-(2005) 4 MLJ 659, Union ofIndia, rep. by the Secretary to Government of India, Ministry ofFinance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi Vs. A.Kannan and Another –(2008) 4 MLJ 424 and the decision of the learned Single Judge of this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court in S.Muthuramu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its ChiefSecretary to Government, Public (Special-A) Department, Chennai-9 andAnother – (2008) 3 MLJ 766.8. The second issue which was raised is that the document inquestion was a release deed and such release was between bloodbrothers in respect of an un-divided share in a co-parceneryproperty. Therefore, it is contended that the document was correctlytreated by the concerned Sub-Registrar under Article 55 Schedule I ofIndian Stamp Act as a release deed and not as a conveyance underArticle 23 of Schedule I. Further, by relying upon the clarificationissued by the Government in Government letter No.85 Commercial Taxesand Registration Department dated 10.06.2006, which has clarifiedthat the instrument of settlement or release executed in favour ofbrother or sister is an instrument in favour of a member of a familyas defined under Article 55 Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act andthe earlier clarification applies to release deeds also. Thepetitioner also placed reliance on another clarification issued bythe Government in letter No.962 dated 24.03.2009, which furtherclarified the decision. Therefore, it is contended that there was noerror in the assessment of the document as a release deed underArticle 55 of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act. 9. Mr.K.V.Venkatapathy, learned Senior counsel appearing forthe petitioner in W.P.No.12044/2009 would contend that if thedepartment chose to conduct a re-inspection, they ought to have doneso within a period of three months and this has been clearly speltout in the guidelines issued by the Inspector General on 14.06.2004and the re-inspection was conducted by a sub-enquiry officer, who isa person lower in rank then the petitioner after a period of nearlyfour years. Further, the learned Senior counsel would submit thatthe request for supplying documents was not granted and the standtaken by the respondents is that the documents are not available.This cannot be the stand of the respondents since this Court hadearlier directed to supply these documents. Further, the learnedcounsel would contend that at every stage there has been a delay bystating that the allegation pertain to inspection done by thepetitioner in 2001 for which charge memo came to be issued in 2004 inspite of several representations for supply of documents depositionetc., the same were not granted and the respondents failed to obeythe direction issued by this Court to supply the documents and aftera long lapse of time in 2009, a reply is sent stated that thedocuments are not available and all these events would establish thatthere is an in-ordinate delay from the initiation of the proceedingstill date and on this ground also the impugned charge is liable to bequashed. The learned Senior counsel placed reliance on the decisionof the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.V.Mahadevan Vs. M.D., Tamil NaduHousing Board - 2005 (4) CTC 403. The learned Senior counsel wouldfurther submit that in respect of a similarly placed person by nameMr.A.M.Jameed Bhasha who was also a District Registrar and action was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ taken under 17b of the rules, was exonerated of one of the charges onthe ground that re-inspection of the buildings were conducted after along lapse of four years and during such period, possibilities ofexpansion of the building and addition of amenities is there.Therefore, by relying on the said contention the learned Seniorcounsel would submit that the impugned order is liable to be setaside.10. Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam, learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner in W.P.No.20807/2008, while adopting the submissions madeby the learned Senior counsels would submit that there is absolutelyno allegation of any corrupt motive against the petitioner and thepetitioner had a clear service horoscope and also won several medalsfor his distinguished service and the entire disciplinary proceedingsinitiated against the petitioner is to some how deny the petitioner,his promotion and the petitioner is to attain the age ofsuperannuation on 26.02.2010.11. On behalf of the respondents elaborate submissions weremade by the learned Additional Government Pleader by relying upon thecounter affidavit as well as the records, the first and foremostobjection of the respondents is that the writ petition itself is notmaintainable at this stage and the petitioner having submitted hisexplanation to the charge memo and having participated in the enquirycannot question the charge memo at this point of time. The learnedAdditional Government Pleader elaborately stated that in respect ofthe charge memo dated 30.01.2004 pertain to 11 documents for whichinspection was conducted and in the subsequent inspection, it came tolight that a loss of nearly Rs.2,93,635/- had occurred on account ofthe improper valuation of the buildings by the petitioner and thesub-enquiry officer after conducting the inspection noted that thebuildings have not been correctly valued and there is loss to theGovernment. Only under such circumstances, the charge memo wasissued and the enquiry officer in his report dated 13.04.2005concluded that the charges are proved and therefore further legalproceedings have to be initiated to recover the amount. 12. The learned Additional Government Pleader would furthersubmit that the charge is clear, specific and based on materialevidence and the respondents should be permitted to proceed further.In respect of W.P.No.14682/2009, the learned Additional GovernmentPleader would submit that the Accountant General has pointed out thatthe document No.561 has been registered by the concerned Sub-Registrar by collecting lesser amount of Stamp Duty by treating it asa release deed, but in spite of the such Audit report, the petitionerdid not take any steps to recover the money under Section 33 (A) ofthe Indian Stamp Act. Therefore, it has caused loss of Rs.2,97,810/-to the Government. It is further contended that the clarificationissued in respect of chargeability under Article 55-C of Schedule Iof the Indian Stamp Act came into effect only on 16.12.2004 and such https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ subsequent amendment cannot cure the earlier defect. It is furthersubmitted that the document in question does not come under thepurview of Section 47 (A) and hence question of recovering deficitStamp Duty under Section 47 (A) (6) of the Act does not arise. Thelearned Additional Government Pleader would further submit that theenquiry report is under the consideration of the Government and atthis stage the charges should not be quashed.13. I have considered the submissions made on either side andperused the materials available on record. Though elaboratelysubmissions have been made on either side as regards the factualcontentions raised, the first of the legal issues which would arisefor consideration is to whether the allegations contained in thecharge memo would clothe the respondents with power to initiatedisciplinary action. It has been alleged in the charge memo that thepetitioner ought to have invoked Section 33 A of the Indian Stamp Actfor recovering a deficit Stamp Duty on a release deed submittedbefore the Joint Registrar Central Chennai, who treated the documentas a deed of release under Article 55 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act.Section 33 A deals with recovery of deficit Stamp Duty of the StampAct and provides for contingencies for such recovery and procedure tobe followed. At this stage, it is useful to refer to 33A which readsas follows:-"33-A. Recovery of deficit stamp duty:-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 33 orin any other provisions of this Act, if, after theregistration of any instrument under the Registration Act,1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908), it is found that the properstamp duty payable under this Act in respect of suchinstrument has not been paid or has been insufficiently paid,such duty or the deficit, as the case may be, may, on acertificate from the Registrar of the district under theRegistration Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908) be recoveredfrom the person liable to pay the duty, as an arrear of landrevenue:Provided that no such certificate shall be grantedunless due inquiry is made and such person is given anopportunity of being heard:Provided further that no such inquiry shall be commencedafter the expiry of three years from the date of registrationof the instrument.(2) The certificate of the Registrar of the districtunder sub-section (1) shall, subject only to appeal undersub-section (3), be final and shall not be called in questionin any court or before any authority. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (3) Any person aggrieved by a certificate of theRegistrar of the district under sub-section (1) may appeal tothe Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Any such appealshall be preferred within such time, and shall be heard anddisposed of in such manner, as may be prescribed." 14. Thus, it is to be noted that the pre-requisite for invokingSection 33-A is that it has to be found that proper Stamp dutypayable under the Act in respect of the instrument has not been paidor has not been sufficiently paid and on determining such fact theRegistrar of the District may issue a certificate for recovery ofsuch amount and no such certificate shall be granted unless enquiryis made and such person is given an opportunity of being heard and nosuch enquiry shall be commenced after the expiry of three years fromthe date of Registration of the instrument. Thus, the determinationas to whether proper Stamp Duty has been paid under Act is a quasi-judicial function to be exercised by the registering authority bygoing through the contention of the document and coming to an opinionas to determine as to what calls the document could be classified fordemanding proper Stamp Duty as per the rates specified in Schedule Ito the Act. Therefore, there is an element of adjudication involvedin the matter for determination of proper Stamp Duty chargeable on aninstrument. Even according to the respondents the concerned JointSub-Registrar central Chennai treated the document as a release deedand held that the document would fall within the description underArticle 55 of Schedule I. The allegation is that an Audit objectionwas raised by the Audit Department stating that such instrument whichwas admitted for registration by a Sub-Registrar ought to have beentreated as a deed a of conveyance under Article 23 and not underArticle 55 and therefore, deficit stamp duty is payable and in spitesuch Audit objection said to have been confirmed by the InspectorGeneral, the petitioner failed to invoke Section 33-A for recovery ofdeficit stamp duty. In my view the power of the Sub-Registrar is aquasi-judicial power in determining the Stamp Duty. Likewise, theofficer in the position of the petitioner is required to render aquasi-judicial findings before issuing a certificate for recoverythat the document in question was not sufficiently Stamped. Thisfinding cannot be done without an enquiry to the aggrieved person. 15. Therefore, I am of the clear view that the power, which therespondents state that the petitioner ought to have exercised is aquasi-judicial power. If such power has not been exercised whetherit could form the basis for a disciplinary action. This question isno longer res-integra and having been settled by various decision ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court and it would be useful torefer the recent decision of this Court in S.Muthuramu Vs. State ofTamil Nadu, rep. by its Chief Secretary to Government, Public(Special-A) Department, Chennai-9 and Another – (2008) 3 MLJ 766 inwhich, the earlier decisions have been considered by the learnedJudge and wherein it has been held as follows:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "6. From the perusal of the charge memo it could beseen that the allegation against the petitioner is that hehas fixed the market value at Rs.22/- per sp.ft. in DocumentNo.70 of 1998 whereas the adjacent lands were acquired bythe Government on negotiation at the rate of Rs.58/- persp.ft. in the year 1999. No motive or ill-will is allegedin the said imputation of charge. Admittedly, petitioner isexercising quasi-judicial function under Section 47-A(1) ofthe Indian Stamp Act. If the Department is not satisfiedwith the valuation, nothing prevented the Department fromfiling appeal before the Inspector General of Registrationchallenging the order passed by the petitioner, fixing themarket rate of Rs.22/- per sp.ft. In the absence of anymotive or bad intention, no charge could be framed againstthe Quasi-Judicial Authority and the same is well settled.7. (a) In the decision in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkarv. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC 2881:(1999) 7 SCC 409,:2000-I-LLJ-728:(1999) Supp MLJ 71 the Supreme Court consideredsimilar issue and held that negligence in exercising quasi-judicial power by mere carelessness or inadvertence oromission is not sufficient to initiate proceedings undermisconduct. Unless there is a culpable negligence or ill-motive, no charge could be framed. In paragraphs 43 and 44,the Supreme Court held as follows at p.85 of MLJ:"43.If every error of law were to constitute a chargeof misconduct, it would impinge upon the independentfunctioning of quasi-judicial officers like the appellant.Since in sum and substance misconduct is sought to beinferred by the appellant having committed an error of law,the charge-sheet on the face of it does not proceed on anylegal premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In otherwords, to maintain any charge-sheet against a quasi-judicialauthority something more has to be alleged than a meremistake of law, e.g., in the nature of some extraneousconsideration influencing the quasi-judicial order. Sincenothing of the sort is alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal. The charge-sheet, if sustained,will thus impinge upon the confidence and independentfunctioning of a quasi-judicial authority. The entire systemof administrative adjudication whereunder quasi-judicialpowers are conferred on administrative authorities, wouldfall into disrepute if officers performing such functionsare inhibited in performing their functions without fear orfavour because of the constant threat of disciplinaryproceedings.44. Considering whole aspects of the matter, we are of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the view that it was not a case for initiation of anydisciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The chargeof misconduct against him was not proper. It has to bequashed."(b) Whether the disciplinary proceeding can beinitiated against a judicial officer, who granted bailexercising discretion while discharging the Judicialfunction, was considered by the Supreme Court in thedecision in Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad,(2007) 4 SCC 247 : (2007) 2 SCC (Criminal) 266:(2007) 4 MLJ1055. In paragraph 12 the Supreme Court held as follows atp.1062 of MLJ:"12.This Court on several occasions has disapproved thepractice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings againstofficers of the subordinate judiciary merely because thejudgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The appellate andrevisional courts have been established and given powers toset aside such orders. The higher courts after hearing theappeal may modify or set aside erroneous judgments of thelower courts. While taking disciplinary action based onjudicial orders, the High Court must take extra care andcaution."(c) In the decision in Inspector Prem Chand V.Government of N.C.J. of Delhi (2007) 4 SCC 566 following theearlier decisions, the Supreme Court held that the acts ofnegligence, error of judgment or innocent mistake, do notconstitute misconduct. In the above case, theappellant/Police Officer failed to seize the tainted moneyon receipt of complaint of alleged demand of bribe by anInspector (Malariya). Department initiated disciplinaryproceeding on the charge that he had not seized the taintedmoney, which could be an important piece of evidence incriminal proceeding. The Supreme Court held that the PoliceInspector could not be said to have committed any misconductmerely because in the opinion of the higher authorities heought to have seized the tainted money. The Supreme Courtin paragraphs 10 to 12 dealt with the term misconduct, whichreads as follows:"10.In State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, Ex-Constable AIR1992 SC 2188:(1992) 4 SCC 54 : 1993-I-LLJ-218 it was stated,in para. 5, at page 522:“5. Misconduct has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,6th Edn. at p. 999, thus:‘A transgression of some established and definite rule ofaction, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior;its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior,delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but notnegligence or carelessness.’Misconduct in office has been defined as:‘Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation tothe duties of his office, willful in character. Termembraces acts which the office-holder had no right toperform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act inthe face of an affirmative duty to act.’ ”11. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., at p.3027, the term “misconduct” has been defined as under:“The term ‘misconduct’ implies a wrongful intention, and nota mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily thesame thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word‘misconduct’ is a relative term, and has to be construedwith reference to the subject-matter and the context whereinthe term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act orstatute which is being construed. ‘Misconduct’ literallymeans wrong conduct or improper conduct.”(See also Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. T.K. Raju 2006(2)LLN 54)12. It is not in dispute that a disciplinary proceeding wasinitiated against the appellant in terms of the provisionsof the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980. Itwas, therefore, necessary for the disciplinary authority toarrive at a finding of fact that the appellant was guilty ofan unlawful behaviour in relation to discharge of his dutiesin service, which was wilful in character. No such findingwas arrived at. An error of judgment, as noticedhereinbefore, per se is not a misconduct. A negligencesimpliciter also would not be a misconduct. In Union ofIndia v. J. Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022: (1979) 2 SCC 286:1979-II-LLJ-14 whereupon Mr Sharan himself has placed reliance,this Court held so stating: Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearlyindicates the conduct expected of a member of the service.It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for thegovernment servant in the context of Conduct Rules would bemisconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a wayinconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty inservice, it is misconduct (see Pierce v. Foster 17 Q.B.536,542). A disregard of an essential condition of the contractof service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers 1959 (1) WLR 698)]. Thisview was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v.Divisional Supdt., Central Rly., Nagpur Division, Nagpur 61BLR 1569 and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza 10 GLR 23. TheHigh Court has noted the definition of misconduct inStroud’s Judicial Dictionary which runs as under:‘Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; actsof negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, donot constitute such misconduct’.” (emphasis supplied) (d) A Division Bench of this Court in the decision inA.M.Sankaran V. Registrar, High Court, Madras, 1999 (2) LW174 quashed an order of compulsory retirement passed againstthe judicial officer for destroying the seized spiritwithout examining or recording any evidence regarding theinflamable nature of the spirit. This Court held that thesaid order having been passed during discharge of thefunction as judicial officer, framing such charge withoutany allegation or recklessness or abuse of power, cannot besustained. 8. Applying the principles laid down in the abovedecisions to the facts of this case, particularly when thereis no motive or recklessness attributed against thepetitioner and no mis-conduct is committed by thepetitioner. I hold, the charge as framed is not maintainableagainst the petitioner, who is a quasi-judicial authority.The impugned order is set aside and the writ petition isallowed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions areclosed." 16. Thus, the only conclusion, which could be arrived at afterplacing reliance on all the above decisions is that the chargesframed against the petitioner is not maintainable. That apart, I amalso convinced that the entire disciplinary action has been grosslydelayed and the petitioner has been put to irreparable hardship andmental agony. In reply to the allegation regarding the valuation ofthe buildings, it is common knowledge that any re-evaluation has tobe done within a reasonable period. In the instant case, theInspector General of Registration has issued circular dated14.06.2004 stating that re-inspection should be done within a periodof three months. In the instant case, the re-inspection wasconducted without notice to the petitioner by an officer, whosubordinate to the petitioner, after nearly a period of four years.Inspection and valuation are technical matters to be done based onthe amenities provided in the concerned building and the schedule ofrates prescribed in this regard. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17. Therefore, for applying the schedule of rates, theessential feature is the condition of the building. Undoubtedly thecondition of the building after a period of four years could bedifferent in the sense that there could have been value addition,remodeling or partial re-construction or even deterioration.Therefore, this aspect of the matter also involves a technicalassessment and cannot be construed as purely as administrative act.Therefore, to dislodge the report submitted by the petitioner on thevaluation of the building, there should be sufficient and cogentmaterial to establish that the petitioner willfully under valued thebuildings. In my view the charge does not appear to be so. Thecharge itself is based on the sub-enquiry officer's report, whoinspected all the 10 buildings after a period of nearly four yearswithout notice to the petitioner and the copy of the calculationsheet has not been furnished to the petitioner, in spite of nearly 10representations given and in spite of a direction issued by thisCourt to give the copies of the document. Thus, the entireproceedings appears to have not been conducted in a fair andreasonable manner and the petitioner has been put to disadvantage atevery stage of the matter. That apart as pointed out by the learnedSenior counsels for the petitioner one other person by Mr.A.M.JameedBhasha, who has also a delinquent has been exonerated of the chargeand there is no reason as to why the petitioner alone should be madeto suffer.19. Hence, for the above reasons, the impugned charge memosdated 18.10.2004, 30.01.2004, & 21.09.2006 are held to be notmaintainable and accordingly they are quashed and the writ petitionsare allowed as prayed for. Consequently, connected miscellaneouspetitions are closed. No costs. Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarpbnTo1.The Secretary to Government, The State of Tamil Nadu Commercial Tax and Registration Department, Secretariat Chennai – 600 009. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.The Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road, Chennai – 28. 3.The Deputy Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road, Chennai – 600 028.2 cc To M/s.B.F.S.Legal, Advocate, SR.129341 cc To Mr.MA.Gouthaman, Advocate, SR.12796Pre-Delivery Order inW.P.Nos.14682, 12044/2009 & W.P.No.20807/2008jp(co)pmk.25.2.2010.