D.Vijayakumari v. State of Tamilnadu & Ors.

to detain the detenu as "Goonda" under Act 14 of1982 in order to prevent him from indulging insuch further activities in future, which areprejudicial to the maintenance of public order.The Detaining Authority has not taken intoconsideration the second adverse case, which wasregistered under Section 302, IPC, on the verysame day by the very same E5 Sholavaram PoliceStation. The date of occurrence of the secondadverse case was 6.7.2009, whereas the order ofdetention was passed on 21.7.2003, after 15 daysof the occurrence. Even as per the Proviso toSection 167(2), Cr.P.C., an accused charged underSection 302, IPC., would be entitled forstatutory bail only after a period of ninetydays. Normally it is expected that the Courts arenot granting bail in major offences like S.302,IPC earlier. Therefore, the releasing of thedetenu on bail in the near future is dark. Inthis context, learned counsel for the Petitionerhas contended that if the Detaining Authoritywould have kept in view the fact that the detenuwas an accused in an offence under Section 302,IPC, which had occurred on the very same day, andthere is no real possibility on coming out onbail, he would not have passed the order ofdetention and, therefore, the Detaining Authorityhas passed the order mechanically withoutapplication of mind."8.The Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that thePetitioner's husband K.Dhanasekaran cannot be considered as "SlumGrabber" when he is alleged to have been involved in the landgrabbing cases and further, the allegations of land grabbing againstthe Petitioner's husband cannot be considered as having potentialityto disturb peace and tranquility of a specified locality resulting inbreach of public order and further, it cannot be said that he hasacted in a manner prejudicial to the public order. 9.He seeks in aid a decision of this Court in Vahida V. The Stateof Tamil Nadu, rep. By its Secretary to Govt., Home, Prohibition &Excise Department, Fort St. George, Chennai [2009 (2) MWN (Cr.) 48(DB)] wherein, in paragraphs 4 and 5, it is observed and held asfollows:"4.The Supreme Court, while dealing with a caseof this nature, which relates to an offence ofland grabbing, in Saravana Babu V. State of TamilNadu, 2008 (2) TLNJ 243 (Criminal), has quashedthe order of detention holding that the casesaffecting the public order are those which have https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ great potentiality to disturb peace andtranquility of a particular locality; theallegations cannot be called prejudicial topublic order; the detenu can be dealt with underthe ordinary criminal law if it becomesimperative.5.In the present case on hand, both theadverse cases and the ground case are registeredunder the provisions of Act 14 of 1982 brandingthe detenu as Slum Grabber. Therefore, in view ofthe law laid down by the Apex Court as statedsupra, it cannot be said that the detenu hadacted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenanceof public order. Hence, following the ratio laiddown by the Apex Court in Saravana Babu V. Stateof Tamil Nadu, we allow this Petition therebyquashing the impugned order of detention."10.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner strenuouslycontends that there is no bar in law for the Petitioner to fileanother H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 subsequently on new grounds either notraised or not canvassed in earlier H.C.P.No.1498 of 2011 and in thisregard, he relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inShri Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel V. Union of India and others [(1981) 2SCC 427 at page 428] wherein it is laid down as follows:"The application of the doctrine of constructiveres judicata is confined to civil actions andcivil proceedings. The principle of public policyis entirely inapplicable to illegal detention anddoes not bar a subsequent petition for a writ ofhebeas corpus under Article 32 of Constitution onfresh grounds, which were not taken in theearlier petition for the same relief. (Para 13)In the present case in the subsequent writpetition fresh additional grounds had been takento challenge the legality of the continueddetention of the detenu and therefore, thepetition is not barred as res judicata. (Para14)"11.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits thateven though the detention order speaks of the fact that thePetitioner's husband is in jail in 3 cases, it only considers that intwo cases the Petitioner's husband is likely to come out on bail andthe third case in Crime No.1107 of 2011 has not been considered bythe Detaining Authority and therefore, the detention order is bad inlaw as per the decision in Rekha V. State of Tamil Nadu throughSecretary to Government and another [(2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases244]. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

12.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner invites theattention of this Court to the observation of the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the aforesaid decision in [(2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases 244]at paragraphs 7 and 10 wherein it is held hereunder:"7.A perusal of the above statement in Para 4 ofthe grounds of detention shows that no detailshave been given about the alleged similar casesin which bail was allegedly granted by the courtconcerned. Neither the date of number, norwhether the bail orders were passed in respect ofthe co-accused on the same case, nor whether thebail orders were passed in respect of other co-accused in cases on the same footing as the caseof the accused. All that has been stated in thegrounds of detention is that “in similar casesbails were granted by the courts”. In ouropinion, in the absence of details this statementis mere ipse dixit, and cannot be relied upon.In our opinion, this itself is sufficient tovitiate the detention order. 10.In our opinion, if details are given bythe respondent authority about the alleged bailorders in similar cases mentioning the date ofthe orders, the bail application number, whetherthe bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case ofthe co-accused was on the same footing as thecase of the petitioner, then, of course, it couldbe argued that there is likelihood of the accusedbeing released on bail, because it is the normalpractice of most courts that if a co-accused hasbeen granted bail and his case is on the samefooting as that of the petitioner, then thepetitioner is ordinarily granted bail. Howeverthe respondent authority should have givendetails about the alleged bail order in similarcases, which has not been done in the presentcase. A mere ipse dixit statement in the groundsof detention cannot sustain the detention orderand has to be ignored.”13.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends thatthe Detaining Authority has ignored Crime No.1107 of 2011 of R-7 K.K.Nagar Police Station, Chennai from the purview of consideration andtherefore, the detention order dated 16.09.2011 suffers from nonconsideration of vital material.14.The other contention put forward by the Learned Senior Counselfor the Petitioner is that the Petitioner's husband has been brandedas a 'Slum Grabber' and at the time of his detention, the Detaining https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Authority has taken into account six cases. In the English versionof the grounds of detention dated 16.09.2011, it is mentioned inparagraph 2 that "The 'grounds' on which the said detention has beenmade are as follows:.....". But, the grounds of detention in Tamillanguage dated 16.09.2011 in paragraph 2, it is mentioned that "The'ground' on which the preventive detention order has been made". 15.The grievance of the Petitioner is that in English version ofthe grounds of detention in paragraph 2, the term 'Grounds' arementioned in plural. But, in the vernacular language Tamil in regardto the grounds of detention, it is mentioned in singular 'Ground' andthis material discrepancy, according to the Petitioner, has causedconfusion in the mind of the Petitioner's husband/detenu and he hasbeen deprived of making an effective representation consequently. TheLearned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that this isbecause of the reason that if an order of detention is passed onvarious grounds, those grounds may be severable as per Section 5A ofthe Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,Drug Offenders, Slum Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil NaduAct 14 of 1982). Further, if the order is passed on a sole ground,the instances are not separable. 16.Likewise, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitionersubmits that in the English version of the grounds of detention dated16.09.2011, it is mentioned that 'Though the situation on 08.03.2011and the occurrence committed by the accused Tr.Dhanasekaran was seemsto be a law and order situation, if it would not have been caused thedisturbance of public peace and it affected the general currentpublic life' and that the Detaining Authority is not clear in mindwhether the act of detenu is law and order situation or a publicorder issue.17.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner relies on theFull Bench decision of this Court in Kuppammal and others V. TheDistrict Collector and District Magistrate, Thiruvallur District,Thiruvallur and others [2001 (2) MWN (Cr.) F.B. 198] at page 211, inparagraph 40, wherein it is laid down as follows:"40.On a consideration of the entire case law onthe subject, we are of the considered view thatthe translated or vernacular copy of the groundsof detention furnished to the detenu should notbe a distorted one or it should not give acompletely different meaning or version whentranslated copy of the grounds of detention inthe language known to the detenu is furnished.The constitutional requirements would besatisfied by translating and explaining thecontents of grounds of detention and furnishing acopy of the grounds of detention in the languageknown to the detenu and it would be sufficient if https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ such translation conveys or communicates what hadbeen expressed by the detaining authority in thegrounds of detention made in official languageand it would be sufficient if the translationconveys the meaning or the implications or whatthe detaining authority meant and desired toconvey and it should not be distorted or itshould not give altogether a different meaning."18.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that theDetaining Authority in the grounds of detention dated 16.09.2011 inEnglish version has stated that '..... Further the residents of thearea also stated that the above act of Tr.Dhanasekaran created scarethat there is no safeguard to their properties purchased out of thehard earned money', for which, there is no material placed before theDetaining Authority and supplied to the Petitioner's husband (detenu)and therefore, it is quite evident that Detaining Authority has actedby taking extraneous materials into consideration.19.It is the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for thePetitioner that the Detaining Authority, while relying upon numerousgrounds, should have employed conjunctive "and". But, he has not usedany conjunctives to join the grounds and this exhibits his nonapplication of mind which vitiates the detention order dated16.09.2011. 20.At this stage, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitionerrelies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in JagannathMisra V. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1140] at page 1143at paragraph 7 wherein it is held as follows:"7.There is another aspect of the order whichleads to the same conclusion and unmistakablyshows casualness in the making of the order.Where a number of grounds are the basis of adetention order, we would expect the variousgrounds to be joined by the conjunctive "and" andthe use of the disjunctive "or" in such a casemakes no sense. In the present order however wefind that the disjunctive "or" has been used,showing that the order is more or less a copy ofS. 3 (2) (15) without any application of the mindof the authority concerned to the grounds whichapply in the present case. Learned counsel forthe State however relies on the word " etc."appearing in the affidavit. His contention isthat as the order of detention had already beenmentioned in an earlier part of the affidavit ofthe Home Minister, the word "etc." used in thelater part of the affidavit means that though theaffidavit was only mentioning two grounds, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ namely, the safety of India and the maintenanceof public order, it really referred to all thegrounds mentioned in the order. We are notprepared to accept this. If anything, the use ofthe words "etc." in the affidavit is anotherexample of casualness."21.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner cites thedecision of this Court in P.A.S.Syed Mohideen V. The Joint Secretaryto the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department ofRevenue, New Delhi and another [(1991) 1 MWN (Cri) 226 (HC)] wherein,in paragraphs 11 and 12, it is held as follows:"11. In this case however we are also inclined totake the view that it was not possible for thedetaining authority to make a study of thedocuments, form opinion whether to detain thepetitioner or not and draw the grounds ofdetention between 20-3-1990 and 22-3-1990. Whythe respondents have chosen to be vague and havenot specifically stated when they received thedocuments and the proposal to detain thepetitioner is for them to explain. In any eventwhen the proposal and the documents were notavailable with the detaining authority on anydate prior to 22-3-1990, the order could not havebeen made on 23-3-1990.12. A Bench of this court in W.P. No. 11887 of1990 dt. 9-11-1990, referred to above, considereda case in which the copies of the documentsfurnished to the detenu, were running to 623pages, and the grounds of detention were said tohave been based upon those documents, and theBench held that the detaining authority could nothave read the entire papers, that he could nothave applied his mind to the voluminous documentswhich were placed before him by the sponsoringauthority and that it was certainly not possiblefor the detaining authority to pass the order ofdetention in one day's time. No doubt, in theinstant case, by guess, time may vary between 2days and 1 day, but the respondents have chosento be vague in reply to the specific allegationof the petitioner that the proposal could nothave been received before 22-3-1990 and thedocuments bulk, in the instant case, is 464pages. Learned counsel for the respondents hasrightly pointed out that this bulk is on accountof one-half of the pages being consumed by theTamil translation of the English documents. Bethat as it may. Assuming that the pages consumed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ were 200 plus, the documents were at least notless than 42, because 42 documents have beenreferred to in the impugned detention order."22.He also relies on the decision of this Court in MohamedMarzook V. Mr.Mahendra Prasad, Joint Secretary and the Secretary toGovernment of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, NewDelhi [1990 (2) MWN (Cr.) 259] wherein, at page 261 in paragraph 4,it is observed as follows:"4.Applying the ration in the said case to thefacts of this case, it is seen that the detainingauthority passed the impugned order relying onthe copies of the documents which were furnishedto the detenu, which contained 623 pages. Thelearned Standing Counsel appearing for therespondents did not dispute that it is humanlyimpossible to read all the 623 pages and pass theimpugned order. It is seen from the grounds ofdetention that the detaining authority has reliedon the documents mentioned in the list enclosedto the detention order and the copies of the samewere furnished to the detenu (Petitioner) and thesame consists of 623 pages. As rightly contendedby the learned counsel for the petitioner thedetaining authority could not have read theentire papers and could not have applied his mindto the voluminous documents which were placedbefore him by the sponsoring authority and thatit is certainly not possible for the detainingauthority to pass the impugned order on the sameday. As rightly contended by the learned counselfor the petitioner, the impugned order has beenpassed in a causal and mechanical manner and thatthe detaining authority had not sufficient timefor coming to the subjective satisfaction to passthe impugned order. As such, the impugned orderof detention is to be held not sustainable on theground of non-application of mind by thedetaining authority. This point is found infavour of the petitioner."23.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that itis humanly impossible for the Detaining Authority to read 600 pagesand the last document is dated 15.09.2011 and the detention order hasbeen passed on 16.09.2011 and the detention order has been passed ina casual and mechanical manner. 24.Also, the Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner brings itto the notice of this Court that it is not possible for the DetainingAuthority to pass the detention order dated 16.09.2011 in one or two https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ days and he has not considered the third case in Crime No.1107 of2011 and if the detention order is perused, there is nothing to showthat the grounds or separate grounds and the word "and" is missing. 25.It is the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for thePetitioner that in a case of Slum Grabbing, it is not a violation ofpublic order and it is a violation of law and the Detaining Authorityhas considered irrelevant materials and that not a single statementfrom the public has been recorded and inspite of the voluminousmaterial relied on by the Detaining Authority, there is nonapplication of mind by the Detaining Authority and therefore, thedetention order is liable to be set aside, to prevent an aberrationof justice.26.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner submits that theDetaining Authority has failed to consider that Crime No.916 of 2011and Crime No.1161 of 2011 relate to a civil dispute and further, inCrl.M.P.No.8860 of 2011 on 23.08.2011, the Principal Sessions Judge,City Civil Court, Chennai has passed an order in regard to theanticipatory bail application [filed by one K.Aravindan] in R-10Crime No.916/2011 wherein, at paragraph 15, it is observed that'Thus, it is seen that the allegation in his present complaint dated31.7.2011 that Kolappan and the legal heirs of late Pandurangan haveforged Power Deed after the death of Pandurangan has been exposed bythe defacto complainant's own statement in the said legalproceedings.'27.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner invites theattention to the order dated 04.08.2011 passed by the LearnedPrincipal Sessions Judge, Chennai in Crl.M.P.No.8154 of 2011 filed byR.Amalraj and 3 others praying for anticipatory bail wherein, inparagraph 3, it is observed as follows:"Rajendran was allotted plot by Tamil Nadu SlumClearance Board. He is now no more. But hischildren are there. Defacto Complainant isresiding nearby. Problem arose between both. Itis a question of alleged encroachment to theland. But, it has been disputed. Civil Suit isalso pending in the City Civil Court, Chennai."and submits that the Detaining Authority has not taken into accountof an important fact that 'It is a question of alleged encroachmentto the land. But, it has been disputed. Civil suit is also pending inthe City Civil Court, Chennai.'28.The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contends that inregard to the third case in Crime No.1107 of 2011, the DetainingAuthority has failed to appreciate that in the FIR defactocomplainant has not stated anything about the public order but, hehas improved the same in his 161 Cr.P.C. statement etc. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

29.In paragraph 4 of the counter filed by the 2nd Respondent, itis stated that the grounds raised and not canvassed in H.C.P.No.1498of 2011 are not to be taken into consideration in decidingH.C.P.No.571 of 2012 and that the second H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 is notmaintainable on the same grounds raised in the earlier petition.Further, it is also mentioned that only on the instructions of thePetitioner the grounds have been urged and not arguing the samecannot be the basis of reopening the petition.30.The stand taken by the 2nd Respondent in the counter is thatsecond H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 is maintainable only in the event offresh grounds being made out which are not available when thedocuments and the detention order were served on the Petitioner.31.The 2nd Respondent in his counter has averred that the orderof detention dated 16.09.2011 has been passed after going through therecords and also arriving at subjective satisfaction. Moreover,paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention clearly mentions thecompelling circumstances under which the order of detention has beenpassed. Furthermore, the detenu's bail application moved in R-8Vadapalani PS Crime No.25 of 2010 has been dismissed on 08.09.2011.His bail application for R-8 Vadapalani PS Crime No.25 of 2011 ispending. Also, his anticipatory bail application for R-10 MGR NagarPS Crime No.880 of 2011 is pending. The anticipatory bail applicationfor R-7 KK Nagar PS Crime No.1107 of 2011 has been dismissed. Hefiled bail application for R-7 KK Nagar PS Crime No.1107 of 2011 inCrl.M.P.No.9518 of 2011 and the same is pending. The secondanticipatory bail application for R-7 KK Nagar PS Crime No.916 of2011 is pending. Since in similarly placed cases bails are granted,there is every possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and thesimilarly placed orders of the Court have also been furnished to thedetenu. The conclusion of the Detaining Authority that there is aimminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail has become truebecause the bail has been granted in all these cases by variouscourts.32.The anticipatory bail order furnished mentions that R-10 MGRNagar Police Station Crime No.916 of 2011 in which the Petitioner isarrayed as a co-accused. The copy of the order furnished is oneobtained by co-accused and the same will fortify the apprehension ofthe Detaining Authority that the detenu is likely to obtain thesimilar relief. As a matter of fact, the order mentions the crimenumber and there can be no confusion arising out of these orders.Mere translation error/clerical/trivial in nature will not vitiatethe detention order. The order of detention is to be approved withinthe time specified in law and the delay in communication is not fatalto the detention order. The detention order has been passed based on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ subjective satisfaction after considering all the documents placed inaccordance with law.33.The FIR and connected papers of each case have been reliedupon. The FIR is only a First Information relating to a cognizableoffence. The FIR sets the criminal law in motion. Much ado cannot bemade over mentioning of the Sections in the FIR. Suffice it to statethat the ingredients of the offence are made out on the allegationsset out in the complaint.34.The earlier complaint filed by the complainant has not beentaken into consideration for passing the order of detention and thatthe complaint dated 05.09.2011 is registered as R-10 MGR Nagar PSCrime No.1161 of 2011. The copy of FIR is annexed to the booklet asDocument No.391 and other connected records have also been furnishedto the detenu. Also, the said complaint dated 05.09.2011 speaks aboutthe occurrence of 08.03.2011 and also speak of lodging of thecomplaint. The non furnishing of the earlier complaint will not causeany prejudice to the detenu, since the subsequent detailed complainthas been furnished to him. The bail applications of the co-accusedhave been furnished to the detenu with translation. The anticipatorybail furnished mentions that R-10 MGR Nagar PS Crime No.916 of 2011in which the detenu is a co-accused. The supply of copy of the orderobtained by the co-accused will fortify the apprehension of theDetaining Authority that the Petitioner is likely to obtain thesimilar relief.35.The new ground that an error has crept in the vernaculartranslation of the grounds/ground is of no consequence. It is only aclerical/typographical error. A complete reading of the grounds wouldgo to show that the detention order has been passed on the entiretyof materials taken into consideration. There are sufficient materialsavailable to show that the Detaining Authority has come to asubjective satisfaction while passing the detention order. Thematerials provided in the grounds of detention, in unambiguous terms,make out a criminal case. The portion referred to in the bail orderis interlocutory in nature and it cannot be construed as a finding onthe issue prior to the completion of the investigation/trial. Theimprovement or otherwise in the Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statement ordelay in registering the case are matters for adjudication in trialand not to be considered at the present stage. 36.In response, the Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for theRespondents submits that the Petitioner has deliberately andadvisedly not chosen to raise the points in earlier H.C.P.No.1498 of2011 and further that the second H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 is notcompetent on the same ground merely because some additional pointshave been raised. Furthermore, the second H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 is notin existence when orders in H.C.P.No.1498 of 2011 have been passed bythis Court on 22.02.2012. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

37.In support of the contention that the second H.C.P.No.571 of2012 is not maintainable before this Court, the Learned PublicProsecutor relies on the observations made by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in Smt.Kavita V. State of Maharashtra and others [AIR 1981 SC2084] which runs hereunder:"... The Petitioner having deliberately andadvisedly not chosen to raise the question in theearlier petition, we do not think we will bejustified in admitting this writ petition."38.He further seeks in aid of the decision of the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in Ram Kumar Pearay Lal V. District Magistrate Delhi [1966 Cri.L.J. 153 at page 154] wherein it is held as follows:"No second petition for writ of hebeas corpuslies to the High Court on a ground on which asimilar petition had already been dismissed bythe Court. However, a second such petition willlie when a fresh and a new ground of attackagainst the legality of detention or custody hasarisen after the decision on the first petition,and also where for some exceptionable reason aground has been omitted in an earlier petition,in appropriate circumstances, the High Court willhear the second petition on such a ground forends of justice. In the last case it is only aground which existed at the time of the earlierpetition, and was omitted from it, that will beconsidered. Second Petition will not be competenton the same ground merely because an additionalargument is available to urge with regard to thesame.Held on facts that second petition was notmaintainable as in both the petitions the samematter was put in different words."39.He also relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inSmt.Panna V. A.S.Samra and others [AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1274] atpage 1276 in paragraph 7, it is observed as follows:"There is no force even in the third contentionof the learned Counsel. The detaining authorityin its affidavit before the High Court statedthat he had gone through all the documents placedbefore him and after full application of mind, heculled out the grounds of detention. There is nomaterial on the record to support the contentionof the learned Counsel and as such we see noreason to reject the statement of the detaining https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ authority made on oath before the High Court.Even otherwise the High Court examined theoriginal records and satisfied itself that therewas proper application of mind in issuing thedetention order."40.The Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the Respondentscites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K.Gopalan andanother V. Government of India [1966 CRI.L.J. 602] at page 605 inparagraph 7, it is observed as follows:"7.Then it is urged that there was no applicationof mind by the Government of India before the-orders in question were passed, for as many as140 orders were passed on the same day and thatshows that mind could not have been applied toeach individual case before so many orders werepassed all at once on one day. We are of opinionthat there is no force in this convention either.The reply on behalf of Government of India inthis connection is that the question as to thedetention, of the persons who were ordered to bedetained on March 4, 1965 was under considerationof the Government of India. for quite some timeand that only detention orders were passed on oneday. It has also been stated on behalf of theGovernment of India that it was satisfied withrespect to each individual person ordered to bedetained on March 4, 1965 that detention wasnecessary for reasons already set out and it wasafter such satisfaction that the orders werepassed though they happened to be -.passed on thesame day. We are not therefore prepared to acceptfrom the simple fact that as many as 140 orderswere passed on the same day there was nosatisfaction of the, Government of India withrespect to each individual case. We have noreason to hold that the affidavit filed on behalfof the Government of India in this respect shouldnot be believed. This contention must also fail."41.He also refers to the observation made in paragraph 9 of theaforesaid decision wherein it is inter alia held as follows:"9......These orders were passed when theGovernment of the State of Kerala was beingcarried on under the Proclamation of September 10,1964. That did not prevent the Central Governmentfrom deciding whether it should itself detainthese persons who had till then been detainedunder the orders of December 29, 1964. If itdecided to do so we cannot see anything illegal in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ this action. Further as the Government of Keralawas functioning under the President by virtue ofthe Proclamation, the -decision of the CentralGovernment to detain these persons for itselfcould be given effect to by asking the Presidentto cancel the orders of the Governor datedDecember 29, 1964. Thereafter the CentralGovernment could pass the order of March 4, 1965detaining. the petitioners and others like them.Even where -Persons are detained by orders of theState Government we can see 1 no illegality in theCentral Government asking the State Governmentconcerned to withdraw its order of detention and'to detain the persons thereafter by orders of theCentral Government, provided the State Governmentis agreeable to withdraw its order of detention.Therefore there was nothing illegal in thePresident functioning under the Proclamation ofSeptember 10, 1964 withdrawing the orders ofdetention of December 29, 1964 and thereafter theCentral Government passing the orders of detentionof its own on the same day. It was not necessaryto carry out the empty formality of release fromjail under the orders of cancellation and then toarrest the persons released immediately they cameout of jail and to serve on them the new order ofdetention dated March 4, 1965 : (see Smt. GodavariShamrao Parulekar v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR1964 SC 1128)."42.Further, he cites the decision in Srikant V. DistrictMagistrate, Bijapur and others [2006 CRI.L.J. 1557] wherein it isheld as follows:"Subsequent writ petition would be maintainableif circumstances have changed or on the groundswhich were not available when the earlierpetition was filed. The grounds raised in secondwrit petition challenging detention order wereavailable to be raised when the earlier petitionwas filed. That being so, the grounds raised atpresent can neither be classified as freshgrounds which were not available earlier nor dothey constitute changed circumstance. That apart,the contention that it is a void detention order,was available to the petitioner when the firstpetition was filed. But, the petitioner hasfailed to raise the same. The position that asubsequent petition can be filed on a freshground does not mean that it could be filed on aninadvertently missed out, forgotten or abandoned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ground which was already available when the firstpetition was filed and not raised for the reasonbest known to the petitioner, but it must be aground which was not available when the firstpetition was filed or there should be a change incircumstance of the case. Second petition whichis a subsequent petition by detenu before thesame forum against the very same detention orderthough on a different set of grounds is notmaintainable."43.He also relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inLallubhai Jogibhai Patel V. Union of India and others [AIR 1981Supreme Court 728] wherein it is laid down as follows:"The application of the doctrine of constructiveres judicata is confined to civil actions andcivil proceedings. This principle of publicpolice is entirely inapplicable to illegaldetention and does not bar a subsequent petitionfor a writ of hebeas corpus under Art. 32 onfresh grounds, which were not taken in theearlier petition for the same relief."44.Also, the Learned Public Prosecutor quotes the decision of theHon'ble Supreme Court in T.P.Moideen Koya V. Government of Kerala andothers [(2004) 8 SCC 106] wherein at paragraphs 12 and 13 it is heldthus:"12. However, the position here is quitedifferent. After the habeas corpus petitionseeking quashing of the detention order passedagainst the petitioner and for setting him atliberty had been dismissed by the Kerala HighCourt, the matter was carried in appeal to thisCourt by filing a petition under Article 136 ofthe Constitution. After leave was granted, theappeal was dismissed by a detailed judgmentwherein all the contentions raised layingchallenge to the detention order and also to thecontinued detention of the petitioner had beenconsidered. The question is whether, even in suchcircumstances, a subsequent petition underArticle 32 of the Constitution seeking tochallenge the same detention order would bemaintainable.13. It is well settled that a decision pronouncedby a Court of competent jurisdiction is bindingbetween the parties unless it is modified orreversed by adopting a procedure prescribed bylaw. It is in the interest of public at largethat finality should attach to the binding https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ decisions pronounced by a court of competentjurisdiction and it is also in the publicinterest that individuals should not be vexedtwice over with the same kind of litigation.While hearing a petition under Article 32 it isnot permissible for this Court either to exercisea power of review or some kind of an appellatejurisdiction over a decision rendered in a matterwhich has come to this Court by way of a petitionunder Article 136 of the Constitution. The viewtaken in Bhagubhai Dullabhbhai Bhandari v.District Magistrate MANU/SC/0011/ 1956:1956CriLJ1126 that the binding nature of theconviction recorded by the High Court againstwhich a Special Leave Petition was filed and wasdismissed can not be assailed in proceedingstaken under Article 32 of the Constitution wasapproved in Daryao v. State of U.P. (supra) ( seepara 14 of the report ).Further, in the aforesaid decision, in paragraphs 15 and 16, itis, among other things, observed as follows:"15. We would like to clarify here that thesubsequent petition under Article 32 of theConstitution seeking a writ of habeas corpus forsetting at liberty a person who has been detainedunder any of the detention laws would bemaintainable if the circumstances have changed.It would also be maintainable on the groundswhich were not available when the earlierpetition was decided. To illustrate, a detenusoon after his detention may file a habeas corpuspetition on the ground that the concerned officerof the Government passing the detention order hadno authority to do so or the grounds of detentionrelate to "law and order" and not to "publicorder" ( in a case where detention order has beenpassed under National Security Act), If such apetition is dismissed by the High Court and thejudgment is affirmed by this Court in a specialleave petition under Article 136 of theConstitution, it would always be open to him totile a petition under Article 32 assailing hiscontinued detention on the ground of inordinateand unexplained delay in consideration of hisrepresentation or some procedural infirmity whichmay have occurred subsequent to the decision ofthis Court.16. In the light of the principle discussed abovethe contention of the petitioner may be examined. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The only ground urged by learned counsel for thepetitioner is that at the time of service of thedetention order, the petitioner was already incustody, but the detaining authority had notapplied his mind to the aforesaid fact whetherstill there was any necessity to detain thepetitioner. It is also urged that the said tactnamely, that the petitioner was already incustody having not been mentioned in thedetention order, the order of detention passedagainst the petitioner is wholly illegal. Insupport of this submission reliance has beenplaced upon Binod Singh v. District Magistrate,wherein it has been held that if at the time ofthe passing of the detention order, there is noproper consideration of the fact that the detenuwas already in custody or that there was any realpossibility of his release, the power of pre-emptive detention should not be exercised. Thisplea was raised in the habeas corpus petitionwhich was filed in the Kerala High Court. TheHigh Court examined the plea in considerabledetail and rejected the same by the judgment andorder dated 11.2.2003. Similar plea was alsotaken in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.1215 of 2003 (vide para Nos. 2.3 and 2.4 andground Nos. H to L). In fact, in para 7 of thepresent Writ Petition it is stated that acontention was raised and was specifically arguedbefore this Court in the Special Leave Petitionthat the order of detention has been vitiated onaccount of the fact that the same was served uponthe detenu while he was in jail, but the fact ofhis being in custody was not reflected in thedetention order. However, a grievance is raisedthat the said contention has not been dealt withor decided in the judgment of this Court. It is,therefore, apparent that the only plea raised inthe present petition had also been raised in theSpecial Leave Petition which had been filedearlier seeking quashing of the detention orderand the release of the petitioner. It is neithera subsequent development nor a new plea which maynot have been available at the earlier stage. Ifthe plea raised has not been considered in thejudgment rendered by this Court on 28.7.2003 inSpecial Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1215 of2003, as submitted by the petitioner, it cannotbe a ground to entertain a fresh petition underArticle 32 of the Constitution on the principles https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ discussed above. In the course of judgment Courtsnormally deal with only such points which arepressed and argued. If fresh petition underArticle 32 is permitted on the ground thatcertain point has not been dealt with in thejudgment a party can file as many petitions as helikes and take one or two new points every time.Besides, if such a course was allowed to beadopted, the doctrine of finality of judgmentspronounced by the Supreme Court would also bematerially affected. Therefore, having regard tothe facts pleaded and the grounds raised, thepresent petition is not maintainable."45.In this connection, we make a relevant and useful reference tothe definition of Section 2(h) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention ofDangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Forest-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982)deals with 'Slum-Grabber' which reads as follows:(h)"slum-grabber" means a person, who illegallytakes possession of any land (whether belongingto Government, local Authority or any otherperson) or enters into or creates illegaltenancies or leave and licence agreements or anyother agreement in respect of such lands; or whoconstructs unauthorised structures thereon forsale or hire, or gives such lands to any personon rental or leave and licence basis forconstruction or use and occupation ofunauthorised structures or who knowingly givesfinancial aid to any person for taking illegalpossession of such lands, or for construction ofunauthorised structures thereon, or who collectsor attempts to collect from any occupier of suchlands, rent, compensation or other charges bycriminal intimidation or who evicts or attemptsto evict any such occupier by force withoutresorting to the lawful procedure; or who abetsin any manner the doing of any of the above-mentioned things."46.Likewise, Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982concerning the definition of 'Goonda' which enjoins as follows:"(f)"goonda" means a person, who either byhimself or as a member of or leader of a gang,habitually commits, or attempts to commit orabets the commission of offence Substituted byAct 16 of 2008 for "Punishable under Chapter XVIor XVII or XXII of Indian Penal Code, 1860 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (Central Act 45 of 1860)" [punishable underSection 153 or Section 153-A under Chapter VIIIor under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or ChapterXXII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act45 of 1860) or punishable under Section 3 orSection 4 or Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Property(Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992 (TamilNadu Act 59 of 1992);]."47.A person cannot be detained as 'Goonda' unless there areallegations of his involvement in more than one offence on variousoccasions.48.A 'Goonda' is one whose acts are prejudicial to public order.When he/she engaged or making preparation for engaging in anyactivity as a person of 'Goonda' which affects adversely ormaterially to act adversely, maintenance of public order. The orderof detention on the ground that the detenu robbed a wrist watch atknife point is held to be unsustainable as per decision in Mrs.MalaV. Secretary to Government and another [2004 MLJ (Crl.) 306].49.It is to be borne in mind that the term 'Law and Order' iswider in scope because of the fact that the violation of law alwaysaffects order, whereas 'Public Order' has a narrow ambit. The publicorder will be affected only by such violation which affects thepublic at large or the community. To put it succinctly, the 'PublicOrder' will take within its ambit the tempo of life of the communitytaking the country in entirety or even a particular locality.50.The distinction between breaches of 'Law and Order' and the'disturbance of Public Order' is to be drawn based on the followingfactors:"1.A contravention of law always affects order,but before it can be said to affect public order,it must affect the community or public at large. 2.Public order is the even tempo of the life ofthe community taking the country as a whole oreven a specified locality.3.It is the degree of disturbance and its effectupon the life of the community in general or inparticular locality which determines whether thedisturbance amounts only to breach of law andorder or a disturbance of public order.4.It is potentiality of the act to disturb theeven tempo of the life of the community whichmakes it prejudicial to the maintenance of publicorder.5.If the contravention in its effect is confinedonly to a few individuals directly involved as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ distinguished from wide spectrum of the public,it would cause a problem of law and order only'as per decision in Sanjay Singh V. State of U.P.[2000 Cri. L.J. 1683 at page 1691.]."51.In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.MukherjeeV. State of West Bengal [AIR 1970 Supreme Court 852] at page 857 inparagraph 9, it is observed as follows:"9.The difference between the concepts of 'publicorder' and 'law and order' is similar to thedistinction between 'public' and 'private' crimesin the realm of jurisprudence. In considering thematerial elements of crime, the historic testswhich each community applies are intrinsicwrongfulness and social expediency which are thetwo most important factors which have led to thedesignation of certain conduct as criminal.Dr.Allen has distnguished 'public' and 'private'crimes in the sense that some offences primarilyinjure specific persons and only secondarily thepublic interest, while others directly injure thepublic interest, and affect individuals onlyremotely – (See Dr.Allen's Legal Duties, p.249).There is a broad distinction along these lines,but differences naturally arise in theapplication of any such test. The learned authorhas pointed out that out of 331 indictableEnglish offences 203 are public wrongs and 128private wrongs."52.'Public Order' is not necessarily disturbed by panicking thecommunity by show of force though normally, in a case of infractionof law or use of open force, the disturbance is so sudden and gravethat commotion and panic immediately follows: When violence isadvocated, it spontaneously tends to disturb the even tempo of lifeof the society as a whole thereby prejudicially threatening themaintenance of 'public order'. While the various criminal actsleading to 'public disorder' in the society are obtrusive andobvious, certain potential surreptitious and secret unlawfulactivities may be strikingly prejudicial to the 'public order'. Moreserious and of wide spectrum are the cases where the 'public order'is disturbed in a clandestine and silent manner, as per decisionRavindra Kumar Agrahari V. Union of India, 2000 Cri LJ 3028 at 3035.53.In short, the distinction between the areas of 'Law and Order'and 'Public Order' is one of degree and the extent of reach of theact in issue on the society. 54.The potentiality of the act to affect normal way of life ofthe community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ public order. If a violation is limited only to a few individualsdirectly involved, in contra distinction to a wide spectrum ofpublic, it can raise the problem of law and order only. The length,intensity and magnitude of the terror wave unleashed by a certaineruption of disorder that helps to differentiate as an act affecting'Public Order' from that concerning law and order.55.There is a thin difference to find out whether certain act canaffect the maintenance of public order of the law and order and theeffect of a particular act which has to be judged to assess thedegree and the extent of its reach on the society to find out whetherthe said activity has affected the even tempo of the life ofcommunity or not. As the facts of no two cases can be similarlyidentical, it is clearly not possible to decide whether oneparticular incident is related to the problem of maintenance ofpublic order or law and order.56.In a case where there is loss of single life and injury to twopersons it is held, in the decision Suresh Chandra Katare V. State ofU.P. [2001 All LJ 2210], that it is a violation of law and order andnot public order.57.The nature of act will determine whether the act committed bythe detenu has impact over the society and can disturb the even tempoof the community or its effect is confined to a few individuals so asto make it a problem of law and order only as per the decision inAnirudha V. D.M.Allahabad, [1987 Cri LJ 1784].58.It is to be noted that no straight jacket formula can beevolved to find out as to whether certain incidents or the criminalactivities will fall within the ambit of 'law and order' or 'publicorder'. It is the gravity and magnitude of the incidents and theimpact of such incidents upon the even tempo of the localities whichis a decisive factor as per decision Jaya Daniel Lobo V. A.S.Samra[(1994) 2 Bom CR 429 at 433].59.In Shamsher Yadav V. Union of India [2006 Cri LJ 708 at 710(All)] in paragraph 9 and 10 it is held as follows:"9.We have considered the arguments of thelearned counsel for the petitioner as well aslearned A.G.A. And the learned standing counselfor the Union of India and have ourselves perusedthe petition counter and rejoinder affidavits. Sofar as the first ground relating to law and orderis concerned the same has been pleaded inparagraph Nos.10, 13 and 15 of the writ petition.From the perusal of the grounds of detention(Annexure 2 to the writ petition), which has notbeen challenged by the detaining authority andother respondents, it is clear that the two https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ grounds on which the petitioner has been detainedare relatable only to law and order and not topublic order. Let us make our meaning clear. Sofar as the ground No.1 is concerned only thismuch is stated that Sangram Singh was roamingwith D.B.B.L. Gun and some cartridge alleged tobe belonging to the petitioner. Beside this,nothing in mentioned in ground No.1. This groundcan not at all be said to be concerned withpublic order in any manner whatsoever.10.So far as the second ground is concerned,the same is based on an incident, which was theoutcome of the personal animosity between twofactions. The said incident had taken place at 9p.m. at the door of the persons of rival faction.The incident was not related to any element ofpublic order. In the month of September at 9 p.m.in the village generally people are inside thehouses and there are very few people out on thestreets and in the open, consequently the publictempo being disturbed by the complained activityis not comprehensible, which in fact was theoutcome of village rivalry. We do not mean to saythat there cannot be any element of public orderin any crime but what to say that there cannot beany element of public order in any crime but whatto impress upon is the fact that there is noevidence to show in this particular case that anypublic order was involved. It is to be recalledthat the said incident was of 26.9.2004 and thepetitioner surrendered in the Court on 1.10.2004and since then he was continuously in jail. Itwas after a lapse of five months (25.3.2005) thatthe detention order was passed. It is alsorelevant to point out, from annexure 3 writpetition that dossier from the police stationMohammadabad, Gohana, District Mau is dated24.3.2005 meaning thereby that there was norecommendation for taking preventive action on orbefore 24.3.2005 a gap of more than five and ahalf months. It is also relevant to note thatduring this period of five and a half months thepetitioner was continuously languishing in jaiand was not granted bail, we are of the opinionthat it was a case of law and order and notpublic order. So, the detention order in questionis bad in law."60.At this juncture, we deem it appropriate to cite the followingdecisions: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (a) In Sant Singh V. District Magistrate, Varanasi and others[2000 CRI. L.J. 2230 at page 2231], it is held as follows:"8. .... In the instance case, the incident ofmurder of Bhaiya Lal Maurya had taken placethough in the broad day light but at acomparatively lonely place at Chhiohhnatrijunction, which is hardly populated. It wasnot a residential locality. The locus in que isat a distance of about 3 kms. from GarthanaBazar. The 'public order' could not be disturbedat a place where there was in fact no public.There is not even a faint suggestion in thegrounds accompanying the detention order that theterror and tension prevailed in the area and thatthe residents of the nearby localities felt soinsure that they confined themselves to theirhouses after closing doors and windows or thatthere was any commotion in Grathana market or inany local area. Mere using the bald words thatthe regional residents of area suffered mentaltrauma on account of the ill-effect of theincident and that the 'law and order' hadcompletely broken down without any concrete andtangible material is of no consequence. There canbe no escape from the finding that it was a caseof murder having been committed on account oflong standing personal rivarly in an area, whichwas bereft of the residential houses and market.Every murder has some ill-effect but then inevery case it cannot be termed as resulting in'public disorder'. Our finding in the matter isthat it was a case, pure and simple, of breach of'law and order' and not of 'public disorder'."(b) In Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh V. M.M.Mehta, Commissioner ofPolice and others [(1995) 3 Supreme Court Cases 237] at page 239, itis observed as follows:"9...... In order to bring the activities of aperson within the expression of 'acting in anymanner prejudicial to the maintenance of publicorder', the fall out and the extent and reach ofthe alleged activities must be of such a naturethat they travel beyond the capacity of theordinary law to deal with him or to prevent hissubversive activities affecting the community atlarge or a large section of society. It is thedegree of disturbance and its impact upon theeven tempo of life of the society or the peopleof a locality which determines whether thedisturbance caused by such activity amounts only https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to a breach of 'Law and order' or it amounts to'public order'. It the activity falls within thecategory of disturbance of 'public order' then itbecomes essential to treat such a criminal anddeal with him differently than an ordinarycriminal under the law as his activities wouldfall beyond the frontiers of law and order,disturbing the even tempo of life of thecommunity of the specified locality."(c) In Smt.Victoria Fernandas V. Lalmal Sawma and others [AIR1992 Supreme Court 687], in paragraph 8 and 10, it is held as follows:"8. .... While the expression 'law and order' iswider in scope inasmuch as contravention of lawalways affects order, while 'public order' has anarrower ambit and public order would be affectedby only such contravention which affects thecommunity or the public at large. Public order isthe even tempo of life of the community takingthe country as a whole or even a specifiedlocality. The distinction between the areas of'law and order' and 'public order' is one ofdegree and extent of the reach of the act inquestion on society. It is the potentiality ofthe act to disturb the even tempo of life of thecommunity which makes it prejudicial to themaintenance of the public order. If acontravention in its effect is confined only to afew individuals directly involved as distinctfrom a wide spectrum of public, it could raisethe problem of law and order only. It is thelength, magnitude and intensity of the terrorwave unleashed by a particular eruption ofdisorder that helps distinguish it as an actaffecting 'public order' from that concerning'law and order'. The question to ask is : Does itlead to disturbance of the current life of thecommunity so as to amount to a disturbance of thepublic order or does it affect merely anindividual leaving the tranquillity of thesociety undisturbed ? This question has to befaced in every case on its facts. 10. .... Where the incidents relied on forordering preventive detention were a solitary actof assault on a journalist and two incidents ofextending threats to journalists the saidincidents were not of such a magnitude andintensity as to have the potentiality ofdisturbing the even tempo of community so as toamount to acts prejudicial to the maintenance of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ public order. Consequently, detention order basedon the said incidents was liable to be setaside.”(d) In Arun Ghosh V. State of West Bengal [AIR 1970 Supreme Court1228], it is held as follows:“The question whether a man has only committed abreach of law and order or has acted in a mannerlikely to cause a disturbance of the public orderis a question of degree and the extent of thereach of the act upon the society. An act byitself is not determinant of its own gravity. Inits quality it may not differ from another but inits potentiality it may be very difficult.Similar acts in different contexts affectdifferently law and order on the one hand andpublic order on the other. It is always aquestion of degree of the harm and its effectupon the community. Individual act can be aground for detention only if it leads todisturbance of the current of life of thecommunity so as to amount a disturbance of thepublic order and not if it affects merely anindividual leaving the tranquillity of thesociety undisturbed.Public order embraces more of the community thanlaw and order. Public order is the even tempo ofthe life of the community taking the country as awhole or even a specified locality. Disturbanceof public order is to be distinguished from actsdirected against individuals which do not disturbthe society to the extent of causing a generaldisturbance of public tranquillity. It is thedegree of disturbance and its effect upon thelife of the community in a locality whichdetermines whether the disturbance amounts onlyto a breach of law and order.”(e) In Ajay Dixit V. State of U.P. and others [AIR 1985 SupremeCourt 18], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:“It is, therefore, necessary in each case toexamine the facts to determine, not thesufficiency of the grounds nor the truth of thegrounds, but nature of the grounds alleged andsee whether these are relevant or not forconsidering whether the detention of the detenuis necessary for maintenance of public order.Thus where one of the grounds mentioned in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ order of detention was old and stale and theother grounds were also unfortunate and theconduct of the alleged detenu was reprehensibleand moreover in view of the allegations mentionedin the grounds, the grounds were not of suchnature as to lead any apprehension that the eventempo of the community would be endangered, thedetention of the detenu under the provisions ofS.3(2) was not justified.”(f)In Pushkar Mukherjee and 29 others V. The State of West Bengal[1969 (1) Supreme Court Cases 10], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has heldas follows:“ Rule issued to show cause why release fromdetention should not be ordered against all orany of the respondents. (a) It is settled law that the satisfactionof the detaining authority under Section 3 (1) ofthe Act is subjective and not justiciable.Reasonableness of the satisfaction cannot bequestioned. State of Bombay v. Atma Ram SridharVaidya, (951) SCR 167, relied upon.(b)But the satisfaction of the detainingauthority can be challenged if the grounds areirrelevant or malafide. (c)What was meant by maintenance of publicorder was the prevention of disorder of a gravenature whereas the expression 'maintenance of lawand order' meant prevention of disorder ofcomparatively lesser gravity and of localsignificance. Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia v. State ofBihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709, 746 (per Hidayatullah,J.) relied upon.(d)It is well established that even if oneof the grounds or reasons that led to thesatisfaction of the detaining authority isirrelevant, the order of detention would beinvalid, for it can never be certain to whatextent the bad reasons operated on the mind ofthe authority concerned or whether the detentionorder would have been made at all if only one ortwo good reasons had been before them. Reliesupon:Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U.P., (1954)SCR 418. Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar,(1966) 1 SCR 709. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (e)Even though one ground is vague and theother grounds are not vague the detention orderhas to be struck down as not in accordance withlaw. “Vagueness” discussed."(g)In Sayed Abul Ala V. Union of India and others [(2007) 15Supreme Court Cases 208] at page 214 & 215 in paragraph 21 to 24, theHon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:“21. Proper application of mind on the part ofthe detaining authority must, therefore, be borneout from the order of detention. In cases wherethe detenu is in custody, the detaining authoritynot only should be aware of the said fact butthere should be some material on record tojustify that he may be released on bail havingregard to the restriction imposed on the power ofthe Court as it may not arrive at the conclusionthat there existed reasonable grounds forbelieving that he was not guilty of such offenceand that the detenu could not indulge in similaractivity, if set at liberty. 22. The detaining authority furthermore isrequired to borne in mind that there exists adistinction between the 'likelihood of his movingan application for bail' and 'likelihood to bereleased on bail'. While arriving at hissubjective satisfaction that there is likelihoodof the detenu being released on bail, recordingof the satisfaction on the part of the detainingauthority that merely because an application forgrant of bail had been filed, would not beenough. It would also not be sufficientcompliance of the legal obligation that thedetaining authority had informed himself that thedetenu has retracted from his earlier confession.23. So far as the 2nd retraction of confession isconcerned, the same is dated 1.6.2000, and thusthe same could not have been within the knowledgeof the detention authority. Refraction fromconfession by the detenu although may be one ofthe grounds for arriving at the conclusion withregard to the subjective satisfaction of thedetaining authority, in our opinion, thedetaining authority should have also informedhimself about the implication of Section 37 ofthe Act. If the detenu was involved in a largenumber of cases and the prosecution was aware ofthe same, it would invariably be brought to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ notice of the court dealing with the applicationof bail filed by the detenu by the publicprosecutor. Further more, the order of the Courtgranting bail would be passed only when the courtdealing therewith forms an opinion that there arereasonable grounds for believing that he is notguilty of such offences that there was nolikelihood to commit any offence while on bail. 24. In Amritlal & Ors. vs. Union Govt. throughSecy., Ministry of Finance & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC341, wherein this Court, following the decisionin Binod Singh Vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad(1986 (4) SCC 416, held as under:“6.The requirement as noticed above in BinodSingh Case that there is ?likelihood of thepetitioners being released on bail? however isnot available in the reasoning as provided by theofficer concerned. The reasoning available is the'likelihood of his moving an application forbail' which is different from 'likelihood to bereleased on bail'. This reasoning, in our view,is not sufficient compliance with therequirements as laid down.7.The emphasis however, in Binod Singh case thatbefore passing the detention order the authorityconcerned must satisfy himself of the likelihoodof the petitioner being released on bail and thatsatisfaction ought to be reached on cogentmaterial. Available cogent material is thelikelihood of having a bail application moved inthe matter but not obtaining a bail order.”(h)In Mannar @ Ezhilarasan V. The State of Tamil Nadu rep. by itsSecretary to Government Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St.George, Chennai [2008-1-L.W.(Crl.) 152 at page 153], the DivisionBench of this Court has held thus:“In the instant case, the adverse cases relate tothe offence punishable under Sections 457, 380and 511 IPC, whereas there is only one solitaryinstance, viz., the ground case, where the detenuhad robbed in the public-In view of the decisionin R.Kalavathi case 2007-1-L.W. (Crl.) 338 (2006)6 SCC 14, from one single transaction, thoughconsisting of several acts, a habit cannot beattributed to a person-Stand taken by thedetaining authority that the detenu is habitually https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ committing crime and acted in a mannerprejudicial to the maintainable of public ordercannot be sustained. Moreover, there is no material on record toshow that the reach and potentiality of thesingle incident of robbery was so great as todisturb the even tempo or normal life of thecommunity in the locality or disturb generalpeace and tranquility or create a sense of alarmand insecurity in the locality-HCP allowed.(i) In Dipak Bose alias Naripada V. State of West Bengal [(1973)4 Supreme Court Cases 43] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held asfollows:"Every assault in a public place like a publicroad and terminating in the death of a victim islikely to cause horror and even panic and terrorin those who are the spectators. But that doesnot mean that all of such incidents donecessarily cause disturbance of dislocation ofthe community life of the localities in whichthey are committed. If in the grounds ofdetention there was nothing to suggest thateither of them was of that kind and gravity whichwould jeopardise the maintenance of public order,the two incidents alleged against the petitioner,thus, pertained to specific individuals, andtherefore, related to and fell within the area oflaw and order. In respect of such acts thedrastic provisions of the Act are notcontemplated to be resorted to and the ordinaryprovisions of the penal laws would be sufficientto cope with them."(j)In Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan V. Police Commissioner,Ahmedabad and another [(1989) 4 Supreme Court Cases 43 at page 44],the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:"The criminal cases against the detenu mentionedin the grounds of detention were confined tocertain private individuals. There was nothing inthis case to show that the petitioner was amember of a gang engaged in criminal activitiessystematically in a particular locality whichcreated a panic and a sense of insecurity amongstthe residents of that particular area inconsideration of which the impugned order wasmade. The alleged activities of the detenu did https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ not affect adversely or tend to affect the eventempo of life of the community. They merelyrelated to law and order problem. Their reach andeffect was not so deep as to affect the public atlarge and they did not in any way pose a threatto the maintenance of public order. An act maycreate a law and order problem but such an actdoes not necessarily cause an obstruction to themaintenance of public order. So there has beencomplete non-application of mind by the detainingauthority before reaching a subjectivesatisfaction to make the impugned order ofdetention."(k) In Smt.Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan V. Union of India andothers [AIR 1989 Supreme Court 371], the Hon'ble Supreme Court hasheld thus:"There was an isolated criminal case against thedetenus with no sinister significance attached toit. The offence was committed by the detenus, twomisguided police men under the cover of darknesswith the assistance of a member of the public. Itwas certainly suicidal to those two policepersonnel. But it has no connection whatsoever todisturb the 'public order' in the circumstancesof the case. Therefore, the order of thedetention passed against the detenus would beliable to be quashed. The Court cannot beunmindful of the danger to liberties of peoplewhen guardians of law and order themselvesindulge in undesirable acts. But the law ofpreventive detention is not different to policepersonnel. It is the same law that applies topolice as well as to public. Therefore, differentstandard cannot be applied in respect of actsindividually committed by any police officer. Thesubjective satisfaction of the detainingauthority with respect to the persons sought tobe detained should be based only on the nature ofthe activities disclosed by the grounds ofdetention. The grounds of detention must havenexus with the purpose for which the detention ismade." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

61.The Petitioner has raised in all 20 grounds in the firstH.C.P.No.1498 of 2011 wherein she has prayed for quashing thedetention order dated 16.09.2011 passed by the 2nd Respondent underAct 14 of 1982 and resultantly, to direct the Respondents to produceher husband before this Court and to set him at liberty fromdetention [who is now detained at Central Prison, Vellore].62.At the time of final hearing of the H.C.P.No.1498 of 2011 bythis Court, the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of thePetitioner has confined to the submission as mentioned in the orderdated 22.02.2012 beginning from paragraphs 5 to 17.63.On going through the new grounds 1 to 10 raised inH.C.P.No.571 of 2012, it is quite evident that except the GroundNo.3, other grounds taken in H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 have not been takenin earlier H.C.P.No.1498 of 2011, for the same relief, in ourconsidered opinion. Undoubtedly, the plea of res judicata orconstructive res judicata as applicable to civil proceedings isinapplicable to the plea of illegal detention. Therefore, theH.C.P.No.571 of 2012 filed by the wife of the detenu on fresh/newgrounds for the same relief is maintainable in law and the point isso answered.64.As regards the plea taken on behalf of the Petitioner that inthe English version of the detention order dated 16.09.2011 inparagraph 2, it is mentioned as 'Grounds' (in plural) and in theTamil language in paragraph 2, it is mentioned as 'Ground' (insingular) that has caused confusion in the mind of the detenu andthere is a material discrepancy, from the voluminous materialavailable on record, it is clear that the Petitioner's husband is aJail Bird and he is quite aware of the niceties of legal provisionsparticularly how to make an effective representation. As such, wereject the contra plea taken on behalf of the Petitioner. 65.The penal laws in India are primarily meant to prevent thecommission of offences by punishing the offenders. The purpose ofpunishment to be meted out is to protect the society from undesirableand mischievous persons by deterring the real offenders fromcommitting further offences. Also, the object of punishment is toreform them and ultimately to turn them into law abiding citizens. Inthis connection, we pertinently recall the words "Manu" which runs asfollows:"Punishment governs all mankind, punishment alonepreserves them, punishment wakes while theirguards are asleep, the wise consider thepunishment as the perfection of justice" https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (Institutes of Hindu Law (Translated by Haughton)Ch.7, para 18 at page 189.66.That apart, in preventive detention order, the concept of lawand order on one side and public order on the other, and the conceptof security of State ordinarily and generally will arise. Toappreciate the difference between 'concept of law and order, publicorder and security of State', one has to determine that the biggeraspect that takes within its fold is the concept of law and order.The other one is called as 'Public Order'. The next one is theconcept of security of State. A detention order is to be passed onlyto preserve Public Order or the Security of State. The legal conceptof law and order is wider in ambit and it may not necessarily takewithin its purview the concept of Public Order or the security of theState. The term "law and order" is not a genus, different from publicorder or security of the State. The real difference between the areasof law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature orquality of the act. However, it is based on the degree and extent ofits reach upon society. In one set of given circumstances, the actcomplained of may affect an individual member of the society only.The similar act done in a different way will have ramifications onthe whole society or atleast on a section of the society. In theearlier case, the act, which is made the subject matter of detention,may be categorised as one falling within the ambit of law and order.In the latter case, a similar action may fall within the purview ofthe expression 'Public Order'. What has to be taken intoconsideration are the circumstances or the background in the light ofwhich the act has been committed as per Article 22(5) of theConstitution.67.Article 21 prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life andpersonal liberty by prescribing that these two possessions can onlybe taken away as per procedure established by law. It is wellsettled principle of law that no Authority in India (Legislative,Executive or Judicial) can deprive an individual of his life orpersonal liberty unless it can justify its stand/ action inaccordance with the procedure established by law. In fact, Article 21of the Constitution of India does not say what the law should be nordoes Article 22 of the Constitution say so. Article 22 in a wayadvances the object of Article 21 of the Constitution, when it speaksof some guaranteed rights available to arrested individuals ordetained persons and prescribes the manner in law persons detainedpreventively to be dealt with.68.Article 22 of the Constitution prescribes the permissiblelimits of legislation empowering preventive detention. It enjoins theminimum procedure that should be included in any law permittingpreventive detention and as and when such requirements are notobserved the detention, even if void ab initio, ceases to be "inaccordance with the procedure established by law" and infringes the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ fundamental right of the detenu guaranteed as per Articles 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution as per decision in State of Bombay V. AtmaRam Shridhar Vaidhya [AIR 1951 SC 157].69.The existence of power of preventive detention is based onsafeguards mentioned in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution ofIndia. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7) speaks of safeguard againstpreventive detention and law of preventive detention or action by wayof preventive detention taken under such law must be in conformitywith the restrictions laid down by clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22.The law of preventive detention is to pass the test not only ofArticle 22, but also of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Nodoubt, other than Article 22, Article 21 also prescribes restrictionson the power of preventive detention.70.As a matter of fact, a combined reading of Articles 21 and 22of the Constitution of India point out that it allows the punitiveand preventive detention if it is in accordance with the procedureestablished by law. However, the fundamental rights available to adetenu must be strictly enforced notwithstanding the nature of hisactivities as per decision in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel V. Unionof India and others [(1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 51].71.In the Tamil translation of the grounds of detention dated16.09.2011, it is mentioned that ".... Hence, the situation on08.03.2011 and the incidents committed by the Dhanasekaran areconnected with law and order and it will not only affectspeace/tranquility among the general public, but also their life."72.But, in the English version of the grounds of detention dated16.09.2011, it is mentioned hereunder: "Though the situation on 08.03.2011 and theoccurrence committed by the accusedTr.Dhanasekaran was seems to be a law and ordersituation, if it would not have been caused thedisturbance of public peace and it affected thegeneral current public life."73.This Court, on going through the aforesaid English translationportion of the grounds of detention cited supra, opines that 'thelines beginning from '....., if it would not have been caused thedisturbance of public peace and it affected the general currentpublic life' are not happily translated in English in a verbatimfashion. But, that by itself will not exhibit the non application ofmind by Detaining Authority, as opined by this Court.74.The plea of vernacular translation of new Ground No.3 raisedin H.C.P.No.571 of 2012 has already been taken in H.C.P.No.1498 of2011 and as such, it is not a new plea being raised by the Petitionerfor the first time. Consequently, the Petitioner is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ estopped/precluded from taking the said plea in the presentH.C.P.No.571 of 2012 once again. 75.(i)The case in R8 Vadapalani Police Station Crime No.25/2010under Sections 147, 448, 427, 506(ii) I.P.C. r/w 3 of the PPDL Act[including the reopening of the case as per Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.and further investigation is being done in regard to the removal ofTr.Dhanasekaran (Petitioner's husband) and his friends Murugesan,Govindarajan, Ananthalingam etc.]; (ii) The case in R10 MGR NagarPolice Station Crime No.880/2011 under Sections 447, 294(b), 323, 427and 506(ii) I.P.C. in which the conduct of investigation disclosesthat Tr.Dhanasekaran with his associates in order to help his DMKYouth wing secretary Tr.Amulraj of MGR Nagar went to Raji's house on12.05.2011 night threatened him with dire consequences and wrongfullyconfined the complainant and his family members into the house asnarrated above and ultimately grabbed Raji's land to annex with theland of Amul Raj; (iii) The case in R-10 MGR Nagar Police StationCrime No.916/2011 under Sections 120(b), 342, 380, 406, 420, 427,448, 454, 467, 468 and 506(ii) I.P.C. was registered and that theinvestigation shows that in order to grab the property the accusedTr.Dhanasekaran (Petitioner's husband) used the forged General Powerof Attorney purported to be signed by the victim and using hispolitical and muscle power threatened the complainant Tr.George withdire consequences and also committed robbery of properties about 38sovereigns gold jewels and Rs.10 lakhs cash grabbed the saidproperty; (iv) The case in R-10 MGR Nagar Police Station registeredin Crime No.1161/2011 under Sections 147, 448, 323, 294(b), 506(ii)and 380 I.P.C. and that the accused Dhanasekaran (Petitioner'shusband) under his leadership along with Mayil @ Mayilvanan,Lingeswaran, Govindaraj, Soundararajan along with few otherstrespassed in the complainant's show threatened the complainant ofhis life and took away the properties mentioned above totalling aboutRs.55,000/- and forcibly took possession of his shop [Subsequently,the Sections have been altered as 147, 148, 448, 323, 294(b), 427,336, 304(ii) and 397 I.P.C.]; (v) The case in R-7 K.K.Nagar PoliceStation Crime No.1107/2011 under Sections 129(b), 409, 420, 386, 506(ii) I.P.C. and Section 3 r/w 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of ChargingExorbitant Interest Act, 2003 being registered based on the complaintof Jeevanandam against the Petitioner's husband Dhanasekaran etc.;(vi) The case in R-7 KK Nagar Police Station PS Crime No.916/2011under Sections 147, 148, 294(b), 448, 451, 354, 380, 384 and 506(ii)I.P.C. being registered against Dhanasekaran (Petitioner's husband)and others based on the complaint of Anuradha, as made mention of inthe grounds of detention only refers to the law and ordersituation/provblem involving the acts of the Petitioner's husband(detenu) and the said acts are not affecting the Public Ordersituation or resulting in breach of public order in contradistinction to the law and order [although micro section of theindividual public are affected by the acts of Petitioner's husband]. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

76.It transpires from the detention order dated 16.09.2011 passedby the 2nd Respondent/Detaining Authority that he has not at alladverted to or taken into consideration the remote possibility of therelease of the detenu (Petitioner's husband) on bail in R-7 K.K.Nagar PS Crime No.1107/2011 and this non consideration/failure ofconsideration of the possibility of the release of the detenu on bailin case involving graver offence amounts to non application of mind,which vitiates the order of detention [notwithstanding the fact thatthe 2nd Respondent/Detaining Authority in the detention order dated16.09.2011 in paragraph 4 has referred to other bail applications inCrime No.25/2010 of R-8 Vadapalani Police Station and R-10 MGR NagarPS Crime No.1161/2011]. To this extent, non application ofmind/failure of consideration by the 2nd Respondent/DetainingAuthority has clearly been established before us and this vitiatesthe detention order dated 16.09.2011.77.We are alive to the fact that an order of detention canordinarily be passed based on a single/solo act. Whether a single actis enough or not, to sustain an order of detention, will revolve uponthe gravity and nature of the act having regard to the fact whetherthe act is an organised one or a manifestation of organisedactivities. The contra test is gravity and nature of the act, it isnot necessary that there ought to be plurality of grounds forsustaining an order of detention. Even a solitary act can justify thedetention, if it is really a grave one which has affected the publicorder or in fact there being a breach of public order. If the singleact has the effect of disturbing public order and even the normallife of the society or community, then, a preventive detention isjustified in law.78.An order of detention is not a curative or reformative orpunitive action. However, it is only a preventive action. No wonder,a preventive detention is a devise to afford protection of thesociety.79.In regard to the contention that the detention order of the2nd Respondent dated 16.09.2011 is passed on numerous grounds and theyare severable as per Section 5A of the Tamil Nadu Prevention ofDangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, ForestOffenders, Goondas, Immoral Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum Grabbersand Video Pirates Act, 1982, it is true that Section 5A has beeninserted by Act 52 of 1986 with effect from 05.08.1986 and earliereven if one of the grounds failed, it showed the way for the detenuto come out from other cases. After Section 5A has been inserted, ifone or more of the grounds is vague, the detention order can still begood if any one of the grounds deemed to be valid. Only with thisbackground the ingredients of Section 5A of the Act have beeninserted. If there is only one composite ground enumerated in several https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ paragraphs the severability of grounds would not arise as perdecision in A.Sowkath Ali V. Union of India and others [AIR 2000Supreme Court 2662]. But, in the instant case on hand, we havealready come to the conclusion that the unlawful acts of thePetitioner's husband Dhanasekaran are only law and order problems notaffecting the public order resulting in public breach/peace andtherefore, the deeming clause to view as if a separate order of eachground being passed does not assume any significance and in fact, itrelegates to the background.80.Even though the Detaining Authority in the order of detentiondated 16.09.2011 in English version has stated the following:"The chain of events of unlawful acts of theaccused Tr.Dhanasekaran is made clear that thesefacts of the case, it was difficult to bring tothese acts which were liable to be dealt withunder the ordinary laws of land, a public orderdimensions within the meaning of and for purposeof the ex-ordinary law of preventive detention."yet, the acts complained of concerning the Petitioner's husband canbe tackled under the ordinary laws of the land to establish whenadmittedly he has been charged under various Sections of I.P.C. etc.,in various crime numbers before concerned Magistrate Courts.81.The preventive detention is a harsh measure and though in page14 of the English version of the detention order dated 16.09.2011,the 2nd Respondent has mentioned that 'Further, the residents of thearea also stated that the above act of Tr.Dhanasekaran created scarethat there is no safeguard to their properties purchased out of thehard earned money', these are all only ritualistic rhetorics beingemployed in the absence of any such material being placed before theDetaining Authority and supplied to the detenu [like the statementsof residents of the area]. Therefore, it is latently and patentlyquite clear that the 2nd Respondent has taken into account theextraneous matter into consideration at the time of passing of thedetention order dated 16.09.2011 and on this ground, the said orderof detention stands vitiated. 82.Dealing with the plea on the side of the Petitioner that whilerelying upon numerous grounds, the 2nd Respondent/Detaining Authorityshould have employed conjunctive "and" and that he has not used anyconjunctives to join the grounds and therefore, it exhibits the nonapplication of mind, it is to be pointed out that the 2nd Respondent /Detaining Authority, in the detention order, has to assign reasonsand there is no rule of thumb which enjoins the employment of anyparticular language or certain specified format. As such, the nonuser of the conjunctive 'and' pales into insignificance and the sameis not fatal, as opined by this Court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

83.In regard to the plea of the Petitioner that the statement ofwitnesses dated 19.01.2010 in Crime No.25/2010 completely exoneratesthe detenu and further, the Detaining Authority has failed toconsider Crime No.916/2011 and Crime No.1161/11 do arise out of asingle civil dispute/civil litigation and moreover, the DetainingAuthority has failed to consider the order of the Principal SessionsJudge in Crl.M.P.No.8860 of 2011 dated 23.08.2011 in R-10 CrimeNo.916/2011 and also an order of the Learned Principal Sessions Judgein Crl.M.P.No.8154 of 2011 in R-10 Crime No.880/2011 dated 04.08.2011and in Crime No.1107 of 2011, the defacto complainant has not statedanything about the public order but only he has improved the same inhis 161 Cr.P.C. statement or delay in regard to the registration ofcomplaints, we are of the opinion that thesenuances/niceties/intricacies of law are to be agitated/canvassedbefore the appropriate criminal Court at the time of trial and theyare not germane for the present. Further, the Petitioner cannot bankupon the observations made by the Learned Principal Sessions Judgewhile disposing of the Crl.M.Ps. which are only tentative and notfinal adjudication of the matter [before the completion ofinvestigation/ trial], to his advantage because of the fact that atthe time of passing of the order of detention, the DetainingAuthority is to look into the matter, collected by the Police duringinvestigation, when such materials are quite relevant for the purposeof forming subjective satisfaction regarding detention. No elaborateor detailed examination of the merits of the matter, need be goneinto by the Detaining Authority at the time of passing of thedetention order. Also, the 'Bail' or 'Jail' is the blurred area ofcriminal jurisprudence, as opined by this Court.84.In regard to the contention of the Petitioner that it isimpossible for the Detaining Authority to peruse nearly 659 pages ona single day and to prepare the grounds of detention viz., 18 pagesin English and 24 pages in Tamil version and therefore, it exhibitsnon application of mind. It is to be pointed out by this Court thatno straightjacket cast iron formula or fixed parameter can be laiddown by any one because of the fact going through the contents ofnearly 659 pages depends upon the intelligent quotient, sharpness,ability, competence and capability of an individual. Therefore, thecontra plea taken on behalf of the Petitioner is of no avail.85.In regard to the plea of the Petitioner that beforeregistering the case, a CSR has been registered but not documentsproduced etc., in the counter, the Detaining Authority has statedthat the mentioning of CSR is only a narration of the facts of thecase and the same has not been relied upon as a document by him andtherefore, the non placing of the same will not vitiate thedetention. As such, the stand of the Petitioner that he has beendeprived of a making an effective representation has no legs to stand. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

86.In the light of the detailed discussions and on considerationof the entire gamut of the material available on record, we come toan irresistible conclusion that in the present case on hand, itcannot be said that the Petitioner's husband K.Dhanasekaran has actedin a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Thecriminal acts/cases complained of against the Petitioner's husbandare confined to specific private individuals and only relate to Lawand Order, which, in our considered view can be dealt with underordinary criminal and other laws of the land applicable if any [asseen from the various criminal cases in numerous crime numbers filedagainst the Petitioner's husband as made mention of in the detentionorder passed by the 2nd Respondent/Detaining Authority dated16.09.2011]. In reality, the offences alleged against thePetitioner's husband (detenu) do not affect adversely the maintenanceof public order. In short, there are no existence of sufficientcauses for preventive detention in the case on hand. Moreover, thealleged criminal acts/activities of the detenu (Petitioner's husband)are not travelling beyond the arms of ordinary law to deal with him.In fact, the acts complained of against the Petitioner's husbandviz., detenu do not affect the community at large having a bearing onthe issue of maintenance of public order. The absence ofconsideration by the 2nd Respondent/Detaining Authority in regard tothe remotest possibility of the detenu viz., K.Dhanasekaran comingout of bail in Crime No.1107/2011 of R-7 K.K. Nagar Police Station[concerning with graver offence] amounts to failure ofconsideration/non application of mind, which, in the eye of law,vitiates the order of detention. As such, the Order of Detentiondated 16.09.2011 of the 2nd Respondent/Detaining Authority is illegaland unjustified, in view of the fact that the same is not inaccordance with the procedure established by law. Viewed in thatperspective, we allow the Hebeas Corpus Petition. 87.In the result, the Hebeas Corpus Petition is allowed and theimpugned Order of Detention passed by the 2nd Respondent, in hisProceeding No.303/BDFGISSV/2011, dated 16.09.2011 is quashed. Thedetenu viz., K.Dhanasekaran is directed to be set at libertyforthwith, unless his presence is required in connection with anyother case/cause.Sd/-Asst. Registrar[CO]/true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.Sgl https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To1.The Secretary to Government, State of Tamilnadu, Prohibition and Excise Department Fort. St. George, Chennai-600 009.2.The Commissioner of Police, Chennai.3. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai.4. The Joint Secretary to Government,Public [Law and Order] Department,Fort St. George, Chennai 9.5. The Public Prosecutor,High Court, Madras.1 cc To Mr.R.Vivekananthan, Advocate Sr 30072H.C.P.No.571 OF 2012pur[co]gp/28.5