S. ArumuganainarSenior Manager Transport (South)Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd v. M/s. Jeenath Roadways32

1.9.2000 and for six tank lorries with effect from 1.11.2000, whichprovides extension for another year on the same terms and conditions.Dictating some serious violations in respect of two of the tank lorries,two show cause notices were issued on 31.5.2003. Under the show causenotices, it was intimated “... We are suspending all your tank lorrieswhich are in contract with BPCL with immediate effect”. A reply wasfurnished by the respondent claiming that malpractice had been committedby the concerned driver without the knowledge and connivance of therespondent. Two writ petitions, namely, W.P.No.17962 and 17966 of 2003were filed challenging such order of suspension and interim orders werepassed on 30.6.2003 staying the operation of such suspension order inrespect of seven lorries relating to which no malpractice had beendetected. On 20.6.2003, an order blacklisting the tank lorries wasissued. The operative portion was to the following effect :-“We are therefore, blacklisting your ten tank lorries, whichare in contact with BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORTION i.e. includingthe seven tank lorries, which are in contract at TondiarpetInstallation along with the crew with immediate effectincluding ex-MI loads on industry basis as per industryguidelines on transport discipline July 1998.”A counter affidavit in the two writ petitions was filed on 22.7.2003justifying the order of suspension. In such counter affidavit thesubsequent order of blacklisting was also indicated. While the writ petitions were pending, the present respondent filedpetition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,numbered as O.A.No.724 of 2003 and an order of stay was passed on5.9.2003 staying the operation of the order dated 20.6.2003 except withregard to two tank lorries involved in the malpractice. While considering the miscellaneous petitions, both the writpetitions were taken up for hearing with the consent of the counselsappearing for the parties and by common order dated 16.9.2003, both thewrit petitions were dismissed. Thereafter, the present respondent filedW.A.Nos.3797 & 3798 of 2003 on 28.10.2003. By the time the writ appealswere taken up, the respondent had also filed O.P.No.708 of 2003 forappointment of an arbitrator. Noticing all these developments, theDivision Bench observed:- “4. In view of the fact that the contract period hasitself ended and now, the controversy is limited to action ofblacklisting both the parties agree that the matter should nowbe proceeded with by an arbitral Tribunal as per the transportagreement between the parties. Both the parties agree thatboth the parties should be allowed to raise all such plea asare available to them in law. If the matters are proceededbefore the Arbitral Tribunal, now both the parties agree that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the writ appeals could be disposed of as infructuous. In thatview, the writ appeals are declared as infructuous and aredisposed of as such.”On 21.1.2004, the respondent filed Contempt Petition No.53 of 2004alleging violation of the interim order of stay dated 5.9.2003 inO.A.No.724 of 2003. In reply to such contempt petition, the presentappellant narrated the developments from stage to stage. In such replyit was also indicated that the Corporation had intimated about the listof tank lorries blacklisted to all other companies as per the existingconvention and after receipt of the said notice, such companies were alsointimated accordingly. It was also intimated that by the time the orderof stay was served, the contract period had come to an end in respect oftwo tank lorries by 31.8.2003 and in respect of other tank lorries by31.10.2003. It was specifically stated that as the order was notcommunicated prior to 31.10.2003, the respondent could not comply withthe order, and, therefore, had not violated the order of this court. The applicant/respondent had filed a rejoinder stating that for aperiod of five months they were kept out of work and the said act of therespondent was not correct. It was further indicated that in respect ofother tanker owners, their contract had been extended on adhoc basis andthe petitioner was also entitled to similar facility, but the same hadbeen denied by the Corporation.A further reply affidavit was also filed on behalf of the respondent/ appellant.The contempt petition was taken up for hearing on 20.6.2004 and wasdisposed of on 29.6.2004. After noticing the contentions raised by boththe parties, the learned single Judge closed the contempt petition withthe following observations :-“5. Though this court can punish the respondent, asprovided under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act forviolating the orders, if any, I do not find any wilfulness anddeliberate violation of the order of this court. By takinginto consideration the submissions made by the respondent inthis case, it also appears to be true, I do not propose to givea finding on that aspect. But, however, the respondent is notentitled to cause loss to the petitioner, when its contractperiod was upto 31-10-2003.6. The fact that the respondent has not given thecontract to the petitioner from 31-5-2003 to 31-10-2003for 9 tanker lorries is not in dispute. The petitioner hasfurther submitted that they have invested huge amount byavailing credit facilities from various financial institutionsfor the purchaser of tanker lorries and entered into contract https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ with the respondent and as the respondent has not given thework, the entire operation has come to a standstill and thepetitioner is unable to utilise the vehicles for any otherpurpose, as they are purchased only for the purpose oftransportation of petroleum products for the Corporation. Itis also submitted that the said tanker lorries cannot beutilised for any other purpose also, as they were designed onlyfor transportation of petroleum products and thereby they haveincurred huge loss.7. Taking into consideration the inconvenience caused tothe petitioner and also the incompatibility expressed by therespondent, instead of punishing the respondent, I feel thatthe following directions would meet the ends of justice.i) The respondent is hereby directed to give contractwork, i.e. transporting the petroleum products to thepetitioner, for 6 tanker lorries only, which they have beengiving to the petitioner prior to 31-5-2003, for a period of 5months, commencing from 15-7-2004. ii) Awarding of contract for further period beyond 5months, as it is said to have been given to the other tankerlorry owners, may also be considered to the petitioner also.” (Emphasis added)3. The present appeal has been filed invoking Clause 15 of theLetters Patent.4. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of thepresent respondent regarding maintainability of the appeal. It has beensubmitted by him that under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act anappeal can be filed against the order convicting/punishing a person underthe Contempt of Courts Act and since in the present case the presentappellant neither been convicted nor had been punished, the appeal underSection 19 cannot be filed. It is further submitted that the Contempt ofCourts Act is a special statute containing specific provisions regardingfiling of appeal and if the order passed is not appealable in terms ofSection 19, no such appeal can be filed invoking Clause 15 of the LettersPatent. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon thedecision of the Supreme Court reported in (2004) 11 SCC 672 (P.S.SATHAPPAN (DEAD) BY LRS. v. ANDHRA BANK LTD. AND OTHERS) in support ofhis contention.5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that theaforesaid decision of the Supreme Court does not have the effect oftaking away the jurisdiction of an appeal under Clause 15 of the LettersPatent. It has been submitted by him that since the Court had found thatcontempt had not been committed, contempt petition was closed. However, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ while passing such order, the court had passed order, as contained inparagraph 7 of such order which has already been extracted, whichprejudicially affects the right of the appellant, therefore, the appealis maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In support ofsuch submission, he has placed reliance upon the Division Bench decisionof this Court reported in 1993-2-LW 225 (R. RAJAGOPAL v. M.P. CHELLAMUTHU& 3 OTHERS).6. The relevant portion of section 19 of the Contempt of CourtsAct, 1971 is as follows :-“19. Appeals. - (1) An appeal shall lie as of right fromany order or decision of High Court in the exercise of itsjurisdiction to punish for contempt -(a) where the order or decision is that of a singleJudge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;. . . ”7. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court isas follows :-“15. Appeal from the Courts or Original Jurisdiction tothe High Court in its appellate jurisdiction – And We dofurther ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Courtof Judicature at Madras from the judgment (not being a judgmentpassed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect ofa decree or order made in the exercise of appellatejurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of thesaid High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise ofrevisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or orderpassed or made in the exercise of the power of thesuperintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of theGovernment of India Act, or in the exercise of criminaljurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judgeof any Division Court, pursuant to Sec.108 of the Government ofIndia Act, and that notwithstanding anything herein beforeprovided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from ajudgment of one judge of the said High Court or one Judge ofany Division Court, pursuant to Sec.108 of the Government ofIndia Act made (on or after the 1st day of February, 1929), inthe exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decreeor order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by aCourt subject to the superintendence of the said High Court,where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the caseis a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal fromother judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of suchDivision Court shall be to Us. Our Heirs of Successors in Ouror Their Privy Council as hereinafter provided.”8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reliance upon paragraph 148 of the decision in (2004)11 SCC 672 (citedsupra), which according to the learned counsel for the respondent, summedup the conclusion in the said decision. In paragraph 148,it has beenstated :“148. The upshot of our decision would be:(1) Finality clause contained in a statute, unlessattached to an order passed in appeal, would not take away theright of appeal expressly provided for under the specialstatute.(2) Letters Patent being a subordinate legislation has theforce of law but the same is subject to an Act of Parliament.(3) If an appeal is maintainable under sub-section (1) ofSection 104 of the Code, no further appeal therefrom would bemaintainable in terms of sub-section (2) thereof.(4) A right of appeal being creature of a statute, it mayprovide for a limited right of appeal or limiting theapplicability thereof.(5) Clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot override thebar created under Section 104 of the Code. Section 104(1) ofthe Code must be read with sub-section (2) of Section 104; andby reason thereof saving clause in relation to the LettersPatent would not be attracted. An attempt should be made touphold a right of appeal only on harmonious construction ofSections 4, 104 and other provisions of the Code.(6) However, when an appeal is provided for under aspecial Act, Section 104 of the Code shall have no applicationin relation thereto as it merely recognises such right but doesnot provide for a right of appeal.(7) If a higher status is given to a Letters Patent overa law passed by Parliament including the Code of CivilProcedure, the same would run contrary to the history of theLetters Patent as also the parliamentary Acts.(8) The judgment of this Court must be read as a whole andthe ratio therefrom is required to be culled out from readingthe same in its entirety and not only a part of it.”9. In our opinion, the aforesaid submission made by the counselfor the respondent, is not correct. The conclusion, as summarised inparagraph 148 of the judgment, reflects merely the minority viewexpressed by S.B. Sinha, J for himself and for N. Santosh Hegde, J. A https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ careful reading of the entire decision clearly indicate that theconclusion, as per paragraph 148, obviously is not the conclusion of themajority opinion. The majority opinion is contained in paragraphs 1 to35, whereas the minority view is reflected in paragraphs 36 to 150 andthe order of the Court is contained in paragraph 151, which is to thefollowing effect:-“151. In view of the majority judgment, the order of theHigh Court is set aside and these appeals are allowed with noorder as to costs. The matters are remitted back to the HighCourt for decision on merits.”10. The minority view can be of no assistance. On the otherhand, it was observed in the majority decision as follows :-“ 32. ... Further it is settled law that between aspecial law and a general law the special law will alwaysprevail. A Letters Patent is a special law for the High Courtconcerned. The Civil Procedure Code is a general lawapplicable to all courts. It is well-settled law, that in theevent of a conflict between a special law and a general law,the special law must always prevail. We see no conflictbetween the Letters Patent and Section 104 but if there wasany conflict between a Letters Patent and the Civil ProcedureCode then the provisions of the Letters Patent would alwaysprevail unless there was a specific exclusion. This is alsoclear from Section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code whichprovides that nothing in the Code shall limit or affect anyspecial law. As set out in Section 4 CPC only a specificprovision to the contrary can exclude the special law. Thespecific provision would be a provision like Section 100-A. ...34. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with thereasoning of this Court in the aforesaid decision. The samereasoning would apply in respect of the submission that if itis held that Section 104(2) did not bar a letters patentappeal an anomalous situation would arise inasmuch as if thematter were to come to the High Court a further appeal wouldbe permitted but if it went to the District Court a furtherappeal would not lie. An appeal is a creature of a statute.If a statute permits an appeal, it will lie. If a statutedoes not permit an appeal, it will not lie. Thus, forexample, in cases under the Land Acquisition Act, theGuardians and Wards Act and the Succession Act, a furtherappeal is permitted whilst under the Arbitration Act a furtherappeal is barred. Thus different statutes have differingprovisions in respect of appeals. There is nothing anomalousin that. A District Court cannot be compared to a High Courtwhich has special powers by virtue of Letters Patent. The https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ District Court does not get a right to entertain a furtherappeal as it does not have “any law for the time being inforce” which permits such an appeal. In any event we find noprovisions which permit a larger Bench of the District Courtto sit in appeal against an order passed by a smaller bench ofthat Court. Yet in the High Court even, under Section 104read with order 43 Rule 1 CPC, a larger Bench can sit inappeal against an order of a Single Judge. Section 104 itselfcontemplates different rights of appeals. appeals saved bySection 104(1) can be filed. Those not saved will be barredby Section 104(2). We see nothing anomalous in such asituation. Consequently the plea of discrimination urgedbefore us must be rejected.” 11. In our opinion, there is nothing in the majority view whichin any way postulates that the appeal under Clause 15 of the LettersPatent would be barred merely because the impugned order in the contemptpetition is not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of CourtsAct. 12. On the other hand it seems that the question as to whethersuch appeal would be maintainable has been directly raised and decided inseveral decisions of this Court.13. The Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated14.8.1990 in Vidya Charan Shukla V. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association andanother (C.A.No.5 of 1990 and Letters Patent Appeal No.123 of 1990) whileholding that an appeal under Cl.15 of Letters Patent would lie againstany order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction ofthe High Court provided such an order or decision is a ‘judgment’ andsatisfied the other requirements of Cl.15 of the Letters Patent, hasobserved as follows :-“Various judgments, where recourse to an appealunder the Letters Patent has not been permitted, dealtwith cases where the Act provided an expressprohibition or exclusion of an appeal under any otherlaw. That was the petition in Union of India V.Mohindra Supply Co. AIR 1962 S.C. 256 which concernedwith the provisions contained in S.39(2) of theArbitration Act, and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442 dealing withthe Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 100A of the Codeof Civil Procedure is again one of such instances whererecourse to the Letters Patent cannot be had. Since,in our opinion Section 19(1) of the Act cannot beconstrued to be destructive of the valuable right of anappeal granted by Cl.15 of the Letters Patent and thereis no provision contained in the Contempt of Courts Actalerogating or excluding the provisions of Cl.15 of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Letters Patent, we hold that except to the extent ofthe occupied field covered by Section 19(1) of the Act,an appeal under Cl.15 of the Letters Patent would lieagainst any order or decision passed in exercise of thecontempt jurisdiction of the High Court, provided suchan order or decision is a ‘judgment’ and satisfied theother conditions laid down in Cl.15 of the LettersPatent and does not fall in any of the excludedcategories. We therefore, overrule the preliminaryobjection relating to the non-maintainability of theappeal under Cl.15 of the Letters Patent on the factsof the instant case.”14. The aforesaid decision was followed in 1993-2-LW 225(cited supra), wherein it was observed :-“ We are in entire agreement with the above view expressedby the Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla V.Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another (C.A.No.5 of 1990and Letters Patent Appeal No.123 of 1990). Inasmuch as by theorder under appeal, the learned Single Judge has declared thatthe first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area inquestion for a period of 3½ months and directed respondents 2to 4 to permit the first respondent, to quarry sand for aperiod of 3½ months from 1.5.1993. we are inclined to holdthat such an order is a ‘Judgment’ for the purpose of clause 15of the Letters Patent and that the order under appeal satisfiesthe conditions prescribed in Cl.15 of the Letters Patent. Inthese circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that thepresent appeal is maintainable under Cl.15 of the LettersPatent.”15. In our opinion, the effect of the aforesaid decisions havenot been shaken in any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court or of theMadras High Court. On the other hand, the observations made by theSupreme Court in (1996) 6 SCC 291 (J.S. PARIHAR v. GANPAT DUGGAR ANDOTHERS) in paragraphs 4 and 6 supports the views expressed by this Court.16. In the above view of the matter, we are of the opinion thatthe present appeal is maintainable. It is therefore not necessary toconsider the alternative submission made by the counsel for the appellantrelying upon a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Courtreported in 1997 CRI.L.J. 864 (HOOGHLY DISTRICT CENTRAL CO-OPERATIVEBANK LTD., v. ANOJ KUMAR ROY) that such an order is even appealable underSection 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 17. Once it is held that the appeal is maintainable, stage isnow set to consider the merits of the contentions raised by the counsels https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for either parties in the present appeal. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant has made the followingsubmissions :-(1) The learned single Judge having held that there was no wilfuland deliberate violation of the order of this Court and directed that thecontempt petition is to be closed, should not have travelled beyond thescope of the contempt petition by issuing several directions affectingthe right of the parties.(2) In alternative it is submitted by him that even assuming thatsuch directions could have been given, in the peculiar facts andcircumstances of the present case, when the validity of the suspensionorder has been upheld in W.P.No.17962 and 17966 of 2003 and W.A.Nos.3797& 3798 of 2003 had been dismissed, an order of blacklisting had beenpassed, validity of which was sought to be adjudicated in the arbitrationproceedings, no such directions should have been issued.19. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the otherhand submitted that even though the contempt proceedings had been closed,the learned single Judge has passed the order in the interest of justicekeeping in view the relevant facts and circumstances, and, therefore,such discretionary order does not call for any interference in appeal.20. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon thedecision of the Supreme Court reported in (1996) 6 SCC 291 (cited supra).In the said decision it was observed:-“6. The question then is whether the Division Bench wasright in setting aside the direction issued by the leanedSingle Judge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended byMr.S.K. Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant,that unless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of thedecision taken by the Government in preparation of theseniority list in the light of the law laid down by threeBenches, the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whetheror not the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyedthe orders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of theAct. Therefore, the learned single Judge of the High Courtnecessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We donot find that the contention is well founded. It is seenthat, admittedly, the respondents had prepared the senioritylist on 2-7-1991. Subsequently promotions came to be made.The question is whether seniority list is open to review inthe contempt proceedings to find out whether it is inconformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches.It is seen that once there is an order passed by theGovernment on the basis of the directions issued by the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressalin an appropriate forum. The preparation of the senioritylist may be wrong or may be right or mayor may not be inconformity with the directions. But that would be a freshcause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of theopportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be consideredto be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercisingthe judicial review in contempt proceedings. a fresh directionby the learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw theseniority list. In other words, the learned Judge wasexercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on meritsin the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissibleunder Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the Division Benchhas exercised the power under Section 18 of the Rajasthan HighCourt Ordinance being a judgment or order of the Single Judge;the Division Bench corrected the mistake committed by thelearned Single Judge. Therefore, it may not be necessary forthe State to file an appeal in this Court against the judgmentof the learned Single Judge when the matter was already seizedof the Division Bench.” (Emphasis added)21. In (1997) 9 SCC 640 (STATE OF J & K v. SAYEED ZAFFARMEHDI), relied upon by the appellant, it was observed as follows :-“3. It is true that by the judgment delivered in WritPetition No.169 of 1984 the Court directed that the petitionershould be deemed to be in continuous service with allconsequential benefits as admissible under the Rules. It wasfurther stated that if any action is proposed to be taken onhim for alleged overstaying on leave, it shall be taken inaccordance with the principles of law and of natural justiceafter making proper inquiry in the matter under the Rules. Itis true that this order not having been carried in appealbecame final. That, however, does not mean that the respondentwhen refused promotion can move the contempt application in thesame matter and seek the court’s order for granting himpromotion. The scope of the original writ petition was limitedand did not include matters in regard to future promotions. Inthe contempt application it was not open to the court toenlarge the scope of the original petition and also directpromotion. It is necessary to impress upon the High Court thatcontempt being a quasi-criminal matter, care should be taken tosee that the scope of the original petition is not enlargedwhile making orders in contempt matters. The proper course forthe respondent was to challenge the decision of the Governmentrefusing to grant him promotion and examine the same inaccordance with law. We, therefore, set aside the impugnedorder dated 30-11-1994 as well as the order of the Division https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Bench dated 11-10-1996 and hold that the contempt applicationwas misconceived and not competent. However, this will notpreclude the respondent from questioning the refusal to grantpromotion through proper process, if so advised. The appealwill stand so disposed of with no order as to costs.”(Emphasis added) 22. Mr.N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for therespondent, on the other hand has placed reliance upon some decisions insupport of his contention that even in a contempt proceeding, the Courtcan issue appropriate directions, in the interest of justice.23. The first and foremost decision relied upon by him isreported in A.I.R. 1991 SC 1171 (R.M. RAMAUL v. THE STATE OF HIMACHALPRADESH AND OTHERS). In the said decision, the petitioner before theSupreme Court had filed the complaint of contempt alleging that therespondent despite the specific directions in the order dated 2.12.1988in C.A.No.6144 of 1983 for restoration of complainant’s seniority inservice over and above two other officers, the said Corporation hadresorted to hair-splitting technicalities in order to deny to thecomplainant the benefit of the order of the Court. The Corporation whilegiving promotion to the complainant did not give any monetary benefit forthe period and observed that such promotion was a mere notionalpromotion. The Supreme Court observed :-“2. In our view complainant’s grievance is a legitimateone. Though there was no specific direction in the order ofthis Court to consider complainant’s case for promotion witheffect from 26-5-1982 such a relief was implicit in thereasoning of the order. Indeed, the Corporation in conveningthe D.P.C. and reviewing the promotions and granting thenotional promotion to the complainant for the period between28-5-1982 to 3-9-1986, had virtually conceded this position.The withholding of the monetary benefits in respect of thisperiod is inconsistent with what was decided in the judgmentand what complainant was clearly entitled to. Since there wasno specific direction in this behalf in the order, technically,there may be no case for punishment for contempt; but we makeit clear that the promotion for the period from 28-5-1982 to 3-9-1986 should be accompanied by the monetary benefits. If aspecific direction is necessary we issue it here and now. Theappropriate monetary benefits shall be granted within 2 monthsfrom today.”(Emphasis added)24. We do not think that the observations made in the aforesaidSupreme Court case can be understood to lay down a general principle thatin every case, the Court, while deciding a contempt matter, can travelbeyond the scope of the contempt petition and grant relief, which couldbe decided in any other appropriate proceedings. A mere perusal of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ observations made by the Supreme Court makes it clear that since therewas no specific direction in the order of the Supreme Court, even thoughsuch direction was considered to be implicit, the Supreme Court issuedsuch specific direction. In other words, the direction issued by theSupreme Court in the contempt proceedings was the natural outcome of theearlier order passed by the Supreme Court and no new material or aspectwas required to be considered.25. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decisionreported in A.I.R. 1996 SC 2005 (DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SKIPPERCONSTRUCTION COMPANY (P) LTD. AND ANOTHER). The Supreme Court in thesaid decision purported to exercise jurisdiction under Article 129 and142 of the Constitution of India. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Courthad found that the contemnor was guilty of contempt of the order of theSupreme Court and, while considering the question of punishment, issuedseveral directions. It is obvious that the Supreme Court was passingancillary orders. We do not think the ratio of the aforesaid decisioncan at all be made applicable to the facts of the present case.26. The Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Courtreported in 2001 CRI.L.J. 2253 (SMT.G. KALAVATHI v. C. ANAND RAO ANDOTHERS) is also equally inapplicable to the facts of the present case.In the said case, the Division Bench categorically found that there wasdisobedience of the orders passed by the High Court and as some of therespondents had retired from service or had been transferred, the Courtfound that no purpose would be served by punishing such persons. On theother hand, the Division Bench directed such respondents to paycompensation. It is, therefore, obvious that the Court after having cometo the conclusion that the respondents were guilty of contempt, waspassing incidental or ancillary orders.27. It is true that in some cases the court while dealing witha contempt petition does not come to any categorical conclusionregarding the allegation relating to contempt and yet issues certainincidental directions more or less clarifying the matter, particularly,with a view to avoid any further litigation. In the present case, it isnot necessary to decide finally as to whether any such incidental orclarificatory directions can be issued while disposing of a contemptpetition because, in our opinion, even assuming that this could be doneparticularly with a view to avoid any protracted litigation, in thepresent case, such directions should not have been issued. Thedirections issued do not appear to be any incidental or clarificatorydirections, but independent positive directions, which are not envisagedwithin the limited scope of the controversy which was before the learnedsingle Judge in the contempt petition. In fact the order seems to be thetrapping of the final order in O.A.No.724 of 2003 itself, although onlythe contempt petition was required to be considered. The learned singleJudge while deciding the matter under Section 9 of the Arbitration andConciliation Act has issued the directions without any discussion https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ regarding various aspects involved. In such view of the matter, theorder passed by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and the sameis hereby set aside.28. It is obvious that O.A.No.724 of 2003 is still pending.Since the contempt petition has been closed, the questions raised inO.A.No.724 of 2003 are only required to be considered by the appropriatecourt. Since such matter is to be decided on merits, it would not beproper on our part to consider the second contention raised by theappellant on merits.29. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned orderpassed by the learned single Judge in issuing various directions, ascontained in paragraph 7 of the order, is set aside. Consequently, theconnected miscellaneous petitions are closed. There would be no order asto costs.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrardpkTo1.The Sub Asst. Registrar (OS)Original Side, High Court, Madras.2.The Sub Asst. RegistrarJudicial Dept.,High Court, Madras.+1cc to Mr.S.Vijayakumar, Advocate Sr 35601+1cc to Mr.K.Ethiraj, Advocate Sr 35622PSI (CO)km/30.8. LPA.NO.18/2004