R.Kaaruppan v. 1. R.Dhanapalraj Chairman Bar Council of Tamil Nadu Chennai-1042. The Bar Council

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 08.09.2005CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESANW.P.No.30901 of 2004R.Kaaruppan..Petitioner -Vs-1. R.Dhanapalraj Chairman Bar Council of Tamil Nadu Chennai-1042. The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary Chennai-104..RespondentsPetition filed under Article 226 of The Constitution ofIndia, praying for the issue of a Writ of CertiorarifiedMandamus, calling for the records on the file of the secondrespondent in his proceedings in R.O.C.No.745 of 2004 dated11.10.2004 and quash the same and direct the respondents not totake any further action against the petitioner with regard to thefull bench judgment in C.A.No.1134 of 2003 dated 17.4.2004 anddirect the first respondent in his personal capacity to pay acompensation of Rs.10,00,000/-.For Petitioner::Mr.R.KaaruppanParty-in-PersonFor Respondents:Mr.K.VenkatakrishnanORDERAn important issue as to whether an Advocate, who has beenfound guilty for contempt of Court, could be prevented by theState Bar Council from appearing in Court, till such time hepurges the act of contempt has arisen for consideration. For adecision on the said issue, a glance of the role andresponsibility of an Advocate, the duty of the Bar Council vis-à-vis the majesty of the judiciary as an institution for a free andfair administration of justice must first be discussed. 2. While considering the petition for interim orders, I haddiscussed the issue in my order dated 18.11.2004. I deem itnecessary to reiterate the same in this order. The rule of law https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is theguardian of the rule of law and if the judiciary is to performits duties and functions effectively and remain true to thespirit with which it is sacredly entrusted, the dignity andauthority of the Courts should be respected and protected. It isfor this reason the Courts are entrusted with the extraordinarypower of punishing those for contempt of Court who indulge inacts whether inside or outside Courts which tend to undermine theauthority of the Courts and bring them any disrepute anddisrespect thereby obstructing them from discharging theirjudicial duties without fear or favour. The foundation of thejudiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in itsability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such, noaction can be permitted which may shake the very foundationitself. 3. The role of an Advocate to uphold the majesty, dignityand decorum of the Court is paramount in the free and fairadministration of justice. No one can be allowed to do anything,which embarrass the administration of justice. Even actualinterference with the administration of justice is not arequirement, as it is enough for such interference is likely ortends in any way to interfere in the proper administration oflaw. An intention to interfere with the administration ofjustice is not essential to constitute contempt of Court. AnAdvocate is an officer of the Court. In the justice deliverysystem, members of the Bar are as much a party thereby as thejustice and it is the closest possible harmony between the Barand the Bench that can yield the best results in achieving theobjectives enshrined in our Constitutional Document. It isneedless to mention that the Bar and the Bench are two sides of acoin. In the administration of justice unless harmony prevailsbetween the Bar and the Bench, no desired results to uphold themajesty of the institution could be achieved. 4. The power and the role of the Bar Council vis-à-vis itsmembers can be well explained by the following paragraphs of theSupreme Court judgment in “C.RAVICHANDRAN IYER v. JUSTICEA.M.BHATTACHARJEE AND OTHERS (1995 (5) SCC 457)”. JusticeK.Ramaswamy, speaking for the Bench, had observed as follows:-“The Advocates Act, 1961 gave autonomy to a BarCouncil of a State or Bar Council of India andSection 6(1) empowers them to make such actiondeemed necessary to set their house in order, toprevent fall in professional conduct and to punishthe incorrigible as not befitting the nobleprofession apart from admission of the advocateson its roll. Section 6(1)(c) and rules made inthat behalf, Sections 9, 35, 36, 36-B and 37enjoin it to entertain and determine cases ofmisconduct against advocates on its roll. Themembers of the judiciary are drawn primarily andinvariably from the Bar at different levels. Thehigh moral, ethical and professional standardsamong the members of the Bar are preconditionseven for high ethical standards of the Bench. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Degeneration thereof inevitably has its eruptionand tends to reflect the other side of the coin.The Bar Council, therefore, is enjoined by theAdvocates Act to maintain high moral, ethical andprofessional standards.”5. The expression of painful thought of Justice A.M.Ahmadi,J., speaking for the Bench of the Supreme Court in “M.B.SANGHI,ADVOCATE v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA (1991 (3) SCC 600)”must have a mention and the same reads hereunder:-“It is high time that we realize that the muchcherished judicial independence has to be protectednot only from the executive or the legislature butalso from those who are an integral part of thesystem. An independent judiciary is of vitalimportance to any free society. Judicialindependence was not achieved overnight. Since wehave inherited this concept from the British, itwould not be out of place to mention the strugglestrong-willed judges like Sir Edward Coke, ChiefJustice of the Common Pleas, and many others had toput up with the Crown as well as the Parliament atconsiderable personal risk. And when a member ofthe profession like the appellant who should knowbetter so lightly trifles with the much endearedconcept of judicial independence to secure smallgains it only betrays a lack of respect for themartyrs of judicial independence and for theinstitution itself. Their sacrifice would go wasteif we are not jealous to protect the fair name ofthe judiciary from unwarranted attacks on itsindependence....When a member of the bar is required to bepunished for use of contemptuous language it ishighly painful – it pleases none – but painfulduties have to be performed to uphold the honour anddignity of the individual judge and his office andthe prestige of the institution. Courts aregenerally slow in using their contempt jurisdictionagainst erring members of the profession in the hopethat the concerned Bar Council will chasten itsmember for failure to maintain proper ethical norms.If timely action is taken by Bar Councils, thedecline in the ethical values can be easilyarrested.”6. The Bar Council is competent to chasten its members forfailure to maintain proper ethical norms and the Supreme Courthad approved not only the power of the Bar Council, but also itscorresponding duties and obligations in correcting its members.While dealing with a review petition filed by an Advocate as apetitioner/party-in-person, the Supreme Court in “UNION OF INDIAAND OTHERS v. GULSHAN BAJWA (2003 (7) SCC 545)” after observingthat the conduct of the Advocate in filing a review petitioncontaining baseless allegations and insinuations reflecting onthe conduct of Judges of the Court did no credit to the noble https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ profession to which he belonged, referred the matter to the BarCouncil of India for such action as it may consider appropriate.7. Mr.R.Kaaruppan, a former President of the renowned andhistorical Madras High Court Advocates Association, was foundguilty under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act and wassentenced to pay a fine of Re.1/= to be paid within one month, indefault to undergo one day simple imprisonment, by a DivisionBench of this Court in “R.KARUPPAN v. THE PATRON OF CHENNAI RIFLECLUB, RAJ BHAVAN, CHENNAI AND OTHERS (2004 (1) M.L.J. 153)”. Hepaid the said fine amount. Again on a suo motu contemptproceedings initiated against him, a Full Bench of this Court byan order dated 17.4.2004 in Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.1134 of2003, finding him guilty of contempt for making scurrilous,offensive allegations against the Judges of this Court, sentencedhim to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three monthsand with a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo simpleimprisonment for three months. After observing that thepetitioner had abused his professional privileges whilepracticing as an Advocate and his conduct was highly contumaciousand unpardonable, the Full Bench referred the matter to beconsidered by the State Bar Council to take appropriate action inaccordance with law. The Full Bench also directed the Registryto forward a copy of the order to the State Bar Council fortaking appropriate action by following the required procedure.After the judgment was pronounced and at the request of thepetitioner, the sentence of imprisonment alone was suspended foreight weeks subject to the condition that the petitioner pays thefine amount of Rs.1,000/= by 19.4.2004. The petitioner had paidthe amount. 8. By a notice dated 23.4.2004, the Secretary In-charge ofthe Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, drawing the attention of thepetitioner to the judgment of the Full Bench, directed him toshow cause within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice as towhy disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against himfor professional and other misconduct in accordance with therules framed by the Bar Council of India under the Advocates Act.By responding to the said notice, the petitioner in hisexplanation dated 2.5.2004 requested the Bar Council to dischargethe said notice and await the orders of the Supreme Court. Thesaid letter needs full extraction and reads as under:-R.Kaaruppan59, Law ChambersHigh Court BuildingsChennai-104ToThe SecretaryBar Council of IndiaHigh Court CampusChennai 600 104 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Dear Sirs, I am in receipt of your notice asking me to showcause against the suo motu contempt petition no.1134of 2004 dated 17.4.2004. In the said notice you havereferred to a copy of the letter of Deputy Registrarof the High Court in R.O.C.No.1475 of 2004 (O.S.)The said judgment is under suspension for 8weeks. The said aspect has already been stated in thejudgment copy itself. I guess that the said portionsuspending the sentence is not found in the copy sentto you and only due to the same you have issued thisnotice to me. Kindly confirm the same to me. As wellsend the letter of the Deputy Registrar.Since no action can be taken on the basis of thejudgment when the very sentence is suspended, Irequest you discharge the present notice and await theorders of the Supreme Court.Yours truly,Sd/-R.Kaaruppan5.2.2004As the petitioner requested for discharge of the said notice onthe ground that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court,apparently the Bar Council did not pursue the notice forinitiating disciplinary proceedings. On the other hand, by theimpugned order dated 11.10.2004, the Bar Council, by placingreliance on Rule 14 of the Madras High Court Rules framed by theHigh Court in exercise of its powers under Section 34(1) of theAdvocates Act, prohibited the petitioner from appearing in anyCourt until he purges the act of contempt. He was also directedto surrender the original enrollment certificate and the identitycard issued to him within 3 days from the date of receipt of thesaid order. The petitioner was also informed that the prohibitoryorder was not by way of punishment, as the same should remain inforce only till the guilt of contempt remains and the same shallstand automatically terminated in the event the petitioner isabsolved from the guilt of contempt. 9. Mr.R.Kaaruppan, party-in-person, would challenge theimpugned order on the following grounds. Firstly, when Rule 14of the High Court Rules came into force, the provision of appealunder Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was notavailable to a person aggrieved by the order punishing him forcontempt. By the provision of appeal, Rule 14 standsautomatically abrogated. He would also submit that when the 25point code of conduct was drawn and notified, Rule 24, which wassimilar to Rule 14 of the old Rules, was introduced. The FullCourt had later on withdrawn the 25 point code of conduct andtherefore Rule 14 also should be deemed to have been withdrawn. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Secondly, he would submit that in any case Rule 14 of the Ruleswould apply only in the case of an Advocate who had committedcontempt of Court in the capacity of an Advocate and not whensuch Advocate is found guilty when he appeared as a party-in-person. As the petitioner appeared in his individual capacity asparty-in-person, the said Rule is not applicable to him.Thirdly, he would submit that assuming Rule 14 is still in force,even the High Court, which framed the Rules, did not thought itfit to apply the Rules after the judgment of the Full Bench andtherefore the State Bar Council cannot invoke the said Rule.Fourthly, he would submit that when once the petitioner isreleased on bail, in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 19 ofthe Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 389 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, the sentence is deemed to have been suspendedand therefore the judgment of the Full Bench cannot be a groundfor invoking Rule 14. Lastly, he would submit that in any casethe right of an Advocate to practice cannot be taken away by theBar Council without following any procedure by affordingopportunity to the petitioner, as the right to practice apartfrom appearing before Courts includes right to file Vakalat,draft pleadings, take instruction from clients etc. By theimpugned order, the petitioner has not only been prohibited fromappearing in Courts, but also was directed to surrender hisoriginal enrollment certificate and identity card. He reliedupon the following judgments of the Supreme Court in “BAR COUNCILOF INDIA v. HIGH COURT OF KERALA (2004 AIR SCW 2684)”, “PRAVINC.SHAH v. K.A.MOHD. ALI AND ANOTHER (2001 AIR SCW 4193)” as wellthe judgment of the Mysore High Court in “T.VENKANNA v. THEHON’BLE HIGH COURT OF MYSORE BY ITS REGISTRAR AND ANOTHER (AIR1973 MYSORE 127)”. 10. In response to the above submissions,Mr.K.Venkatakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the BarCouncil of Tamil Nadu as well for Mr.R.Dhanapalraj, Chairman ofthe Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, who has been impleaded in hispersonal capacity, submitted that the High Court rules have beennotified on 21.1.70. The action taken by the Bar Council waspursuant to the directions of the Full Bench. Though initially ashow cause notice for professional misconduct was issued, in viewof the explanation of the petitioner that the order in thecontempt petition was suspended for eight weeks, no furtheraction was taken. As no reply was received from the petitionereven after the expiry of the period of eight weeks, the impugnedorder was passed. So far, the petitioner has not purged thecontempt. After having waited for almost six months, the meetingof the general council was held on 9.10.2004 and by a majority itwas resolved to pass the impugned order. He would submit that itis the duty of the Bar Council to safeguard the rights,privileges and interest of the Advocates on its roll. Theinterest of Advocates includes the Advocates to practice theprofession in a dignified manner and in the event the conduct ofan Advocate was not in any way in advancement of the interest ofthe Advocate, the Bar Council is entitled to take action. Byplacing reliance on Rule 14 of the High Court Rules, the impugnedorder has been passed in order to uphold the rule of law and thedignity of the profession as well in the interest of public. Hewould further submit that so long as Rule 14 is not repealed in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the manner required, the petitioner cannot claim that the saidrule stands automatically abrogated by virtue of the appealprovision under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Hewould also submit that merely because the petitioner is releasedon bail, that would not amount to suspension of the order of theFull Bench punishing the petitioner. Hence, the impugned orderis well within the power of the State Bar Council. 11. I have carefully considered the above submissions. Rule14 of the Rules, which has been relied upon by the State BarCouncil, reads as follows:-“No advocate who has been found guilty of contemptof court shall be permitted to appear, act or pleadin any court unless he has purged himself ofcontempt.”The above rule was notified and came into force on 21.1.70. Therule has not been either amended or modified or repealed so far.In so far as the first submission as to the appellate remedy, itis true that as against the order punishing for contempt, anappeal is provided under Section 19. Sub-section (2) of Section19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is much relied upon by thepetitioner, which reads as follows:-“Pending any appeal, the appellate court mayorder that—(a) the execution of the punishment or orderappealed against be suspended;(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he bereleased on bail; and(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that theappellant has not purged his contempt.”Prior to coming into force of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971,the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 was in force. The said Act didnot provide for any appeal remedy. Considering the fact that anorder passed by a Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction wastreated to be final without there being a remedy of appeal, theprovisions of Section 19 was introduced in the 1971 Act. Merelybecause an appeal provision is made, that will not take away theprovisions of Rule 14 framed by the High Court to prevent anAdvocate who has been found guilty for contempt of Court fromappearing in Courts. Both the Rule and the Section should be readharmoniously and in isolation. The object of Section 19 is onlyto provide an appeal remedy. The Rules are made by the HighCourts in exercise of powers to regulate internal administrationand in order to protect the majesty of Court. At no stretch ofimagination the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971would curtail or take away either such power of the High Court orthe Rules made. 12. The next contention of the petitioner is that when the25 point code of conduct was introduced, a similar rule wasintroduced in Rule 24 of the code of conduct and that when thesaid code of conduct was withdrawn, it must be presumed that Rule14 also was withdrawn. I am unable to accept the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ submission. The withdrawal of the code of conduct was only inrespect of the 25 point code of conduct which was sought to bebrought into force. Though a similar rule was also introducedand the entire code of conduct was withdrawn, so long as the Rule14 of the High Court Rules, which was notified on 21.1.70, wasnot specifically withdrawn in the manner known to law, it cannotbe contended that by withdrawal of code of conduct the above ruleis also deemed to have been withdrawn. For the said reason, I amunable to accept the submission of Mr.R.Kaaruppan.13. Coming to the second and third submissions, no doubtRule 14 refers to only an Advocate. In my opinion, the rulecannot be strictly construed, as any such interpretation woulddefeat the object of the Rule itself. If the rule is construedas contended by Mr.R.Kaaruppan, the Court would be left with nopower to prevent a party-in-person, who appears before the Court,commits an act of contempt. The proper rule of construction wouldbe that in exercise of the power, the High Court would becompetent to prevent an Advocate even when he appears as party-in-person from appearing in Court till he purges the act ofcontempt. The word "Advocate" employed in Rule 14 must beunderstood to mean and include not only an Advocate but also anAdvocate appearing as party-in-person before the Court. The rulemust be read only in that context and with the object for whichit was framed viz., to prevent an Advocate from appearing inCourt when he was found guilty of contempt and till such time hepurges the same. In this case, the party-in-person is an Advocateand in addition, he is the former President of the Madras HighCourt Advocates' Association. In this context, it is relevant tonote that when an Advocate filed a review petition before theSupreme Court containing baseless allegations and insinuationsreflecting on the conduct of Judges, after observing that theconduct did no credit to the noble profession, the Supreme Courtin Gulshan Bajwa’s case (supra) had directed the Bar Council totake appropriate action against the Advocate. The right of theBar Council to take action against an Advocate even when suchAdvocate faced contempt proceedings in personal capacity wasrecognised by the Supreme Court in the said judgment. Asdiscussed earlier, the rule of law is the foundation of ademocratic society and the dignity, decorum and the majesty oflaw cannot be allowed to be undermined whether it is by anAdvocate or a party in person. Merely because an Advocate who isa part of the institution and is expected to uphold the dignity,decorum and the majesty of law while he appears as a party inperson cannot be allowed to undermine the majesty of law in anyform and at any cost. An Advocate who appears as a party-in-person cannot stand on different footing than an Advocate. Theargument of Mr.R.Kaaruppan is that the punishment imposed on himfor contempt of Court was not in the capacity of an Advocate, butwas in his individual capacity while he appeared as a party inperson and therefore the State Bar Council has no power to passthe impugned order. I find no merit in the said submission. Therole of the State Bar Council is discussed in the earlierparagraphs of this order. The impugned order was passed onlyafter the Full Bench directed the communication of the copy ofthe order to the State Bar Council. In that view, it will bewell within the duty coupled with the power of State Bar Council https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to pass the impugned order. For the same reasons, the contentionof Mr.R.Kaaruppan that even the Full Bench, which passed ordershad not invoked the Rule and in that event, the State Bar Councilcannot pass orders is also liable to be rejected. 14. In so far as the fourth contention as to the release onbail would automatically amount to suspension of the punishmentor order, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 19 isexplicitly clear. Pending any appeal, the appellate court mayorder that (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealedagainst be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, hebe released on bail. The power of the appellate Court in thisregard is two fold and is exercisable independently. Merelybecause a person who has been found guilty of contempt and takenin confinement is released on bail, that would not amount to anautomatic order of suspension of the execution of punishment ororder. Unless the specific orders of the appellate Court insuspending the execution of punishment or order appealed against,an order punishing an Advocate or a person for contempt of Courtcannot be considered to have been automatically suspended. Inthe absence of such order, Rule 14 would still be made availableto restrain such an Advocate or a party in person from appearingin the Court. The power of the appellate Court to suspend thesentence or order is independent of its power to order bail. Incase the order or punishment is suspended, the appellant may, asa matter of right, seek an order for bail, as no order punishinghim would be in force after it is suspended. However, theconverse cannot be either presumed or drawn that when anappellant is released on bail, the punishment or order is notautomatically suspended. 15. In regard to the submission on Section 389 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, it must be seen that the said Sectionwould be applicable only in respect of a person convicted of anoffence by a criminal Court. Nevertheless, in exercise of thepowers under sub-section (1) of Section 389, the appellate Court,for the reasons to be recorded in writing, may order that theexecution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspendedand also if he is in confinement that he be released on bail oron his own bond. The discretion to suspend the execution of thesentence or order lies on the trial Court. The power of theappellate Court to release on bail is independent of the power ofthe trial Court to suspend a sentence or order. Sub-section (3)of Section 389 is much relied upon and the said section reads asfollows:-“Where the convicted person satisfies the Court bywhich he is convicted that he intends to present anappeal, the Court shall—(i) where such person, being on bail, is sentencedto imprisonment for a term not exceeding threeyears, or(ii) where the offence of which such person has beenconvicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail,order that the convicted person be released on bailunless there are special reasons for refusing bail, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for such period as will afford sufficient time topresent the appeal and obtain the orders of theAppellate Court under sub-section (1) and thesentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is soreleased on bail, be deemed to be suspended.”That section relates to a case where a person being on bail issentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years orwhere the offence of which such person is convicted is a bailableone, and such person satisfies the Court by which he is convictedthat he intends to present an appeal, the Court which imposes theconviction, in order to give an opportunity to such accused topresent an appeal, suspend the sentence so long as he is soreleased on bail. In my opinion, this power vested in the trialCourt to suspend the sentence is not applicable to the case onhand, more particularly, in case of an order passed by the StateBar Council by invoking Rule 14 of the Rules framed by thisCourt. 16. As regards the last contention that the right of anAdvocate to practice cannot be taken away without affordingopportunity, it would be proper to refer to the followingjudgments of the Supreme Court. Similar Rule 11 of the KeralaHigh Court Rules was framed in exercise of powers under Section34(1) of the Advocates Act. Rule 11 of the Rules reads that “NoAdvocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court shall bepermitted to appear, act or plead in any Court unless he haspurged himself of contempt”. The validity of the said rule cameup for consideration before the Supreme Court in “PRAVIN C.SHAHv. K.A.MOHD. ALI AND ANOTHER (2001 (8) SCC 650)” and was upheld.Again the said rule came up for consideration before the SupremeCourt in “BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. HIGH COURT OF KERALA (2004 (6)SCC 311)”. The judgment in Pravin Shah’s case (supra) inupholding the validity of the said rule was affirmed again by theSupreme Court. In view of the law settled by the Supreme Court,the High Court, in exercise of powers under Section 34 of theAdvocates Act, is entitled to frame rules preventing an Advocatefrom appearing in the Court. 17. The rule was framed concerning the dignity and orderlyfunctioning of the Courts. As observed by Justice K.T.Thomas inPravin Shah’s case (supra), the right to appear and conduct casesin the Court is a matter on which the Court must have the majorsupervisory power and hence the Court cannot be divested of thecontrol or supervision of the Court merely because it may involvethe right of an Advocate. The core question raised by thepetitioner is that whether the general council could invoke Rule14 of the High Court Rules for prohibiting the petitioner frommaking appearance in the Court. Section 6(1)(d) envisages apower on the Bar Council to act in the interest of the Advocate.The general council of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu has resolvedto pass the impugned order. The contention of the petitioner isthat the Rule cannot be invoked by the Bar Council in the mannerin which the impugned order has been passed. As observed byK.T.Thomas, J. while speaking for the Bench in Pravin Shah’scase, the rule is a self-operating provision. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

18. The first limb of the rule is in regard to thepunishment for contempt and the second limb is for restriction toappear, act or plead in any Court unless such Advocate has purgedhimself of the contempt. By virtue of the second limb and byoperation of the same, the petitioner is not entitled to appear,act or plead in any Court so long as he fails to purge thecontempt. The power of the Bar Council to take action on anAdvocate for professional or other misconduct, which could beexercised by disciplinary committee, cannot be mixed up with thepower of the Bar Council to pass orders as an interim measurepreventing an Advocate from practicing in the face of the factthat such Advocate was found guilty by a Court and he has notpurged himself of the contempt. The impugned order has beenpassed pursuant to the directions of the Full Bench of thisCourt. The Full Bench order has to be read as a whole. The FullBench has referred to the punishment imposed on the petitionerfor contempt of Court by a Division Bench and imposed a fine ofRe.1/= to be paid in one month. The Full Bench also referred tothe pendency of suo motu contempt proceedings initiated byJustice S.S.Subramani in Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.33 of 1998now pending before a Full Bench. The Full Bench also referred tothe pendency of another suo motu contempt proceedings in no.301of 2001 initiated by a Division Bench of this Court presided byK.Narayana Kurup, J. Similarly, pendency of another suo motucontempt proceedings in no.310 of 2001 initiated against thepetitioner are pending before a Full Bench. The Bar Council ofTamil Nadu in the impugned order had referred to the order of theFull Bench in Suo Motu Contempt Petition No.1134 of 2003 dated17.4.2004. It must therefore be held that the impugned order hasbeen passed taking into consideration of all the above aspects.In the impugned order, the Bar Council has merely referred toRule 14 of the Rules, which is a self-operating provision and forsuch provision no further opportunity need be given before theorder is passed. As the impugned order prohibiting thepetitioner from appearing in Court would be in operation only forsuch time either the petitioner purges the contempt or isabsolved from the guilt of contempt by the Supreme Court, thesaid order cannot be called in any manner casting any stigma onthe petitioner. 19. The next issue that falls for consideration is as towhether the Bar Council was well within its power in directingthe petitioner to surrender the original enrollment certificateand the identity card issued to him. Though I have found that byvirtue of Rule 14 of the Madras High Court Rules, the Bar Councilis empowered to place reliance on the said Rule in order toprohibit an Advocate from appearing in Court, the said Rulecannot be stretched to confer power on the Bar Council to directan Advocate to surrender his enrollment certificate and identitycard. This conclusion could be arrived as the right of anAdvocate is not only restricted to practice apart from appearingbefore Courts, but also to file Vakalat, draft pleadings, takeinstruction from clients etc. Such a right to file Vakalat,draft pleadings, take instruction from clients cannot be takenaway by placing reliance on Rule 14 of the Rules, which relatesonly to the appearance of an Advocate in Court. The reliance https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ placed by Mr.K.Venkatakrishnan on Section 6(1)(d) for issue ofsuch direction is also unacceptable. I find every merit in thegrievance of Mr.R.Kaaruppan in challenging the said direction.Hence, the impugned order in so far as it directs the petitionerto surrender the enrollment certificate and identity card issuedto him is alone set aside and the other directions are sustained.The writ petition is partly allowed. No costs. ssSd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarTo1. The Secretary Bar Council of Tamil Nadu Chennai 600 1042. Mr.R.Dhanapalraj, Chairman Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, Chennai 104.Order inW.P.No.30901 of 2004GM(CO)SR/8.9.2005