Sun TV Limited367/369 Anna SalaiTeynampetChennai – 600 018 v. Tata Sky Limited264

2Since the facts involved in these two writ petitions are same,they are decided by this common order and the facts which are necessaryfor consideration, are as under:aTATA Sky Limited (“TATA” for short), the first respondentherein had filed a petition under Section 14 of the TelecomRegulatory Authority Act of India, 1997 in Petition 291(c) beforethe Telecom Dispute Appellate Tribunal (in short “the Tribunal),the second respondent herein seeking the relief of declaration thatSun TV Limited (in short “Sun TV”), the petitioner herein, is adefaulter in terms of Government of India order dated 01.06.2005for having refused access of the channels on a non-discriminatorybasis to TATA as laid down in the applicable regulation of TRAI andfor a direction to Sun TV to discharge the statutory obligationsunder the interconnection regulation of TRAI dated 10.12.2004 toprovide signals of its channels to TATA on the reasonable terms andconditions.bIt was stated in the counter-affidavit filed by Sun TVthat it owns about 11 channels and its group companies viz., GeminiTV Pvt. Ltd. and Udaya TV Ltd. own 5 and 4 channels respectivelyand these Companies have authorized “Channel Plus” a unit of KalCom Pvt. Ltd. to licence the said channels for broadcastdistribution on DTH platform; in the absence of fixation of rate bythe TRAI, TATA should pay the rate fixed by Sun TV and there was nocause of action for TATA to approach the Tribunal; as per 3.6 ofthe Telecom Interconnection Regulation Act, 2004, the broadcasterhas to provide TV signals or turn down the request and such denialof request will enable the distributor to agitate the matter in theappropriate forum and there is no denial of request on the part ofSun TV as in fact, TATA had been asked to meet the concerned personin the office of Sun TV and none of TATA’s people has met the SunTV in-charge; the cable TV rate for 14 channels as declared to TRAIis Rs.83.67 per subscriber per month and not Rs.25/- per subscriberper month and that of Sun Network adds up to Rs.119/- persubscriber per month; TATA had created some documents as if aproposal had been sent to Sun TV, a term sheet had been handed overto Sun TV and a draft agreement also had been submitted to Sun TVand at no point of time, there was any discussion between Sun TVand TATA regarding of supply of channels though the former hadaddressed several letters to the latter to negotiate with its oneHansraj Saxena, the person in-charge.cAs per the order dated 21.11.2006 passed by the Tribunalthat a meeting for amicable settlement be held on 24.11.2006, ameeting was held between the parties at Chennai on 24.11.2006during which meeting, Sun TV informed TATA that signals of 20channels of Sun TV group pending fixation of rates would beprovided at the rate of Rs.85/- to the subscriber per month andthis was not acceptable to TATA. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dOn 24.01.2007, for TATA’s request to pass an interimorder in the petition, the Tribunal held that it cannot be accededto due to the diversity of the stand between Sun TV and TATA.Aggrieved by the non-granting of an interim order, TATA filed awrit petition before the Delhi High Court seeking issuance of awrit of mandamus to the Tribunal to grant interim relief. In themeanwhile, since the Tribunal felt it difficult to pass finalorders due to certain reasons, it insisted upon the counsel toplace their arguments for an interim prayer and after hearing thearguments of both sides, it passed the order dated 19.03.2007granting the interim prayer sought by TATA to the following effect:“. . .Therefore, as an interim measure, wedirect the respondent to make available signals ofall its channels to the petitioner on a-la-cartebasis at 50% of its declared rates. It is madeclear that view expressed in this order is onlyfor purposes of passing this interim order and itis not an expression of final opinion on thecontroversy between the parties in this case.”eAs against the above interim prayer granted by theTribunal, a Review Petition had been filed by Sun TV which was nottaken on file by the Tribunal and instead, as per the direction ofthe Tribunal, Sun TV had filed a modification petition. This beingthe position, the Tribunal took up E.P. No.3 of 2007 filed by TATAto execute the interim order and ordered Sun TV to implement theinterim order within a period of three days, defeating the purposefor which the modification petition was filed.3Questioning the legality of the above two orders of theTribunal, one in Petition No.291 (C) of 2006 dated 19.03.2007 grating aninterim order and the other in E.A. No.3 of 2007 dated 03.04.2007directing Sun TV to implement the said interim order within a period ofthree days, the present writ petitions have been filed by Sun TV.4This Court, on 05.04.2007, admitted the writ petitions andpassed an order of interim stay of the impugned order dated 19.03.2007.5Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for thepetitioner has contended that:awhen a writ petition filed by the first respondent beforethe Delhi High Court challenging the order dated 24.01.2007 of theTribunal is pending, the Tribunal ought not to have passed theinterim order in P. No. 291 (C) of 2006, particularly because ofits own rejection of the interim order and the fact that theprinciple of res judicata estops it from passing the same;bby passing the impugned order in Execution Applicationdirecting Sun TV to implement its order within three days, theTribunal had made the modification petition filed by Sun TVinfructuous; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 6With regard to his contention that a part of cause of actionhas arisen in Chennai by virtue of the fact that the first meetingtowards settlement was held in Chennai as per the direction of theTribunal and that is sufficient to maintain this writ petition on theaspect of territorial jurisdiction, the learned Senior Counsel for thepetitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Courtreported in (2006) 6 SCC 207 in the case of Om Prakash Srivastava vs.Union of India and another: (para 8)“Two clauses of Article 226 of theConstitution on plain reading give clearindication that the High Court can exercise powerto issue direction, order or writs for theenforcement of any of the fundamental rightsconferred by Part III of the Constitution or forany other purpose if the cause of action wholly orin part had arisen within the territories inrelation to which it exercises jurisdictionnotwithstanding that the seat of the Government orauthority or the residence of the person againstwhom the direction, order or writ is issued is notwithin the said territories.”7On the above aspect, further reliance has been placed by thelearned counsel for the petitioner on a decision of the Supreme Courtreported in AIR 2000 SC 2966 in the matter of Navinchandra N. Majithiavs. State of Maharashtra (para 7)“Thus, the power conferred on High Courtsunder Article 226 could as well be exercised byany High Court exercising jurisdiction in relationto the territories within which “the cause ofaction, wholly or in part, arises” and it is nomatter that the seat of the authority concerned isoutside the territorial limits of the jurisdictionof that High Court. The amendment is thus aimedat widening the width of the area for reaching thewrits issued by different High Courts.”8Mr. P.S. Raman, learned Senior Counsel has placed furtherreliance on the above aspect on a decision of the Supreme Court reportedin (2004) 6 SCC 254 in the matter of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited vs.Union of India and another: (para 10)"Keeping in view the expressions used inclause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia , indisputably even if a small fraction ofcause of action accrues within the jurisdiction ofthe Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in thematter." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 9The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner hasfinally contended that the Tribunal has erred in granting an order atthe interim stage which tantamounts to granting of a final order and onthis ground, the impugned order dated 19.03.2007 has to be quashed. Inthis regard, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of thisCourt reported in 2007 (3) CTC 11 in the matter of the Bank of TokyoMitsubishi Limited, Mumbai vs. Spartex Ceramics India Limited and others(para 16)"14.From a reading of the above-referredcatena of judgments and taking an overall view ofthe matter, we find that there is no suchcircumstances warranting the learned Single Judgeto give a finding to the effect that the sharesare standing in the name of the second plaintiffand were not transferred and therefore, primafacie they belong to the second plaintiff andthus, the plaintiffs have right for an interiminjunction against the second defendant also notto deal with the shares, pending disposal of thesuit. Similarly, there is no warrantingcircumstance for the learned Single Judge todirect the appellant herein to deposit theoriginal share certificate in this Court. Thesereliefs granted by the learned Single Judge at theinterim stage is nothing but the prayer in theSuit itself which has to be considered only at theultimate stage of final decree. We are,therefore, of the considered opinion that thelearned Single Judge, without going into the legalproposition involved in this regard, has grantedthe main relief itself which is sought in the suitat the interim stage, which in other words,tantamounts to a pre-trial decree.15.As for the reliance placed by thecounsel for the appellant on the decision of theSupreme Court reported in Allahabad Bank vs.Canara Bank and another, 2000 (2) CTC 723:2000 (4)SCC 406, we do not deem it necessary to go intothe same at this stage as the challenge is onlywith regard to the validity of the orders of thelearned Single Judge passed in the InterimApplications.16.Having regard to the facts andcircumstances of the case, the discussion madeabove and also the various rulings cited, we areof the considered opinion that the interim orderspassed by the learned Single Judge in ApplicationNos.42 and 280 of 2000 suffer from legal infirmity https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as stated above and as such, do not have legs tostand. In that view of the matter the interimorders which are impugned in these Appeals arequashed and the Appeals are accordingly allowedwithout any order as to costs."10Mr. Habibullah Badsha, learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe first respondent, at the outset, has vehemently argued that thisCourt does not have any territorial jurisdiction over the Tribunal sincethe latter is in New Delhi. In support of this contention of his, hehas relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1997 SC1125 in the matter of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and others:(para 91)“Having regard to both the afore-saidcontentions, we hold that all decisions ofTribunals whether created pursuant to Article 323Aor Article 323B of the Constitution, will besubject to the High Court’s writ jurisdictionunder Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, beforea Division Bench of the High Court within whoseterritorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunalfalls.”11Further reliance has been placed by Mr. Habibullah Badsha,learned Senior Counsel, on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in(2004) 9 SCC 786 in the matter of National Textile Corporation Ltd. andothers vs. Haribox Swalram and others (para 12)“. . .As discussed earlier, the mere factthat the writ petitioner carries on business atCalcutta or that the reply to the correspondencemade by it was received at Calcutta is not anintegral part of the cause of action and,therefore, the Calcutta High Court had nojurisdiction to entertain the writ petition andthe view to the contrary taken by the DivisionBench cannot be sustained. In view of the abovefinding, the writ petition is liable to bedismissed. . .”12Secondly, Mr. Habibullah Badsha, learned Senior Counsel hascontended that the petitioner has accepted and agreed to act upon theorder dated 19.03.2007 in its various applications filed after thepassing of the said order and furthermore, by filing ModificationApplication, only a small portion of the interim order passed by theTribunal was sought to be modified and as such, the petitioner isestopped from challenging the interim order passed by the Tribunal.13Thirdly, the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondenthas contended that the writ petition filed by the first respondent hasbeen withdrawn on 13.03.2007 which is much prior to the passing of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ impugned interim order and hence, the allegation of the petitioner thatthe first respondent has instituted parallel proceedings cannot stand.14Mr. Habibullah Badsha, learned Senior Counsel, in support ofhis contention that the principle of res judicata does not play any rolein this case since the order of the Tribunal is only interim in natureand the said principle is applicable only in respect of final orders,has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1960 SC941 in the matter of Satyadhyan Ghosal and others vs. Smt. Deorajin Debiand another (paras 8 & 16)“The principle of res judicata applies alsoas between two stages in the same litigation tothis extent that a court , whether the trial courtor a higher court having at an earlier stagedecided a matter in one way will not allow theparties to re-agitate the matter again at asubsequent stage of the same proceedings. Doesthis however mean that because at an earlier stageof the litigation a court has decided aninterlocutory matter in one way and no appeal hasbeen taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, ahigher court cannot at a later stage of the samelitigation consider the mater again?It is clear therefore that an interlocutoryorder which had not been appealed from eitherbecause no appeal lay or even though an appeal layan appeal was not taken could be challenged in anappeal from the final decree or order. A specialprovision was made as regards orders of remand andthat was to the effect that if an appeal lay andstill the appeal was not taken the correctness ofthe order of remand could not later be challengedin an appeal from the final decision. If howeveran appeal did not lie from the order of remand thecorrectness thereof could be challenged by anappeal from the final decision as in the cases ofother interlocutory orders. The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and canhave no application to appeals to the SupremeCourt, one reason being that no appeal lay to thePrivy Council or lies to the Supreme Court againstan order of remand.”15On the above aspect, the learned Senior Counsel has furtherrelied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2002) 7 SCC 447in the matter of C.V. Rajendran and another vs. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi(paras 4 & 5) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Senior Counsel,appearing for the appellants contends that theorder passed by the Appellate Authority holdingthat the eviction petition was maintainable andthat Section 15 of the Act was not a bar, does notoperate as res judicata. In support of hiscontention, the learned Senior Counsel relies upona judgment of this Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal v.Deorajin Debi.We have perused that judgment. It is laiddown therein that an interlocutory order which didnot terminate the proceedings and which had notbeen appealed against either because no appeal layor even though an appeal lay, an appeal was nottaken, could be challenged in an appeal from thefinal decree or order. It was observed thatinterlocutory judgments which have the force of adecree must be distinguished from otherinterlocutory judgments which are a step towardsthe decision of the dispute between the parties byway of a decree or a final order. In that case,the question of applicability of Section 28 of theoriginal Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 was held to beinterlocutory in nature, falling in the lattercategory.” 16As contended by Mr. Habibullah Badsha, learned Senior Counsel,Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the firstrespondent in W.P. No.12826 of 2007 also has contended that res judicatawould come into force only in respect of final orders as per Section 11of the Civil Procedure Code and since the order passed by the Tribunalis only an interim one, the impugned order is not hit by res judicata.In this regard, reliance has been placed by him on a decision of theSupreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 993 in the matter of Arjun Singhvs. Mohindra Kumar and others (para 13)“It is needless to point out thatinterlocutory orders are of various kinds; somelike orders of stay, injunction or receiver aredesigned to preserve the status quo pending thelitigation and to ensure that the parties mightnot be prejudiced by the normal delay which theproceedings before the court usually take. Theydo not, in that sense, decide in any manner themerits of the controversy in issue in the suit anddo not, of course, put an end to it even in part.Such orders are certainly capable of being alteredor varied by subsequent applications for the samerelief, though normally only on proof of new facts https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ or new situations which subsequently emerge. Asthey do not impinge upon the legal rights ofparties to the litigation the principle of resjudicata does not apply to the findings on whichthese orders are based, though if applicationswere made for relief on the same basis after thesame has once been disposed of the court would bejustified in rejecting the same as an abuse of theprocess of Court.”17Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for the firstrespondent, to substantiate his argument that no cause of action hasarisen in Chennai and that a Court would have territorial jurisdictiononly if there is at least a part of cause of action, has relied on ajudgment of the Supreme Court reported in [2007] 136 Comp Cas 665 (SC)in the matter of Alchemist Ltd. and another vs. State Bank of Sikkim andothers (para 44):“From the aforesaid discussion and keeping inview the ratio laid down in catena of decisions bythis court, it is clear that for the purpose ofdeciding whether facts averred by the petitioner-appellant, would or would not constitute a part ofcause of action, one has to consider whether suchfact constitutes a material, essential, orintegral part of the cause of action. It is nodoubt true that even if a small fraction of thecause of action arises within the jurisdiction ofthe court, the could would have territorialjurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition.Nevertheless it must be a “part of cause ofaction”, nothing less than that.”18While contending that the entire facts pleaded in support ofthe cause of action should constitute a cause so as to empower the courtto decide a dispute, Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel hasrelied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2002) 1 SCC 567in the case of Union of India and others vs. Adani Exports Limited andanother (para 17)“It is seen from the above that in order toconfer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain awrit petition or a special civil application as inthis case, the High Court must be satisfied fromthe entire facts pleaded in support of the causeof action that those facts do constitute a causeso as to empower the court to decide a disputewhich has, at least in part, arisen within itsjurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgmentthat each and every fact pleaded by therespondents in their application does not ipsofacto within the court’s territorial jurisdiction https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ unless those facts pleaded are such which have anexus or relevance with the lis that is involvedin the case. Facts which have no bearing with thelist or the dispute involved in the case, do notgive rise to a cause of action so as to conferterritorial jurisdiction on the court concerned.If we apply this principle then we see that noneof the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition,in our opinion, falls into the category of bundleof facts which would constitute a cause of actiongiving rise to a dispute which could conferterritorial jurisdiction on the courts atAhmedabad.” 19Countering the arguments made by Mr. Habibullah Badsha, Mr.P.S. Raman appearing for the petitioner has contended that the secondrespondent Tribunal is only a statutory body and not created pursuant toArticle 323-B of the Constitution of India and as such, the contentionmade by the former that the writ petition can lie only before a DivisionBench cannot be sustained. 20I have given due consideration to the rival contentions of thelearned Senior Counsel for the parties and the judgments relied on bythem in support of their arguments.21The points which emerge for consideration in these writpetitions are as follows:a.Whether this Court has got territorialjurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions?b.Whether the interim order granted by theTribunal on 19.03.2007 in P. No.291(c) of 2006tantamouts to granting of a final order?c.Whether the impugned order dated19.03.2007 in P. No.291(c)of 2006 passed by theTribunal is hit by the principle of res judicatain view of its order dated 24.01.2007d.Whether the Tribunal is correct in itsapproach in ordering the execution petition?22As far as the first point for consideration is concerned, itis no doubt trite, as has been held by the Supreme Court in its catenaof judgments, that even if a fraction of a cause of action has arisenwithin the territorial jurisdiction of a court, that is sufficient forthe court concerned to entertain a petition which cannot be dismissed onthe ground that the court does not have territorial jurisdiction to dealwith the said petition. In the instant case, admittedly, while thepetitioner is having its registered office in Chennai and carrying onits business in Chennai, the first respondent is having its office inNew Delhi and also the Tribunal which has passed the impugned orders ishoused in New Delhi. Mr. Habibulla Badsha, learned Senior Counsel forthe first respondent, by placing reliance on the judgment reported in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ AIR 1997 SC 1125 (supra) has vehemently contended that since theTribunal is located in Delhi, the present petitions which have beenfiled before this Court and that too before a Single Judge, cannot bemaintained on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction by this Court.While attacking this contention of Mr. Habibullah Badsha, Mr. P.S. Ramanhas contended that the judgment relied on by the former cannot be madeapplicable to the facts of this case since the Tribunal is not a bodyinstituted under Article 323A or 323B of the Constitution but under astatute and this reply given by Mr. Raman sounds to be convincing.Further, it is to be seen that the reach of the package offered by thepetitioner is not restricted to one particular area only. Rather, it isgoing to have a nation-wide coverage. That apart, as per the directionof the Tribunal, the petitioner and the first respondent have also helda meeting in Chennai to come to an amicable settlement, but in vain andthis is not disputed by the first respondent. In this case, thepetitioner has pleaded every aspect of cause of action and the factspleaded do have some nexus and relevance with the issue involved in thiscase. Moreover, the ultimate relief if it is granted, it will have aneffect of giving signals from the channels owned by Sun TV. Therefore,there is at least a part of cause of action which does offerjurisdiction to this Court as per clause 2 of the Article 226 of theConstitution of India.23From the above series of events, it has to be held that a partof cause of action has certainly arisen for the petitioner to move thisCourt by way of the present writ petitions questioning the interim orderdated 19.03.2007 passed by the Tribunal. In that view of the matter,the first question for consideration is answered in affirmative; assuch, let me proceed to answer the other two questions.24While coming to the second point for consideration as towhether the order passed by the Tribunal on 19.03.2007 tantamounts togranting of final order at the interim stage, it would be useful to havea look at the main reliefs sought in Petition No.291(c) before theTribunal which are necessary for answering the above question and thesame read as under:a.to declare the respondent herein asdefaulter in terms of Government of India Orderdated 01.06.2005 having refused access of theirchannels on a non-discriminatory basis to thepetitioner as laid down in the applicableregulations of TRAI; and b.direct the respondent to discharge theirstatutory obligations under the InterconnectionRegulation of TRAI dated 10.12.2004 to providesignals of its channels to the petitioner onreasonable terms and conditions which are found tobe fair, non-discriminatory and reasonable by thisHon'ble Court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 25Further, it would also be necessary to refer to the findingportion of the order dated 19.03.2007 passed by the Tribunal which readsthus:"At this stage it is difficult to say whetherthe alleged agreement of the respondent with DishTV is real or sham. However, we cannot lose sightof the fact that the arguments that Dish TV isstill not showing any of the channels ofrespondent in spite of alleged agreement ofNovember 2006, has not been controverted by thecounsel appearing for the respondent. Therefore,for present purposes we can take it as correctthat Dish TV is not showing any of therespondent's channels on its DTH platform. Thiscasts a doubt about the argument that another DTHoperator, i.e. Dish TV has taken the entirebouquet of respondent.The learned counsel for the respondent alsoargued that the petitioner is carrying bouquets ofchannels of other broadcasters and therefore,petitioner should have channels of respondent alsoin bouquet only. In our view, this argument istotally misconceived. The arrangement of thepetitioner with each distributor is a matter ofnegotiation between the parties and whatever maybe the arrangement with a particular party itcannot be said that same arrangement has to bewith another party. Moreover, the respondent hasnot given any concrete instance in this behalfexcept making a bald statement. The respondent isoffering its channels on a-la-carte basis as peraffidavit quoted above, which leaves no scope forsuch an argument. This argument is therefore,rejected.Next, it was argued on behalf of therespondent that allowing petitioner to takechannels of respondent on a-la-carte basis willcreate a discriminatory regime because therespondent is not offering its channels on thatbasis to any other party. This argument isfactually contrary to the stand of the respondentin its own affidavit which has been quotedhereinbefore. Moreover, the respondent has notplaced any material before us nor anything wasreferred to in support of the stand that it wasoffering its channels only as a bouquet/package toits customers. Such argument being advancedwithout laying any factual foundation for it, isneither here nor there. So far as the question https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of rates of the channels of the respondent isconcerned, the respondent has admittedly giventhese rates to the TRAI also and the rates givenon page 154 of the Paper Book were not evendisputed by the counsel appearing for respondent.Therefore, as an interim measure, we direct therespondent to make available signals of all itschannels to the petitioner on a-la-carte basis at50% of its declared rates. It is made clear thatview expressed in this order is only for purposesof passing this interim order and it is not anexpression of final opinion on the controversybetween the parties in this case."26From a reading of the above, it is clear that the main reliefsought by TATA which is numbered as "b" has been granted as an interimmeasure. In other words, one of the main reliefs sought by TATA hasbeen granted by the Tribunal by going into the merits of the case afterexhaustively discussing various matters such as supply of signals asmentioned in page 154 of paper book as a bouquet, fixation of price forthe supply of those channels, etc. which have to be discussed only atthe stage of final hearing for grant of final order. I am therefore ofthe considered opinion that the Tribunal, without going into the settledlegal proposition that the main relief cannot be granted at the interimstage, has granted the main relief in the guise of granting an interimorder and this certainly tantamounts to the effect of granting a pre-trial decree. This opinion of mine is supported by a Division Benchjudgment of this Court reported in 2007 (3) CTC 11 which is relied on bythe learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner (supra) in which I was amember. Therefore, I am constrained to hold that the order passed by theTribunal on 19.03.2007 directing Sun TV to make available signals of allits channels to TATA on a la-carte basis at 50% of its declared ratescannot be sustained and in that view of the matter, the order dated19.03.2007 passed by the Tribunal is quashed. Accordingly, thisquestion is answered in favour of the petitioner.27To decide the third point for consideration as to whether theorder dated 19.03.2007 passed by the Tribunal is hit by the principle ofres judicata in view of the Tribunal's order dated 24.01.2007, it wouldbe useful to refer to the order mentioned latter which reads thus:"We have tried to explore the possibilitythat an interim order could be passed at thisstage pending final hearing of the petition. Itappears that the diversity of the stand of thepetitioner and the respondent is so much thatinterim order is not possible. Dr. Singhvi,learned Senior Counsel appearing for therespondent has offered that the respondent cansupply all the 20 channels listed at page 154 ofthe paper book to the petitioner @ Rs.85/- persubscriber per month. He submits that it is atthis rate that the respondent is supplying signals https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of all the 20 channels to the other DTH operatorknown as Dish TV/ASC. However, this offer is notacceptable to the petitioner. According to thelearned counsel for the petitioner, the factsabout the above offer are not correct.The respondent has filed an additionalaffidavit with our permission in the Court today.List the matter for hearing on 14th February 2007."28A reading of the above order would make it amply clear thatthe Tribunal has worked out the possibility of granting an interim orderand since that was not possible due to the diverse stand of the parties,the matter had been adjourned to 14.02.2007. To put it in the otherway, what the Tribunal has done is, it has tried its level best to bringthe parties to an amicable settlement. But, due to the diversifiedstand of the parties, there was no other option except to adjourn thematter. Thus, it is clear that no order, either interim or final, waspassed and at the same time, the request for an interim prayer was notrejected and instead, the matter simply stood adjourned. In that viewof the matter, it cannot be held that the impugned order dated19.03.2007 passed by the Tribunal is in contravention to Section 11 ofthe CPC which deals with the principle of res judicata. Thus, the thirdpoint for consideration is answered in favour of the first respondent.29With regard to the fourth point for consideration as towhether the Tribunal is correct in ordering the execution petition, thisCourt holds that since the impugned order dated 19.03.2007 is quashed,the Execution Application which is a consequence of the order dated19.03.2007 cannot be sustained and so also the order of the Tribunaltherein. 30Though it is made clear by this Court that the impugned orderdated 19.03.2007 is not hit by res judicata, considering the fact thatfinal hearing of the matter is to be taken by the Tribunal in a fewdays' time, i.e. on 12.07.2007 as per the direction of the Supreme Courtin S.L.P.(Civil) No.6993 of 2007 dated 27.04.2007, the petitioner andthe first respondent are directed to maintain status quo as on date tillthe matter is taken up by the Tribunal for final hearing on 12.07.2007.In fine, both the writ petitions are allowed. No costs.Consequently, connected M.Ps are closed.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cadToThe RegistrarThe Telecom Disputes Appellate TribunalNew Delhi.2 cc To M/s.S.Ramasubramanian & Associates, Advocate, SR.40862.2 cc To Mr.P.Wilson, Assistant Solicitor General, SR.40419, 40420.W.P. Nos.12826 and 12827 of 2007 JRG(CO)RVL 10.07.2007