High Court · 2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 14.06.2007CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.KULASEKARANWrit Petition No. 5674 of 20041.Vijaya2. Meenakumari... Petitioners.VsThe Inspector General of Registration,Santhome High Road,Santhome, Chennai-600 004.... Respondent.Prayer:- Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia, praying for the issuance of the writ of Certiorarified Mandamuscalling for the records relating to the order passed by the respondent inhis office reference No.61444/N5/2003 dated .12.2003 and signed on7.1.2004, quash the same and direct the respondent to take the appealfiled by the petitioners on 12.12.2003 on file and dispose of the same onmerits within the time that may be fixed by this Court.For Petitioners: Mr.P.ManiFor Respondent: Mr.C.Ramesh, AGPO R D E RThe petitioners suffered an order passed by the Special DeputyCollector (Stamps) dated 11.8.2003 which was received by them on14.10.2003 which is not in dispute. Appeal was filed before the respondentherein on 12.12.2003. The respondent rejected the appeal on the groundthat (i) the same was presented after the expiry of 60 days from the dateof passing of the order which is in violation of Rule 9(1) of the TamilNadu Stamps (Prevention of Under Valuation of Instruments) Rules; (ii)Rule 9(2) has not been complied with; (iii)Necessary proofs and noticeshave not been enclosed under Rule 9(3); and (iv) the relevant Court feestamps have not been affixed.2. In the present writ petition, the petitioner has challengedthe condition No.1 of the impugned order. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted thatthe order was passed by the Special Collector(Stamps) on 11.8.2003, whichwas served on the petitioner only on 14.10.2003; that the said date iscrucial; from that date onwards, the period of limitation started runningand the appeal was filed on 12.12.2003, as such, taking into account thedate of receipt, the appeal is in time, but the first respondent hasrejected the appeal taking into account the date of passing of the order,without considering the fact when it was served on the petitioner, whichis untenable in law.4. In support of his contention, learned counsel for thepetitioners has relied on the Division Bench Judgment in P.Ramadoss andanother Vs. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Sivakasi (2004-2 L.W. 720)wherein it is stated as follows:"6.We find from the xerox copy of the order of theRevenue Divisional Officer, Sivakasi, though the ordersare dated 18.11.2003, the Personal Assistant has signedthe same on10.12.2003 and there is an endorsement madeby the appellants for the receipt of the order on23.12.2003. It is clear that if the date of signatureof the Personal Assistant, namely, 10.12.2003 is takeninto account, the appeals which were filed on 30.1.2004are within time. As per Section 47A of the IndianStamps Act, 1899 read with Rule 9 of the Tamil NaduStamps (Prevention of Under Valuation of Instruments)Rules, it is open to the appellants to file an appealwithin two months from the date of the order. The 3rdrespondent has proceeded on the basis of the date ofthe order is the date which the order bears. But, it iswell settled that for the purpose of computing thelimitation in preferring the appeals the date ofservice of the order is relevant and not the date whichthe order bears.In Harish Chandra v. Dy.L.A. Officer (AIR1961 S.C. 1500) the Supreme Court construed theexpression, 'the date of the award' found in Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to mean the datewhen the award is either communicated to the party orknown to him either actually or constructively. TheSupreme Court after considering earlier decisions heldas under:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "A similar question arose before the MadrasHigh Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Col.J.G.Cloete, ILR 6Mad 189. Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act XXVIIIof 1860 limited the time within which a suit may bebrought to set aside the decision of the settlementofficer to two months from the date of the award, andso the question arose as to when the time would beginto run. The High Court held that the time can begin torun only from the date on which the decision iscommunicated to the parties. 'If there was anydecision at all in the sense of the Act,' says thejudgment, 'it could not date earlier than the date ofthe communication of it to the parties; otherwise theymight be barred of their right of appeal without anyknowledge of the decision having been passed'.Adopting the same principle a similar construction hasbeen placed by the Madras High Court in Swaminathan v.Lakshmanan Chettiar, ILR 53 Mad 401: (AIR 1930 Mad 490)on the limitation provisions contained in Ss.73(1) and77(1) of the Indian Registration Act XVI of 1908. Itwas held that in a case where an order was not passedin the presence of the parties or after notice to themof the date when the order would be passed theexpression 'within thirty days after the making of theorder' used in the said sections means within thirtydays after the date on which the communication of theorder reached the parties affected by it. Thesedecisions show that where the rights of a person areaffected by any order and limitation is prescribed forthe enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrievedagainst the said order by reference to the making ofthe said order, the making of the order must meaneither actual or constructive communication of the saidorder to the party concerned."We, therefore, hold that the date of the orderunder Section 47-A for the purpose of deciding thelimitation for filing appeals should be construed tomean the date of the service of the order. Hence, thedate of order under Rule 9 of the said Rules shall beconstrued to mean the date of service of the order forthe purpose of determining the time limit to prefer theappeals.7. Moreover, in the instant case, the PersonalAssistant has signed the order on 10.12.2003 fordespatch to the appellants and the orders could nothave been despatched prior to 10.12.2003. It isapparent that if 10.12.2003 is taken into account, theappeals preferred would be within time. The orderssuffer from other infirmities, as the third respondentwithout giving an opportunity to explain as to how the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appeals preferred were within time, rejected theappeals. In our view, it is not necessary to quash theorders on the ground that they were passed in violationof the principles of natural justice as we hold thatthe view entertained by the third respondent that thedate of order means the date which the order bears andnot the date of service of the order to determine thetime limit for preferring the appeals is not legallysustainable. Hence, the orders of the 3rd respondentholding that the appeals preferred were beyond theperiod prescribed under Section 47-A of the Stamps Actare not sustainable. Consequently, the orderschallenged in both the appeals are set aside and thematters are remitted back to the 3rd respondent toconsider the same on merits.5. Relying upon the said judgment, learned counsel for thepetitioner submitted that two months time contemplated is reckoned fromthe date of service of the order not from the date of passing of the orderand prayed for quashing of the same. 6. Heard Mr.Ramesh, learned Additional Government Pleader on theabove contentions.7. Rule 9(5) (a) of the Tamil Nadu Stamps (Prevention of UnderValuation of Instruments) Rules is as follows:"An appeal under sub-section(10) of Section 47-Ashall be preferred within two months from the date offinal order passed under sub-section)5) or sub-section(6) of section 47-A: Provided that in so far as an order passed undersub-section(6) of section 47-A between the commencementof the Indian Stamp (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1998(Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 2000) and ending with 9th March2001 is concerned, the said period of two months shallbe reckoned from the 9th March 2001."8. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel on bothsides, the relevant provisions of Rule 9(5)(a) and following the decisionof the Division Bench, this Court is of the view that the order passed bythe Special Tahsildar Stamps was received by the petitioner on 14.10.2003,which fact is not in dispute, the appeal was filed on 12.12.2003, hence,the appeal is in time. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. In the result, condition No.1 of the impugned order passed bythe respondent is quashed. Insofar as condition Nos.2,3 and 4 areconcerned, learned counsel submitted that he is ready to comply with thesame. Hence, the petitioners are permitted to re-present the papers aftercomplying with condition Nos.2,3 and 4 within a period of two weeks fromthe date of receipt of a copy of this order to the respondent and onreceipt of the same, the respondent is directed to consider the case onmerits and pass orders in accordance with law as expeditiously aspossible. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. vjy/Sd/-Asst.Registrar/true copy/ Sub Asst.RegistrarToThe Inspector General of Registration,Santhome High Road,Santhome, Chennai-600 004.+1 cc to Mr.P.Mani, Advocate Sr.No.35023.+1 cc to the Government Pleader Sr.No.34990.MRD(CO)dcp/29.06.07Writ Petition No. 5674 of 2004