2004 CRL. A. NO.576 OF 20041. Mr.Sanjay Dalmia2. Mr.Vijayakumar Dalmia3. Mrs.Suman Dalmia v. Stare rep. byDeputy Superintendent of PoliceCrime Branch, CID Metro WingChennai – 2

He collected the expressrecords, Exs.P-26 and P-27 registered under Section 174 Cr.P.C.from P.W.20. Since it has come to light that Archana died withintwo years after marriage, he forwarded the express records to the Personal Assistant (General) to the Madras District Collectorthrough the Sub-Inspector of Police. Then he reached the sceneof occurrence, where in the presence of P.W.25 and anotherprepared the observation mahazar, Ex.P-46 and the rough sketch, Ex.P-52. P.W.25 witnessed the above proceedings. Then P.W.27sent for the photographer to take photographs of the scene ofoccurrence as well as the dead body. P.W.18 is the photographer, who accordingly photographed the crime scene as well as the deadbody. M.O.23 and M.O.24 series are the photographs and negatives.P.W.27 sent the dead body to the hospital for post-mortem. Fromthe crime scene he recovered M.Os. 1 to 9 under Ex.P-47. Then hesent those properties through the Tahsildar for chemicalexamination.

He examined P.W.24 and others by recording theirstatements. P.W.20 had already sent the express records to the Personal Assistant (General) to the Madras District Collector.P.W.27 also sent a report to the Personal Assistant (General) tothe Madras District Collector about the crime. The Tahsildar, Mambalam-Guindy was directed to conduct inquest.6. P.W.23, during the relevant time, was Tahsildar, Egmore-Nungambakkam circle. He was directed to conduct inquest regardingthe death of Archana. Ex.P-34 is the requisition given by P.W.27to the Collector to conduct inquest. P.W.23, accordingly, went tothe Royapettah Government Hospital where the dead body kept in themortuary was identified to him, which he observed. Then in thepresence of panchayatadars, he conducted inquest over the deadbody and prepared Ex.P-25, inquest report. He noticed traces ofblood on the left hand elbow of the dead body. He sent arequisition for conducting post-mortem by atleast two doctors.P.W.23 examined Rakesh Kumar (brother of the deceased and notexamined in this case), A-1 and the panchayatadars by recordingtheir statements.

A-1 brought the panchayatadars. Ex.P-36 is thestatement of A-1; Ex.P-37 is the statement of Rakesh Kumar(brother of the deceased and not examined in this case) and Ex.P-38 is the statement of A-5. In the crime scene, which is an openterrace in the second floor of the house, he found dots of bloodand blood spread in the open terrace floor; parapet wall; the doorleading to the open terrace and on the side wall of the stairsleading to the open terrace. Post-mortem was conducted by a teamconsisting of P.W.22 and others. Rakesh Kumar, the brother of thedeceased, asked permission from P.W.23 to videograph the post- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mortem and he accordingly permitted it. However, the team ofdoctors, who conducted post-mortem, refused permission tovideograph the post-mortem stating that it is not possible andonly when the dead body is in police custody it could bevideographed.

Accordingly, P.W.23 permitted videographing of thedead body before commencement of post-mortem. P.W.26 is thevideographer, who on the request of the President of Lions Club, Royapuram, went to his office and with him he went to the crimescene. He photographed the bloodstains found in the staircase ofthe first floor; the wall on either side of the staircase and thescreen just at the beginning of the staircase. He was asked tophotograph those persons present there and the police personnel. He also noticed broken bangles on the sides of the stair case andplastic pipes. Then he was taken to the open terrace where he wasshown the smoked area and he was asked to photograph it. With thepermission of the police he photographed it. By 6.30 p.m. on theday, he completed the work and took sixteen photographs. Ex.P-48series are the videoed photographs (16 Nos.) and the negatives areEx.P-49 series. The Lions Club President asked him to go to Royapettah Government Hospital to photograph the dead body.

Accordingly, he reached the mortuary in the Royapettah GovernmentHospital on 1.2.01 and he videographed as directed by the doctor. Ex.P-50 is the video cassette. The police personnel there askedhim to take photographs also as his video camera had a provisionto take photographs. Accordingly, he took photographs also andEx.P-51 series are the photographs. P.W.23 continued his actionfurther. He examined A-5, who is shown to have suffered burninjuries in the crime scene in SRM Hospital (A-5 was alreadyadmitted there on 1.2.01) and examined her by recording herstatement. As there were bloodstains in the crime scene, he senta requisition to the forensic laboratory to depute a scientificexpert to examine the scene and, accordingly, the crime scene wasexamined by scientific experts. Ex.P-39 is the report of suchexamination. On 7.2.01 P.W.1 gave a complaint and on the same dayRakesh Kumar, brother of the deceased (not examined) sent to himsixteen photographs taken from the scene of occurrence along witha letter.

P.W.23 sent those photographs to the Assistant Directorof Forensic Laboratory. Ex.P-40 is the letter given to him by Rakesh Kumar. Ex.P-6 was given to him personally by P.W.1. TheAsst. Commissioner of Police, Saidapet, sent twenty-one objectsrecovered by him in connection with this case to him on 7.2.01 andthose properties were also sent by this witness to the forensiclaboratory as an enclosure to his letter, Ex.P-41. Ex.P-39(already marked) is the report of the Assistant Director of theforensic laboratory, which he received on 12.2.01. On 19.2.01P.W.1 sent another letter (Ex.P-42). The inquest conducted bythis witness revealed that it may be a case of dowry death and, therefore, he sent his report to the District Collector forinvestigation by the police. Ex.P-43 is his report. Ex.P-44 isthe requisition given by him to the hospital authorities toconduct post-mortem. He received a report only in respect ofthree objects out of twenty-one from the scientific laboratory, which report he sent to the Asst. Commissioner of Police as anenclosure to his letter, Ex.P-45. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

Then by using cotton swab procedure, he recoveredbloodstains noted by him on the plywood door leading to the openterrace; from the open terrace floor and from the plastic ropes(yellow and green colour); blood sample from A-5, who is stated tohave helped the victim and then handed over the same to the Asst. Commissioner of Police for their onward journey to the laboratory.P.W.27 continued his investigation. On 2.2.01 P.W.22 (the doctor, who did post-mortem) inspected the crime scene and then examinedA-5, who was admitted as in-patient in SRM Hospital. P.W.27 wouldstate that he sent for the services of P.W.24 to assist him in hisinvestigation and we have already referred to the oral evidence ofP.W.24. The incrimination objects recovered by P.W.24 from thecrime scene and handed over to P.W.27 were sent by him to theforensic laboratory through the inquest Tahsildar. Ex.P-53 is thesaid requisition.

P.W.27 caused blood samples to be taken from A-5 through P.W.24. Further witnesses were examined by P.W.27 byrecording their statements. He sent all the case propertiesrecovered in this case to the laboratory for chemical examination. By examining the employees of Airtel (mobile service provider) heverified the duration of certain outgoing calls stated to havebeen made by A-5 to her fiancee (would-be husband). He collectedthe post-mortem report from P.W.23 and as the post-mortem reportdisclosed internal injuries on the head of Archana, and sincedrops of blood were noticed in several places in the crime sceneand witnesses have stated that Archana, before her death, wassubjected to cruelty, he altered the section of offence from oneunder Section 174 Cr.P.C. into one under Sections 302 and 498-AIPC. Ex.P-54 is the altered express first information report. The alteration is also on the basis of the statement made by thedoctor, who did post-mortem.

At 2.00 p.m. on 19.2.01 he arrestedA-1 and then sent him for judicial remand. On 22.2.01 he sent thepost-mortem report to the court. He examined further witnesses byrecording their statements. On 27.2.01 he arrested A-2 to A-5from their residence at West Mambalam and then sent them forjudicial remand. Pursuant to the orders obtained by P.W.1 andanother in the High Court by filing O.P. Nos. 2656/01 and 3279/01and as per the directions of the Director General of Police, theinvestigation was transferred to the Crime Branch CID, GreaterChennai and, accordingly, he handed over the entire case diary to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch CID, Chennai. Exs.P-55 to P-59 are the reports received from the forensiclaboratory on 15.2.01, 23.2.01, 1.3.01 and 12.3.01. M.O.9 wasrecovered under Ex.P-47.

It was talked at that time that duringmarriage gold and silver ornaments, besides a cash of Rs.1 lakhshould be given. Giving electronic articles also was in the talk. It was indicated that a total sum of Rs.10 lakhs would be neededfor the marriage. That sum would take care of the marriage andbetrothal expenses. She would state that the marriage took placeat Radha Park hotel between Archana and A-1 on 22.1.99. Aftermarriage, Archana and A-1 were living at West Mambalam as membersof a joint family and initially they were happy. Over telephoneArchana used to tell her that A-5's conduct is not conducive andin addition to that, her in-laws, namely, A-2 and A-3 are alsopestering her often for money and giving troubles to her in thatregard and, therefore, requested P.W.4 to come over and see her. Archana told her that A-1, A-4 and A-5 are irritating her and onoccasions A-1 under intoxication of liquor used to assault her.P.W.4 advised Archana that these are all common features in ajoint family and as days goes on everything would become alright.P.W.1 had taken four LIC policies in the name of Archana besidesone Indra Vikas Certificate and all that was prior to marriage.

After marriage, A-5 insisted that the nomination in the policiesand Indra Vikas Certificate should be changed in the name of A-1and finding no way out, P.W.1 changed the nomination from his nameto that of A-1's name in the LIC policies. Archana gave birth toa boy and the naming ceremony of that child was held in GeethaBhavan; Archana's wedding anniversary was held at Hotel Sindooriand on the same day in the same hotel, A-5's betrothal also tookplace. P.W.4 participated in the function along with her familymembers. At that time she noticed Archana very sad and when sheasked her as to why she is so sad, Archana told her that A-3 andA-5 had taken all her jewels and this witness saw A-3 and A-5wearing those jewels. Archana also told this witness that shemust give all the jewels to A-5 for her marriage. Archana wasfound to be heart-broken and sad and this witness noticed Archanawearing imitation jewellery.

P.W.4 knows that A-1's business isnot doing well and, therefore, through his wife he used to demandmoney from P.W.1. Pursuant to demands made after marriage formoney, P.W.1 had given in all a sum of Rs.6 lakhs to the accused. For the marriage of A-5, A-1 demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs fromP.W.1 through Archana, since deceased and P.W.1 replied that hewould think about it. She came to know on 30.1.01 that Archanadied and she immediately went to her house along with her husband. But, however, she did not see the dead body as by that time it hadbeen taken to the hospital. She noticed, in the walls of thefirst floor, dots of blood and in the steps of the staircaseleading from first floor to second floor also dots of blood werealso noticed by her. She also saw broken bangles and they were onthe floor near the grill gate in the first floor and the screen. Before the marriage of Archana, a demand for 101 sovereigns ofjewels was made, which accordingly was given by Archana's family, but, however, she did not know the value. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

On15.4.00 a sum of Rs.28,574/= was credited into the account of Archana by clearing a cheque and on 19.4.00 a sum of Rs.28,500/=was withdrawn. P.W.11 is a laundry man and he is employed in theshop belonging to his brother in Baroda Street where the crimescene is situate. His duty is to go to every house for collecting https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ clothes for ironing and then delivering the ironed clothes. During the course of such work, he had gone to the house of theaccused also several times who reside opposite to the shop wherehe is working. Besides A-1, A-2, A-4 and A-5, Archana was alsoliving there. Their residential accommodation consists of aground floor, first floor and an open terrace and he had gone totheir house several times to collect clothes for ironing. On someoccasions, he had noticed Archana in a happy mood and on someoccasions in a dejected mood. Archana told him that in theabsence of the household servant main, she used to wash clothesand whenever ironing charges are asked, she used to reply that shewill not ask for money from the others and P.W.11 can directly askothers.

On occasions when he used to go to the house of theaccused to collect clothes, he had seen A-5 and Archanaquarrelling and immediately they will cool down and then go backto their routine moods. P.W.12 is the Manager of Bank of Baroda. In his Bank, Dalmia Private Ltd., had an account and Ex.P-16 isthe application given to open an account and Ex.P-17 is thestatement of accounts of that account holder for the period from3.4.99 to 29.1.01. P.W.13 is the Chief Manager of State Bank of India at T.Nagar and he speaks about the account of A-2 in that Bank. Ex.P-18 is the account opening application form and Ex.P-19is the statement of accounts for the period from 2.2.99 to31.1.01.

From the same phone there was another outgoing call at9.55 a.m. on the same day to another phone having No.4800219 andthe duration of that call was 37 seconds. At 10.48 a.m. on thesame day from the same mobile phone there was an outgoing call totelephone bearing No.4839371 and the duration of the call is 2mins. 41 seconds. Ex.P-20 is the billing chart. P.W.16 is aresident of Shenoy Nagar, Chennai and she has done her course in Business Management. She knows the accused and the deceased andher father and P.W.1 are close friends. She would state that shehad attended the betrothal and the marriage of Archana, sincedeceased and she would state that after marriage, Archana wasliving as a member of joint family in West Mambalam. She wouldthen state that she had not seen Archana often thereafter, butduring functions she used to meet her. But, however, she used totale to her over phone often. She would then depose that herbrother's marriage was attended to by Archana and at that time https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Archana cried to her by stating that her in-laws are torturing herand A-1 was demanding money.

According to her, Archana alsostated that besides the above, A-5 was also torturing her and thatA-1 used to beat her by compelling her to get money from herparents. P.W.17 is the Manager of a hire purchase company, whospeaks about financing a sum of Rs.1.20 lakhs on 26.12.00 to A-2to purchase a vehicle and Ex.P-21 is the document evidencing thesame. On that financial assistance, A-2 purchased a vehiclebearing No. TN-07-H-7533 and the payment schedule is fixed atRs.8,300/= per month for the first seventeen months and Rs.7,100/=for the eighteenth month. Upto 28.4.01 four instalments havebeen paid and Ex.P-22 is the statement of accounts. P.W.19 is aretired doctor from Tamil Nadu Medical Service and he was aconsultant at SRM Hospital. On 30.1.01 when he was on duty, A-5was brought before him for burn injuries and he issued Ex.P-25,the wound certificate. The injuries are simple in nature. A-5had suffered a abrasion on her right hand.

He did not notice anyfresh bleeding in injury No.7 and he also did not notice anybleeding at all in the other burn injuries. P.W.21 is anotherdoctor working in SRM Hospital, who had examined A-5 broughtbefore him by A-4 on 30.1.01. Ex.P-28 is the intimation sent byhim to the police and Ex.P-29 is the wound certificate given byhim for A-5. He noticed a partly healed abrasion on A-5's righthand wrist. On 7.2.01 a eleven months old child named PiyushDalmia was brought before him at 7.30 a.m. and he found onlysuperficial burn injuries and the burn injuries is to the extentof 1%. Ex.P-30 is the certificate given by him for the child.

Smalllacerations seen on the lateral aspect of leftthenar eminence 1 x 0.2 cms x fascia deep. Smallpunctuate lacerations seen on the medial border ofleft palm. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 3) Superficial split laceration seen on the dorsumof left hand in the 2nd metacarpal region (indexfinger) 4.5 x 1 cms x fascia deep. Internal Injuries :-Bruising of the scalp seen over the vault of theskull and also on the left temporal region. Subscalpular extra cranial haematoma seen over thevault of the skull 8 x 7 x 0.2 cms. On dissection of Head : Thin film of subduralhaemorrhage seen all over the brain. Heart : Chambers contained clotted blood. Lungs : Oedematous c/s congested exudes copiousfrothy fluid. Larynx and Trachea : Contained frothy fluid. Sootparticles. Hyoid Bone : Intact. Stomach : Empty. No specific smell perceived. Mucosa – NAD.Liver, Spleen and Kidneys : C/S congested. Bladder : Empty.

Uterus : Empty. Copper 'T'found inside. Brain : Thin film of subdural haemorrhage seen. Hyperaemic surface vessels full. C/S showsnumerous petichiae. "The doctor opined that death is as a result of shock due to burns. He had also stated that the injuries found on the head of Archanaare not sufficient to cause death. But, however, as a result ofthose injuries, the victim could have become unconscious. But hecannot say the duration of such unconsciousness. He then deposedthat the 4th injury found on the head of the dead body could havebeen caused by the blunt side of a weapon and such injury is notpossible if the head comes in contact on its own with anotherobject. All the injuries are ante-mortem in nature. He thenstated that immediately after post-mortem he visited the crimescene.

Assuming this Court could brushaside the contents of Exs.P-26 and P-37 for the present, yet theevidence of P.W.s 1 to 4 also do not show any disclosures, whichare incriminating in nature against the accused. According tohim, the evidence of P.W.s 1 to 4 is far from convincing and farfrom the truth when tested with the contents of Exs.P-26 and P-37.Even assuming for a minute, without conceding, that the entireprosecution case stands established without there being anyrebuttal, yet it only shows that subsequent to the marriage of Archana with A-1, to expand the business of A-1 and to meet themarriage expenses of A-5 and also to get reimbursement of theexpenses incurred by the Dalmia family in having the betrothalfunction at Faridabad, Delhi, which fell through, demand for moneywas made. The expression "dowry" is defined under Section 2 ofthe Dowry Prohibition Act. The Section broadly shows, that anyproperty or security given or agreed to be given must haveconnection with the marriage of the parties, namely, A-1'smarriage with Archana.

Since admittedly there is no evidence toshow that such demands, as referred to above, was made inconnection with the marriage of A-1 and Archana, this Court has tonecessarily hold that the ingredients of the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act is not made out at all. Once the offenceunder the Dowry Prohibition Act fails, then the offence under Section 304-B IPC also would have no legs to stand, since theingredients of the offence of "dowry" as defined under Section 2of the Dowry Prohibition Act stands telescoped into theingredients of Section 304-B IPC. By taking us through the Explanation to Section 304-B IPC, learned counsel would contendthat the expression "dowry" used in Section 304-B Part-I IPC wouldhave the same meaning as given under Section 2 of the DowryProhibition Act, 1961. Consequently, learned counsel wouldcontend that unless the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC areestablished, then there is no scope for drawing the statutorypresumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

It isthen submitted by the learned counsel that the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC, which are, admittedly, totally different fromthe ingredients of the other offence referred to earlier are alsonot established and, therefore, the conviction of the appellantsfor the offence referred to earlier is without any legal evidence. To bring the act of the accused within the provisions of the DowryProhibition Act, especially having the definition given to theword "dowry" in the said Act, learned counsel wound contend thatthere should be explicit materials on record to show that thedemand for dowry is vociferous; put in action in a telling manner https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ by telling Archana in clear terms that unless she complies withthe demands made by them, neither she could enter the house norshe could continue in the house any longer. All these materialsare totally absent in this case.

But on the other hand, Archanawas living as a free bird in the house of her in-laws. Therefore, the cumulative effect of the absence of telling circumstancesexposing Archana to cruelty and torture in the context of thedemand for dowry and her continuing to live in the house withoutany restriction shows that the prosecution is not speaking thetruth. It is also contended by the learned counsel for theappellants that from the evidence of C.W.1 and the contents ofEx.P-39, the prosecution case that Archana was assaulted, lost herlife and then she was put in flames cannot be sustained. There isnothing to show, in this case, that Archana was subjected totorture in the context of dowry demand soon before her death andthat the demands shown to have been made after her marriage, haveno connection with the marriage of A-1 and Archana and, therefore, it must be held that the demands stated to have been made prior tothe marriage, assuming they are true, have become stale and thelink between that demand and the death is not alive.

Ex.P-5, theinquest report of the Tahsildar (P.W.23) is relied upon to contendthat the present prosecution case is an afterthought. Unless sucha live link between the demand/exposure to torture and death isshown, Section 304-B would not get attracted. Mr.Sanjay Ramasamy, learned counsel for the appellants, in support of his arguments, namely, what materials would constitute the ingredients of theoffence under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and the DowryProhibition Act and what proof the court would expect from theinvestigating agency in such cases, brought to our notice a numberof judgments, and those judgments are :-"1) 2003 Crl. L.J. 69 (SC) ;2) 1995 Crl. L.J. 2472 (Orissa High Court) ;3) 1993 Crl. L.J. 2766 (Himachal Pradesh HighCourt) ;4) 1995 Crl. L.J. 2944 (Punjab & Haryana HighCourt) ;5) 2005 Crl. L.J. 625 (Uttranchal High Court) ;6) 2004 Crl. L.J. 5005 (SC) ;7) 2004 Crl. L.J. NOC 244 (Andhra Pradesh HighCourt) ; and8) AIR 2005 SC 4429"

According to him, and such a demand could be made evenafter performance of the marriage. Therefore, the expression "inconnection with the marriage" takes within its fold all the threestages as referred to above. According to him, the expression "inconnection with the marriage" as it stands in the Statute booktoday is in substitution for the earlier expression "inconsideration of the marriage". The legislative intent insubstituting the expression as referred to above must be takennote of and in interpreting a provision in a Statute theobjectives of the Act, which was sought to be achieved, must behad in mind and the mischief sought to be suppressed shall beallowed to revive. Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor also submittedthat from the established circumstances if an inference could belegally drawn that there is a demand for dowry, then there is noharm at all for the court in drawing such inference withoutinsisting for direct evidence for the crime.

For the abovementioned purpose, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor relies upon thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar & Another – Vs –State of Haryana reported in 1998 SCC (Crl.) 740. The phrase, "inconnection with the marriage" would take in its fold continuationof the marriage bond till it reaches its logical and natural endor gets snapped by an order of court. He elaborated hissubmission by stating that if such is not the meaning to be givento the expression "in connection with the marriage", then the veryobject of the Act to prevent menace to the society would never beachieved. He also added that if such an interpretation is not tobe given to the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, thenevery greedy and avaracious person would avoid making express andexplicit demands for dowry "in connection with the marriage"before the marriage itself and cleverly would camouflage hisdemand in a totally different form after the marriage though inreality such demands has the connection with the marriage.

Incontinuation of the above submission, learned Addl. PublicProsecutor argued by taking us through the entire evidence onrecord that at all stages, namely, at the negotiation stage forthe marriage of A-1 with Archana; then Tilak function stage; atthe marriage time; on the trip to Tirupathi in January, 2000;naming ceremony of the child of Archana; for the alleged businessexpansion of A-1; when the first betrothal function of A-5 held at Faridabad, Delhi failed; during the time when the second betrothalfunction of A-5 was held at Chennai and subsequently when themarriage date was fixed, there has been constant and persistentdemands for money by the accused from P.W.1's family. Incontending that those demands are in connection with the marriageof A-1 with Archana, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor wouldcontend, even otherwise from the established circumstances this Court could legally infer that those demands would definitely havea telling impact on the continuance of the marriage of A-1 with Archana.

In other words, if a fear was put in the mind of Archanathat her marriage with A-1 would break, then the demands shown tohave been made by the accused at one stage or the other must bedefinitely inferred as a demand "in connection with the marriage"of A-1 with Archana. As far as Ex.P-39 is concerned, learnedAddl. Public Prosecutor would contend that by the time C.W.1entered the crime scene and examined, there are possibilities for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the entire evidence being tampered with in favour of the accused, since, admittedly, from 2.2.01 till 5.2.01, the day on which C.W.1inspected the crime scene, the crime scene was in the exclusivecontrol of C.M.Goel, who is none else than the brother of A-3.The findings noted by C.W.1 in Ex.P-39 were not noted at all byP.W.24, the scientific officer (a Government employee) when hevisited the crime scene on 2.2.01. According to him, assuming theworst against the State based on C.W.1's evidence and Ex.P-39,this Court could only hold that Archana was mobile during thecourse of the occurrence.

But nonetheless, according to thelearned Addl. Public Prosecutor, the post-mortem report and theevidence of P.W.22, the doctor, who did post-mortem, show that theinjuries found on the head of Archana were ante-mortem in natureand his evidence also shows that injury No.4 found on the head of Archana is definitely due to use of extraneous force and notArchana on her own coming into contact with any other object. Inthis case there are continuous acts spoken to by the witnessesagainst the accused of making demands, which are definitely in thenature of demand for dowry. Courts have held that the expression"soon after death" is an elastic term and it can never be saidthat the said expression conveys only one meaning, namely, justbefore death. According to the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, such exposure to cruelty or torture may be over a period of timeand what would be the proper period which could be taken intoaccount by a court would depend upon the facts available in eachcase.

Lastly by inviting our attention to Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor wouldsubmit that the burden is on the defence to prove that he had notcommitted the offence under the Sections mentioned therein. Learned counsel then elaborated this point by stating that fromthe materials placed by the prosecution on record, this Court caneasily infer that the demands shown to have been made by theaccused subsequent to the marriage, though appear to be in adifferent context, yet it is really a demand for dowry inconnection with the marriage of A-1 with the deceased. If this isaccepted, then a duty is cast upon the accused to show that theyhave not made any such demands, which they have failed to do inthis case. Learned Addl. Public Prosecutor argues that thedefence had not chosen to place any material – either oral ordocumentary, to discharge this burden, which is initially castupon them.

As far as Ex.P-35 is concerned, it is pointed out thatthe panchayatadars are shown to have been brought by A-1 andjudging by their status it can be easily seen that they areobliging people to the accused. In any event they being notfamily members of the accused or their neighbours, could have hadno chance at all to know the difficulties of the deceased.

She deposed that though she belongs to Delhi, she hadsettled down at Chennai after her marriage and when she attendedone of the religious courses at Geetha Ramayana Sabha, she came tobe introduced to C.M.Goel. According to her, sometime thereafter,C.M.Goel requested her to look for an alliance for his nephew, namely, A-3's son. She would then state that she only negotiatedwith P.W.1 for getting his daughter married to A-1. As far as thecrux of the prosecution case is concerned, she had very clearlystated that during the negotiation stage, a demand for dowry inthe form of gold jewellery; silver articles; a cash of Rupees Onelakh and electronic articles were demanded. She would then statethat Archana informed her over telephone that her sister-in-law'sconduct (the sister-in-law is A-5) is not conducive. When Archanasaw her personally, she told her that her father-in-law (A-2) andmother-in-law (A-3) are often pestering her for money and in thatcontext A-1, A-4 and A-5 are also irritating her considerably.

She had further told at that time that A-1, under intoxication ofliquor, used to assault her. As is expected of a married womanand as a person, who had finalised the marriage proposal, P.W.4appears to have advised Archana that in joint family living, suchproblems may be there and as time progresses, everything will bealright. P.W.4 would then state that P.W.1 had taken four L.I.C.policies in the name of Archana, besides one Indra Vikas Patra andall that have been taken prior to Archana's marriage and Archanatold this witness that A-5 was pestering that all those policiesshould be transferred in the name of A1 and finding no way out,P.W.1 took steps to change the nomination in favour of A-1. Herevidence further shows that she attended the naming ceremony of Archana's child held in Geetha Bhavan and she also attended thewedding anniversary of Archana at Hotel Sindhoori. On that dayitself the betrothal function of A-5 took place.

This witness isshown to have participated in that function along with her familymembers. She would then state that at that time, she noticedArchana looking sad and when asked, Archana told her that A-3 andA-5 had taken all her jewels and that they were wearing her jewelsat that time. Archana also told her that the accused wantedArchana to give all her jewels to A-5 for her marriage and P.W.4noticed Archana at that time to be very sad. She also noticedArchana wearing only imitation jewellery at that time. Thiswitness had been subjected to a lengthy cross examination. Shehad affirmed in her evidence in cross that she had participated inthe negotiation prior to the marriage between Archana and A-1,which took place in the house of C.M.Goel. On going through herevidence in cross, we do not find that she had not caved in at allin favour of the accused. On going through the entire evidence ofP.W.4, we find that it is natural and convincing and the defencehas not made out any case at all while cross examining her todisbelieve her evidence.

Therefore, without any hesitation weconclude that the evidence of P.W.4 establishes beyond doubt thefollowing aspects, namely, prior to marriage a demand for dowrywas made by the accused which was complied with; after marriageArchana told her about the cruelty to which she was subjected toin the context of demand for money; Archana losing her confidencein the house and feeling depressed on account of the behaviour of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ A-5 and the accused taking her jewels and wearing it by themselveson the wedding anniversary of Archana on which date A-5'sbetrothal also took place and Archana was found to be not happy atall.

He had also admitted that he had not shown the expensesincurred by him in celebrating his daughter's marriage and meetingother expenses in his income-tax return and that he has the incometax return details in his office. We have to only state thatthere appears to be a very light-hearted cross-examination of thiswitness as far as his solvency to meet the claims of the accused. Nonetheless, from the evidence we find that being a fleet operator– possessing seven lorries, and his evidence that his gross profitper year would be Rs.2 lakhs, it is not possible to hold that itwould have been impossible for P.W.1 to comply with the demandsmade by the accused. Normally, a parent prepares himself to meetthe possible expenses of his daughter's marriage, why even for hisson's marriage, long prior to the expected function. No familynormally buys jewellery and other ornaments just before themarriage day and, therefore, it is definitely a long processduring which the family of a bride builds up its assets to meetthe exigencies of the marriage at a future date. Under thesecircumstances, as already noted, we are not in a position to doubtthe capacity of P.W.1 to meet the demands shown to have been madeby the accused.

One may get agitated immediately and try to expose thepeople making the demand and the other one may succumb to thepressure with a view to see that his daughter's marriage life isnot disturbed in any manner. Therefore, it all varies from personto person and the background to which the family belongs. Simplybecause P.W.1 had not given any complaint to the police at anypoint earlier to the date on which his daughter died, in ourconsidered opinion, is of no significance at all, since P.W.1 mayhave been hoping that everything would turn around in hisdaughter's favour and that she would start living sooner or laterhappily and in peace. Any hasty action, we cannot lose sight of, if taken by P.W.1 in going to the police, may result inirreparable injury to his daughter. Therefore, without anyhesitation we conclude that the evidence of P.W.1, as to thedemands made by the accused, as spoken to by him in his evidencein chief stands intact, though he had been subjected to a lengthycross examination.

Like P.W.1, P.W.s 2 and 3 had also been cross-examined by the defence. We must notice here that the nature ofthe offence being one demanding dowry, the court can definitelysee that the evidence for such demands would be only from thefamily members of the bride, namely, Archana in this case. Therefore, we cannot find fault with the prosecution for notexamining anybody other than P.W.s 1 to 3, namely, any neighbourto speak about the dowry demand made by the accused and the ill-treatment to which Archana was exposed to by her husband's family. It must be noticed here that P.W.4 is not only related to theprosecution side, but had firmly stated that she knew C.M.Goel, who is none else than the brother of A-3 quiet well and it is onlyat their instance she mooted the marriage proposal of Archana withA-1 in this case.

P.W.3 also did not give up the prosecution case inany manner when he was cross-examined. We have gone through eachand every piece of answer that came from the mouth of P.W.s 2 and3 when they were cross-examined by the defence and we find, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ without any doubt in our mind, that both the witnesses stronglysupported the evidence of P.W.1 about the demands made by thefamily of the accused. In other words, the evidence of P.W.s 2and 3 is in total corroboration to the oral evidence of P.W.1already referred to. P.W.6 turning hostile is no surprise, sinceshe is the sister-in-law of A-3. Nonetheless, we find that thereis nothing in her evidence, which would in any way demolish theprosecution case. P.W.7 is the household servant of P.W.1. P.W.1would state that when his daughter was in the family way, to be ofassistance to her, he asked P.W.7 to go and work in Archana'smatrimonial house.

Ofcourse, P.W.7 did not in his evidence speakabout any ill-treatment to which Archana was subjected to in thecontext of any unlawful demands. His stay in Archana's house washardly for a period of four days. He would state that A-5 askedhim to leave the house stating that there are enough householdservants in their house to undertake all the work. This witnesshad stated that during his tenure in the matrimonial abode of Archana, he noticed that Archana alone was doing all the householdworks and none, other than Archana in the house, will attend toany of those works. To substantiate the point that P.W.1 compliedwith the cash demands made by the accused, the prosecution hadexamined P.W.8, the cashier of P.W.1. Ofcourse, as rightlycontended by the learned counsel for the defence, no account bookswhatsoever has been produced either by P.W.1 or by P.W.8 to showthat payments so made have been entered in their books ofaccounts.

P.W.8 would admit in his evidence, regarding thepayment made on various dates, that he speaks only from his memoryand not from the account books. But, nonetheless, we hold thatsimply because P.W.8 is not in a position to speak regarding thepayments made by referring to the account books and in the contextof the evidence of P.W.1 that such payments have not been enteredby him in his regular books of account, we are not inclined tobrush aside the evidence of P.W.s 1 to 3 regarding the complianceof the demands of the accused by P.W.1. The fact remainsestablished that prior to the marriage of Archana, P.W.1 had takenfour LIC policies in her name, besides an Indra Vikas Patra andinitially the nominee under those LIC policies was only P.W.1. Ithas also come out in evidence that after the marriage of Archanato A-1, nomination in all the policies has been changed bybringing in the name of A-1 as the nominee.

There is evidence toshow that there was a demand from the accused side to change thenomination in the policies in favour of A-1 and, hence, such amove was made. P.W.9 is the officer from LIC, who speaks aboutthe change of nomination in favour of A-1. Ofcourse, his evidenceshows that it was on a request given by the policy holder, namely, Archana. But we can still see the reasons behind such change innomination, which had come to occur within a short span after themarriage, namely, within six months. P.W.9 also deposed thatafter the change in the nominee's name was made, two out of thefour L.I.C. policies were surrendered before maturity forencashment and, accordingly, surrender was accepted and paymentsmade. Therefore, the urgency in which two policies weresurrendered for payments speaks volumes about the need for moneyin the family of the accused. The accused are in a position toexplain the circumstances under which the policies weresurrendered.

But they have not explained. Assuming there is no https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ clear cut documentary evidence showing the payment for thepolicies; credit entry and withdrawal entry, we have no reason todisbelieve P.W.9, who is an independent witness from L.I.C. of India. However, P.W.9 had proved Ex.P.9. A reading of Ex.P.9shows that it is addressed to the deceased (Archana) and as anenclosure to that letter, a cheque – the details of which is giventhere, in respect of the surrender value of the policy mentionedtherein, had been enclosed. The policy number mentioned thereinis one of the policies taken by P.W.1 in favour of his daughter. Therefore, going by the overall evidence available in this case, namely, the evidence of P.W.s 1 to 4, we have no hesitation at allto conclude that the prosecution had definitely established theircase that the accused had made demands for dowry and Archana wassubjected to ill-treatment in the context of their unlawfuldemands.

D.W.1, examined to prove that Archana was living happilywith her husband, would state that after Archana's marriage, hermother died and when she visited Archana after her mother'sdemise, she found her to be depressed. She consoled her when shewas weeping. She claims that she knows the family of the accusedfor quite a long time. She admits that her husband and theaccused belong to the same community. She had categoricallyadmitted that she did not attend Archana's marriage. She had notgiven any reasons for not attending. This belies her evidencethat she is closely acquainted with A1, A4 and A5 from their ageof 10 and therefore she knows the their inside story. Herfailure to attend Archana's wedding raises a serious doubt in ourmind as to whether we should believe her evidence at all. Herevidence shows that Archana was found depressed and she wasweeping (though this witness would state that it is as a result ofher mother's demise). Going by her overall evidence, we are ofthe view that her evidence is very very unnatural and probablypressed into service only to defeat the prosecution case. Therefore we are not inclined to accept the evidence of D.W.1 inpreference to the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4.

It is not thecase of the defence that at all stages P.W.1 was also living intheir house itself along with them. P.W.1's evidence is that, around 12.00 noon on the occurrence day, a telephone call camefrom A-1, which was attended to by P.W.1's eldest son and at that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ time information was passed on that Archana died. His evidencefurther shows that he then proceeded to the crime scene. P.W.2also would state that she, along with her father-in-law (P.W.1)and her husband (P.W.3), reached the crime scene at 12.00 noon.P.W.3's evidence is also to the same effect. By the time theyreached the house, Archana was already dead. In fact, she wascharred to death. Why we are highlighting the above aspects isfor the following reasons. When A-1 and A-2 were bodily andphysically present in their house, where the occurrence had takenplace, then it is normally expected from them that they must alonedisclose to the police as to what happened.

From the evidence ofP.W.20 referred to earlier, it is clear to our mind that A-1 andA-2 were trying to keep themselves away from the limelight andthat is the reason probably they asked P.W.20 to enquire P.W.1,who, as we have already noted, had reached the crime scene onlyafter the occurrence was over. In other words, we find absolutelyno justification for A-1 and A-2 to tell P.W.20 to ask P.W.1 forthe details. P.W.2 in her evidence had stated that on reachingthe crime scene, she along with her husband (P.W.3) and herbrother-in-law, Rakesh Kumar Goel, went to the second floor andshe found, at that time, the body of Archana totally charred andshe also noticed blood stains in the second floor as well as inthe steps leading to the second floor. P.W.1 had stated that whenhe wanted to go up and see the dead body of his daughter, someunknown persons prevented him from going up and he becameemotional at the crime scene and though he wanted to go up andsee, yet he could not go because he could not muster the courage; conviction and strength to go up and see.

P.W.3 had also statedthat he, along with his younger brother and P.W.2 went to the openterrace where he found the charred dead body of his sister. Having regard to the evidence of P.W.s 1 to 3 as to how they haveconducted themselves after entering the crime scene, we find itextremely difficult to digest the suggestion made by A-1 and A-2to P.W.20 that he must enquire P.W.1 and get the details. P.W.20would then state that when he asked P.W.1 to give a complaint, hesaid that he did not know Tamil. P.W.20 also admitted that healso did not know Hindi as also the constables, who were by hisside at that time. His evidence shows that A-1 and A-2, alongwith Goel – who is the uncle of A-1, were there. Then he woulddepose that A-1 and A-3 conversed in Hindi and then as theynarrated in Tamil, he reduced the same into writing. His evidencefurther shows that A-1 and A-2 got the signature of P.W.1 in thatcomplaint and gave it to him, which is marked as Ex.P-26.

He is a neutral witnessand we see no reason at all as to why he must depose in court thatP.W.1 is not the author of the contents of Ex.P-26, but it is onlyto the narration of A-1 and A-3 he reduced the same into acomplaint. Therefore, we accept the evidence of P.W.20 that thecontents of Ex.P-26 were subscribed only by A-1 and A-3.Ofcourse, the contents of Ex.P-26 discloses that Archana, in adepressed mood, had self-immolated her and died. Ex.P-26 containsinformation as hereunder :-"At about 9.00 a.m. on 30.1.01 (the occurrenceday), A-2, A-1 and A-4 have left their house totheir company situated at No.1, Janakiram Street, West Mambalam; at 10.15 a.m., A-2 came back to hishouse and taking his wife, A-3, went to a cliniccalled Ramana Clinic at West Mambalam to visit oneof their relatives. "It is not the case of the defence that P.W.1 knew before hand, namely, before entering the crime scene or even after enteringthe crime scene, that A-1, A-2 and A-4 moved out of the house andA-2 coming back again went out in the company of A-3, which areall part of the contents of Ex.P-26.

If we test the disclosuresfound in Ex.P-26 as extracted above, and in the light of the othermaterials, which we have noted earlier, we have no doubt at allthat even by the time P.W.20 had arrived at the crime scene, theaccused have started scheming among themselves as to how towriggle out of the tight corner in which they are placed. WhenP.W.1 is not shown to be knowing the movements of the accused asreferred to above from the house, we fail to understand as to howhe could have given those details to P.W.20 as found reflected inEx.P-26. Again we find in Ex.P-26 a disclosure, namely, A-5 onhearing her sister-in-law's distress call, ran upstairs and whenshe attempted to put out the flames, she suffered injuries on bothher hands and, therefore, she was taken to SRM Hospital at WestMambalam. Once again we find that it is not the case of thedefence that P.W.1 had this information also by the time he wentto the house of the accused or even by the time the police arrivedat the scene.

In these circumstances, we have to state that fromthe contents of Ex.P-26 and having the evidence of P.W.20 in ourmind, we have no doubt at all that Ex.P-26 is the brain child ofA-1 and A-3, if not A-2, and they have very cleverly managed toput these materials in the complaint and get the signature ofP.W.1 as its subscriber. The extent of shock to which P.W.1 wouldhave been subjected to in coming to know that his dear daughter ischarred to death cannot be evaluated at all, and in fact theevidence of P.W.1 is that, though he wanted to go up and see hisdaughter lying dead, yet he cannot gather the courage and strengthto go up. In these circumstances, we have the least hesitation toreject the submission of Mr.Sanjay Ramasamy, learned counselappearing for the appellant that the contents of Ex.P-26 must betaken as a true disclosure made by P.W.1.

Themarriage had already taken place prior to the above referred todemands. There is nothing to indicate from these demands thatthey were made in connection with the marriage. If that is so, the charges are misconceived and, therefore, the conviction of theaccused for the offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act and, consequently, the conviction of the accused under Sections 304-Band 498-A IPC cannot be legally sustained. Though this argument, ex-facie, appears to be impressive, yet on a deeper considerationof the entire materials on record and having the avowed object ofthe Dowry Prohibition Act in mind, if we consider the argumentfrom that angle, then we have no hesitation at all to say thatthis argument has to fall to the ground. The prosecution case isthat the deceased had complained to her father, P.W.1, that herhusband consumes liquor and often assaults her and, therefore,P.W.1 must change the nomination under the policies.

We havealready noted that P.W.1 had stood the test of cross-examinationon all aspects of the prosecution case. Therefore, from the aboveevidence, it is clear that the change of nomination in theinsurance policies is not a voluntary and unilateral act on thepart of P.W.1, but it was brought about only by the act of A-1 asbrought to the notice of P.W.1 by Archana. P.W.1 had stated inhis evidence that because of Archana's request, as stated earlier, to change the nominee's name, he took steps to change thenomination in the policies and he also gave his piece of mind toher to adjust herself in the new environment. P.W.1 had alsostated that since the marriage had taken place only recently, lapse of time would bring peace to her. P.W.1's evidence showsthat in the betrothal function of A-5 held at Chennai, he foundhis daughter totally unhappy and he also saw that all the jewelsprovided by him to his daughter were worn by A-5 at that time andhis daughter was wearing only imitation jewellery.

He proceeds tostate that his daughter was upset about all that. P.W.2 had alsostated that she participated in the second wedding anniversary ofher sister-in-law held at Hotel Sindhoori and she also saw hersister-in-law at that time unhappy and while her sister-in-law waswearing imitation jewellery, her gold jewelleries were worn by A-3and A-5. Her evidence also shows that earlier in the month of January 2001, during Pongal, when they went to Tirupathi alongwith the family of the accused, Archana told her that A-1 and A-3are compelling her to give her jewels to A-5 for her marriage.P.W.3 would state that as his father refused to reimburse the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ expenses incurred by the accused for the betrothal of A-5 held at Faridabad, which did not end in the marriage, Archana wassubjected to increased torture. P.W.3 would further state that onthe morning of the occurrence day (the earlier night his brotherattended to a call around midnight from A-1) when he calledArchana, A-3 picked up the phone and, thereafter, gave the phoneto Archana and the moment she picked up the phone, Archana startedweeping.

P.W.3 would then state that he immediately gave thephone to his father, P.W.1, who after talking with his daughterhad told P.W.3 that as Archana is weeping, P.W.3 must immediatelygo and bring her home. P.W.3 would then state that his fathertold him that he would send Rakesh Kumar – the other son, by 12.00noon to the house of the accused to bring home Archana. Therefore, it is clear to our mind that Archana was subjected toill-treatment in one form or the other right from the day ofmarriage even till the last minute, namely, on the morning of theoccurrence day when she was contacted over phone initially byP.W.3 and then P.W.1 also conversing with her on the telephone, asa continuous process. If we have these aspects of the prosecutioncase in mind, then we have no doubt at all that the demands shownto have been made by the accused after Archana's marriage, thoughdo not directly have the colour of a dowry demand, yet, itdefinitely assumes the colour of a dowry demand.

We reflect ourmind hereunder that the demands are made in a camouflaged mannerso as to get away from any possible implication in a criminalprosecution, if ultimately it comes to. We find that there is noneed or responsibility for the bride's family to meet the expensesof the marriage of the sister of the bridegroom. When such ademand is made and in the context of the continued sufferings to Archana, it must be held that her marriage with A-1 was at stakeall the time. In other words, Archana must have been made tounderstand that if the various demands referred to were not met bythe prosecution party, then there is a grave risk of Archanalosing her matrimonial tie with her husband. We find that Archanawas found to be continuously sad and depressed on all occasionswhenever her kith and kin had chance to see and observe her. Ifso, we must find out the reasons therefor. If the demands provedto have been made after marriage are only innocuous demands withno adverse impact on Archana, then we see no reason at all for herunhappiness. From the fact that she was found to be unhappy, wedo not find it difficult to see that she would have been subjectedto a mounting pressure to see the demands are met as otherwise shewould go out of the house.

The section also takes into it's fold a demand fordowry made at any time after the marriage and given or agreed tobe given at that stage. There is nothing in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act to conclude that a demand made subsequent tothe marriage cannot part-take the character of dowry. As alreadystated, the demand must be in connection with the marriage of theparties to the marriage. Would a reading of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act mean that if a demand is made after theconclusion of the marriage, it cannot be said that the demand isnot in connection with the marriage. To answer this, the Courtmust have the object and purpose of the Dowry Prohibition Act inmind. The purpose and object of the Dowry Prohibition Act, whenit was brought in as a Statute, was to suppress the menace ofdowry, which was prevailing in all sections of society. It wastreated as a great menace to the society's well being.

Therefore, we have no doubt at all that in interpreting either the Act or aparticular Section, the Court must see that the object which theenactment wanted to achieve should be protected and the"mischief", which it wanted to suppress must not to be allowed tobe perpetuated. Therefore, if we hold that the expression used in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, namely, "in connectionwith the marriage of the said parties" would only take in its foldthe demands for dowry made either prior to the marriage or at thetime of the marriage and not the demands made after the completionof the marriage, it would be disastrous and it would bedemolishing and destroying the very object, which the Act soughtto achieve. The expression "in connection with the marriage" ofthe said parties, was substituted for the expression "asconsideration for the marriage" of the said parties, by amendingAct 63/84. Therefore the Legislative intent appears to be thatthe Act should have a wide coverage to cover all acts of dowrydemand.

The expression "in connection with the marriage" woulddefinitely have a wider meaning than the expression "inconsideration for the marriage". Under these circumstances, wehave no doubt at all that the expression "in connection with themarriage" shall not be given a narrow meaning but it should begiven the widest meaning possible, having regard to the Legislative intent, object and purpose which the Act wanted toachieve.

In our considered opinion, it is an elastic term. There must benexus between the alleged exposure to cruelty or the date on whichthe demand for dowry made till the dreaded incident, namely, thedeath takes place. In this case, we have already noted that thelink had survived throughout. It is not as though the making ofdemands came to an end just before the marriage. But, on theother hand, in one form or the other, one demand or the other wascontinuously made from the accused side. In these circumstances, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ referred to above, and in the factual scenario available in thiscase, we have no doubt at all that the victim had been subjectedto cruelty or harassment at the hands of the appellants beforethis Court as contemplated under Section 304-B IPC. The SupremeCourt, in the judgment referred supra, had detailed the essentialingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC as hereunder:-"(i) The death of a woman should be caused byburns or bodily injury or otherwise than under anormal circumstance.

(ii) Such a death should have occurred withinseven years of her marriage. (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty orharassment by her husband or any relative of herhusband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for orin connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to havebeen meted out to the woman soon before herdeath. "In this case, we have to state that all the ingredients of Section304-B IPC as referred to above stands squarely established.

The initial burden of provingunder Section 304-B IPC with the help of the statutory presumptionavailable under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, is onthe prosecution, namely, they must satisfy the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC by producing necessary materials and then onlythe burden shifts to the accused. As far as the presumptionunder section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, oncea prosecution is launched against a person for the offence undersection 3 or under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, theinitial burden itself lies on the accused to prove that he had notcommitted an offence under the sections referred to above. At therisk of repetition, we state that we have already found from theevidence that Archana was found to be not happy at all in hermarried life in her matrimonial abode. The reasons are not faroff to be seen and according to us, the only reason would be themanner in which the accused have conducted themselves by exposingArchana to mental pressure and agony by making demands in one formor the other periodically from her parents' side thereby giving adefinite impression to her that her married status could no-longerbe continued, unless the demands made by them were met by herparents.

This should be her only perception. Even on the morningof the occurrence day, evidence shows that, she was weeping overtelephone to her brother and father. This only speaks volumesabout the torture - more predominantly mental torture, to whichshe would have been subjected to and the mental agony she wouldhave been suffering as a result thereof. When such is theevidence available, we have no doubt at all that a duty is castupon the accused to prove, that they have not committed anyoffence under the Dowry Prohibition Act, as contemplated undersection 8-A of the said Act. In this case, we have alreadyfound that the prosecution had definitely established theessential ingredients of section 304-B I.P.C and therefore the Statutory presumption available under section 113-B of the IndianEvidence Act gets attracted. Even on that presumption, theaccused is duty bound to place rebuttal evidence. From eitherangle, the accused had not placed any material at all.

Therefore, the possibility of Archana being https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ assaulted prior to her fateful end cannot be totally ruled out. Ofcourse, there is no direct evidence to show who attacked her. The case of the defence that A-1 to A-4 were not in the house atall at the occurrence time is not established. Assuming A-1 andA-4 had gone out to the factory, it has come out on evidence thatthe factory premises is hardly at a distance of five minutes walkfrom the house of the accused. Though the presence of A-2 and A-3in the private clinic at Mambalam is attempted to be established, yet we are of the opinion that assuming it is true that A-2 and A-3 had gone to the hospital, as put forward to the witness incross-examination, that by itself, in our considered opinion, donot rule out their presence in the house at the time of theoccurrence. There is no acceptable evidence to show the exacttime of their presence in the hospital.

In any event, we findthat there is no dispute that Archana was living at hermatrimonial abode as a member of the joint family along with herhusband, A-1 and A-2 to A-5. The accused are not tried for theoffence of murder so that a plea of alibi could come handy foranyone of the accused to escape from the clutches of law. On theother hand, the trial is for offences under Sections 498-A and304-B IPC and Sections 4 and 6 (2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, assuming for a minute, without conceding, that A-1 toA-4 were not in the house at the time of the occurrence (though weare not agreeing with that defence version), yet, having regard tothe offences for which the accused were put up for trial andactually tried, the continued presence of the accused at the timewhen Archana's life was brought to an end is not necessary tosustain the prosecution case. In other words, it may be only amomentus absence of A-1 to A-4, assuming it is so, from the crimescene, when Archana's life came to an end.

That does not meanthat their involvement in the crime is totally eliminated. Anargument is advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, byrelying on the opinion of the panchayatdars, who participated inthe inquest held by P.W.23, the Thasildar. Ex.P.35 is the saidreport. In column No.15 of that report, the opinion of thepanchayatdars stands reduced into writing as hereunder:-"We know Sanjay Dalmia (A1) and his wife(deceased) very well; they have been leading ahappy life; we know that at 11.00 a.m on30.01.2001, Archana Dalmia died in the openterrace of her house with burn injuries; howeverwe do not know how she suffered burn injuries. "Relying upon a part of this conclusion namely, A1 and Archana wereliving happily together, an argument is advanced by the learnedcounsel for the appellants that the present prosecution case thatall the time Archana was unhappy due to one reason or otherattributable to the accused, stands falsified.

Column No.1 ofEx.P.15 shows who the panchayatdars are. They are, a lady by nameSuraj (Marwari Community); Baba Kumar, stated to be in the cine-field; Chandrasekar - a coolie residing at Punjab corner, WestMambalam; Malar, a construction worker residing at Punjab Gardenand Sekar, a coolie residing at Alapakkam, Chennai – 600 118.P.W.23, the inquest Thasildar, had admitted that all thepanchayatadars were brought by A1. This inquest was held byP.W.23 on 31.01.2001. From the status of the panchayatadars asdisclosed in Column No.1 of Ex.P.35 and the fact that they were https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ brought by A1 for the inquest, we have every reason to doubt as towhether these five panchayatadars were obliging people to thefamily of the accused as otherwise, how a person namely, Sekar, residing at Alapakkam with pincode of 600 118 could say that heknows A1 and his family, who were living at West Mambalam withpincode of 600 033.

There is no evidence to show that the abovereferred to panchayatadars had ever visited the house of A1. Weare at a loss to understand as to how a man in cine-field; acoolie; a construction worker and a coolie again, would be in aposition to know the in and out of the family of the accused. Under these circumstances, we are not at all impressed with theargument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants thatbased on Ex.P.35, the present prosecution case that Archana wassubjected to harassment, cannot be sustained. For all the reasonsstated above, we find that there are no merits in the appeal and, accordingly, it stands dismissed.