Kumbakonam Central Co-op.Bank Employees UnionNo.22, Ganni LodgeKamarajar Road, Kumbakonamrep. by Thiru. S.Paramasivam v. 1. The Presiding Officer Labour Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATE : 13.12.2007CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.J.MUKHOPADHAYAANDTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.VENUGOPALW.A. NO. 1606 OF 2002Kumbakonam Central Co-op.Bank Employees UnionNo.22, Ganni LodgeKamarajar Road, Kumbakonamrep. by Thiru. S.Paramasivam.. Appellant- Vs -1. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, Cuddalore.2. The Management of Kumbakonam Central Co-op. Bank Limited T.S.R. Big Street, Kumbakonam 612 001... Respondents Writ Appeal filed against the order dated 7.2.2002 passed by learnedsingle Judge in W.P. No.12399 of 1995 praying for issuance of writ ofcertiorarified mandamus to quash the order dt. 20.09.1994 made in I.D. No.3/92 on the file of Labour court, Cuddalore (I.D. No.140/92 on the file ofI Addl. Labour Court, Madras) as illegal, against law and direct the 2ndrespondent to pay the wages as claimed in the claim petition to thepetitioner for the suspense period For Appellant: Mr. K.V.AnanthakrishnanFor Respondents: Ms.Narmada Sampath for R-2JUDGMENTS.J.MUKHOPADHAYA, J.The appellant, Kumbakonam Central Co-operative Bank Employees Union,(hereinafter referred to as 'Union') has challenged the order dated 7thFeb., 2002, passed by learned single Judge in W.P. No.12399/95. By thesaid order, while affirming the decision of Labour Court, Cuddalore, thewrit court held that by-law 13 (d) related to question of suspensionduring pendency of departmental proceeding and so far a the suspension ofpunishment is concerned, such punishment would be imposed in view of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ provision contained in by-law 13 (a), which did not limit the duration ofsuspension as a method of punishment.2. The questions that arises for determination in this case are :-a) Whether by-law 13 (d) deals only with suspension during thependency of departmental proceeding or both, including suspension as ameasure of punishment.b) Whether suspension as a measure of punishment could be imposed fora limited period in view of by-law 13 (d).3. The brief facts of the case is that, one, S.Paramasivam, a memberof the union had joined the 2nd respondent, Kumbakonam Central Co-operativeBank Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as 'Bank') and was working asSecretary of Palakudi Village Agricultural Credit Society. He was placedunder suspension on 5th July, 1977 pending departmental enquiry intocertain allegations. A domestic enquiry was held and he having been foundguilty, the 2nd respondent, by order dated 15th Oct., 1977, imposedpunishment of suspension for a period of two years with effect from 5thJuly, 1977. Subsequently, he rejoined the duty on 7th July, 1979, afterexpiry of the period of two years and, in the meantime, the unionchallenged the matter before the industrial tribunal as a reference wasmade. The reference having answered against the workman, it waschallenged by the appellant on the ground that the disciplinary authorityhad no jurisdiction to impose the punishment of suspension for a periodbeyond three months. It was contended that the management under by-law 13(d) would inflict punishment of suspension only for a period not exceedingthree months and as such the suspension for a period of more than threemonths was not sustainable.4. Learned single Judge compared the provision contained in by-law 13(a) and 13 (d) as was existing before they were amended and were in vogueat the time when punishment was imposed. The writ court was of the viewthat "......... however, by-law 13 (d), which related to question ofsuspension during pendency of departmental proceeding has not envisagedthat suspension could not have exceeded more than three months at a time".So far as the suspensionas a measure of punishment is concerned, the Courtwas of the view that "(i) ........ in my view, such punishment could beimposed in view of the provisions contained in by-law 13 (a), which do notlimit the duration of suspension as a method of punishment".5. We have heard the parties, who have made similar submission as wasmade before the labour court and learned single Judge.6. For proper appreciation of the case, it is desirable to notice therelevant by-law 13 (a) and 13 (d) as were in vogue at the time theproceeding was initiated and order of punishment was passed.In 1977, by-law 13 (a), while empowered the competent authority toimpose one or other punishment, suspension was shown as one of thepunishment. Subsequently, in 1980, while by-law 13 (a) was amended,suspension was deleted from the arena of punishment.By-law 13 (d), as was in vogue in 1977, dealt with subsistenceallowance as was payable during the period of suspension. It also limited https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the maximum period of suspension at a time for punishment under by-law 13(a). Subsequently, suspension having deleted from the arena ofpunishment, by-law 13 (d) was suitably amended in 1980, as evident fromthe provisions and quoted hereunder :-By-law 13 (d) as in 1977By-law 13 (d) as amended in 1980The authority competent to suspendan employee may at its discretionsanction him a subsistenceallowance at a rate not exceedingone fourth his substantive payduring the period of hissuspension.No employee shall in any case bekept under suspension for periodexceeding 3 months at a time forpunishment under by-law No.13 (a)i) The Chief Executive, viz., theManaging Director or the Secretary,Chief Executive Officer as the casemay be shall have the powers tosuspend to any member of theestablishment pending enquiry ofthe charge of acts of misconduct ormisappropriation or negligence ofduty, etc.ii) The committee of the Bank shallhave the power to place the ChiefExecutive Officer under suspensionpending enquiry on the charge ofacts of misconduct ormisappropriation for negligence ofduty, etc., provided that the ChiefExecutive is a member of theEstablishment of the Bank.iii) The authority competent tosuspend an employee may at itsdiscretion, sanction him asubsistence allowance at a rate notexceeding one fourth of hissubstantive pay during the periodof his suspension. No employeeshall ordinarily be kept undersuspension for a period exceeding 3months from the date of suspension.The period of suspension may,however, be extended for reasons tobe recorded in writing and thatsuch extension shall not exceed 3months at a time.7. Learned counsel for the appellant, while submitted that by-law 13(d) prescribed limited suspension as a measure of punishment, according tothe learned counsel for the respondents, the said by-law 13 (d) related toquestion of suspension during pendency of departmental proceedings only asheld by learned single Judge. She also placed reliance on a Full Benchdecision of this Court in The Secretary, Palani Co-operative Sales Society, Palani – Vs – Presiding Officer, reported in AIR 1975 Madras 241.8. We have noticed the Full Bench decision as rendered in the case ofPalani Co-operative Sales Society (supra) as also the impugned judgmentpassed by learned single Judge. We are of the view that the Full Benchdecision of this Court in Palani Co-operative Sales Society (supra) is notapplicable in the present case. The said case related to by-law 13 (h), https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ which stipulated prescription of subsistence allowance while an employeeis under suspension, relevant portion of which reads as follows :-"2. ........."The authority competent to suspend an employee, may,in its discretion, sanction him subsistence allowanceat a rate not exceeding one-fourth of his substantivepay during the period of his suspension. No employeeshall in any case be kept under suspension for aperiod exceeding three months at a time."From the aforesaid provision it will be evident that by-law 13 (h)only prescribed the subsistence allowance as may be paid during the periodof suspension of an employee and such suspension during the pendency ofthe proceeding was limited to a maximum period of three months. In viewof aforesaid provision, Full Bench held that by-law 13 (b) of the said Co-operative Society gives an unlimited discretion to the competent authorityto award such punishment, particularly to suspend an employee for anyperiod as may be decided by it.9. In the present case, it will be evident from by-law 13 (d) as wasin vogue in 1977 that for the purpose of 'subsistence allowance' it coversboth thesuspension, whether during the pendency of the departmentalproceeding or as a measure of punishment; prescription was made as to whatamount the competent authority may pay as subsistence allowance(substantive pay) during such period of suspension. So far as limitationis concerned, no general prescription was made with regard to suspensionduring pendency of departmental proceeding, but a limitation wasprescribed for punishment under by-law 13 (a), as evident from sub-para ofby-law 13 (d) and quoted hereunder :-"No employee shall, in any case, be kept under suspensionfor a period exceeding three months at a time forpunishment under by-law 13 (a)."10. We have already noticed that by-law 13 (a) merely empowers thepunishing authority to inflict one or other punishment, includingsuspension where no limitation has been prescribed, but under by-law 13(d), in sub-para as quoted above, a period of limitation of three monthsat a time was prescribed for punishment under by-law 13 (a). (Emphasisadded).Learned single Judge, while passing order, failed to notice that thesub-paragraph of by-law 13 (d) confine to 'suspension for punishment underby-law 13 (a)' and had nothing to do with suspension during thedepartmental proceeding and, thus, came to a wrong conclusion that by-law13 (d) related to suspension during pendency of a departmental proceeding.11. We, accordingly, hold that first part of by-law 13 (d), whichempowers the competent authority to grant substantive allowance(substantive pay), is applicable in both types of suspension, i.e.,suspension during the pendency of departmental proceeding and suspensionas substantive punishment, but, so far as sub-para of by-law 13 (d) isconcerned, it prescribes limitation of three months of suspension at atime is confined only to suspension as a measure of punishment and notapplicable in case of suspension during pendency of a departmental https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ proceeding.12. For the reason aforesaid, we hold that the impugned order ofpunishment of suspension for a period of two years, to the extent itexceeds a period more than three months, i.e., one year and nine months,is bad and we set aside such part of the order of suspension. Theimpugned order of suspension shall be deemed to have been passed for amaximum period of three months. However, as the person on whom thepunishment was inflicted, namely, S.Paramasivam, had already undergone theperiod of suspension of two years and had not actually worked beyond theperiod of three months, we are not inclined to grant any arrears ofsalary, though the period of one year and nine months, i.e., the periodbeyond three months suspension will be accounted for all other purposes,such as retirement benefits, etc. The order passed by learned singleJudge dated 7th Feb., 2002, is set aside. The writ appeal is allowed withthe aforesaid observations. But there shall be no order as to costs.sd/-Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarGLNToThe Presiding OfficerLabour CourtCuddalore.+ one cc to Mr. R. Parthiban, ADvocate, SR. 73844.+ one cc to Mr. K.V. Anantha Krushan, Advocate, SR.73697.KM(CO)RP 19.12.2007. W.A. NO. 1606 OF 2002