Partner Dinamalar Tamil Daily Newspaper v. Sun TV Network LimitedRep. by its Authorized Person

2. The first petitioner is the Editor of the Daily TamilNewspaper-Dinamalar and the second petitioner is its Publisher andthey are also partners of the firm-Dinamalar. The respondent is acompany incorporated under the Companies Act 1956. The allegedimputation complained of by the respondent is that a news item waspublished on 30.09.2007 in Dinamalar Daily wherein in the said newsitem certain statements were made and the said statements are persedefamatory and it was further alleged that the same was made with anintention to bring bad reputation to the complainant among thegeneral public, subscribers and viewers of the complainant.3. The petitioners seek to quash the said complaint contendingthat a corporation cannot complain of loss of reputation as theCorporation has no reputation apart from its property or trade; itcannot bring a prosecution for words which merely affect its honouror dignity; a reading of the averments in the complaint and thesworn statement shows that the complainant / respondent iscomplaining that the alleged statement in the news item has affectedits honour and name whereas the name of the respondent was not atall mentioned in the statement, but only the name of 'Sun DTH' wasmentioned and the alleged imputations published in the petitioners'newspaper is not against the complainant. It is the furthercontention of the petitioners that the complainant is not anaggrieved person and as such it cannot file the complaint.4. When the above petition came up for admission on 06.11.2007,Mr.J.Ravindran learned counsel took notice on behalf of therespondent. As this Court was of a prima facie view that the quashpetition could not be entertained at this stage, the learned counselon either side were requested to make their submissions andaccordingly elaborate submissions were made on either side.Mr.S.Elambharathi learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated theabove said contentions put forth in the quash petition andelaborated the same.5. The main thrust of the contention of the learned counsel forthe petitioners is that the complainant / respondent herein has nolocus standi to maintain the complaint. Learned counsel submittedthat the company may maintain a prosecution or an action for a libelaffecting its property, but not for a libel merely affectingpersonal reputation as a company has no reputation apart from itsproperty or trade; the words complained of must reflect on themanagement of its business and must injuriously affect the company,as distinct from the individual who compose it; the alleged libelmust attack the company in its method of conducting its affairs,must accuse it of fraud or mismanagement, or must attack itsfinancial position and it cannot bring a prosecution for words whichmerely affect its honour or dignity. Learned counsel further https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ submitted that the name of the complainant namely 'Sun TV Net WorkLimited' is not mentioned as such in the impugned publication and onthat ground also the complainant / respondent herein cannot beconsidered to be an aggrieved person. 6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners thereis no allegation in the complaint that the property of the companyis affected. Learned counsel submitted that the impugned statementrefers only to 'Sun DTH' which is a separate legal entity and 'SunDTH' is not the complainant. In support of his above saidcontentions, the learned counsel relied upon the followingdecisions:-(I) A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon 108 (Maung Chit v. Maung Tun), whereinit is observed as follows:-“... A corporation may maintain a prosecution oran action for a libel affecting its property, butnot for a libel merely affecting personalreputation as a corporation has no reputationapart from its property or trade. The wordscomplained of must reflect on the management ofits business and must injuriously affect thecorporation, as distinct from the individuals whocompose it. The alleged libel must attack thecorporation in its method of conducting itsaffairs, must accuse it of fraud or mismanagement,or must attack its financial position. It cannotbring a prosecution for words which merely affectits honour or dignity. Moreover, it cannotmaintain a prosecution for words which reflect,not upon it as a body, but upon its membersindividually, unless special damage has therebybeen caused to it.”(II) AIR 1985 Bombay 229 (Indian Express Newspapers (Bom.) Pvt.Ltd. v. Jagmohan) wherein in paragraph 22 it is observed asfollows:-“22. It is well settled that a corporation cannotsuffer damages in mind or body. But as held inMetroplitan Saloom Ombinus Co. Ltd. v. Hawkins (1859)4 H & N 87 : South Helton Coal Co. v. North EasternNews Association Ltd. (1894) 1 Q.B. 133 : D.L.Caterers Ltd. v. D'Ajou (1945) K.B. 364 : Lewis v.Daily Telegraph Ltd. (1964) A.C. 234 and Selby BridgeProprietors v. Sunday Telegraph (The Times Feb. 17,1966) a trading corporation has a business reputationand can sue for defamation in respect of a publicationcalculated to injure its reputation in the way of itsbusiness. The position is succinctly stated in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Spencer Bower on Actionable Defamation at Pp.278-279:-“It is obvious that 'reputation' in the sense inwhich alone it concerns the topic of defamationhas relation to the particular person enjoying it.But it must not be forgotten that 'person' forthis purpose includes an artificial person; thatis to say, it includes both 'a body of persons'and a firm ....'. That a commercial 'body ofpersons' has a trading character and can sue inrespect of a publication to injure that tradingcharacter is now clearly well established.”It may be that the innuendo or the imputation may bedirected against an individual connected with themanagement of the commercial body of persons. But ifit is of such nature as to not only defame theindividual but also injure the trading character ofthe commercial body of persons, then both theindividual as well as the commercial body will have acause of action to sue for defamation."(III) AIR 1925 Calcutta 1121 (Pratap Chandra Guha Roy V.Emperor) wherein in paragraph 17 it is observed as here-under:-"17. The other questions raised apply equally to boththe charges. The first question is whether thecomplainant was the person defamed or, in the words,whether he is a "person aggrieved" by the offence ascontemplated under Section 198 of the CriminalProcedure Code, so as to entitle him to maintain theprosecution. This is what is stated in the petitionof complaint: "That it appears therefore that inmaking the above charges Dr. Pratab Chandra Guha Royhas intended to harm the reputation of the police andother high officials of the British Government andthe Government themselves. .... The allegations arebeing announced throughout the District and it istherefore necessary that their falsity should beproved in the most effective manner viz., by trial inCourt of law, etc.' The learned Standing Counselrelies on ex-planation 2 of Section 499, I.P.C., asgiving the complaint the right to maintain theprosecution, That explanation runs as follow: "It mayamount to defamation to make an imputation concerninga company or an association or collection of personsas such," the contention seams to be that in this,case there was defamation of the police force, i.e.,a "collection of persons as such." As far as I amaware those words in the explanation have not been https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ judicially dealt with in any reported case. In myopinion those words mean that a collection of personsas such may be collectively detained in the samemanner as a "company." The general principles onwhich a company may be said to have been defamedwould therefore apply equally to the case where it isalleged that a collection of persons as such has beendetained. Those general principles were formulatedby Chief Baron Pollock in 'Metropolitan SaloonOmnibus Go. v. Hawkins (1859) 4 H.&N.87, where hesaid: "It (a corporation) could not sue in respectsof an imputation of murder or incest, or adultery,because it could not commit those crimes. Nor couldit sue in respect of a charge of corruption, for acorporation cannot be guilty of corruption, althoughthe individuals composing, it may be." This wasadopted in Mayor, (do., or Manchester v. Williams(1893) 1 Q.B. 94 where it was laid down that acorporation may sue for libel affecting property, notfor one affecting personal reputation. Similarly,Lopez, L.J., said in South Hetton Coal Co. v. NorthEastern News Association (1894) 1 Q.B. 133: "Acorporation or company could not sue in respect of acharge of murder, or incest or adultery because itcould not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue inrespect of a charge of corruption or of an assaultbecause a corporation cannot be guilty of corruptionor of an assault although the individuals composingit may be." These observations are quite apposite tothe question before us and in my opinion the policeforce as such cannot complain of any imputation asregards its personal reputation because it cannot beguilty of beastly {conduct, nor can the collectivebody be guilty of the offence of bitting off the'nipple of the breast of a woman or of biting thecheek of a woman. The matter may be tested inanother way. Suppose somebody laid a complaintbefore a Magistrate in terms of the words of thecharges in this case, would any Magistrate issueprocess against the police force as such or anymember of the police force? I am sure no Magistrate,would. In my judgment, therefore, the charges failon the ground that they refer to the personal conductonly of a collection of persons as such".(IV) AIR 1969 Punjab & Hariyana 150 (P.K.O.H. Mills v. TilakChand) wherein in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said decision certainpassages from 'Winfield on Tort' and 'Salmond on the Law of Torts'have been extracted, which read as follows:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “8. Law relating to the capacity of corporations to sue intort is summed up in “Winfield on Tort” (Seventh Editionat page 80) in the following words:-“A corporation can sue for torts committed againstit, but there are certain torts which it isimpossible to commit against a corporation. Suchare assault and personal defamation. Thus, acorporation cannot sue for libel a person whocharges it with bribery and corruption although theindividual members of it might be able to do so,but if a libel or slander affects the management orits trade or business, then the corporation itselfcan sue; as where the workmen's cottages of acolliery company were falsely described in anewspaper as highly insanitary.”In “Salmond on Law of Torts” (fourteenth edition), thesame subject is dealt with at pages 614-615 in theseterms:-“In general a corporation may sue for a tort (e.g.,malicious presentation of a winding up petition) inthe same way as an individual. The onlyqualifications are (i) the tort must not be of akind which it is impossible to commit against acorporation e.g., assault or false imprisonment;(ii) in case of defamation, it must be shown thatthe defamatory matter is of such nature that itstendency is to cause actual damage to thecorporation in respect of its property or business.Thus an action of libel will lie at the suit of atrading corporation charged with insolvency or withdishonest or incompetent management. But wherethere is no actual damage, nor any tendency toproduce such damage, no action will lie at the suitfor the corporation; the only persons who have anycause of action are the individual members oragents of the corporation who have been defamed.So it has been held that a municipal corporationcannot sue for libel charging it with corruptionand bribery in the administration of municipalaffairs.”9. We would have had to judge the capacity of theappellant to sue by applying the tests laid down in theabove-quoted texts of authority if the appellants were acorporation in law. Unfortunately for the appellants,however, it is not even a legal person. It is apartnership firm. It is well known that a firm is merelya compendious artificial name adopted by its partners andis not itself a legal entity. Libel or slander of apartnership firm may indeed amount to defamation of its https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ partners. But then it is the partners who may in such aneventuality sue and not the firm".(V) (2006) 2 M.L.J. (Crl.) 105 (P.Varadarajan v. G.K.Mani,M.L.A.) wherein in paragraph 18 it is observed as follows:-“18. The imputations found in the article underchallenge do not relate to the complainant or hispolitical party, there is no allegation of thepolitical activity of Dr. Anbumani Ramadoss in theaforesaid article. As there is no defamatoryimputation levelled against the political party of thecomplainant and Dr.Anbumani Ramadoss, the complainantcannot claim that he falls squarely under the categoryof "some persons aggrieved" by the offence ofdefamation. PMK was not the target of attack in thearticle which is put to test. Therefore, therespondent/complainant who is the President of PMK hasno locus standi to prefer the complaint for an offenceunder Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code". (VI) AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2609 (G.Narasimhan v.T.V.Chokkappa) wherein in paragraphs 10 and 13 it is observed asfollows:-"10. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, whoheard the said applications, rejected the saidcontention in the following words:"The Dravida Kazhagam is an identifiable group.The complainant is a member of this Kazhagam.He was the Chairman of the Reception Committeein the conference. He is active member of theDravida Kazhagam. He was one of those whopiloted and sponsored the resolution. Certainlyhe is a person aggrieved within the meaning ofSection 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thecomplaint by him is competent.""11. ... 12. ... 13. On these contentions, the principal questionfor determination is whether the respondent could besaid to be an aggrieved person entitled to maintainthe complaint within the meaning of Section 198 ofthe Code. That section lays down that no Magistrateshall take cognizance of an offence falling interalia under Chapter XXI of the Penal Code (that is,Sections 499 to 502) except upon a complaint made bysome persons aggrieved of such offence. Section 198,thus, lays down an exception to the general rulethat a complaint can be filed by anybody whether he https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is an aggrieved person or not, and modifies thatrule by permitting only an aggrieved person to movea Magistrate in cases of defamation. The section ismandatory, so that if a Magistrate were to takecognizance of the offence of defamation on acomplaint filed by one who is not an aggrievedperson, the trial and conviction of an accused insuch a case by the Magistrate would be void andillegal."7. Countering the said submissions Mr. P.S.Raman, learnedAdditional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of Mr. J.Ravindranlearned counsel for the respondent by referring to the followingportion in the impugned news item which is the subject matter of thecomplaint namely,"mjw;fhd tpsf;f';fs;""rd; FGkk;/ "Fiwe;j tpiyf;F tH';Ffpnwhk;"vd;W bghJkf;fis FHg;g[fpd;wdh;. rd; o/o/vr;/. rhjdk; ,ytrk; vd;WTwptpl;L/ mij th';f brd;why; +/1.500 brYj;j ntz;Lk;vd;fpd;wdh;/ etPd bjhHpy;El;gk; vd;w bgahpy; kj;jpa murpd;tpjpfSf;Fg; g[wk;ghf jhd; njhd;wpj;jdkhf bray;gLtijvjph;f;fpnwhk;/rd; o/o/vr;/. ,ytrk; vd;w bgahpy; 50 yl;rk; re;jhjhuh;fisneuo fl;Lg;ghl;Lf;Fs; bfhz;L te;J vjph;fhyj;jpy; ahUnknghl;o ,y;yhky; bra;J mjpfgl;r re;jhthf +/500 Mf Mf;fptpLth;/"submitted that the words "rd; FGkk;" found in the above saidextracted passage reveals only to the complainant / respondentherein and the other allegations contained therein are persedefamatory as it lowers the reputation of the respondent among thegeneral public, subscribers and viewers of the respondent. LearnedAdditional Advocate General further submitted that in paragraph 8 ofthe complaint it is stated that one Mr.Manoharan called and informedabout the publication in the Dinamalar Daily dated 30.09.2007 and hestated that after reading the publication he doubted whether to buySun DTH or not and also whether Sun Television Group of Companiesfollowed all the rules and regulations made in this regard.According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the above saidaverments in the complaint indicate that impugned news item hasaffected the complainant's property and trade. Learned AdditionalAdvocate General by relying upon explanation 2 to Section 499 of theIndian Penal Code submitted that in respect of defamatoryimputations against a company, the complaint filed by the company isvalid as the company is the aggrieved person. Learned Additional https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Advocate General further submitted that at this stage it is not thefunction of this court to appreciate the evidence or scope andmeaning of the statement contained in the impugned news item andfurther submitted that the Court has to read the complaint as awhole and find out whether the allegations disclosed constitute anoffence under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code triable by theMagistrate and when the Magistrate prima facie came to theconclusion that the allegations might come within the meaning of'defamation' under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and hadtaken cognizance, this Court may not embark upon weighing theevidence and come to any conclusion to hold, whether or not theallegations made in the complaint constitute an offence punishableunder Section 500. Learned Additional Advocate General in support ofhis above said submissions relied upon the following decisions:-(i) (1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases 263 (Shatrughna Prasad Sinhav. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi) wherein in paragraphs 10 and 13 it isobserved as follows:-“10. Explanation 2 to the said decision envisagesthat it may amount to defamation to make animputation concerning a company or an association orcollection of persons as such.11. ...12. ....13. As regards the allegations made against theappellant in the complaint filed in the Court ofJudicial Magistrate, Ist Class, at Nasik, on areading of the complaint we do not think that wewill be justified at this stage to quash thatcomplaint. It is not the province of this Court toappreciate at this stage the evidence or scope ofand meaning of the statement. Certain allegationscame to be made but whether these allegations doconstitute defamation of the Marwari community as abusiness class and whether the appellant hadintention to cite as an instance of general feelingamong the community and whether the context in whichthe said statement came to be made, as is sought tobe argued by the learned Senior Counsel for theappellant, are all matters to be considered by thelearned Magistrate at a later stage. At this stage,we cannot embark upon weighing the evidence and cometo any conclusion to hold, whether or not theallegations made in the complaint constitute anoffence punishable under Section 500. It is thesettled legal position that a court has to read thecomplaint as a whole and find out whether https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ allegations disclosed constitute an offence underSection 499 triable by the Magistrate. TheMagistrate prima facie came to the conclusion thatthe allegations might come within the definition of'defamation' under Section 499 IPC and could betaken cognizance of. But these are the facts to beestablished at the trial. The case set up by theappellant are either defences open to be taken orother steps of framing a charge at the trial atwhatever stage known to law. Prima facie we thinkthat at this stage it is not a case warrantingquashing of the complaint filed in the Court ofJudicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To thatextent, the High Court was right in refusing toquash the complaint under Section 500 IPC.”(ii) (2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 30 (John Thomas v. Dr.K.Jagadeesan) wherein in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 it is observed asfollows:-“11. .... It is not disputed that the complainant isthe Director of K.J. Hospital. Explanation 2 inSection 499 IPC reads thus: “Explanation 2 . - It may amount to defamation tomake an imputation concerning a company or anassociation or collection of persons as such.”12 . In view of the said Explanation, it cannot bedisputed that a publication containing defamatoryimputations as against a company would escape fromthe purview of the offence of defamation. If thedefamation pertains to an association of persons or abody corporate, who could be the complainant? Thiscan be answered by reference to Section 199 of theCode. The first sub-section of that section alone isrelevant in this context. It reads thus: “199. Prosecution for defamation .- (1) No courtshall take cognizance of an offence under ChapterXXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) exceptupon a complaint made by some person aggrieved bythe offence.”13. The collocation of the words “by some personsaggrieved” definitely indicates that the complainantneed not necessarily be the defamed person himself.Whether the complainant has reason to feel hurt onaccount of the publication is a matter to bedetermined by the court depending upon the facts ofeach case. If a company is described as engaging https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ itself in nefarious activities its impact wouldcertainly fall on every Director of the company andhence he can legitimately feel the pinch of it.Similarly, if a firm is described in a publication ascarrying on offensive trade, every working partner ofthe firm can reasonably be expected to feel aggrievedby it. If K.J. Hospital is a private limited company,it is too far-fetched to rule out any one of itsDirectors, feeling aggrieved on account ofpejoratives hurled at the Company. Hence theappellant cannot justifiably contend that theDirector of K.J. Hospital would not fall within thewide purview of “some person aggrieved” as envisagedin Section 199( 1) of the Code.”(iii) AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2609 (referred to supra) whereinin paragraph 14 it is observed as follows:-“14. .... But Explanation (2) to the section laysdown the rule that it may amount to defamation tomake an imputation concerning a company or anassociation or collection of persons as such. Adefamatory imputation against a collection of personsthus falls within the definition of defamation. Thelanguage of the Explanation is wide, and therefore,besides a company or an association, any collectionof persons would be covered by it. But such acollection of persons must be an identifiable body sothat it is possible to say with definiteness that agroup of particular persons, as distinguished fromthe rest of the community, was defamed. Therefore, ina case where Explanation (2) is resorted to, theidentity of the company or the association or thecollection of persons must be established so as to berelatable to the defamatory words or imputations.”(iv) 1984 L.W. (Crl.) 104 (K.R.Karalan v. M/s. SouthernRoadways Ltd., wherein in paragraphs 3 and 5 it is observed asfollows:-“3. Alleging that the materials contained in theposters were perse defamatory and harmed thereputation of the complainant, Thiru Chandran,Additional Executive officer of the complainantCompany, field the two complaints in question.4. .... 5. .... Therefore, it follows that everyone whobelongs to the management of the group company canbe termed an aggrieved person. The company, thougha juridical entity, does not have a physical or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ bodily existence in flesh and blood an, such, onlythe Directors or the Managerial staff orrepresentatives of the company can institute actionon behalf of the company. In this case, the clearaverment in the complaint is that Thiru Chandran,Additional Executive Officer, who has filed thecomplaint has been duly authorised by the Managementof the company to take appropriate legal action inregard to the subject matter of the complaints andconnected legal matters. In the light of thesefactors, there is absolutely no scope for thepetitioner to contend that the complaints have notbeen preferred by an aggrieved person andconsequently, the complaints have been taken on filein violation of the provisions of S.199 (1)Crl.P.C.”8. I have carefully considered the above said submissions madeby the learned counsel on either side, perused the materialsavailable on record and the decisions relied upon by the learnedcounsel on either side.9. A reading of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon108 (referred to supra) shows that the alleged libel must attack thecorporation in its method of conducting its affairs, must accuse itof fraud or mismanagement, or must attack its financial position andit cannot bring a prosecution for words which merely affect itshonour or dignity. The decision reported in AIR 1985 Bombay 229(referred to supra) arose out of a suit filed by a company seeking adecree for injunction alleging infringement of copy-right. Whileconsidering the issues that arose for consideration in that suit itis observed that if the imputations is of such nature as to not onlydefame the individual, but also injure the trading character of thecommercial body of persons, then both the individual as well as thecommercial body will have a cause of action to sue for defamation.This decision in the considered view of this Court is not of anyhelp to decide the issue that arises for consideration in the abovepetition. In the decision reported in AIR 1925 Calcutta 1121(referred to supra) the decision reported in (1893) 1 Q.B. 94 hasbeen referred to, wherein it has been laid down that a corporationmay sue for libel affecting property, but not for one affectingpersonal reputation. The said decision is sought to be relied uponby the learned counsel for the petitioner, which in the consideredview of this Court, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Inthe decision reported in AIR 1969 Punjab & Hariyana 150 (referred tosupra) it has been held that a firm is merely a compendiousartificial name adopted by its partners and is not itself a legal https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ entity. By holding so the Division Bench has held that libel orslander of a partnership firm may indeed amount to defamation of itspartners, but then it is the partners who may in such an eventualitysue and not the firm. This decision also is of no help in decidingthe issue that arises for consideration in the above petition. Thedecision reported in (2006) 2 M.L.J. (Crl.) 105 (referred to supra)is not applicable to the facts of this case as the facts of thatcase are totally different. In the decision reported in AIR 1972Supreme Court 2609 (referred to supra) after considering theprovisions contained in Section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Codeit has been held that the said Section lays down an exception to thegeneral rule that a complaint can be filed by anybody whether he isan aggrieved person or not, and modifies that rule by permittingonly an aggrieved person to move a Magistrate in cases of defamationand in the said decision Explanation (2) to Section 499 of theIndian Penal Code has also been considered and after suchconsideration it has been held that in a case where Explanation (2)is resorted to, the identity of the company or the association orthe collection of persons must be established so as to be relatableto the defamatory words or imputations. Therefore, a case fordefamation in respect of imputations made against a company can befiled but it has not been decided in that case as to who can filethe complaint namely whether the company can file the complaint orits Directors alone can file the complaint. Therefore in theconsidered view of this Court the said decision is not helpful todecide the issue that arises for consideration in the abovepetition. In the decision reported in (1996) 6 Supreme Court Cases263 (referred to supra) also the question as to whether a companycan maintain a complaint by itself in respect of a defamatorystatement made against it has not been decided and as such the saiddecision is also not helpful to decide the issue that arises forconsideration in the above petition. In the decision reported in(2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 30 (referred to supra) the issue thatcame up for consideration before the Honourable Apex Court iswhether the Director of the company which has been defamed canmaintain a complaint, while considering that issue the Apex Courthas held as follows:-"If a company is described as engaging itself innefarious activities its impact would certainly fallon every Director of the company and hence he canlegitimately feel the pinch of it. Similarly, if afirm is described in a publication as carrying onoffensive trade, every working partner of the firmcan reasonably be expected to feel aggrieved by it.If K.J. Hospital is a private limited company, it istoo far-fetched to rule out any one of its Directors,feeling aggrieved on account of pejoratives hurled atthe Company. Hence the appellant cannot justifiably https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ contend that the Director of K.J. Hospital would notfall within the wide purview of “some personaggrieved” as envisaged in Section 199 (1) of theCode.”Here again though it has been held that the Director of a companycan maintain a complaint in respect of a defamatory statement madeagainst a company the issue as to whether the company can maintain acomplaint for defamation in respect of a defamatory statement madeagainst the company has not come up for consideration before theApex Court. Therefore, this decision is also not helpful to decidethe issue that arises for consideration in the above petition.10. The decision reported in 1984 L.W. (Crl.) 104 (referred tosupra), as rightly contended by the learned counsel for thepetitioners, squarely applies to the facts of this case. In thatcase, alleging that the materials contained in the posters wereperse defamatory and harmed the reputation of the complainant, ThiruChandran, Additional Executive officer of the complainant Company,field the complaints stating that he has been duly authorised tofile the complaint. A contention was put forth by the accused thatthe complaint filed by the company through its AuthorisedRepresentative is not maintainable. While considering the same, aLearned Judge of this Court has observed as under:-"The company, though a juridical entity, doesnot have a physical or bodily existence in flesh andblood an, such, only the Directors or the Managerialstaff or representatives of the company can instituteaction on behalf of the company. In this case, theclear averment in the complaint is that ThiruChandran, Additional Executive Officer, who has filedthe complaint has been duly authorised by theManagement of the company to take appropriate legalaction in regard to the subject matter of thecomplaints and connected legal matters. In the lightof these factors, there is absolutely no scope forthe petitioner to contend that the complaints havenot been preferred by an aggrieved person andconsequently, the complaints have been taken on filein violation of the provisions of S.199 (1) Crl.P.C."11. The facts of the above said case are similar to the factsof the case on hand. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the saiddecision squarely applies to the case on hand, if that be so, thecontention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that thecompany cannot maintain a complaint has to be rejected. Since theabove said decision has been rendered by a Learned Judge of this https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Court, I am bound to follow the same, whereas the decisions reportedin A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon 108 (referred to supra) and AIR 1925 Calcutta1121 (referred to supra) are having only a persuasive value and itcannot be considered that it is binding on me. 12. Therefore for the reasons stated above, in the consideredview of this Court, the complaint filed by the respondent ismaintainable.13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitionersthat the company may maintain a prosecution or an action for a libelaffecting its property, but not for a libel merely affectingpersonal reputation as a company has no reputation apart from itsproperty or trade is concerned, this Court is of the considered viewthat since there are some allegations in paragraph 8 of thecomplaint it is not the province of this Court to appreciate at thisstage the evidence or scope of and meaning of the statement. Atthis stage this Court cannot embark upon weighing the evidence andcome to the conclusion to hold, whether or not the allegations madein the complaint constitute an offence punishable under Section 500of the Indian Penal Code. As laid down in (1996) 6 Supreme CourtCases 263 (referred to supra) it is the settled legal propositionthat a court has to read the complaint as a whole and find outwhether the allegations disclosed constitute an offence underSection 499 of the Indian Penal Code triable with the Magistrate andthe Magistrate, prima facie, has come to the conclusion that theallegations might come within the meaning of 'defamation' underSection 499 of the Indian Penal Code and had taken cognizance of,but these are the facts to be established at the trial. The caseset up by the petitioners are either defences open to be taken orother steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage knownto law. Prima facie this Court is of the considered view that, atthis stage, it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaintfiled before the Court below. The contention of the petitioners,that in the impugned publication there is no reference to thecomplainant, but there is a reference only to 'Sun DTH' isconcerned, it is for the Court below to consider as to what meaningto be given to the words "rd; FGkk;".14. Therefore this Court is not inclined to express any opinionon this aspect of the matter, except to the limited extent of sayingthat the Court below had not acted wrongly in coming to the primafacie conclusion that the contents of the impugned publicationappeared to contain defamatory material and therefore there was needto take the complaint on file and issue process to the accused. Iam not going any further into this aspect of the matter because thedoor must be open for the petitioners to raise their contentions https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ before the trial court that the contents of the impugned publicationis not perse defamatory and therefore they cannot be convicted foran offence of defamation.15. For the above said reasons, the above criminal originalpetition fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently the connectedMPs are closed.SrkSd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarToThe Metropolitan Magistrate Court XVII, Chennai•1 cc to Mr. B. K. Girish Neelakandan, Advocate SR No. 68553•1 cc to M/s. K. J. Rebello, Advocate SR No. 68183Crl.O.P.No.33138 of 2007 andM.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2007 AD(CO)SR/21.11.2007