Kannika Parameshwari Service StationBharath Petroleum Dealersrep. By N.Venkataraman(Proprietor)105 A v. Bharath Petroleum Corporation Anna Nagar

Dr.Besant Road, Triplicane, Chennai 600 005 and the BharathPetroleum Corporation Ltd., who is a tenant is vacating theschedule premises, thereby informing the petitioner that thedealership has come to an end on the eviction from the premises.2. The case of the petitioner was that, the petitioner is aRetail Outlet Licensee under the Burmah Shell from 1972 and afterthe Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd., was formed in 1979, thepetitioner continued to carry on business at No.105-A Besant Road,Chennai 600 005. Thus, it is carrying on business for the past 35years and many persons are employed. It is the case of thepetitioner that as per the conspiracy among the respondents, thethird respondent has filed a Suit for Ejectment under the ChennaiCity Tenants' Protection Act,1921, against the first respondent,without impleading the petitioner, who is in actual possession ofthe land and building. An enjectment order has been obtained by thethird respondent against the first respondent. The petitioner haspaid the licence fees to the first and second respondentsregularly.2(a). Originally, the Burmah Shell had given licence in theyear 1969 to one G.Balaraman and the petitioner purchased the samewith the approval of the Burmah Shell by entering into an agreementon 23.03.1973 and the petitioner erected machineries apart fromcarrying on renovation work by spending huge amount. The firstrespondent has succeeded the Burmah Shell and the petitionercontinued to be the licensee under the first respondent, paying theenhanced licence fees for every quarter. The petitioner is workingas a Retail Outlet Dealer as a Licensee under the first respondentand is also an income-tax assessee.2(b). On 13.06.2007, the impugned order was served by thefirst respondent stating that an eviction order has been obtainedby the third respondent against the first respondent and thepetitioner should vacate and hand over possession. The petitionerhas also informed the first respondent that the petitioner isentitled for the protection under the Chennai City Tenants'Protection Act,1921, because it can purchase the land inoccupation for the market price. The petitioner later came to knowthat the third respondent has filed an ejection suit against thefirst respondent under Section 41 of the Presidency Small CauseCourts Act,1882 and the third respondent has agreed to pay the costof existing superstructure.2(c). In the ejectment appeal filed by the respondents 1 and 2against the order of eviction, the first and second respondentsfiled applications to purchase the land and the value of the landwas fixed at Rs.73,05,810/-. However, the first and secondrespondents have not paid the amount, and thereafter, the thirdrespondent has filed an application to determine the value ofsuperstructure and the Advocate Commissioner has determined thevalue at Rs.2,70,000/- and the same was deposited in the Court andthe first respondent has made endorsement in collusion to evict thepetitioner from the place, agreeing to vacate within four monthstime. 2(d). According to the petitioner, the ejectment suit is a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ fraud played by the respondents against the petitioner. It is thecase of the petitioner that it has filed the applications to setaside the decree dated 08.06.2007 passed in the ejectment suit andalso to implead itself apart from filing application under ChennaiCity Tenants' Protection Act,1921. The Rent Control court hasheard the applications and reserved orders. In the meantime, thefirst and second respondents have stopped supplying petroleumproducts to the petitioner from 25.09.2007. The Small Causes Courthas dismissed the applications on 27.09.2007 and the petitioner hasfiled copy application for getting the said order and thepetitioner is awaiting copy of the order to file appeal.2(e). On 1.10.2007, when there was some agitation in the City,the Sales Officer of the second respondent has entered into thepetitioner's place of business at about 6.00 p.m. and using cranehas taken away the name boards and removed electrical bulbs, Canopyand compressor and also removed the old petrol tank of 9 KLcapacity and left the premises and thereby demolished the entirepremises. According to the petitioner, in spite of the saidconduct of the second respondent, it is still in possession of thepetitioner and it is entitled to be in possession until evicted bydue process of law. 2(f). The stoppage of supply of petroleum products byrespondents 1 and 2 resulted in great hardship, affecting thelivelihood of the petitioner and 30 persons, who are employed byit. The petitioner has every right to agitate before the Civilcourt to restore its possession. According to the petitioner,since it is a tenant under respondents 1 and 2, it can be evictedonly by the provisions of the Chennai City Tenants' ProtectionAct,1921, and therefore, the conduct of the third respondent inobtaining an eviction order against the first and secondrespondents and in the guise of executing the said order, removingthe petitioner from the place of business is highhanded andillegal.3. The first and second respondents have filed their counteraffidavit. According to the first and second respondents, thepetitioner was only a Licensee, allowed to operate the firstrespondent's Retail Outlet at No.105-A Besant Road, Triplicane,Chennai–5, by virtue of Dispensing Pump Selling Licence (DPSL)dated 18.05.1977 and the property was developed by the respondents1 and 2 with all facilities like, underground tanks, salesbuilding, dispensing pumps and canopy as per the permission of thelandlord, the third respondent. The respondent Corporation is aGovernment of India Company under Section 617 of the CompaniesAct,1956 and a Public Sector Enterprise of the Government of Indiaunder the administrative control of the Ministry of Petroleum andNatural Gas. 3(a). The superstructure erected by the first and secondrespondents has been assessed to property tax in the name of firstrespondent. The premises belongs to the third respondent which wasoriginally leased out to M/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage DistributingCompany of India Ltd., and after acquisition of the said Company,the lease-hold right of the said Company got transferred in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ name of the first respondent Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd.,and after the expiry of the lease period, the third respondent,owner was not interested in extending the lease and filed a suitfor ejectment, seeking an order of eviction before the Court ofSmall Causes, Chennai.3(b). The said factum was already informed to the petitionerby a letter dated 07.11.2005 about the expiry of lease granted tothe first respondent by the third respondent stating thatcontinuance of the Retail Outlet in the said premises is uncertainand the petitioner has to be prepared for closure of operations atany time. 3(c). In the said eviction proceedings filed by the thirdrespondent/landlord, the first respondent has filed applicationunder Section 9 of the Chennai City Tenants' Protection Act,1921and an appeal was filed against the value of the land fixed, sincethe value fixed by the appellate Court was not agreeable to thefirst respondent. Thereafter, the value of superstructure was fixedthrough an Advocate Commissioner and on deposit of the value ofsuperstructure fixed by the court, eviction order was passedagainst the first respondent on 08.06.2007, granting four monthstime to vacate.3(d). It was in continuation of the earlier letter statedabove, the first respondent has informed about the evictionproceedings to the petitioner on 13.06.2007, stating that theoperation of the Retail Outlet should come to an end and also askedthe petitioner to remove all its personal effects from the saidRetail Outlet site, since the third respondent in the meantime hasthreatened that beyond the time granted by the Court, if the firstrespondent continues to occupy the premises, it has to pay damagesfor use and occupation.3(e). By various letters dated 03.07.2007, 12.07.2007,31.07.2007, 08.09.2007 and 25.09.2007, the first respondent hasinformed the petitioner to close the Retail Outlet site andfinally by letter dated 04.10.2007, informed that the firstrespondent's Manager (Sales) will be visiting the place of RetailOutlet site on 06.10.2007 at 10.00 am to hand over possession tothe landlord, viz., third respondent in accordance with the Courtorder. At the request of the first respondent, the Joint ChiefController of Explosives by letter dated 01.10.2007, has alsocancelled the Explosives Licence and by letter dated 28.09.2007,the first respondent has requested the Tamil Nadu Electricity Boardto disconnect the electricity connection and the Controller ofLocal Metrology was informed to remove the facilities likedispensing pumps, tanks, etc. and according to the firstrespondent, the first respondent has handed over the vacantpossession of the property in compliance of the order of the Courton 06.10.2007 and intimated the same in writing to the thirdrespondent and on 06.10.2007 at 2.30 pm, the same was informed tothis Court in the pending writ petition. 3(f). It is the case of the first respondent that due to theeviction order suffered by the 1st respondent at the instance of the3rd respondent/landlord, the first respondent was unable to supply https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the petroleum products to the writ petitioner, who is only alicensee, operating the retail outlet. The first respondent statesthat the writ petitioner is not in possession and it has not put upany superstructure and the writ petitioner is having only themovable utensils, which belonged to it. According to the firstrespondent, the petitioner is not a tenant under the 3rd respondentat all and the relationship between the petitioner and the firstrespondent is that of licensee and licensor to vend the petroleumproducts on behalf of the Licensor. It is denied that thepetitioner has improved the property. It is also stated that theproperty tax in respect of the superstructure and electricitysupply given are all standing in the name of the first respondentand water supply and sewerage charges are levied in the name of the1st respondent and therefore, the claim of the petitioner is denied.3(g). It is the case of the 1st respondent that being a tenantunder the 3rd respondent, the 1st respondent was directed to vacatefrom the premises as per the court order and hence, the 1strespondent decided to surrender possession. By virtue of the courtorder, the petitioner cannot claim to be in possession, because anysuch illegal conduct of the petitioner would attract damages to bepayable by the 1st respondent to the 3rd respondent for the use andoccupation.4. The 3rd respondent has filed counter affidavit, wherein itis stated that property originally belonged to his grand fatherM.Ranganathan Chetty, who leased out the said property on17.03.1967 to run a petrol bunk to M/s.Burmah Shell Oil StorageDistributing Company of India Limited. It was, subsequently thesaid Ranganathan Chetty, on 13.05.1968 rented out 2145 sq.ft. tothe said Burmah Shell Oil Storage Distributing Company of IndiaLimited, fixing the monthly rent of Rs.321/- for the total extentof 5170 sq.ft. for a period of ten years from 01.04.1968 t031.03.1978 and thereafter it was increased to Rs.375/- for next 10years from 01.04.1978 to 31.03.1988. In 1976, M/s.Burmah ShellOil Storage Distributing Company of India Limited was taken over bythe Government of India and the tenancy was transferred in favourof Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited, the 1st respondent herein.4(a). After the death of the grandfather of the 3rd respondentM.Ranganathan Chetty, who died on 17.03.1976, in a partition suitin C.S.No.263 or 1988, the property in question and some otherproperties were allotted to the 3rd respondent's father VaradhappaChetty and the 3rd respondent. On 05.10.2002, the 3rd respondent'sfather has settled his share in favour of the 3rd respondent andthereafter, the 3rd respondent has leased out the disputed propertyto the 1st respondent Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited. On20.12.2004, the 3rd respondent has filed ejectment suit No.70 of2004 on the file of Small Causes Court, Chennai, against the 1strespondent, who is the tenant and in M.P.No.292 of 2005 filed undersection 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, an advocateCommissioner was appointed for the purpose of finding out the valueof the land and the Commissioner inspected the property in thepresence of the partner of the writ petitioner, N.Venkatraman whowas aware of the entire proceedings from 2005 onwards.Subsequently, by order dated 15.5.2005, the Small Causes Court, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Chennai has directed the first respondent to pay the land cost ofRs.89,44,100/- to the third respondent within three months. Sincethe said order was not complied with, the application filed undersection 9 was dismissed. Thereafter, the third respondent filedanother application under section 3 of the City Tenants ProtectionAct to fix the value of superstructure put up by the firstrespondent/tenant. The advocate-Commissioner appointed in thatregard has also fixed the value of the superstructure. At the timeof visit by the advocate-Commissioner, the petitionerMr.Venkatraman, partner of M/s.Kannika Parameshwari ServiceStation, which is a licensee under the first respondent was alsopresent. In fact, he has also signed the proceedings of theadvocate-commissioner. 4(b). Aggrieved against the cost of the land, viz.,Rs.89,44,100/- fixed by the Court, the first respondent has filedejectment Appeal in Appeal No.4 of 2006 on the file of ChiefJudge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, who by order dated 3.1.2007 hasreduced the value to Rs.73,05,210/- and the first respondent hasnot complied with the said order. In the meantime, in theapplication filed by the third respondent, the value of thesuperstructure was fixed at Rs.2,70,000/- by order dated 18.4.2007and the third respondent has deposited the amount on 20.4.2007 andconsequently, by order dated 8.6.2007, the Small Causes Courtgranted an order of eviction of the first respondent/tenant bygiving four months' time. The first respondent was slow in takingthe movable properties and notice was issued stating that if thefirst respondent continues to be in possession beyond 8.7.2007,the first respondent has to pay damages for the use and occupation.But the first respondent has taken all necessary steps to deliverpossession of the leased properties and by letter dated 4.10.2007the first respondent agreed to hand over possession on 6.10.2007 at10.00 a.m. The third respondent has also stated that the firstrespondent removed the moveable properties from the leasedproperty and delivered possession of the superstructure on6.10.2007 and after taking possession, the third respondent hasdemolished the entire superstructure and raised a compound wellfacing Dr.Besant Road, Triplicane, on 06.10.2007 itself forsecurity purposes. Therefore, it is the case of the thirdrespondent that the petitioner has never been a tenant under thethird respondent at any point of time and it was only the firstrespondent which was the tenant subsequent to the transfer ofcompany by M/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing CompanyIndia Limited. According to the third respondent, since therelationship of landlord and tenant is only between the firstrespondent and the third respondent it is not necessary that thepetitioner should be made as a party in the Ejectment Suit. Thepetitioner's relationship with the first respondent is onlylicensee-licensor. It is stated that various applications filed bythe petitioner before the Small Causes Courts have been dismissedand only after delivery of possession of the property on 6.10.2007,the writ petition came to be filed and inasmuch as the possessionof the property has been handed over to the third respondent,nothing survives in the writ petition. 5. Mr.N.S.Sivam, learned counsel for the petitioner would https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ submit that the entire process of legal action taken by the thirdrespondent against the first respondent is collusive. Accordingto him, as per the memorandum of agreement entered between thepetitioner and the first respondent, licence can be terminated onlyby giving 90 days notice in writing and in the absence of suchnotice, the licence cannot be deemed to be terminated. He wouldalso submit that filing of ejectment suit by the third respondentagainst the first respondent without impleading the petitioner whois in actual occupation of the property as a party is an abuse ofprocess of law and the same is illegal. He would submit that asper section 41 of the Small Causes Court Act, 1882, the petitionerbeing a person in possession is entitled for notice and therefore,the order of eviction passed by the Small Causes Court is againstthe law and has to be ignored. He also submits that under section43 of the said Act, any order passed in its absence is not bindingon the petitioner since admittedly, the petitioner has been inpossession. It is the further case of the learned counsel that thethird respondent was aware of the lawful possession of thepetitioner in the premises. Learned counsel would also submit thatthe petitioner purchased the service station along with equipmentsand machinery from the previous licensee G.Balaraman under theagreement dated 23.2.1973, in which the representatives ofM/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Company India Limitedhave also signed as witnesses and the first respondent being theGovernment of India Undertaking, having obtained property fromM/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Company India Limitedcannot disown the knowledge of petitioner's possession. It is hisfurther case that on 6.10.2007 in spite of filing of writ petitionbefore this Court and during the currency of order of status quo,the respondents in a most highhanded manner demolished the entireproperties with bulldozer. 6. On the other hand, Mr.M.K.Kabeer, learned senior counselfor the third respondent submits that the petitioner is not atenant under the third respondent in respect of the property inquestion and the petitioner being a licensee under the firstrespondent for vending its product, can only work out his remedyagainst the first respondent and the petitioner has no right overthe property at all. It is only his submission that when the thirdrespondent is the owner of the property who has leased out theproperty to the first respondent, the petitioner cannot claim anyoccupancy right over the same. He has neither the tenancy right,nor occupancy right over the property since the occupancy rightcomes to an end when the tenant, viz., the first respondent handsover the possession of the property to the owner as per the Courtorder. He would submit that the licensee can never be treated as atenant. He would also submit that the petitioner has no right toclaim any right under section 41 or 43 of the Small Causes CourtAct. He also submits that even as per the licence agreementbetween the petitioner and the first respondent, the petitionercan never be treated as a tenant. As per the agreement between thefirst respondent and the third respondent in respect of licence, itis for the first respondent to take appropriate action against thepetitioner and any action taken by the petitioner would amount topreventing the landlord/third respondent from getting possession inaccordance with law. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. Mr.K.Ethiraj, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2would submit that it is not correct to state that the petitionerwas not aware of the ejectment proceedings filed by the thirdrespondent against the respondents 1 and 2, as the petitioneritself voluntarily submitted to the ejectment proceedings and infact, the first respondent has heavily contested the case and asagainst the order under section 9 of the Act, the first respondentfiled appeal for the purpose of reduction of amount fixed, but thefirst respondent was unable to pay the amount so reduced. He wouldfurther submit that it is the first respondent who is the tenantunder the third respondent/landlord and the petitioner has noconnection with the property at all. He would also submit thatthe petitioner has never put up the superstructure and thesuperstructure belonged to the first respondent. He would submitthat all assessments in respect of the property are standing in thename of first respondent. He would further submit that thepetitioner has no right to claim permanent licence under thefirst respondent and in fact, by various communications thelicence has been revoked.8. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well asrespondents and perused the entire records. 9. Factually, it is not in dispute that the petitioner wasgranted a dealership in the name of N.Venkatraman who is the soleproprietor of the petitioner by M/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage &Distributing Company India Limited under the agreement dated20.2.1973 and the terms of agreement show that it is a licence forretail sale of M.S./ Lubricants Greases and for sale of motorspares which will be supplied against the indents placed by thepetitioner. It is seen that originally one G.Balaraman was thelicensee under M/s.Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing CompanyIndia Limited and the petitioner has purchased the said servicestation along with equipments and machineries under an agreementdated 22.3.1973. A reference to the said agreement clearly showsthat what was purchased by the petitioner on the said date fromG.Balaraman was the service equipments and machineries withnecessary connections and the said agreement reads as follows:"One three h.p. Air compressor with connections(Tecalemit)One tyre inflator with connections (Tecalemit)One four ton Tecalemit hoist with all connectionsOne single gun car washer (Tecalemit)One mobile grease pump (Tecalemit) with necessaryconnectionsOne oil sprayer/ring spanners-6 Nos./double head spanners9/Allen key-2/plug spanner – 1/Hammer spanner-1/Monkeyspanner 1/Wheel spanner 1/oil pump 1/dummy dist.cap1/Measures – 5 1 – 1, 2 1-2, 1 1-1, ½ litre – 1/Funnels-2/Radiator can-1/empty grease tins-2/long tray-1/handgrease gun-1/Old screw driver-1/water pump/motor and itsconnecting pipes/cocoa cola box-1/bucket-1/hose clips-15Nos./servicing facilities board-1/tables-2/chairs-3, cashbag -empty-1." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10. It is not in dispute that Burma Shell which was a companyregistered in England stood transferred to the first respondentwhich is a company registered under Section 617 of the IndianCompanies Act, and is under the control of the Government of India.It is also not in dispute that after the transfer from BurmaShell to the first respondent, the first respondent has entered alicence agreement with the petitioner on 18.5.1977. A reference tothe said licence agreement clearly shows that the petitioner isonly a licensee permitted to enter into the premises viz., 105,Dr.Besant Road, Madras-5 for the purpose of using the motor spiritand pumps, storage tank pipes and fittings and all other facilitieserected and provided by the first respondent company upon the saidpremises for the purpose of selling motor spares and motor oils,grease and other motor accessories as licensee of the firstrespondent company. It is clearly stated in the said agreementthat the company reserved its right to take back whole or any partof the said premises or the said facilities or alter them at itsdiscretion. It is also clearly stated that the petitioner has topay the licence fee as a licensee to the first respondent, apartfrom the rates of tax, cess, duties, other impositions andoutgoings, etc. levied by Municipality and Government in respect ofthe premises on behalf of the first respondent. It is also statedthat the petitioner has to make some deposit as a licensee and thesaid deposit is returnable only on the termination of licence andafter surrender of the deposit receipt duly despatched. It is alsoclearly stated in clause 12 of the licence agreement that thelicence may be terminated without assigning any reasonwhatsoever by either party giving the other not less than 90 days'notice in writing and on the expiry of the said period, the licencestands cancelled or revoked. It is also clearly stated in Clause15 of the Agreement that after revocation or termination oflicence, the petitioner as a licensee has no right to remain in thepremises and thereafter it will be treated as a trespasser. It isseen that as early as on 7.11.2005, the first respondent had issueda notice to the petitioner directing the petitioner to be readyto close the operation as a retail outlet licensee. By letterdated 13.6.2007 which is impugned in this writ petition, the firstrespondent has informed the petitioner that the first respondentis suffering an order of eviction from the landlord, viz., thethird respondent, in respect of the premises and therefore, thefirst respondent will not be in a position to comply with the termsof Dispensing Pump and Selling Licence agreement and directed thepetitioner to remove all its personal effects and it wasthereafter, by subsequent letter dated 8.9.2007, much after 60days, which is required as per the license agreement, the firstrespondent has asked the petitioner to hand over possession due tothe reason that the third respondent/landlord has obtained an orderof eviction against the first respondent.11. On the reference to the terms of the licence, there isabsolutely no difficulty to come to the conclusion that thepetitioner has no iota of right to be in possession of the propertyas licensee after it is validity terminated as per the terms oflicence agreement. The petitioner can never claim ownership sincethe ownership of the third respondent is not disputed. The onlyclaim raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ suit for ejectment has been filed against the first respondentwithout impleading the petitioner who is in occupation andtherefore, the order of ejectment is a nullity in law. It is clearthat section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882mandates that the claim to make an occupier to be a party in a suitfor ejectment is unsustainable. For better understanding of thesaid proposition, the said Section 41 of the said Act is extractedhereunder:"Section 41. Summons against persons occupying propertywithout leave:-When any person has had possession of any immovableproperty situate within the local limits of the SmallCause Court's jurisdiction and of which the annual valueat a rackrent does not exceed [five thousand rupees] asthe tenant, or by permission of another person, or ofsome person through whom such other person claimsand such tenancy or permission has determined orbeen withdrawn,and such tenant or occupier or any person holdingunder or by assignment from him (hereinafter called theoccupant) refuses to deliver up such property incompliance with a request made to him in this behalf bysuch other person,such other person (hereinafter called the applicant)may apply to the Small Cause Court for a summons againstthe occupant, calling upon him to show cause, on a daytherein appointed, why he should not be compelled todeliver up the property."12. The contention raised by the learned counsel for thepetitioner that the petitioner should be treated as a person inoccupation with the permission of the first respondent/tenant andtherefore, for the purpose of obtaining the order of ejectment, thepetitioner should have been made as a party is not sustainable.Section 43 enables the Small Causes Court to pass order ofpossession if the occupant does not appear on the appointed date toshow-cause as to why he should not be evicted. The said sectionreads as under:"Section 43. Order of possession:- If the occupant does not appear at the timeappointed and show cause to the contrary, the applicantshall, if the Small Cause Court is satisfied that he isentitled to apply under section 41, be entitled to anorder addressed to a bailiff of the Court directing himto give possession of the property to the applicant onsuch day as the Court thinks fit to name in such order.Explanation.- If the occupant proves that thetenancy was created or permission granted by virtue of atitle which determined previous to the date of theapplication, he shall be deemed to have shown causewithin the meaning of this section." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

13. The words, 'tenant by permission of other person or someperson through whom such other person claims' can only berelatable to a tenant or a person who gets right of tenancy underthe original tenant. In the present case, it is not even the caseof the petitioner that the petitioner was allowed by the firstrespondent who is admittedly the tenant under the thirdrespondent/owner to continue as a sub-tenant in respect of thepremises under the licence agreement between the first respondentand the petitioner and it is clear that the petitioner was allowedto occupy the premises only as a lessee of the first respondent forthe purpose of running a retail outlet license under the firstrespondent and not permitting the petitioner to occupy as a tenant.It is also the case of the first respondent that as per theagreement with the third respondent, the first respondent has putup various constructions in the premises belonging to the thirdrespondent, which is evident from the fact that the thirdrespondent/owner after obtaining order of ejectment has filed apetition under section 3 of the City Tenants Protection Act forvaluing the superstructure and deposited the value so fixed intothe Court. By applying the definition of tenant under the CityTenants Protection Act, 1921, it is clear that a tenant is a personwho is liable to pay rent in respect of the land and also a tenantby holding over. Section 2(4) of the City Tenants Protection Actdefined the term, 'tenant' as follows:"Section 2(4). 'Tenant' in relation to any land-(i)means a person liable to pay rent inrespect of such land, under a tenancyagreement express or implied, and(ii) includes-(a) any such person as is referred to in sub-clause(i) who continues in possession of the land after thedetermination of the tenancy agreement,(b) any person who was a tenant in respect of suchland under a tenancy agreement to which this Act isapplicable under sub-section (3) of section 1 and who areany of his predecessors in interest had erected bybuilding on such land and who continues in actualphysical possession of such land and building,notwithstanding that-(1)such person was not entitled to the rightsunder this Act by reason of the proviso tosection 12 of this Act as it stood beforethe date of the publication of the [Chennai]City Tenants' Protection (Amendment)Act,1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972), or(2)a decree for declaration or a decree or anorder for possession or for similar reliefhas been passed against such person on theground that the proviso to section 12 ofthis Act as it stood before the date of thepublication of the [Chennai] City Tenants'Protection (Amendment) Act,1972 (Tamil NaduAct 4 of 1972) disentitled such person fromclaiming the rights under this Act, and(c) the heirs of any such person as is referred to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) (a) or (ii) (b),but does not include a sub-tenant or his heirs;]"14. It is therefore clear that a person is a tenant who willhave a right either to file an application under section 9 of theAct for the purpose of valuing a site so as to enable him topurchase the said site which is in occupation or enabling thelandlord to file an application under section 3 for the purpose offixing the value of the superstructure put up by the tenant so asto enable the tenant to get the amounts spent by him for putting upthe said construction. From the fact that the third respondent hasalready approached the Civil Court and obtained an order ofeviction and in the circumstance that it is the categorical case ofthe petitioner that he is only the licensee under the firstrespondent, there is absolutely no necessity for the thirdrespondent to implead the petitioner as a party in the ejectmentsuit. In any event, as submitted by the learned counsel for thepetitioner, the petitioner is working out his remedy in the civilCourt wherein an order of ejectment has been passed and therefore,without expressing any opinion about the same, prima facie I amsatisfied that the petitioner has no right to remain in possessionof the property when the licence granted by the first respondentin favour of the petitioner has been terminated as per the terms ofthe agreement. It is not in dispute that the first respondent hasissued two letters, one on 13.6.2007 directing that the petitionerto stop vending petroleum products and another on 8.9.2007terminating the licence, which would show that the first respondentbeing the licensor has acted in accordance with the agreement oflicence by giving notice as required to the petitioner byterminating the licence. Once the licence is terminated, as Ihave enumerated above, as per the terms of licence agreement, thepetitioner cannot claim to remain in possession, and in view of thesame, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief as claimed.The writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Itis made clear that since the petitioner has approached the civilCourt for remedy, the same shall be decided by the Civil Court inaccordance with law without being influenced by any of theobservations made herein. In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, connectedmiscellaneous petitions are closed.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.kh https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To1.Bharath Petroleum Corporation Anna Nagar, Chennai 600 040.2.The Territory Manager (Retail) Bharath Petroleum Corporation No.35, Vaidyanathan Street Post Box No.1152, Tondiarpet Chennai 600 081+ 1 CC To Mr. Sivam Sivandaraj, Advocate SR NO.7683+ 1 CC To Mr. K.Ethiraj, Advocate SR NO.7491+ 2 CCs To Mr. Sundaragopal, Advocate SR NO.7742W.P.No.32100 of 2007rs[co]gp/20.2.