K.Muthuramalingam v. Kalyani Ragunathan

3.In R.C.O.P.No.574/2001, the respondent herein as landladystated that the revision petitioner is a tenant under her paying amonthly rent of Rs.750/- and the tenanted portion is the outhouseof premises bearing old No.7, new No.13, Veerabadran Iyer Street,Nungambakkam, measuring an extent of 400 sq.ft., and consisting ofa bed room, hall, kitchen and bath room. The landlady is having 2sons and she is staying with her aged husband, with her elder sonat the premises bearing Old No.8, New No.11, which propertybelongs to her elder son and the same is situated in the frontportion of the landlady's premises bearing Old No.7, New No.13.Apart from the outhouse, which is under the occupation of therevision petitioner-tenant, the property of the landlady has twoportions, one in the ground floor, which is under the occupationof her younger son and another in the 1st floor, which is under theoccupation of another tenant. 4.It is the case of the landlady in RCOP No.574/2001 that sheand her husband found it very difficult to live with their elderson in his premises on account of friction in relationship withhis elder son and his wife. Therefore she bona fidely requiredthe outhouse portion under the occupation of the revisionpetitioner for her residential purpose. Hence she filed RCOPNo.574/2001 for the above said relief.5.The revision petitioner as tenant resisted RCOP No.574/2001by filing a detailed counter statement. It is the tenant'scontention that there is no bona fide in the claim of thelandlady. He stated that the younger son who was staying inground floor portion of the landlady's property has alreadyvacated that portion. He referred to O.S.No.4640/1998 filed byhim against the landlady for a permanent injunction restrainingthe landlady from disturbing the tenant's peaceful possession ofthe petition premises. O.S.No.4640/98 was decreed exparte on5.2.2002. The landlady filed RCOP No.2125/98 against the tenantfor eviction on the ground of wilful default in the payment ofrent and the same was dismissed for default on 1.11.2000.6.It is further stated by the tenant in his counter that asthe landlady had drastically reduced the water supply to hisportion, the tenant filed RCOP No.2306/1999 for restoration ofwater supply. An order of interim restoration was passed, againstwhich the landlady filed an appeal, which was dismissed. Againstthe dismissal of appeal, the landlady filed CRP No.1605/2001 andthe same was allowed by the High court. The tenant filed SLPNo.12488/2001 which was allowed by the Supreme Court. The SupremeCourt directed the rent controller to complete the trial in RCOPNo.2306/99 within 6 months. In 3rd week of May 2002, the tenantcame to know that the landlady applied to the Commissioner, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Corporation of Chennai for permission to demolish the premises inwhich the tenant is in occupation of the outhouse. As thelandlady made arrangements to demolish the premises, the tenantfiled O.S.No.3114/2002 for a permanent injunction restraining thelandlady from demolishing the premises except through due processof law. Along with the suit, I.A.No.8953/2002 was filed forinterim injunction and an interim injunction was granted whichwas made absolute insofar as the outhouse portion is concernedafter hearing the counsel for the landlady. As it was mentionedin the counter in the I.A.No.8953/2002 that the landlady appliedfor an order of demolition and reconstruction and the saidapplication was not processed in view of interim orders, thetenant filed a writ petition in W.P.No.24170/2002 for a mandamusforbearing the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai from grantingpermission to the landlady to demolish the premises as long as thetenant is a lawful tenant in the outhouse portion. The writpetition was dismissed on 5.7.2002 with an observation to proceedfurther before the civil court seeking for appropriate relief.Therefore the tenant filed O.S.No.3835/2002 for a declaration todeclare that the defendants in the suit are not entitled to permitthe landlady to demolish the premises as long as he is a lawfultenant in the outhouse portion. An interim injunction was grantedby the trial court in I.A.No.10878/2002, against which thelandlady filed C.M.A., which is pending before the appellatecourt. Therefore, according to the tenant the above referred tolegal proceedings would establish that there is no bona fide onthe part of the landlady. The rent controller by order dated27.4.2004 allowed the RCOP by holding that the landlady isentitled for an order of eviction on the ground of own use andoccupation, against which the tenant filed RCA No.687/2004 and theappellate authority by order dated 3.1.2006, dismissed the appealand confirmed the order of the rent controller.6.Before the appellate authority the tenant filedM.P.No.777/2005 and M.P.No.11149/2005 to receive additionaldocuments and the landlady also filed M.P.No.915/2005 to receiveadditional documents. M.P.No.777/2005 was allowed and on thatbasis petition copy of RCOP No.171/2004 was marked as Ex.R11 andsimilarly M.P.No.11149/2005 was also allowed and on that basis thecopy of the General Power of Attorney deed executed by thelandlady was marked as Ex.R12, the copy of the deposition ofwitness examined in RCOP No.171/2004 was marked as Ex.R13, theorder copy in CRP No.610/2003 was marked as Ex.R14 and the orderof the Supreme Court in SLP No.12488/2001 was marked as Ex.R15.M.P.No.915/2005 filed by the landlady was also allowed and on thatbasis a copy of the order made in CRP No.881/2005 was marked asEx.P2, the copy of the petition in RCOP No.171/2004 and the orderspassed thereon was marked as Ex.P3 and the copy of the memo filedin RCOP No.171/2004 was marked as Ex.P4. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7.RCOP No.171/2004 was filed by the landlady pending RCOPNo.574/2001 on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, butthe landlady has chosen not to press RCOP No.171/2004 for thereasons stated therein in Ex.P4 memo.8.The appellate authority after going through the entireevidence felt that considering the old age of the landlady and herhusband, their desire to reside in the ground floor portion rentedto the tenant is perfectly honest and justified. Insofar as thepreceding litigations and pending litigations are concerned, theappellate authority observed that mere filing of petitions foreviction on different grounds at different point of time accordingto necessity would not be a valid reason to suspect the bona fideof the landlady. Coming to the question of filing RCOPNo.171/2004 on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, theappellate authority held that RCOP No.171/2004 was later onwithdrawn, there is no inconsistent and contradictory plea in thepresent RCOP filed for owner's occupation. Hence the appellateauthority confirmed the order of the rent controller.9.I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and thelearned counsel for the respondent. I have also perused thedocuments filed and the judgments referred to by them in supportof their submissions. 10.The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuouslycontended that it is a case of both the authorities below shuttingtheir eyes to the evidence let in before them and therefore thisconcurrent mistakes committed by the authorities below ought to beinterfered with under Sec.25 of the Act 18 of 1960. The learnedcounsel drew my attention to the entire litigation filed by theparties and contended that this itself would prove that there isno bona fide on the part of the landlady. The learned counsel forthe petitioner specifically drew my attention to RCOP No.171/2004filed by the landlady pending RCOP No.574/2001 and submitted thatthe pleadings in RCOP No.171/2004 and the pleadings in RCOPNo.574/2001 are mutually contradictory to each other and in suchcircumstances, the mala fide intention of the landlady was clearlyestablished. The learned counsel further drew my attention to theconduct of the landlady in withdrawing RCOP No.171/2004 afterrealising that that could be fatal to her case in RCOPNo.574/2001. The learned counsel relied on the followingdecisions in support of his submissions:1)2000(2) M.L.J. 1(S.C.) (Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan)2)1989(1) L.W.155 (Durgai Ammal v. R.T.Mani)3)1988(1) L.W.53 Summary of Cases (Extracts)-Pyarelal Malhotra,(M/s. v. M/s.Lakshmi Vilas Bank)4)2001(1) M.L.J. 390 (Geetha v. Sankaran) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 5)2000(2)MLJ 495 (Vijayan v. M/s.Kalaimagal Account Book Shop)6)2001(3)L.W.224 (M/s.Shaw Wallace & Co.Ltd. v. GovindasPurushothamdas & Anr.(S.C.)7)2000(2)M.L.J. 204 (Srirangaraja v. Ponniah Thevar)8)2000(2)L.W.630 (Chandramohan,C. v.Sengottaiyan & ors (S.C.)9)2002(2)L.W.611 (S.V.Janardanam and another v. D.Kivraj Sowkarand 2 others)10)1998(1)MLJ 155 (Karuppanna Gounder v. Visuvasam)11)2002(2)L.W.559 (Loganathan, S. v. V.S.Rangasamy)12)2000(2)M.L.J 31 (Suganthi v. Sambalingam)13)2001(2)MLJ 80(S.C.) (M/s.Shaw Wallace and Co.Ltd. v. GovindasPurushothamdas)14)2000(1)CTC 634 (Ispahani,S.M. v. Harrington House School) 15)2004(2)LW 440(Shanmuga Sundaram v. A.S.Kamalam)16)2001(5)SCC 705(Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal)17)2000(1)MLJ 25(Sivasubramaniam v. Kashinath Pujari)18)1983(2)MLJ 191 (Ranganatha Mudaliar v. Yakoof Khan)19)AIR 1992 S.C. 700(Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram)20)1997(3)L.W.235(Jermons,J. v. Alimmal & others)21)1985(1)MLJ 106 (M/s.Thilagaraj Match Works v. Sundaresan)22)1994(2)L.W.152(Sankaran, A and another v. Balasundaram S.K. andanother)23)2002(1)L.W.600(Siddalingamma and another v. mamtha Shenoy)24)AIR 1994 S.C. 800 (Shadi Singh v. Rakaha)25)2005(5)CTC 585(Abu Tahir, M. v. M.Rahamathulla).11.Per contra the learned counsel for the respondentvehemently contended that it is a typical case of the tenantharassing a landlady by filing litigations after litigations andwhen both the authorities below, on the basis of evidence let inbefore them, concurrently held that the bona fide of the landladyis proved, High Court cannot interfere with the same under Sec.25of the Act. 12.The learned counsel for the respondent relied on thefollowing decisions in support of his submissions:1)1967(1)MLJ 289 (N.Sampathu Chetty v. S.V.Bapulal)2)2001(2)L.W.647(South Indian Bank Ltd., etc., v. SarojaGovindarajan etc.)3)1997-3-L.W.141(S.Mariappan v. Kadar Beevi)4)2001(8)SCC 561(Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy)5)AIR 1997 S.C. 2339 (Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal)6)2004(5)SCC 772(Shakuntaala Bai v. Narayan Das)7)2004(8)SCC 490 (Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand)8)1996(I)CTC 681(Rengaiyan, N. v. A.M.Noorullah)9)2004(3)MLJ 333(Janakavalli Ammal v. The Regional Manager, TamilNadu Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Limited, Vellore)10)2001(1)M.L.J.110(Hatim and Co. v. Radhakrishnan)11)1999 MLJ 93(C.Prasad Rao v. C.Narasimhan) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 12)1998 MLJ 270(M/s.Boston v. Akbar)13)2000 MLJ 19 (Munawar Jan Begum v. Subramaniam)14)2001(3) CTC 206(Karur Ghee Stores v. N.Palaniappan)15)1999 M.L.J.(Supp.) 389(Dalichand v. Ramalingam)16)1998(III)CTC 467(Vasantha Leela v. N.Vadivelu Chettiar)17)98 L.W.29 (J.S.-Summary of Cases(Extracts)-Band Box DryCleaners v. K.Kuppuswamy)18)2004(2)M.L.J.194(Alis v. Jayalakshmi)19)1997-1-L.W.727(R.Perianna Asari and another v. Jayakumar).13.I have considered the rival submissions with regard tofacts and citations.14.Under Sec.10(3)(a) of the Act, a landlord may apply to thecontroller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlordin possession of the building, in case it is a residentialbuilding, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation orfor the occupation of any member of his family and if he or anymember of his family is not occupying the residential building ofhis own in the city, town or village concerned. The controller ifhe is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, makean order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession ofthe building on such date as may be specified by the controllerand if the controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an orderrejecting the application. 15.Therefore if the landlord wants a building under theoccupation of the tenant for his own use and occupation, he has toprove (1)that he requires it for his own occupation, (2)he is notoccupying a residential building of his own in the placeconcerned. Apart from that, he has to satisfy the controller thatthe claim is bona fide.16.RCOP No.574/2001 was filed by the landlady directing thetenant to deliver vacant possession of the portion in the tenant'soccupation as she wanted to reside there with her husband. It isthe case of the landlady that she is residing with her eldest sonand his wife and due to some friction with her elder son, shewanted to reside in her premises in which there are 3 portions.In the ground floor portion, the landlady's younger son is livingthere with his family and another tenant is in occupation of the1st floor portion. The tenant is in the occupation of theouthouse. Therefore the landlady being an elderly person with herolder husband, could not claim the stairs and also did not want todisturb their younger son, wanted the outhouse portion for theirown use and occupation. The claim of the landlady was alleged tobe a mala fide intention by the tenant by pointing out the numberof litigations filed between the parties and also the subsequentdevelopment of the younger son vacating the ground floor premises. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Both the authorities below concurrently held on the basis ofevidence that the claim of the landlord is bona fide. Whethersuch concurrent findings with regard to the question of bona fidecould be upset by the High Court under Sec.25 of the Act is aquestion that now arises for consideration.17.Now it is settled law that the revisional jurisdictionvested in the High Court under Sec.25 of the Act is wider thanSec.115 of C.P.C., and the High court is entitled to satisfyitself as to regularity of proceedings of the correctness,legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein andif on examination, it appears to the High court any such decisionor order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted forreconsideration, it may pass such orders accordingly. Where thefindings recorded by the appellate authorities are illegal,erroneous or perverse the High court having regard to the ambit ofits revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Act, will be wellwithin its jurisdiction in reversing the findings impugned beforeit and recording its own findings. When the decision of theauthorities below is perverse and based on no evidence, the Highcourt can set aside that order under Sec.25 of the Act. Theprinciple has been set out in the judgments 1 to 15 and 17 (citedsupra) in para 10 namely-1)2000(2) M.L.J. 1(S.C.) (Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan)2)1989(1) L.W.155 (Durgai Ammal v. R.T.Mani)3)1988(1) L.W.53 Summary of Cases (Extracts)-Pyarelal Malhotra,(M/s. v. M/s.Lakshmi Vilas Bank)4)2001(1) M.L.J. 390 (Geetha v. Sankaran)5)2000(2)MLJ 495 (Vijayan v. M/s.Kalaimagal Account Book Shop)6)2001(3)L.W.224 (M/s.Shaw Wallace & Co.Ltd. v. GovindasPurushothamdas & Anr.(S.C.)7)2000(2)M.L.J. 204 (Srirangaraja v. Ponniah Thevar)8)2000(2)L.W.630 (Chandramohan,C. v.Sengottaiyan & ors (S.C.)9)2002(2)L.W.611 (S.V.Janardanam and another v. D.Kivraj Sowkarand 2 others)10)1998(1)MLJ 155 (Karuppanna Gounder v. Visuvasam)11)2002(2)L.W.559 (Loganathan, S. v. V.S.Rangasamy)12)2000(2)M.L.J 31 (Suganthi v. Sambalingam)13)2001(2)MLJ 80(S.C.) (M/s.Shaw Wallace and Co.Ltd. v. GovindasPurushothamdas)14)2000(1)CTC 634 (Ispahani,S.M. v. Harrington House School) 15)2004(2)LW 440(Shanmuga Sundaram v. A.S.Kamalam)16)2000(1)MLJ 25(Sivasubramaniam v. Kashinath Pujari)18.At the same time, the power conferred under Sec.25 of theAct is not wide enough to go into the question of fact in detailand assess the evidence and unless the evidence proved to be falseor incorrect, the High Court will not interfere with the findingsof fact rendered concurrently by the authorities below. When the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ High Court does not find any illegality, impropriety orirregularity in the orders of the authorities below, nointerference is called for under Sec.25 of the Act. It is notdesirable for the revisional court to interfere with theconcurrent findings when there is no patent error or perversity inthe approach of the authorities below. Revisional jurisdiction isnot akin to fullfledged appeal and the High Court sitting inrevision must be very careful about launching an independent re-appreciation of evidence and substitute findings of rent controlauthorities with another when the materials before the court couldequally sustain conclusion arrived at.19.The above principles have been laid down in the followingjudgments which are referred above: They are-1996(1)CTC 681(Rengaiyan, N. v. A.M.Noorullah) 2001(1)M.L.J.110(Hatim and Co. v. Radhakrishnan)1999 MLJ 93(C.Prasad Rao v. C.Narasimhan)1998 MLJ 270(M/s.Boston v. Akbar)2000 MLJ 19(Karur Ghee Stores rep., by V.Periasamy vs.M.Palaniappan & another)2001(3) CTC 206(Karur Ghee Stores v. N.Palaniappan)1999 M.L.J.(Supp.) 389(Dalichand v. Ramalingam)1998(III)CTC 467(Vasantha Leela v. N.Vadivelu Chettiar)98L.W.29 (J.S.-Summary of Cases(Extracts)-Band Box Dry Cleaners v.K.Kuppuswamy)2004(2)M.L.J.194(Alis v. Jayalakshmi)1997-1-L.W.727(R.Perianna Asari and another v. Jayakumar).20.With the scope of Sec.25 of the Act, let me considerwhether a case has been made out by the revision petitionerwarranting interference when both the authorities below haveconcurrently held that the landlady has proved her bona fide inrequiring the rented portion for their own use and occupation.21.The question of bona fide is a mixed question of fact andlaw and there must be an actual pressing need, not a mere whim orfanciful desire. Mere desire of the landlady to live separatelycannot be attributed to the need for the premises occupied by thetenant. The need must be bona fide, genuine, honest and conceivedin good faith. A desire is not a substitute for the need for thepremises. The bona fide is not the impulse or desire of thelandlady but there must be an element of need for the landladybefore it could be stated that she requires the premises for herown occupation. The question to be asked by the court is whetherthe need of the landlady can be said to be real, natural, sincereand honest. If the answer is in the positive then the need isbona fide. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

22.These principles have been clearly set out in thedecisions-, which are referred above and they are, 2001(5)SCC 705(Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal)2000(1)MLJ 25(Sivasubramaniam v. Kashinath Pujari)1985(1)MLJ 106 (M/s.Thilagaraj Match Works v. Sundaresan)1994(2)L.W.152(Sankaran, A and another v. Balasundaram S.K. andanother)2002(1)L.W.600(Siddalingamma and another v. mamtha Shenoy).23.Once it is clear that the claim is not a device, verylittle evidence is required to find that the claim is an honestone. Bona fide is not a meaningless jargon but it has to beculled out from the averments contained in the petition and fromthe evidence adduced in the proceedings. It is not alwaysnecessary to prove the bona fide beyond all reasonable doubt as incriminal proceedings. If the requirement is found to be bonafide, then the choice is left to the landlord to decide as towhich building he should occupy and the tenant will not have anysay in the matter. The concept of bona fide requirement of thelandlord requires practical approach and court must guard againstapproach which is too liberal, too constructive or pedantic.24.The above principles have been laid down by the decisionsin-, which have been already already referred above. They are, 1967(1)MLJ 289 (N.Sampathu Chettyv. S.V.bapulal)2001(2)L.W.647(South Indian Bank Ltd., etc., v. SarojaGovindarajan etc.)1997-3-L.W.141(S.Mariappan v. Kadar Beevi)2001(8)SCC 561(Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy)25.In the light of the above decisions with regard to bonafide, let me consider whether the landlady in the present caseproved her bona fide in requiring the premises under theoccupation of the tenant for her use and occupation. 26.It is not in dispute that there has been a strainedrelationship between the tenant and the landlady right from theyear 1998 when the tenant filed O.S.No.4640/1998 for an injunctionrestraining the landlady from dispossessing the tenant by force.An order of interim injunction was granted and the suit itself wasdecreed exparte. The landlady on her part filed RCOP No.2125/98for eviction on the ground of wilful default, nuisance and owner'soccupation and the same was dismissed for default. The tenantfiled RCOP No.2306/99 for restoration of water supply and afterobtaining an interim order for restoration of water supply, thetenant filed E.P.No.285/2000 to execute the interim order.Against the interim order of restoration, the landlady filedRCA.846/2000 and the same was dismissed. Against which thelandlady filed CRP No.1605/2001 which was allowed by this court. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The tenant filed SLP No.12488/2001 before the Supreme Court andthe Supreme Court by order dated 11.7.2002 directed the rentcontroller to dispose of RCOP No.2306/99 expeditiously, ifpossible within 6 months. While ordering that the interim ordergranted by the Supreme court on 10.8.2001 will continue till therent controller decides RCOP No.2306/99. The interim order passedby the Supreme Court is that the bore-well stated to have been dugby the tenant on the premises shall not be removed. It is alsonot in dispute that RCOP No.2306/99 was allowed in favour of thetenant against which RCA No.836/2005 was filed by the landlady andthe same is said to be pending. 27.Thus it is established that the relationship is sostrained between the parties to such an extent that even forrestoration of water supply the tenant had to approach the highestcourt of this land.28.Further it is also not in dispute that in the middle of2002 there was an attempt on the part of the landlady to demolishthe entire premises including the portion under the occupation ofthe tenant necessitating the tenant to file O.S.No.3114/2002 for apermanent injunction restraining the landlady from demolishing thepremiss except by due process of law. Initially an interiminjunction was granted which was made absolute restricting theinjunction insofar as the outhouse portion under occupation of thetenant only. In the counter filed in the above suit, it wasadmitted by the landlady that she applied for demolition andreconstruction to the corporation authorities. In the meanwhile,the present RCOP was filed requiring the portion bona fidely forthe landlady's own use and occupation. After the RCOP was allowedin favour of the landlady, RCA No.687/2004 was filed by the tenantchallenging the order of eviction. In the meanwhile, another RCOPwas filed again by the landlady in RCOP No.171/2004 for an orderof eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction and thesame was later on withdrawn by the landlady. By taking intoconsideration, the entire conduct of the landlady, in filing rentcontrol petitions and withdrawing the same or allowing it to bedismissed for default, it cannot be said that there is bona fideon the part of the landlady in requiring the tenant's portion forher own use and occupation. After all, bona fide requirement isto be found on the basis of the pleadings, the entire evidence letin, the totality of circumstances and the overall conduct of thelandlady. If the totality of circumstances and the overallconduct of the landlady are taken into consideration, it isextremely difficult to comprehend that the landlady required thepremises bona fidely and honestly for her own use and occupation.In fact, the filing of RCOP No.171/2004 and the petition and theevidence let in in that RCOP were brought to the knowledge of theAppellate Authority by filing a petition by the tenant for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ producing additional documents and on the basis of that petition,these documents were marked as Exs.R11 to R15. In RCOPNo.171/2004 it is stated by the landlady that she has obtainednecessary permission from the appropriate authorities for thedemolition of the existing building including the outhouse inwhich the tenant is residing. It is further stated by her thatthe landlady wanted to construct a modern multi-storey buildingin the said property for her own occupation. Therefore she hasdecided to demolish her own building with a view to augment theincome and put up a multi-storey building in the premises. Shehad also given an undertaking that the demolition would commencewithin one month and complete it within 3 months.29.From the above averments in RCOP No.171/2004, it isexplicitly clear that the landlady has now taken a different standfrom what was averred in RCOP No.574/2001. Further, in RCOPNo.171/2004, P.W.1 who is the daughter-in-law of the landladyadmitted that her husband's younger brother and her family membersare residing in some other place in Chennai. This statement ofthe daughter-in-law of the landlady goes against the pleading ofthe landlady in RCOP No.574/2001 that her younger son and herfamily members are living in the ground floor of her property.30.The appellate authority erred in law in refusing to lookinto Exs.R11 to R15 on the ground that RCOP No.171/2004 was lateron withdrawn by the landlady and therefore the landlady stuck toher claim on the basis of ownership occupation only. Thisapproach of the appellate authority in taking a too liberalistic,pedantic and hyper-technical view is in my considered opiniondefinitely warrants interference by this court under Sec.25 of theAct.31.In fact, the learned counsel for the tenant submitted thateviction on the ground of owner's occupation and also on theground of demolition and reconstruction do not synchronise andthey are mutually inconsistent. The learned counsel stronglyrelied on the decision of this court reported in 2005(5) CTC 585(cited supra). 32.In the above decision this court after going throughSec.14(3)(a)(iii) and Sec.14(1)(b) of the Act, held as follows:"11. ...that Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Actis quite inconsistent with Section 14(1)(b) ofthe Act, since the landlord is attempting toevict the tenant, on these two grounds.Realizing this difficulty, it was concededbefore me that personal occupation is notpressed, and eviction is aimed only on theground of demolition and reconstruction." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

33.From the above, it is very clear that after taking boththe grounds of landlord's own occupation and his requirement fordemolition and reconstruction on the ground of personaloccupation, the ground of personal occupation was not pressedbefore the court and eviction was sought only on ground ofdemolition and reconstruction.34.In the case in hand, the landlady did not press RCOPNo.171/2004 filed for demolition and reconstruction and she hasbeen pressing the ground of owner's occupation only. However,considering the averments in RCOP No.574/2001 and the averments inRCOP No.171/2004 which are mutually inconsistent and destructiveand considering her conduct of withdrawing RCOP No.171/2004, thattoo, after giving evidence in that RCOP, the only inescapableconclusion that could be arrived at is that there is no bona fideon the part of the landlady in requiring the portion for their ownuse and occupation. When the appellate authority has failed toappreciate the entire evidence adduced before him and in factrefused to consider Exs.R11 to R15 in its proper perspective bytaking a too pedantic and hyper-technical approach, this court cancertainly interfere with the findings of the appellate authority.After all, bona fide is not an empty jargon and the same is to beestablished by going into the totality of circumstances and theconduct of the landlady.35.The learned counsel for the petitioner further contendedthat in view of the subsequent developments namely, the landladyfiling an RCOP No.171/2004 for demolition and reconstruction,withdrawing the same after letting in evidence and the depositionof the landlady's daughter-in-law that the landlady's younger sonand his family members are not residing in the ground floorportion of the building, there is no requirement at all for thelandlady seeking eviction of the tenant.36.But the learned counsel for the landlady submitted thatwhat is to be decided is whether the landlady bonafidely requiresthe building on the date of filing the RCOP and if it isestablished that her bona fide was true at the time of filing theeviction petition, then eviction is to be ordered.37.It is settled law that courts could take note of thesubsequent events and arrive at a conclusion on the basis of thoseevents. Courts can definitely take note of the alteredcircumstances and mould the relief in accordance with thecircumstances as they stand at that time when the order is finallymade. Whenever subsequent events of fact or law which have amaterial bearing, the court is not precluded from taking a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes to mould the relief.Subsequent events could even be taken note of by the High Court atthe time of revision.38.This principle has been set out in the decisions reportedin-, which have been referred above and they are,1)1983(2)MLJ 191(Ranganatha Mudaliar v. Yakoof Khan) 2)AIR 1992 S.C. 700(Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram)3)1994 S.C.800(Shadi Singh v. Rakaha) 4)1997(3)L.W.235(Jermons,J. v. Alimmal & others)39.It is equally true that when the landlord who obtained anorder of eviction on the ground of requiring the premises for hisown use and occupation passed away pending appeal or revision, thesubsequent event of death of the landlord cannot be put againstthe legal heirs to defend the appeal or revision on the cause ofaction which had been originally pleaded (as held in 1997 S.C.2399 (cited supra) and 2004(5)SCC 772(cited supra). It is alsopernicious unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on theeve of his reaching the final after passing through all theprevious levels of litigations, merely on the ground that certaindevelopments occurred pendente lite because the opposite partysucceeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.{2004(8)SCC 490(cited supra}. 40.In the present case, the Subsequent events are also to beconsidered in denying the relief to the landlady because it wasthe landlady who filed another RCOP on the ground of demolitionand reconstruction containing inconsistent and mutuallydestructive pleadings in which her own daughter-in-law deposedthat the landlady's younger son is residing elsewhere and not inher property. Further, after realising the folly of filing RCOPNo.171/2004, she withdrew the said RCOP as not pressed afterletting in evidence. Therefore the subsequent events ought to betaken cautious cognizance of and it is to be held that thelandlady has miserably failed to establish her bona fide inrequiring the outhouse portion under the occupation of the tenant.41.In the result, the order of the authorities below are setaside and this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs. Theconnected C.M.P., is closed. Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.sks https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To1. The RegistrarCourt of Small Causes,Chennai.2. The Record Keeper,VR Section,High Court, Madras.1 cc to Mr.V. Raghavachari, Advocate, sr. 22756C.R.P.(NPD)226/06.NG (CO)kk 24/4