Sellamuthu v. State

for one year. Challenging the aforesaid conviction and sentence,they are now before this Court with this criminal appeal.3. The facts of the prosecution case in brief would be asfollows:- The appellants are father and son respectively. The1st appellant/A1 is the consumer of electricity under ElectricityService Connection No.642 installed at D.No.3/29, TeachersColony, Edhirmedu, Kumarapalayam to run the power-looms. On22.06.2004, P.W.2, the then Assistant Executive Engineer, TNEB,Kumarapalayam along with P.W.1, the then Assistant ExecutiveEngineer [O & M] and P.W.3, another Engineer of TNEB made asurprise inspection at the above premises. At that time, A1 wasnot present. However, A2 was present. P.W.2 gave a notice ofinspection to A2. In the presence of A2, P.Ws.1 to 3 conductedinspection, during which, they noticed the power-looms running.But, they also noticed that the electricity meter was notrunning and recording the electricity consumption. Theydeveloped suspicion. When, P.W.2 further probed, he found asmall piece of belt inserted in between the meter and the meterboard. When the belt was removed, the meter started running.Thus, it came to light that the belt had been inserted in orderto prevent the meter running and recording the electricityconsumption. M.O.2 is the said belt piece. M.O.1 is the entiremeter with board [series]. Thereafter, P.W.1 prepared anobservation mahazar. A2 declined to sign the same. P.W.1 signedthe observation mahazar as a witness. P.W.4, the VillageAdministrative Officer, who was present at the time ofinspection also signed the observation mahazar as a witness.Ex.P.2 is the said observation mahazar. As per the relevantrules, P.W.2 calculated the electricity so stealthily consumedby the accused at 14021 units and estimated the loss atRs.54,331/-. P.W.2 gave an offer to A2 to pay a sum ofRs.1,40,000/- as compounding fees so as to avoid complaint tothe police. A2 expressed his inability to pay the same.Therefore, P.W.1 preferred a complaint at Kumarapalayam PoliceStation under Ex.P.1. Based on the above said complaint,P.W.10, the then Sub Inspector of Police , registered a case inCrime No.467 of 2004 for offence under Section 135(1)(b) of TheElectricity Act, 2003. He proceeded to the place of occurrenceat 3.30 p.m. and prepared an observation mahazar under Ex.P.12.He examined the prosecution witnesses P.Ws.1 to 4 and recordedtheir statements. He recovered the electricity meter along withthe meter board [M.O.1 series] as well as the piece of belt[M.O.2] from the place of occurrence. He requested P.W.5 totake photographs of the meter board and belt etc. Then, heexamined the other prosecution witnesses including P.W.4, theVillage Administrative Officer. He arrested A1 at 7.30 p.m. on22.06.2004 at Kumarapalayam bus stand and forwarded him forjudicial remand. Then, he forwarded the material objects to thecourt. He examined the photographer and collected thephotographs with negatives. Then, he handed over the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ investigation to P.W.11. P.W.11, the then Inspector of Policetook up further investigation and on completing theinvestigation, he laid the final report under Section 135 (1)(b) of the Electricity Act, 2003 r/w 34 of IPC against both theaccused.4. The learned Magistrate took cognizance on the saidpolice report and after complying with the requirements ofSection 207 Cr.P.C. committed the case to the Court of Sessionsfor trial.5. Based on the above materials, the trial court framed alone charge under Section 135(1)(b) of the Electricity Act r/w34 of IPC. The accused denied the charge and, therefore, thetrial court went ahead with the trial. In order to establish thecase of the prosecution, as many as 11 witnesses were examinedby the prosecution as P.Ws.1 to 11 besides 17 documents wereexhibited. The meter along with the meter board and the pieceof belt were marked as M.O.1 [series] and M.O.2 respectively.P.Ws.1 to 3 have spoken to about the inspection made and thepreparation of observation mahazar, etc. P.W.4 , the VillageAdministrative Officer has spoken to about the preparation ofobservation mahazar by the Sub Inspector of Police. P.W.5 is thephotographer who took photographs at the request of the police.P.W.6 to 9 have turned hostile and they have not supported thecase of the prosecution at all in any manner. P.W.10 and P.W.11are the police officers who have spoken to about theregistration of the case and investigation. 6. When the incriminating materials were put to the Accusedby the trial court under Section 313 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, they denied the same. However, they did not examineany witness on their side, nor did they mark any document.Having considered the available materials, the trial courtconvicted the accused as stated in the second paragraph of thisjudgement. That is how, the accused are now before this courtwith this appeal.7. I have heard Mr.N.Manokaran, learned counsel appearingfor the appellants/A1 & A2 and Mr.I.Subramaniam, learned PublicProsecutor for the respondent. I have also perused the recordsmeticulously.8. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellantswould submit that as per Section 151 of the ElectricityAct,2003, as it stood prior to the amendment, the competent courtcan take cognizance of an offence punishable under the Act onlyupon a complaint in writing made by the appropriate Governmentor appropriate Commission or any of their officer authorised bythem or a Chief Electrical Inspector or an Electrical Inspectoror licensee or the generating company, as the case may be, for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ this purpose. Subsequently, Section 151 of the Act was amendedby which two provisos were added to the same by The Electricity[Amendment] Act, 2007 [Central Act 26 of 2007] which came intoeffect from 15.06.2007. Section 151 as amended reads asfollows:-"151. Cognizance of offences.- No courtshall take cognizance of an offence punishableunder this Act except upon a complaint inwriting made by Appropriate Government orAppropriate Commission or any of their officerauthorised by them or a Chief ElectricalInspector or an Electrical Inspector orlicensee or the generating company, as the casemay be, for this purpose:Provided that the court may also takecognizance of an offence punishable under thisAct upon a report of a police officer filedunder Section 173 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 [2 of 1974]Provided further that a Special Courtconstituted under Section 153 shall becompetent to take cognizance of an offencewithout the accused being committed to it fortrial."9. In the instant case, the final report was submitted byP.W.11 on 13.09.2004. Soon thereafter, cognizance was taken.The charge was framed on 28.08.2006 by the trial court. Thus, ason the date when cognizance was taken, the Electricity[Amendment] Act, 2007 had not come into force. Therefore,according to the learned counsel for the appellants, as per theunamended provision in Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003,the cognizance taken in this case on the police report isillegal which vitiates the entire proceedings including theconviction and sentence.10. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor would contendthat of course it is true that as on the date when cognizanceof the offence was taken by the trial court, the amended Acthad not come into force. He would further submit that suchcognizance taken by the trial court on the police report is onlyirregular and not illegal. He would also submit that theamendment which came into force on 15.06.2007, being purelyprocedural, is retrospective in operation and, therefore, theabove irregularity in the matter of taking cognizance standscured. 11. In order to substantiate the his contentions, thelearned counsel for the appellants would rely on a judgement ofthe Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kartar Sing v. State of Punjab,1994 (3) SCC 569 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ occasion to deal with the scope of Article 21 and the phrase"except according to the procedure established by law" and ithas held in paragraph 448 as follows:-"448. ....... Article 21 is aconstitutional command to State to preserve thebasic human rights of every person. Existenceof right and its preservation has, thus, to beconstrued liberally and expansively. As acorollary to it the exercise of power by theState has to be construed narrowly andrestrictively. It should be so understood andinterpreted as not to nullify the basic purposeof the guarantee. No legislative or executiveaction can be permitted to get through unlessit passes through the judicial scanning of itbeing not violative of the cherished rightpreserved constitutionally. If the article isconstrued as empowering the State to make a lawand deprive a person as the Constitutionpermits it then the entire concept of personalliberty shall stand frustrated. A politicalparty voted to power may adopt repressivemeasures against its political foes by enactinga law and it may well be said that deprivationbeing in accordance with procedure establishedby law it is within the constitutional frame.The procedure adopted by State eitherlegislatively or executively must thereforesatisfy the basic and fundamental requirementof being fair and just. The word ‘except’restricts the right of the State by directingit not to fiddle with this guarantee, unless itenacts a law which must withstand the test ofArticle 13. Today it appears wellnigh settledthat procedure established by law, extends bothto the substantive and procedural law. Furthermere law is not sufficient. It must be fair andjust law. ......... "[Emphasis supplied]12. Relying on the above judgement, the learned counsel forthe appellant would submit that the term "procedure establishedby law" as enumerated in Article 21 of the Constitution of India,does not mean a law which is substantive alone but includesprocedural law as well. In the case on hand, indisputably,Section 151 of the Electricity Act, both before and after theamendment is pure and simple a procedural law and the same is nota substantive law. In such view of the matter, the learnedcounsel for the appellant would contend that though it is aprocedural law, if the same violates in any manner Article 21 of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Constitution, the conviction which is a result of suchviolation is vitiated.13. But, the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that itis only in a case where the law which is alleged to have beenviolated is a substantive law, then for such violation theentire conviction based on the same will stand vitiated. But,at the same time, in respect of violation of a law which ispure and simple a procedural law, it shall not result invitiation of the conviction unless it is established by theaccused that such violation has caused prejudice to himresulting in failure of justice. For this purpose, the learnedPublic Prosecutor has relied on a judgement of the Hon'bleSupreme Court in Purshottam Jethanand v. The State of Kutch, AIR1954 SC 700 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held asfollows:-"We think it clear that without a freshorder under Section 190(2) Cr.P.C. ShriKansara had no power to take cognizancesubsequent to the 19th August, 1950.Notwithstanding this conclusion, we are of theopinion that the defect is cured by Section529 Cr.P.C. It is admitted that Shri Kansarahad no knowledge at all of the notificationdated 19th August , 1950 by the date he tookcognizance of the case on the filing of thecomplaint on the 26th August, 1950. His takingcognizance of this case was therefore 'bonafide' and no prejudice has been shown."14. The learned Public Prosecutor would nextly rely on aConstitution Bench judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inWillie [William] Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC116. That was a case where a question arose as to whether theconviction of the accused shall stand vitiated for want of aproper charge. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that theconviction does not stand vitiated proceeded on the footing thatonly in a case where there is a failure of justice occasioned onaccount of the irregularity, then only the benefit of the samewill enure in favour of the accused or else conviction shallnot stand vitiated. In the words of the Hon'ble Supreme Court"In adjudging the question of prejudice the fact that theabsence of a charge, or a substantial mistake in it, is aserious lacuna will naturally operate to the benefit of theaccused and if there is any reasonable and substantial doubtabout whether he was, or was reasonably likely to have been,misled in the circumstances of any particular case, be is asmuch entitled to the benefit of it here as elsewhere; but if, ona careful consideration of all the facts, prejudice, or a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ reasonable and substantial likelihood of it, is not disclosedthe conviction must stand."15. There can be no doubt that the most cherishedfundamental right in the constitution is the right to lifeguaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Asit is enshrined in the said provision, the right to life can bedeprived of only by following a procedure established by law.Here, the learned counsel for the appellants would point outthat the term 'procedure established by law' as found in Article21 of the Constitution will include both the substantive law aswell as the procedural law. As has been held by the Hon'bleSupreme Court in Katar Singh's case cited supra, there can beno doubt on the said legal position. But, at the same time, asheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the other judgements citedsupra, if the law is, pure and simple, one dealing withprocedure regulating the trial of the case, unless it is shownto the court that by the violation of the said procedure,prejudice has been caused or prejudice is imminent, it cannot beheld automatically that there is a violation of Article 21 ofthe Constitution so as to hold that the conviction is vitiated.If the law is, pure and simple, a procedural law regulating theconduct of investigation or trial, in addition to establishingthe violation of the said procedural law, it is incumbent uponthe accused to show prejudice which has resulted in failure ofjustice. To put it otherwise, on the ground of mere violation ofa procedure, in the absence of any prejudice to the accused,resulting in failure of justice, the conviction shall not standvitiated. 16. Section 529 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 isexactly reproduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 inSection 460. Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 contemplates the irregularities which do not vitiate theproceeding. Sub-section (e) of Section 460 of the Code statesthat if any Magistrate, not empowered by law to take cognizanceof an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)of section 190 Cr.P.C., takes cognizance of any offence, thenthe said irregularity will not vitiate the proceedings. In thecase on hand, as per the unamended Act, the learned Magistratewas not empowered to take cognizance on a police report inrespect of an offence punishable under Section 135 of theElectricity Act. Instead, under Section 151 of the Act, theCourt can take cognizance only on a complaint filed by any of ofthe authorities enumerated thereunder. Therefore, takingcognizance on the police report is a violation of section 151 ofthe Act as it stood unamended and it is surely an irregularity.But, in view of Section 460 of the Code, the said irregularitywill not vitiate the entire proceedings. That is what has beensuccinctly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PurshottamJethanand v. The State of Kutch, AIR 1954 SC 700. Therefore, I https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ have no hesitation to hold that in this case, though as on thedate when cognizance was taken on the police report, theMagistrate was not empowered to take cognizance on such policereport, such irregularity shall not vitiate the entireproceedings. 17. The learned public prosecutor would nextly contend thatthe said irregularity stand cured by amendment to Section 151 ofthe Electricity Act brought in by the Electricity [Amendment]Act, 2007 [26 of 2007] which came into force on 15.06.2007.According to him, since Section 151 is pure and simple aprocedure for taking cognizance, the Electricity [Amendment]Act, 2007 [26 of 2007] will have retrospective operation andthe irregularity pointed out by the learned counsel for theappellant in the matter of taking cognizance thus stands cured.For this proposition, the learned public prosecutor relies on ajudgement of the Calcutta High Court in Ajoy Kumar Ghosh v. TheState of West Bengal and antoher, 2008 Cri.L.J. 276 wherein theretrospective applicability of Section 151 of the ElectricityAct, 2007 came up for consideration. After making a thoroughsurvey of various judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, theCalcutta High Court has held that the said procedural law isretrospective in operation. As a matter of fact, the CalcuttaHigh Court has followed the judgement in Union of India v.Sukumar Pyne , AIR 1966 SC 1206 wherein the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has held as follows:-"9. ..... In our opinion, there is forcein the contention of the learned Solicitor-General. As observed by this Court in 1953 SCR118: AIR 1953 SC 394, a person accused ofcommission of an offence has no vested right tobe tried by a particular court or a particularprocedure except in so far as there is anyConstitutional objection by way ofdiscrimination or the violation of any otherfundamental right is involved. It is wellrecognized that "no person has a vested rightin any course of procedure" (vide Maxwell 11thEdition, p. 216), and we see no reason why thisordinary rule should not prevail in the presentcase. There is no principle underlying Art. 20of the Constitution which makes a right to anycourse of procedure a vested right. Mr.Chatterjee complains that there is noindication in the Amending Act that the newprocedure would be retrospective and he furthersays that this affects his right of appealunder the Criminal Procedure Code. But if thisis a matter of Procedure, then it is notnecessary that there should be a specialprovision to indicate that the new procedural https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ law is retrospective. No right of appeal underthe Criminal Procedure Code is affected becauseno proceedings had been started under theCriminal Procedure Code."[Emphasis supplied]18. Again the Calcutta High Court has referred to thejudgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anant Gopal Sheorey v.The State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 wherein the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has held as follows:-"The question that arises for decision iswhether to a pending prosecution theprovisions of the amended Code have becomeapplicable. There is no controversy on thegeneral principles applicable to the case. Noperson has a vested right in any course ofprocedure. He has only the right ofprosecution or defence in the mannerprescribed for the time being by or for theCourt in which the case is pending and if byany Act of Parliament the mode of procedure isaltered he has no other right than toprocedure according to the altered mode. [SeeMaxwell on Interpretation of Statutes onP.225] : [Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v.Irving, 1905 AC 369]. In other words, a changein the law of procedure operateretrospectively and unlike the law relating tothe vested right is not only prospective."[Emphasis supplied]19. Lastly, the Calcutta High Court had an occasion torefer to yet another judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inK.S.Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012 whereinthe Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-"A statute dealing with substantiverights differs from a statute which relates toprocedure or evidence or is declaratory innature inasmuch as while a statute dealingwith substantive right is prima facieprospective unless it is expressly or bynecessary implication made to haveretrospective effect, a statute concernedmainly with matters of procedure or evidenceor which is declaratory in nature has to beconstructed as retrospective unless there is aclear indication that such was not theintention of the legislature. [Emphasis supplied] https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

20. After having a thorough analysis of the abovejudgements, the Calcutta High Court has come to the conclusionin paragraph 19 which reads as follows:- "19. Since the amendment of Section 151of the Electricity Act, 2003, i.e. thePrincipal Act by the Electricity (Amendment)Act, 2007 is purely procedural in naturewhich has merely altered the form ofprocedure, in absence of anything to thecontrary would apply retrospectively to allpending cases,in the sense that such amendedprovisions shall apply to all actions, eventhough such action may have began earlier andthen not reached to its logical conclusion.As held by the Apex Court in the case ofUnion of India v. Sukumar Pyne (1966 Cri.L.J.946) (supra) since the amendment in questionis merely a matter of procedure suchamendment should operate retrospectivelywithout even any indication the same wouldoperate retrospectively. Thus, the amendedprovision would be applicable to all pendingcases where charge-sheet has been submittedby the police in respect of an offencepunishable under the Electricity Act evenbefore such amendment came into force."21. Similar view has been taken by the Jharkhand High Courtin Ashish Kumar Jain v. State of Jharkhand and another, 2009(84) AIC 893 (JHAR. H.C.)] wherein in paragraph 15 the JharkhandHigh Court has held as follows:-"15. In view of my aforesaid findingthat the amendment in section 151 of theElectricity Act will operate withretrospective effect and governs all pendingcases, the institution of present FIR by thepolice is consonance to the law, as such,there is no illegality in it."The Jharkhand High Court had the benefit of referring to thejudgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madras v.Latif Hamid and company, (1971) 3 SCC 560 wherein the Hon'bleSupreme Court has held that "it is well settled that newprocedure prescribed by law governs all pending cases."22. But, the learned counsel for the appellants would relyon a judgement of the Bombay High Court in Shakambari Industriesv. State of Maharashtra, 2006 AIHC 2313 wherein the accusedmoved for quashing the FIR on the ground that under Section 151of the Electricity Act cognizance can be taken only on acomplaint and, therefore, the police has no power to register a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ case and to investigate. The Bombay High Court in paragraph 5has held as follows:-"5. I find that though the police tookcognizance of the offence punishable underSection 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003 nocharge-sheet can be filed and even if filed nocognizance thereof can be taken by the Courtconcerned. Thus this is a fit case in whichinherent powers of this Court are required tobe invoked for preventing the abuse of theprocess of the Court. Hence the order:(i) The criminal application is allowed. ......"23. The learned counsel for the appellants would nextlyplace reliance on the judgement of this Court in Saroj Goyal v.State of Tamil Nadu, 2008 (1) MWN (Cr.) 236 wherein this courtquashed an FIR registered by the police for an offence punishableunder Section 135 of the Electricity Act. That was a case wherethe FIR came to be registered prior to the Electricity[Amendment] Act, 2007 [26 of 2007].24. Nextly, the learned counsel for the appellants wouldrely on a judgement of Patna High Court in Satyendra Rai @Satyendar Kumar Rai @ Bajrang Wali v. State of Bihar, [2009 (84)AIC 380 (Pat. H.C.)] wherein similar view was taken and the FIRwas quashed. 25. Basing his argument on the above judgements the learnedcounsel would contend that in the case on hand also since theregistration of the FIR which culminated in the final report andthe cognizance taken which has resulted in conviction are allillegal, the conviction is liable to be set aside. 26. In my considered opinion, the judgements relied on bythe learned counsel for the appellants would not help theappellants in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the judgements cited supra wherein the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has laid down that a law which prescribes only a procedureis retrospective in operation which will govern even the pendingcases. That has been followed by Jharkhand High Court andKolkatta High Court as cited supra. I am in full agreement withthe said view taken. Therefore, as per the said law laid down bythe Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgements cited supra Ihold that the irregularity committed in the instant case by thelearned Magistrate in taking cognizance on the police report https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ stands cured by the Electricity [Amendment] Act which has gotretrospective operation. Thus, on this ground it cannot be heldthat the conviction is vitiated.27. Now, coming to the facts of the case, the learnedcounsel for the appellants would submit that the prosecution hasfailed to prove that the meter was tampered with by theseappellants. In order to substantiate this contention, the learnedcounsel would submit that the meter was not sent for examinationby an expert to find out whether the meter had been tampered withor not. The learned counsel for the appellant would furthersubmit that in the absence of any expert evidence, convictioncannot be based solely on the basis of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to3 who are interested witnesses. He would also submit that thereare certain contradictions in the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 whichwould make their evidences unbelievable. 28. The learned Public Prosecutor would on the other handsubmit that though independent witnesses were taken at the timeof inspection, they have turned hostile and they have notsupported the case of the prosecution in any manner. However,from the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 , it has been clearlyestablished that these appellants have committed the crime. Hewould further submit that as per the second proviso to Section135(e) (ii) of the Electricity Act there shall be a presumptionthat the consumer has dishonestly caused obstruction in themeter. 29. I have considered the above submissions. It is anadmitted case of the prosecution that the 1st appellant is theconsumer and the 2nd appellant is in no way connected with theelectricity service connection. Simply because he happens to bethe son of the 1st appellant, he cannot be held responsible forthe alleged tampering of the meter. There is no evidence at allavailable on record to the effect that the tampering of the meterwas caused by the 2nd appellant. The presumption under Section135 of the Act also cannot be raised as against the 2nd appellant.Therefore, in my considered opinion, the conviction of the 2ndappellant cannot be sustained and he is entitled for acquittal.30. Insofar as the 1st appellant is concerned, I find noreason to disbelieve the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 who areindependent witnesses. They cannot be termed as interestedwitnesses. They have duly followed the procedure in preparingthe observation mahazar , etc. The photographs taken by thepolice also would go to show the obstruction caused by the 1stappellant with the help of M.O.2. The contention of the learnedcounsel for the appellant that the meter has not been sent for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ examination to prove the tampering cannot be countenanced at allfor the simple reason that it is not the case of the prosecutionthat the meter was tampered with. Instead, it is the case of theprosecution that an obstruction was caused by inserting a smallpiece of belt. It is the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 that when thebelt was removed, meter started running and recording theelectricity consumption. Therefore, I hold that the prosecutionhas clearly proved the guilt of the 1st appellant. Thus, theconviction of the 1st appellant is liable to be sustained. 31. Now coming to the quantum of punishment, the learnedcounsel for the 1st appellant would submit that the 1st appellanthas already paid the demanded amount of Rs.54,000/- to theelectricity board. He would further submit that the 1st appellantdoes not have any bad antecedent. The learned counsel would alsoadd that the petitioner is now aged about 65 years. Consideringall the above, the learned counsel would submit that leniencymay be shown in the matter of punishment. The learned publicprosecutor is not in a position to dispute the above factualaspects.32. Having regard to the above fact that the loss caused tothe TNEB has been compensated by the payment made by the 1stappellant and having regard to his age and the familycircumstances, I am of the view that it would be suffice if afine of Rs.5,000/- is imposed upon the 1st appellant. 33. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed in part inthe following terms:-(i) The conviction and sentence imposed on the 1st appellantunder Section 135 (1) (b) of the Electricity Act is confirmed.However, the substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed by thetrial court is set aside, instead, he is sentenced to pay a fineof Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for one month;(ii) The conviction and the sentence imposed on the 2ndappellant is set aside and he is acquitted of the charge.(iii) In all other respects the criminal appeal standsdismissed. Sd/- Asst.Registrar. /true copy/ Sub Asst.Registrar.kmk https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To1. The Principal Sessions Judge, Namakkal.2. The Judicial Magistrate,Tiruchengodu3. Do thro The Chief Judicial MagistrateNamakkal4. The Inspector of Police, Kumarapalayam Police Station, Namakkal District.5. The Public ProsecutorHigh Court, Chennai1 cc to M/s. N. Manokaran, Advocate, Sr. 44122 Crl. Appeal No.873 of 2006 RS (CO)kk 3/8