High Court · 2025

W.P.No.21627 of 2025IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 28.10.2025CORAM :THE HONOURABLE MR. MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, CHIEF JUSTICEANDTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.ARUL MURUGANW.P.No.21627 of 2025and W.M.P.Nos.24403 and 24407 of 20251.Union of India through the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, South Block, New Delhi 110 0112.The Chief of the Air Staff Air HQrs, Vayu Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi - 110 1053.The Directorate of Air Veterans Air Headquarters, Subroto Park, New Delhi - 110 0104.JCDA (Air Force) Subroto Park, New Delhi - 110 010PetitionersVs______________Page 1 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025S.No 617873-AEx WO S. Stephen S/o TMJ Soundrarajan, East Shunmugapuram PO, Villupuram Tamil Nadu 605 602RespondentPRAYER : Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chennai in R.A.No.15 of 2023 dated 31.10.2023 confirming the order passed in O.A.No.182 of 2021 dated 23.11.2022 quash the same and consequently restrict the arrears for three years form date of filing the O.A. For Petitioners:Mr.V.ChandrasekaranFor Respondent:Mr.A.Q.ChoudhuryORDER(Order of the Court was made by the Hon'ble Chief Justice)Heard learned counsel for the parties.2. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ______________Page 2 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025is directed against the order dated 31.10.2023 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chennai.3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the relevant facts giving rise to this petition are that the respondent/original applicant was enrolled in the Indian Air Force on 19.05.1973 and he was discharged from service on 31.05.1993, while serving in the rank of Warrant Officer. He served as Warrant Officer from 01.04.1993 to 31.05.1993, a period less than 10 months. He was not granted pension as applicable to the rank of Warrant Officer for the reason and in view of the applicability of the then existing rules that mandated 10 months of service in that rank. Consequently, he was entitled to and granted pension as applicable to the lower rank i.e., Junior Warrant Officer. The respondent/original applicant, however, felt aggrieved by the said decision of granting him pension of the rank lower than the rank on which he had retired. The Original Application (OA) was filed in the year 2021.4. Learned Tribunal, taking into consideration the earlier decisions in the matter of claim of pension attached to the rank from ______________Page 3 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025which army personnel retired and taking into consideration the Government's own decision vide Circular dated 13.10.2016, held the respondent/original applicant entitled to the revised pension in the rank of Warrant Officer. Relying upon an earlier Circular issued on 09.02.2001, the respondent/original applicant was held entitled to revised pension with effect from 01.01.1996, as revised from time to time, with further direction of payment of arrears and interest. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, this writ petition has been filed by the Union of India.6.1. Learned counsel for the Union of India contended before us that in so far as grant of relief of revised pension in the rank of Warrant Officer is concerned, the Union of India would not dispute the same, because it had itself taken a decision to grant the benefit with effect from 01.01.2006 to all the retired employees, which includes the respondent/original applicant as well. However, the challenge is confined only to that part of the order, by which relief has been extended with effect from 01.01.1996, which is not only 10 years before the date with effect from which the relief was granted under a ______________Page 4 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025policy decision dated 13.10.2016, but beyond the period of three years prior to the date of filing of the OA. 6.2. Relying upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh1, he would submit that the benefit, in any case, could not be granted with effect from the date prior to three years preceding the date of filing of the OA. Therefore, to that extent, the order of the Tribunal is bad and warrants interference.7.1. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ original applicant would submit that the respondent/original applicant retired while serving in the rank of Warrant Officer and the petitioners while wrongly denying pension applicable to the rank of Warrant Officer, granted pension associated with the lower rank. It was a continuing wrong and, in fact, the petitioners were obliged to take proactive steps to grant the benefit even without any petition being filed in the Court. Therefore, merely because there was some delay in filing the OA before the Tribunal, the benefit to which he was entitled 1Civil Appeal No.5151-5152 of 2008, dated 13.08.2008______________Page 5 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025to from the initial date could not have been denied. 7.2. Referring to the Circular dated 09.02.2001, he would submit that policy decision was taken to grant the benefit with effect from 01.01.1996. It was in the light of this Circular that the Tribunal granted the benefit with effect from 01.01.1996. He also placed reliance upon an order of this Court in the case of Union of India and others v. The Registrar Armed Forces Tribunal and another2 and another order in the case of Union of India and others v. Vedanabhatla Satish Kumar and another3.8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the records, including the order impugned.9. The respondent/original applicant, after having served for about two months in the rank of Warrant Officer, was discharged on 31.05.1993. It has never been the case of the respondent/original applicant that, on the date of his retirement, the then rules applicable permitted grant of pension of the rank of Warrant Officer, i.e., the post 2W.P.No.15088 of 2024, dated 11.06.20243W.P.Nos.30478 of 2023 and 7884 of 2024, dated 29.10.2024______________Page 6 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025from which he was discharged. It is undisputed position, therefore, on record that the rules prevailing at that point of time only allowed grant of pension from the rank from which an army personnel was discharged, subject to the condition that he had worked at least 10 months in that rank. Therefore, it is quite clear that, on the date of discharge, the respondent/original applicant was not entitled to the benefit of pension in the rank of Warrant Officer. He was, however, granted pension applicable to the lower rank i.e., Junior Warrant Officer.10. While the matter stood thus, a Circular came to be issued on 09.02.2001, which implemented Government's decision on the recommendations of the 5th Central Pay Commission relating to pensionary benefits in respect of Commissioned Officers and Personnel below the Officer rank. It was clarified that pension of all pre-96 retiree armed forces personnel will be revised on the basis of the rank/group last held by the individual and the revised pay scale connected thereto, even if the rank/group was held for less than 10 months before retirement. The further clarification made was that such pension will be reduced proportionately if the qualifying service is less ______________Page 7 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025than 33 years.11. Though policy decision was taken on 09.02.2001 and so implemented, it appears that the respondent/original applicant was not granted that relief. The respondent/original applicant, however, did not take recourse to any remedy of law.12. It appears that later on a decision was taken vide Circular dated 13.10.2016 to grant such benefit to all the pensioners irrespective of any cut-off date. However, for the purpose of granting actual benefits, the benefits were confined only with effect from 01.01.2006. Even, at this stage, the respondent/original applicant did not approach the Tribunal.13. It was as late as in 2021 that the respondent/original applicant knocked the doors of justice by moving OA before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chennai.14. After having gone through the Circulars dated 09.02.2001 and 13.10.2016, it is explicitly clear that, initially in 2001, a decision ______________Page 8 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025was taken to grant benefit of pension with reference to the rank from which an army person retired irrespective of whether he had completed 10 months of service on that post or not. The subsequent policy decision taken sought to confine the actual benefit only with effect from 01.01.2006.15. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the respondent/original applicant was entitled to the said benefits, even according to the policy decision taken by the Union of India with effect from 01.01.1996. The effect would be that the respondent/original applicant was held entitled to grant of notional pension of the rank from which he was discharged, but the actual benefit would be extended only from 01.01.2006.16. The only question which arises for consideration is whether the respondent/original applicant, who had filed OA in the year 2021, was entitled to the relief of that benefit with effect from 01.01.1996 i.e., the date clarified vide Circular dated 09.02.2001.17. The principle applicable in such cases where relief is sought from the initial date in cases of continuing wrong has been elaborately ______________Page 9 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025considered by their Lordships in the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh (supra).18. Explaining the principle underlying “continuing wrong”, in the aforesaid decision, it was held as follows:“4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A 'continuing wrong' refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. 'Recurring/successive wrong' are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan – [AIR 1959 SC 798], explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation act, 1963):“It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by its itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.”______________Page 10 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025In M.R.Gupta vs. Union of India [1995 (5) SCC 628], the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held:“The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation exiting on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is t this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred. .....”______________Page 11 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025In Shiv Dass v. Union of India – 2007 (9) SCC 274, this Court held:“The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. ...... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.”5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong ______________Page 12 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.”19. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case, what we find is that, though the respondent/original applicant's claim for grant of pension on the rank of Warrant Officer was justified in view of the Circular which was ______________Page 13 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025issued on 09.02.2001 and thereafter, every month this claim continued, to what extent the back wages or arrears of pension could be granted would essentially be governed by the other set of principle discussed in the aforesaid judgment. It has been clearly stated therein that the effect of delay and laches would not be that the claim of pension is to be altogether rejected, but the same would have to be confined ordinarily to a period three years prior to the date of filing of the OA. If the aforesaid principle is applied in the present case, the respondent/original applicant is not entitled to claim arrears of pension on the claim of he being entitled to pension attached to the rank of Warrant Officer, in respect of the period prior to three years preceding the date of filing of the OA.20. However, but for the Government's own decision taken vide its Circular dated 13.10.2016 to grant actual benefit from 01.01.2006, we are of the view that the respondent/original applicant was not entitled to that benefit in respect of the period prior to three years preceding the date of filing of the OA. 21. But then, since the petitioners themselves have granted the ______________Page 14 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025relief of actual benefit/arrears of pension with effect from 01.01.2006 in the light of the Circular dated 13.10.2016, we are inclined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal only to that extent. We hold that the order granting benefit from 01.01.1996 is bad in law and in violation of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh (supra). However, the policy decision does entitle the respondent/original applicant to get the actual benefit and arrears of pension from 01.01.2006.22. Reliance placed by the respondent/original applicant on two decisions, one rendered by this Court and the other by the High Court of Telangana, are distinguishable on facts. The decisions did not turn on the principles involved in this case, but are only on the ground of parity in relation to some other cases. 23. In the light of the principles which have been laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh (supra), those decisions cannot be relied upon to grant the benefit as claimed by the respondent/original applicant.______________Page 15 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 202524. In the result, the petition filed by the Union of India is partly allowed in the manner and to the extent stated above. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA, CJ) (G.ARUL MURUGAN,J) 28.10.2025 Index: YesNeutral Citation:YesbbrTo:1.The Secretary, Union of India Government of India, Ministry of Defence, South Block, New Delhi 110 0112.The Chief of the Air Staff Air HQrs, Vayu Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi - 110 1053.The Directorate of Air Veterans Air Headquarters, Subroto Park, New Delhi - 110 0104.JCDA (Air Force) Subroto Park, New Delhi - 110 010______________Page 16 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025______________Page 17 of 18 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.21627 of 2025THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE ANDG.ARUL MURUGAN,J.bbr W.P.No.21627 of 2025 28.10.2025______________Page 18 of 18