Mr.S.Silambanan v. V.Prakash
Case Details
W.P.No.23164 of 2018he was appointed vide order dated 19.03.2013. In the appointment letter of the petitioner, the respondent was designated as patrol in quality department. Though he was referred to as trainee, he was not imparted any training as stated therein. The respondent was engaged in the direct manufacturing process from the beginning in the quality department as a patrol. In short, according to the respondent, if the appointment order is read as a whole and the veil is lifted, it would be clear that the reference to the respondent is trainee was unfair labour practice. The respondent stated that he was transferred from quality department to rubber production department, which was only to harass him. It was further stated that the letter dated 25.07.2014 obtained from the respondent was illegal and not binding on the respondent. The respondent stated that the termination order was against the principles of natural justice and also in violation of Section 25N and 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence illegal.8.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the finding of the labour Court that the appointment order dated 19.03.2013 of the petitioner company was sham and nominal, was unsustainable and was based on misconception of Ex.M.1, the appointment order. The learned counsel further 5/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018submitted that the finding of the labour Court was based on assumptions and presumptions and therefore, deserved to be set aside. The learned counsel further submitted that the finding of the labour Court that the respondent was not a trainee but an employee and therefore termination order passed without conducting domestic enquiry, as per the standing orders was invalid and erroneous. The learned counsel therefore submitted that the award of the labour Court deserved to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment reported in 2007(1) SCC 214, in support of his case.9.The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the findings of facts of the labour Court could not be overturned by this Court as the findings were based on evidence. The learned counsel further submitted that there was no error apparent on the face of the record or any perversity in the findings of the labour Court and hence the well considered award of the labour Court should not be disturbed. The learned counsel for the respondent relied the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in support of his case:(i)In Trambak Rubber Industries ltd.,-Vs-Nashik Workers Union and Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0468/2003.6/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018(ii)In Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Ors.,-Vs-Bikartan Das and Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0888/2023.(iii)In The Indian Hume Pipe Co., Ltd.,-Vs-The Presiding Office, Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and Ors., reported in MANU/TN/9422/2007.10.I have heard both the learned counsels and I have perused the materials placed on record. 11.It is to be first seen, whether the finding of the labour Court that Ex.M.1, the appointment order was sham and nominal one is valid. At the outset, I would like to quote the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bikartan Das and Others, on the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:"50.The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the 7/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. Keeping in view the above legal proposition let us now consider the merits of the case.12.According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the terms of the appointment order were very clear and therefore, the only conclusion that could be drawn is that the respondent was only a trainee and the finding of the labour Court to the contrary, was unsustainable.13.On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent that a bare reading of the appointment order would establish that the respondent was not a trainee. The labour Court, on the basis of the evidence on record and on appreciation of the oral evidence of MW1, concluded that Ex.M.1, the appointment order, was sham and nominal. The relevant portions of Ex.M.1, are as follows:8/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018"This appointment letter is in reference to your application and subsequent tests and interview, for a suitable assignment.DMC Automotive Pvt. Ltd., finds pleasure in employing you under the following terms and conditions of our company.1.Date of Appointment:Your appointment will be effective from 19.03.2013.2.Designation:You will be designated as patrol in Quality Department.3.Remuneration:Your Gross salary will be Rs.6,500/-(Rupees Six Thousand Five Hundred Only) per month. The perquisites applicable to your grade are subject to alteration and amendment and you will be entitled to the same as per the rules of the company.4.Place of posting:You will initially be posted at Thiruvallur - Othappai Village on your joining. You are liable to be transferred to another department, post or place either in India or abroad, either in existence or which may come in existence hereinafter either at the place of the posting or at any place where the Management may establish/open its branch/ office/ works latter on. Upon such transfer the rules & regulations of service applicable to such post or at the place of transfer will become applicable to you.5.Confirmation:You will be on trainee for a period of two years and one year probation from the date of your joining, thereafter, if your services are found satisfactory, you will be confirmed in writing. If found necessary, trainee/probation period may be extended at the 9/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018sole discretion of the management or may be dispensed with earlier during the initial or extended period of trainee/probation. Unless confirmed in writing, you will be deemed as trainee after the expiry of initial or extended period of trainee/probation."14.The crucial terms of the appointment order that support the respondent's case are:(i)The respondent was selected based on his application, tests and interview.(ii)The appointment letter speaks of designation of the respondent as patrol in quality department.(iii)The remuneration is termed as Gross Salary and not stipend and it was also further stated that the perquisites applicable to the respondent's grade were subject to alteration and amendment.(iv)The respondent was liable to be transferred to any department, post or place either in India or abroad etc.(v)Confirmation, on which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner states that the respondent would be on "trainee" for a period of two years and one year probation from the date of joining etc and further unless confirmed in writing he would be deemed as trainee after the expiry of initial or extended period of trainee/probation.10/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018The petitioner taking refuge under Clause-v states that the respondent was only a trainee and not a regular employee.15.From the terms of the appointment order, it is clear that though the respondent was referred to as a trainee, the other terms clearly show that the respondent was employed on regular basis with salary designation, transfer etc. The labour Court relied on the evidence of MW1 to draw an adverse inference against the petitioner for not producing documents showing the training imparted to the respondent as a trainee. Even the evidence of MW1 did not inspire the confidence of the Court in as much as MW1 clearly and categorically admitted in his cross-examination that only 13 workers were permanently employed out of large work force of 350 workers.“2014 Mk; Mz;L kDjhuh; gzpapy; ,Uf;Fk; rkaj;jpy; epue;ju bjhHpyhspfspd; vz;zpf;if 13 kw;Wk; jhd; ,Ue;jJ vd;W brhd;dhy; ,Ue;jpUf;fyhk;. 2014 d; nghJk; Rkhh; 300 Kjy; 350 ngh; bjhHpyhsh;fs; ntiy bra;F bfhz;oUe;jdh;.11/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 201816.From the reading of the evidence of MW1, it is very clear that the entire production activity in the company was carried out by the so-called trainees. Further, the evidence of MW1 was that the entire production department was run by the trainees, which is evident from the following deposition in cross-examination:"Rubber Production Department gphptpy; epue;ju bjhHpyhsp vd;W ahUk; ntiyghh;ftpy;iy vd;W brhd;dhy; ,Uf;fyhk;. Rubber Department-y; ntiy bra;j mizj;J bjhHpyhsh;fSk; trainees vd;w mog;gilapy; eh';fs; ntiyf;F itj;jpUe;njhk; vd;W brhd;dhy; rhpjhd;. Rubber Production Department-y; cs;s MW bkc&pd;fSnk trainee vd;W eh';fs; epakpj;Js;s bjhHpyhspfshy;jhd; ,af;fg;gl;L tUfpwJ vd;W brhd;dhy; rhpjhd;." 17.From the above evidence, it is clear that the entire Rubber Production Department was carried out by the workers, who were designated as trainees. The trainee is one to whom training is imparted. The specific evidence of the petitioner was that in the production department, there were no permanent 12/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018employees, but only trainees. Therefore, in my view the finding of the labour Court that the appointment order was sham and nominal cannot be faulted. In this regard, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s.Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd.,-Vs-Nashik Workers Union & Ors., reported in 2003(6) SCC 416 can be usefully referred to. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:"It would be impossible to believe that the entire production activity was being carried on with none other than the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been trainers too. The Management evidently came forward with a false plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable that the appellant-employer resorted to unfair labour practice."18.Once it is found that the appointment order was sham and nominal, then the termination of the respondents services without following the procedure contemplated under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be sustained. One other aspect that needs to be noted is that assuming that the respondent was not a permanent employee, even then, in my view the respondent would be entitled to notice and domestic enquiry as per the Standing Orders of the 13/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018petitioner.19. Clause-3 of the Standing Orders of the petitioner is relevant:"3.Definition and Classification of Workmen:The workmen will be classified as follows1.Permanent2.Probationer3.Temporary4.Casual5.Trainee6.Apprentice7.Part time employment"Clause 3.5 defines the trainee as follows:3.5.A “Trainee” is one who is engaged either by an agreement or by appointment letter for a period not more than 24 calender months and on the basis of monthly stipend.Therefore, the trainee is engaged on the basis of monthly stipend as already referred to above, the respondent was not appointed on a stipend, but was appointed on gross salary of Rs.6,500/-. Further, Clause 46 of the Standing Orders relates to the suspension of an employee pending enquiry into alleged misconduct 14/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018and procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct."46.Suspension of an employee pending enquiry into alleged misconduct and procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct:46.1.None of the punishments mentioned in clause above will be enforced without first giving an opportunity to explain his/her case. A show cause notice/charge sheet will, therefore, invariably be served on him/her before award of any of these punishment.46.2.If a punishment under clause of the above Stating Order is to be awarded, the workmen concerned should be served with a charge-sheet and an enquiry be set out.46.3.Any workmen against whom an enquiry has to be held shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the charges against him/her indicating there in the nature of offence or misconduct with full particulars thereof. The charge-sheet will invariably end up by calling upon the workmen to give his/her explanation in writing by a stipulated date. If his/her reply is not considered satisfactory by the management or if no reply is received within stipulated time or any extension thereof, an enquiry shall be held by an enquiry officer appointed for the purpose. During this enquiry the concerned workmen will be given all reasonable 15/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018opportunities to defend him/her etc."20.Clause 46.3 of the Standing Orders states that any “workmen” against whom an enquiry has to be held shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the charge against him/her indicating therein the nature of offence or misconduct with full particulars thereof. When under the Standing Orders, trainee category is also included in the definition of workmen then the respondent would be entitled to an enquiry before dismissal as per clause 46.3.21.Admittedly, no charge sheet was issued, no enquiry was conducted in the present case. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the termination of the respondent, without serving the charge sheet and conducting domestic enquiry, is illegal and against the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and also the Standing Orders of the petitioner. Further in the appointment order it is clearly stated that the respondent would be bound by the rules and regulations including the conduct, discipline and appeal rules of the petitioner company. 22.The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the 16/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd.,-Vs-V.Lakshminarayanan, reported in (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 214. I find that the facts of the case are distinguishable and therefore, I find that the reliance placed on the said judgment is misplaced.23.I find no grounds for interference with the Award of the labour Court and hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.01.03.2024Index:Yes/NoSpeaking Order: Yes/NoNeutral Citation:YesNo17/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018To1.The III Additional Labour Court, Chennai.2.The Management of DMC Automotive Private Limited Rep., by its Managing Director, No.5, Othappai Village, Uttukottai Taluk, Tiruvallur-602 023.18/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018N.MALA.J,NsW.P.No.23164 of 2018andW.M.P.Nos.27066 and 26067 of 201801.03.202419/19
W.P.No.23164 of 2018he was appointed vide order dated 19.03.2013. In the appointment letter of the petitioner, the respondent was designated as patrol in quality department. Though he was referred to as trainee, he was not imparted any training as stated therein. The respondent was engaged in the direct manufacturing process from the beginning in the quality department as a patrol. In short, according to the respondent, if the appointment order is read as a whole and the veil is lifted, it would be clear that the reference to the respondent is trainee was unfair labour practice. The respondent stated that he was transferred from quality department to rubber production department, which was only to harass him. It was further stated that the letter dated 25.07.2014 obtained from the respondent was illegal and not binding on the respondent. The respondent stated that the termination order was against the principles of natural justice and also in violation of Section 25N and 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence illegal.8.The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the finding of the labour Court that the appointment order dated 19.03.2013 of the petitioner company was sham and nominal, was unsustainable and was based on misconception of Ex.M.1, the appointment order. The learned counsel further 5/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018submitted that the finding of the labour Court was based on assumptions and presumptions and therefore, deserved to be set aside. The learned counsel further submitted that the finding of the labour Court that the respondent was not a trainee but an employee and therefore termination order passed without conducting domestic enquiry, as per the standing orders was invalid and erroneous. The learned counsel therefore submitted that the award of the labour Court deserved to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment reported in 2007(1) SCC 214, in support of his case.9.The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the findings of facts of the labour Court could not be overturned by this Court as the findings were based on evidence. The learned counsel further submitted that there was no error apparent on the face of the record or any perversity in the findings of the labour Court and hence the well considered award of the labour Court should not be disturbed. The learned counsel for the respondent relied the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in support of his case:(i)In Trambak Rubber Industries ltd.,-Vs-Nashik Workers Union and Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0468/2003.6/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018(ii)In Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Ors.,-Vs-Bikartan Das and Ors., reported in MANU/SC/0888/2023.(iii)In The Indian Hume Pipe Co., Ltd.,-Vs-The Presiding Office, Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and Ors., reported in MANU/TN/9422/2007.10.I have heard both the learned counsels and I have perused the materials placed on record. 11.It is to be first seen, whether the finding of the labour Court that Ex.M.1, the appointment order was sham and nominal one is valid. At the outset, I would like to quote the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bikartan Das and Others, on the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:"50.The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the 7/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. Keeping in view the above legal proposition let us now consider the merits of the case.12.According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the terms of the appointment order were very clear and therefore, the only conclusion that could be drawn is that the respondent was only a trainee and the finding of the labour Court to the contrary, was unsustainable.13.On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondent that a bare reading of the appointment order would establish that the respondent was not a trainee. The labour Court, on the basis of the evidence on record and on appreciation of the oral evidence of MW1, concluded that Ex.M.1, the appointment order, was sham and nominal. The relevant portions of Ex.M.1, are as follows:8/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018"This appointment letter is in reference to your application and subsequent tests and interview, for a suitable assignment.DMC Automotive Pvt. Ltd., finds pleasure in employing you under the following terms and conditions of our company.1.Date of Appointment:Your appointment will be effective from 19.03.2013.2.Designation:You will be designated as patrol in Quality Department.3.Remuneration:Your Gross salary will be Rs.6,500/-(Rupees Six Thousand Five Hundred Only) per month. The perquisites applicable to your grade are subject to alteration and amendment and you will be entitled to the same as per the rules of the company.4.Place of posting:You will initially be posted at Thiruvallur - Othappai Village on your joining. You are liable to be transferred to another department, post or place either in India or abroad, either in existence or which may come in existence hereinafter either at the place of the posting or at any place where the Management may establish/open its branch/ office/ works latter on. Upon such transfer the rules & regulations of service applicable to such post or at the place of transfer will become applicable to you.5.Confirmation:You will be on trainee for a period of two years and one year probation from the date of your joining, thereafter, if your services are found satisfactory, you will be confirmed in writing. If found necessary, trainee/probation period may be extended at the 9/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018sole discretion of the management or may be dispensed with earlier during the initial or extended period of trainee/probation. Unless confirmed in writing, you will be deemed as trainee after the expiry of initial or extended period of trainee/probation."14.The crucial terms of the appointment order that support the respondent's case are:(i)The respondent was selected based on his application, tests and interview.(ii)The appointment letter speaks of designation of the respondent as patrol in quality department.(iii)The remuneration is termed as Gross Salary and not stipend and it was also further stated that the perquisites applicable to the respondent's grade were subject to alteration and amendment.(iv)The respondent was liable to be transferred to any department, post or place either in India or abroad etc.(v)Confirmation, on which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner states that the respondent would be on "trainee" for a period of two years and one year probation from the date of joining etc and further unless confirmed in writing he would be deemed as trainee after the expiry of initial or extended period of trainee/probation.10/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018The petitioner taking refuge under Clause-v states that the respondent was only a trainee and not a regular employee.15.From the terms of the appointment order, it is clear that though the respondent was referred to as a trainee, the other terms clearly show that the respondent was employed on regular basis with salary designation, transfer etc. The labour Court relied on the evidence of MW1 to draw an adverse inference against the petitioner for not producing documents showing the training imparted to the respondent as a trainee. Even the evidence of MW1 did not inspire the confidence of the Court in as much as MW1 clearly and categorically admitted in his cross-examination that only 13 workers were permanently employed out of large work force of 350 workers.“2014 Mk; Mz;L kDjhuh; gzpapy; ,Uf;Fk; rkaj;jpy; epue;ju bjhHpyhspfspd; vz;zpf;if 13 kw;Wk; jhd; ,Ue;jJ vd;W brhd;dhy; ,Ue;jpUf;fyhk;. 2014 d; nghJk; Rkhh; 300 Kjy; 350 ngh; bjhHpyhsh;fs; ntiy bra;F bfhz;oUe;jdh;.11/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 201816.From the reading of the evidence of MW1, it is very clear that the entire production activity in the company was carried out by the so-called trainees. Further, the evidence of MW1 was that the entire production department was run by the trainees, which is evident from the following deposition in cross-examination:"Rubber Production Department gphptpy; epue;ju bjhHpyhsp vd;W ahUk; ntiyghh;ftpy;iy vd;W brhd;dhy; ,Uf;fyhk;. Rubber Department-y; ntiy bra;j mizj;J bjhHpyhsh;fSk; trainees vd;w mog;gilapy; eh';fs; ntiyf;F itj;jpUe;njhk; vd;W brhd;dhy; rhpjhd;. Rubber Production Department-y; cs;s MW bkc&pd;fSnk trainee vd;W eh';fs; epakpj;Js;s bjhHpyhspfshy;jhd; ,af;fg;gl;L tUfpwJ vd;W brhd;dhy; rhpjhd;." 17.From the above evidence, it is clear that the entire Rubber Production Department was carried out by the workers, who were designated as trainees. The trainee is one to whom training is imparted. The specific evidence of the petitioner was that in the production department, there were no permanent 12/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018employees, but only trainees. Therefore, in my view the finding of the labour Court that the appointment order was sham and nominal cannot be faulted. In this regard, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s.Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd.,-Vs-Nashik Workers Union & Ors., reported in 2003(6) SCC 416 can be usefully referred to. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:"It would be impossible to believe that the entire production activity was being carried on with none other than the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been trainers too. The Management evidently came forward with a false plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable that the appellant-employer resorted to unfair labour practice."18.Once it is found that the appointment order was sham and nominal, then the termination of the respondents services without following the procedure contemplated under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be sustained. One other aspect that needs to be noted is that assuming that the respondent was not a permanent employee, even then, in my view the respondent would be entitled to notice and domestic enquiry as per the Standing Orders of the 13/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018petitioner.19. Clause-3 of the Standing Orders of the petitioner is relevant:"3.Definition and Classification of Workmen:The workmen will be classified as follows1.Permanent2.Probationer3.Temporary4.Casual5.Trainee6.Apprentice7.Part time employment"Clause 3.5 defines the trainee as follows:3.5.A “Trainee” is one who is engaged either by an agreement or by appointment letter for a period not more than 24 calender months and on the basis of monthly stipend.Therefore, the trainee is engaged on the basis of monthly stipend as already referred to above, the respondent was not appointed on a stipend, but was appointed on gross salary of Rs.6,500/-. Further, Clause 46 of the Standing Orders relates to the suspension of an employee pending enquiry into alleged misconduct 14/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018and procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct."46.Suspension of an employee pending enquiry into alleged misconduct and procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct:46.1.None of the punishments mentioned in clause above will be enforced without first giving an opportunity to explain his/her case. A show cause notice/charge sheet will, therefore, invariably be served on him/her before award of any of these punishment.46.2.If a punishment under clause of the above Stating Order is to be awarded, the workmen concerned should be served with a charge-sheet and an enquiry be set out.46.3.Any workmen against whom an enquiry has to be held shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the charges against him/her indicating there in the nature of offence or misconduct with full particulars thereof. The charge-sheet will invariably end up by calling upon the workmen to give his/her explanation in writing by a stipulated date. If his/her reply is not considered satisfactory by the management or if no reply is received within stipulated time or any extension thereof, an enquiry shall be held by an enquiry officer appointed for the purpose. During this enquiry the concerned workmen will be given all reasonable 15/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018opportunities to defend him/her etc."20.Clause 46.3 of the Standing Orders states that any “workmen” against whom an enquiry has to be held shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the charge against him/her indicating therein the nature of offence or misconduct with full particulars thereof. When under the Standing Orders, trainee category is also included in the definition of workmen then the respondent would be entitled to an enquiry before dismissal as per clause 46.3.21.Admittedly, no charge sheet was issued, no enquiry was conducted in the present case. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the termination of the respondent, without serving the charge sheet and conducting domestic enquiry, is illegal and against the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and also the Standing Orders of the petitioner. Further in the appointment order it is clearly stated that the respondent would be bound by the rules and regulations including the conduct, discipline and appeal rules of the petitioner company. 22.The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the 16/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd.,-Vs-V.Lakshminarayanan, reported in (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 214. I find that the facts of the case are distinguishable and therefore, I find that the reliance placed on the said judgment is misplaced.23.I find no grounds for interference with the Award of the labour Court and hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.01.03.2024Index:Yes/NoSpeaking Order: Yes/NoNeutral Citation:YesNo17/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018To1.The III Additional Labour Court, Chennai.2.The Management of DMC Automotive Private Limited Rep., by its Managing Director, No.5, Othappai Village, Uttukottai Taluk, Tiruvallur-602 023.18/19 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.23164 of 2018N.MALA.J,NsW.P.No.23164 of 2018andW.M.P.Nos.27066 and 26067 of 201801.03.202419/19