The Chairman Bar Council of Tamil Nadu High Court Campus Chennai – 600 104 v. The Government of Tamil Nadu

of the amount of one lakh rupees under the sub-section" as null andvoid being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For Appellants:Mr.R.Thiagarajanin W.A.Nos.823,Senior Counsel824 and 826/2007 for Mr.K.VenkatakrishnanFor respondents 6 and 8 in WA.No.830/07For respondents2 and 4 in WA.No.831/07For respondents7 and 9 in WA.No.832/07For appellants :Mr.R.Thirugnanamin W.A.Nos.829Spl. Govt. Pleaderto 832/2007For 2nd respondent in W.A.No.823/2007For 7th respondent in W.A.No.824/2007For 6th respondent in W.A.No.826/2007For 1st respondent:Mr.Krishnan, in WA.No.823/2007Senior CounselFor respondents1 to 6 in WA.No.824/2007For respondents1 to 5 in WA.No.826/2007For respondent in WA.No.829/2007For respondents 1 to 5in WA.No.830/2007For 1st respondent in W.A.No.831/2007For respondents 1 to 6in W.A.No.832/2007For 3rd respondent: Mr.R.C.Paul Kanagarajin WA.No.823/2007For 8th respondent in WA.No.824/2007For 7th respondent in WA.No.826/2007For 7th respondent in WA.No.830/2007For 3rd respondent in WA.No.831/2007For 8th respondentin WA.No.832/2007 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ JUDGMENTP.JYOTHIMANI,J.These appeals are filed by the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and theGovernment of Tamil Nadu against the common order of the learnedJudge dated 9.3.2007 made in W.P.Nos.1991 of 1996, 11133 of 1998,1932 of 2003 and 4533 of 2004, by which the learned Judge has struckdown a proviso to Explanation II(5) to Section 16 of the Tamil NaduAdvocates' Welfare Fund Act, 1987 (for brevity, "the Welfare FundAct").2. The first respondent in W.A.No.823/2007, respondents 1 to6 in W.A.No.824/2007, respondents 1 to 5 in W.A.No.826/2007,respondent in W.A.No.829/2007, respondents 1 to 5 in W.A.No.830/2007,first respondent in W.A.No.831/2007 and respondents 1 to 6 inW.A.No.832/2007 (for brevity, "the contesting respondents"), who arethe advocates enrolled with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu afterhaving retired from Government and other services, have challengedthe above said proviso by which the benefit of payment of Rs.2 Lakhsto a member of the Advocates Welfare Fund is denied to the legalheirs or nominees on the death of such advocates who were on receiptof pension, gratuity or other terminal benefits from any StateGovernment or Central Government or other authority or employer. Thecontesting respondents, who are retired officials from variousdepartments and are qualified with Law Degree, have enrolled asadvocates after their retirement in various services and arepracticing in various courts.3. The Government of Tamil Nadu has passed the Welfare Fund Actin order to constitute a welfare fund for the benefit of advocates oncessation of their practice. Under Section 3(1) of the Welfare FundAct, the Government has constituted "Tamil Nadu Advocates WelfareFund", which consists of various amounts as contemplated underSection 3(2) of the Welfare Fund Act and the said fund is maintainedby a "Trustee Committee" constituted under Section 4 of the WelfareFund Act. Section 15 of the Welfare Fund Act enables an Advocatepracticing in any court in the State and being a member of a BarAssociation or an Advocates Association to become a member of theAdvocates Welfare Fund on payment of subscriptions mentioned therein. Under Section 16 of the Welfare Fund Act, every advocate who has beena member of the fund for a period of not less than five years, oncessation of practice was eligible for payment of various amountsspecified in the schedule to the Welfare Fund Act, which depends uponthe number of years of practice. However, the Trustee Committee isempowered to make such schedule payment even to an advocate havingless than five years experience, who ceases to practice, on beingsatisfied that there has been any permanent physical or mentaldisability of such advocate. It is also made clear that in caseswhere a member of the fund dies before receiving the amount as perthe schedule, his nominees or legal heirs would be entitled for such https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ payment.4. While so, the Government of Tamil Nadu has brought anamendment to the Welfare Fund Act, by way of an Amendment Act 43 of1995, by which a new scheme was introduced that on the death of amember, his nominee or legal heir were to be paid an amount of Rs.1Lakh and that was incorporated in Explanation II (5) to Section 16 ofthe Welfare Fund Act. In the proviso to the said provision, the saidbenefit of Rs.1 Lakh was denied to a member who was in receipt of apension or gratuity or other terminal benefits from any State orCentral Government, etc. However, the said amount has been increasedwith effect from 1.2.2001 to Rs.2 Lakhs. 5. The above said proviso was challenged by the contestingrespondents on the grounds that the proviso is contrary to the verypurpose of the Welfare Fund Act; that the classification among theadvocates, who are the members of the Welfare Fund, and denial ofbenefits to the contesting respondents on the basis that they are inreceipt of pension and other benefits, having served in the State orCentral Government, etc., is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative ofArticle 14 of the Constitution of India.6. On the other hand, it was the contention of the respondentsin the writ petitions that the classification among the advocates, onthe basis that the advocates who have devoted full time to theprofession from the beginning and the advocates who after retirementfrom service have entered into the profession, for the purpose ofconferring the lumpsum payment of Rs.2 Lakhs is reasonable and it wasthe case of the respondents in the writ petitions that the nexusbetween the object sought to be achieved and the denial of benefit tothose who are retired officers is to recognize the persons who havedevoted their whole life to the advocate profession and it is in thatway the classification is reasonable and that the other benefits, asavailable in the schedule to the Welfare Fund Act based on the yearsof service, are given to the contesting respondents and what isdenied is only the lumpsum payment. 7. Or otherwise, it was the case of the State Government as wellas the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu that the persons who practiced asadvocates after retirement from service not only have some financialbase, since lumpsum amount of pension, gratuity, etc. have beenreceived by them and on their death the legal heirs would get thefamily pension etc., which is not available to a person who haschosen the profession of advocate from the beginning and it was withthat view of giving protection and monetary benefit to those who havedevoted their entire life for the cause of the profession, theamendment was sought to be made.8. It was the further case of the respondents in the writpetitions that the petitioners were well aware of those conditions https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and only knowing the same they have become members of the AdvocatesWelfare Fund and it is not open to them to challenge the scheme. Itwas also stated that originally when the Advocates Welfare FundScheme was introduced in the year 1991, the amounts were paid to thedeceased member's family based on the number of years standing as perthe schedule and at that time, the welfare stamp affixed in thevakalat and memos was priced at Rs.2/-. The rate of the said WelfareFund Stamp was increased from Rs.2/- to Rs.5/- and it was from15.1.1996, the lumpsum amount of Rs.1 Lakh was directed to be paid tothe Advocate's family on their death without regard to the standingin the bar and subsequently, the price of Advocates Welfare FundStamp was increased from Rs.5/- to Rs.10/- and the lumpsum paymentwas also increased to Rs.2 Lakhs. 9. It was also the case of the respondents in the writ petitionsthat due to paucity of funds it is not possible to extend the benefitof payment of lumpsum to the contesting respondents.10. The learned Judge, having taken note of the fact that theobject of the Welfare Fund Act is to provide for fund to theadvocates on cessation of practice and that while defining the term"advocate" there is no distinction between the advocates who haveenrolled immediately after completion of Law Degree and devoted theentire life for the profession, and the advocates who have enrolledafter retirement, found that the amendment is discriminatory incharacter and set aside the said proviso. It is as against the saidcommon order the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and the State Governmenthave filed the above appeals.11. Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned senior counsel appearing for theBar Council of Tamil Nadu and Mr.R.Thirugnanam, learned SpecialGovernment Pleader appearing for the State Government have submittedthat the impugned amendment is a reasonable classification, in thesense that the advocates who have become the members of the WelfareFund having retired from their services have to their credit lumpsumpayment of gratuity and other terminal benefits and are entitled topension and their families are entitled to pension on their death, whereas an advocate who has entered into the profession immediatelyafter his studies has no financial background and on his death thefamily would not have any base and it was in that view of the matterthe amendment was sought to be included, which has got a rationalnexus to the object sought to be achieved.12. It is the submission of the learned counsel for theappellants that, while it is true that as advocates both the groupsare same and the amount payable on cessation of practice, whichincludes the death of the person, as per the schedule to theWelfare Fund Act is not denied to the contesting respondents, what isdenied to them is only the lumpsum payment on the death of a memberof the Welfare Fund who has devoted his whole life for the profession https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and in such event, when such lumpsum payment is made, the family ofsuch advocate is certainly not entitled to the schedule payment inaddition.13. Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel would also submitthat, in fact, in other States such persons who retired from servicesand enrolled themselves as advocates are not even allowed to becomethe members of the Welfare Fund, but in the State of Tamil Nadu theretired persons are allowed not only to enroll as advocates, but alsoto become members of the Welfare Fund so as to make them eligible toget the schedule payment based on the years of bar experience, ontheir demise. 14. Mr.R.Thiagarajan would rely upon the judgments of theSupreme Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR1958 SC 538, Western M.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. Stateof U.P., AIR 1970 SC 21 and K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Boardof Directors, SBI, (2001) 2 SCC 259 to substantiate his contentionthat the unequal treatment is not arbitrary, but there has been anexus between the basis of classification and the object underconsideration.15. He would also submit that mere hardship is not a ground toattack a provision of law, relying upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in Probhudas Morarjee Rajkotia v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC1044 and State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.It is his submission that the legislature in its wisdom hasenunciated this as a policy for the benefit of those who have weddedto the profession and in such circumstances, the mere hardship thatmay be caused to a group of individuals may not be a ground to strikedown a law. 16. Mr.R.Thiagarajan would also rely on the judgments of theSupreme Court in Saraswat Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,(2006) 8 SCC 520, Prafulla Kumar Das v. State of Orissa,(2003) 11SCC 614 and Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab,(2002) 4 SCC 154 tosubstantiate his contention that the retired persons form a class bythemselves. 17. Mr.R.Thiagarajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for theBar Council of Tamil Nadu would submit that the learned Judge has nottaken note of the fact about the paucity of funds. 18. The above said contentions are also reiterated and supportedby the Mr.R.C.Paul Kanagaraj, learned counsel for the Tamil NaduAdvocates Association.19. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mr.Krishnan, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, whoare the original writ petitioners, that when the writ petitioners https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ were admitted as members of the Advocates Welfare Fund and when it isnot denied that the amount contributed by them also forms part of theAdvocates Welfare Fund under Section 3 of the Welfare Fund Act, thereis no authority on the part of the respondents in the writ petitionsto pass the impugned amendment, discriminating between the advocateswhile granting the lumpsum benefits.20. It is his contention that the pension received by thoseretired employees are the statutory amounts paid to them as per lawfor the services rendered to the previous employer and that amount isan earned amount and that cannot be the basis to deny the lumpsumbenefit payable to advocates as per the Welfare Fund Act. It is hissubmission that, if the financial criteria is taken as a ground forconferring the lumpsum payment, there are very many instances to showthat the advocates, who entered into the profession immediately aftertheir Law Degree have financial resources either earned by familyinheritance or otherwise, and when, admittedly, the said lumpsum ispaid to all such advocates, who enrolled themselves after completionof their Law Degree, even after their service as advocates for morethan 30 or 40 years, there is no reason to presume that all theretired employees, who have become advocates, are financially soundand therefore, it is his submission that arbitrariness is writ large, since there is no yardstick to choose persons on financial basis toconfer the lumpsum benefits.21. He would rely upon the term "advocate" in Section 2(a) ofthe Welfare Fund Act to show that the term is exhaustive in natureand there cannot be a differentiation between the advocates. He alsorelied upon Section 2(i) of the Welfare Fund Act which defines theterm "member of the fund" and when once, as advocates, the writpetitioners have been admitted as members of the fund, they should betreated equally with others. It is his submission that the impugnedproviso is repugnant to Section 2(a) and 2(i) of the Welfare FundAct. He would rely upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in LaxmiDevi v. Mukand Kanwar, AIR 1965 SC 834, which is a case relating toTransfer of Property Act in respect of a conflict between Sections 2(d) and 5 of the Transfer of Property Act.22. It is the further submission of Mr.Krishnan, learned seniorcounsel that under Section 3(2) of the Welfare Fund Act, whilespeaking about the source of Advocates Welfare Fund, various sourcesare explained, including the contributions and payment ofsubscriptions, which includes the payment by Bar Council from theenrollment fees and in such circumstances, and when the contributionof the contesting respondents is also forming part of the AdvocatesWelfare Fund, there is no authority on the State Government or theBar Council to discriminate and distinguish between the advocates forthe purpose of providing the lumpsum benefit from the AdvocatesWelfare Fund. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#23. We have heard the learned counsel on both sides, perusedthe records and given our anxious thought to the issue involved inthese appeals.24. At the outset, it should be understood that for a person topractice as an Advocate, he must enroll with the Bar Council as perSection 17 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Act No.25 of 1961). Under theAdvocates Act, 1961, which was enacted with the main feature ofestablishment of an All India Bar Council and a common roll ofadvocates, having a right to practice in any part of the country, prescribing uniform qualification for the admission as Advocates andcreation of autonomous Bar Councils, one for the whole of India andone for each State, the term "advocate" is defined under Section 2(1)(a) as "an advocate entered in any roll under the provisions of thisAct". The State Bar Councils are authorised to enroll advocates andmaintain a roll of advocates in the order of their seniority asenshrined under Section 17 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which is asfollows:"Section: 17. State Bar Councils to maintain roll ofadvocates.- (1) Every State Bar Council shall prepare andmaintain a roll of advocates in which shall be entered thenames and addresses of,-(a) all persons who were entered as advocates on the rollof any High Court under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926(38 of 1926), immediately before the appointed dayincluding persons, being citizens of India, who before the15th day of August, 1947, were enrolled as advocates underthe said Act in any area which before the said date wascomprised within India as defined in the Government ofIndia Act, 1935, and who at any time] express an intentionin the prescribed manner to practice within thejurisdiction of the Bar Council;(b) all other persons who are admitted to be advocates onthe roll of the State Bar Council under this Act on orafter the appointed day.(2) Each such roll of advocates shall consist of two parts, the first part containing the names of senior advocates andthe second part, the names of other advocates.(3) Entries in each part of the roll of advocates preparedand maintained by a State Bar Council under this sectionshall be in the order of seniority, and, subject to anyrule that may be made by the Bar Council of India in thisbehalf, such seniority shall be determined] as follows:(a) the seniority of an advocate referred to in clause (a)of sub-section (1) shall be determined in accordance withhis date of enrollment under the Indian Bar Councils Act, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1926 (38 of 1926);(b) the seniority of any person who was a senior advocateof the Supreme Court immediately before the appointed dayshall, for the purposes of the first part of the Stateroll, be determined in accordance with such principles asthe Bar Council of India may specify;[* * * * * * * * * * ** ](d) the seniority of any other person who, on or after theappointed day, is enrolled as a senior advocate or isadmitted as an advocate shall be determined by the date ofsuch enrolment or admission, as the case may be.(e) notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), theseniority of an attorney enrolled [whether before or afterthe commencement of the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1980 asan advocate shall be determined in accordance with the dateof his enrollment as an attorney.(4) No person shall be enrolled as an advocate on the rollof more than one State Bar Council." 25. Section 6 of the Advocates Act, 1961, while narrating aboutthe functions of the State Bar Councils also stipulates in Section 6(dd) as "to promote the growth of Bar Associations for the purposesof effective implementation of the welfare schemes referred to inclause (a) of sub-section (2) of this section and clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 7". The Section also enables the State BarCouncils to constitute funds for the welfare of indigent, disabled orother advocates. The said Section 6 of the Advocates Act, 1961 is asfollows:"6. Functions of State Bar Councils.- (1) The functions ofa State Bar Council shall be,-(a) to admit persons as advocates on its roll;(b) to prepare and maintain such roll;(c) to entertain and determine cases of misconduct againstadvocates on its roll;(d) to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests ofadvocates on its roll;(dd) to promote the growth of Bar Associations for thepurposes of effective implementation of the welfare schemesreferred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of thissection and clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 7;(e) to promote and support law reform;(ee) to conduct seminars and organize talks on legal topicsby eminent jurists and publish journals and papers of legalinterests; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (eee) to organize legal aid to the poor in the prescribedmanner;(f) to manage and invest the funds of the Bar Council;(g) to provide for the election of its members;(gg) to visit and inspect Universities in accordance withthe directions given under clause (i) of sub-section (1) ofsection 7;(h) to perform all other functions conferred on it by orunder this Act;(i) to do all other things necessary for discharging theaforesaid functions.(2) A State Bar Council may constitute one or more funds inthe prescribed manner for the purpose of-(a) giving financial assistance to organise welfare schemesfor the indigent, disabled or other advocates;(b) giving legal aid or advice in accordance with the rulesmade in this behalf;(c) establishing law libraries.(3) A State Bar Council may receive any grants, donations, gifts or benefactions for all or any of the purposesspecified in sub-section (2) which shall be credited to theappropriate fund or funds constituted under that sub-section."26. Inasmuch as the law making powers regarding legal, medicaland other professions is included in List III (Concurrent List) ofSchedule-VII of the Constitution of India, the Government of TamilNadu has passed the Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund Act, 1987 (ActNo.49 of 1987) with the purpose of constitution of a welfare fund forthe benefit of advocates on cessation of practice.27. Under the Welfare Fund Act, some of the provisions arerelevant for our discussion. The definition of the term "advocate"as defined under Section 2(a) means "a person whose name has beenentered in the roll of advocates prepared and maintained by the BarCouncil under Section 17 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Central Act 25of 1961) and who is a member of a Bar Association or an AdvocatesAssociation".28. The terms "Advocates Association" and "Bar Association" aredefined as associations recognized by the Bar Council under Section13 of the Welfare Fund Act. The term "cessation of practice" underSection 2(e) of the Welfare Fund Act means "removal of the name of anadvocate from the State Roll under Section 26-A of the Advocates Act,1961 (Central Act 25 of 1961)".29. At this juncture, it is relevant to extract Section 26-A ofthe Advocates Act, 1961, which is as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "26-A. Power to remove names from roll.- A State BarCouncil may remove from the State roll the name of anyadvocate who is dead or from whom a request has beenreceived to that effect."30. The term "fund" is defined under Section 2(g) of the WelfareFund Act as means "the Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund constitutedunder Section 3".31. The term "member of the fund" is defined under Section 2(i)of the Welfare Fund Act as "an advocate admitted to the benefits ofthe Fund and continuing to be a member thereof under the provisionsof this Act".32. The term "stamp" under Section 2(j) of the Welfare Fund Actmeans "the Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund Stamp printed anddistributed under Section 22".33. Section 22 of the Act, which speaks about printing anddistribution of Advocates welfare Fund stamps by the Bar Councilstates as follows:"Section:22. Printing and distribution of AdvocatesWelfare Fund Stamps by State Bar Council-(1) The bar Council shall cause to be printed anddistributed welfare fund stamps of the value of ten rupeesinscribed "Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund Stamp" in suchsize, design and colour, as may be decided by the BarCouncil.(2)The custody of the stamps shall be with the Bar Council.(3) The Bar Council shall control the distribution and saleof the stamps through the Bar Associations and theAdvocates Associations.(4) The Bar Council, the Bar Associations and the AdvocatesAssociations shall keep proper accounts of the stamps insuch form and in such manner as may be prescribed.(5) The Bar Associations and Advocates Associations shallpurchase the stamps from the Bar Council after paying inthe value thereof less ten per cent of such value towardsincidental expenses."34. The term "Trustee Committee" is defined under Section 2(l)to mean "the Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund Trustee Committeeestablished under Section 4". https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#35. Section 3 of the Welfare Fund Act states that the Governmenthas constituted Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund to which variousamounts are credited, including the amounts paid by the Bar Councilunder Section 12 of the Welfare Fund Act. Section 3 of the WelfareFund Act is as follows:"3. Advocates' Welfare Fund.-(1)The Government shall constitute a fund called the TamilNadu Advocates Welfare Fund.(2) There shall be credited to the Fund;(a) all amounts paid by the Bar Council under section 12;(b) any other contribution made by a State Bar Council;(c) any voluntary donation or contribution made to the Fundby the Bar Council of India, any Bar Association, anyAdvocates Association or other association or institution, or any advocate or other person;(d) any grant made by the Government to the Fund;(e) any sum borrowed under section 10;(f) all sums collected under section 15;(g) all sums received from the Life Insurance Corporationof India on the death of an advocate under a GroupInsurance Policy;(h) any profit or divided or refund received from the LifeInsurance Corporation in respect of policies of GroupInsurance of the members of the Fund;(i) any interest or dividend or other return on anyinvestment made of any investment part of the Fund; and(j) all sums collected by way of sale of stamps undersection 22.(3) The sums specified in sub-section (2) shall be paid to, or collected by, such agencies, at such intervals and insuch manner, and the accounts of the Fund shall bemaintained in such manner, as may be prescribed."36. Under Section 12 of the Welfare Fund Act, the Bar Council ofTamil Nadu has to contribute from its enrollment fees annually anamount equal to 20% thereof. Section 12 reads as follows:"Section:12. Transfer of certain monies to the Fund: TheBar Council shall pay to the Fund annually an amount equalto twenty percent of the enrollment fees realized by it."37. Likewise, the Trustee Committee is entitled to borrow withthe approval of the Government any sum required for carrying out thepurposes of the Act under Section 10 of the Welfare Fund Act. TheAdvocates Welfare Fund includes the membership fees as contemplatedunder Section 15 of the Welfare Fund Act, which states that every https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ advocate practicing in any Court in the State, being a member of theBar Association or Advocates Association may apply to the TrusteeCommittee for admission as its member on payment of the annualsubscription mentioned therein along with the application amount ofRs.200/- and the subscription payable annually is Rs.100/- in caseswhere the standing of the advocate is less than ten years andRs.200/- in other cases. The Advocates Welfare Fund also includesthe sums collected by way of sale of stamps under Section 22 of theWelfare Fund Act. 38. The above said Advocates Welfare Fund is maintained by aTrustee Committee established under Section 4 of the Welfare FundAct, which is as follows:"4. Establishment of Trustee Committee:(1) With effect on and from such date as the Governmentmay, by notification appoint in this behalf, there shall beestablished a Committee by the name the Tamil NaduAdvocates Welfare Fund Trustee Committee.(2) The Trustee Committee shall be a body corporate havingperpetual succession and a common seal with power toacquire, hold and dispose of property and shall, by thesaid name, sue and be sued.(3) The Trustee Committee shall consist of:(a) the Advocate General of the State of Tamil Nadu, whoshall be the Chairman of the Trustee Committee, Ex-Officio;(b) the Secretary to the Government in Law Department, Ex-Officio;(c) the Secretary to the Government in Home Department, Ex-Officio;(d) the Government Pleader or the Public Prosecutor, as maybe nominated by the Government;(e) three members of the Bar Council nominated by it for aperiod of three years, and(f) the Secretary of the Bar Council who shall be theSecretary of the Trustee Committee, Ex-Officio."The Secretary of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu is the Ex-Officio Secretary of the Trustee Committee.39. The functions of the Trustee Committee, on which the fund isvested under Section 8 of the Welfare Fund Act, is enumerated underSection 9 of the Welfare Fund Act, as follows:"9. Functions of Trustee Committee.- (1) The Trustee Committee shall administer the Fund.(2) In the administration of the Fund the Trustee Committee https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ shall subject to the provisions of the Act and the rulesmade thereunder.(a) hold the amounts and assets belonging to the Fund intrust;(b) receive applications for admission or re-admission tothe Fund and dispose of such applications within ninetydays from the date of receipt thereof;(c) receive applications from the members of the Fund, their nominees or legal heirs, as the case may be, forpayment out of the Fund, conduct such enquiry as it deemsnecessary and dispose of the applications;(d) record in the minutes book of the Trustee Committee, its decisions on the applications;(e) pay to the application amounts at the rates specifiedin the Schedule;(f) send such periodicals and annual reports as may beprescribed to the government and the Bar council;(g) communicate to the applicants by registered post undercertificate of posting the decisions of the TrusteeCommittee in respect of applications for admissions or re-admission to the Fund or claims to the benefit of thefund."40. Section 16 of the Welfare Fund Act, which is crucial for thepurpose of this case adumbrates payment of amount on cessation ofpractice. As already stated, the cessation of practice is definedunder Section 2(e) of the Welfare Fund Act as to mean removal of thename of an advocate from the State Roll under Section 26-A of theAdvocates Act, 1961 (Central Act 25 of 1961), wherein on the death ofan advocate or on request from him to remove, such removal can beeffected. Section 16 states that on cessation of practice the amountas specified in the schedule is payable. Even though the conditioncontemplated is that such member should have been a member of theWelfare Fund for not less than five years to enable him to get theamount as per the schedule, the Trustee Committee is empowered toconfer such benefits even to those persons who have ceased topractice within five years from the date of admission to the fund dueto the reasons stated therein, namely permanent physical or mentaldisability. The said Section 16 of the Welfare Fund Act wasoriginally as follows:"16. Payment of amount on cessation of practice.-1) Every advocate who has been a member of the Fund for aperiod of not less than five years shall, on his cessationof practice be paid and amount at the rate specified in theSchedule:Provided that where the Trustee Committee is satisfied thata member of the Fund ceases to practice within a period offive years from the date of his admission as member of Fund https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ as a result of any permanent physical or mental disability, the Trustee Committee may pay the member of the Fund anamount at the rate specified in the Schedule. Explanation I.- For the purposes of calculating the numberof years' standing of a member of the Fund for the purposeof this sub-section every four years of practice as anadvocate before the admission of a member to the Fund shallbe counted as one year's standing and every year ofpractice over and above four years before such admissionshall be counted equivalent to three months standing andthe total number of years of standing so counted shall beadded to the number of years of practice after suchadmission. Explanation- II.-1) The period during which a member of the Fund remainedunder suspension shall not be considered for the purpose ofcounting the years of standing.2) Where a member of the Fund dies before receiving theamount payable under sub-Section (1), his nominees or legalheir, as the case may be shall be paid the amount payableto the deceased member of the Fund.3) Any person removed from the membership in the Fund undersub-section (5) of Section 15 and re-admitted to the Fundunder sub-section (6) of that section shall not be entitledto payment of any amount from the Fund under this Actduring the period between the date of his removal from themembership in the Fund and the date of re-admission.4) Any member who is suspended by the Bar Council formisconduct under the Advocates Act 1961 (Central Act 25 of1961) shall not be entitled to payment of any amount fromthe Fund under this Act, for the period of such suspension.5) Where a member of the Fund dies within five years of hisadmission to the Fund, his nominee or legal heir, as thecase may be, shall be paid an amount at the rate of onethousand rupees for each year of practice by the member ofthe Fund.6) Every member or his nominee or legal heir, as the casemay be, shall apply, for payment out of the Fund, to theTrustee Committee, in such form, as may be prescribed."41. Therefore, as originally stood, Section 16(1) of the WelfareFund Act, Explanation II (5) contemplated that on the death of a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ member of the fund within five years from the date of admission, hisnominee or legal heir was eligible for payment at the rate ofRs.1000/- for each year of practice by the member of the fund, thatwas because under Section 16(1) of the Welfare Fund Act, the schedulepayment is possible only if he has completed five years as a memberof the fund. The said clause came to be amended by the impugnedamendment with effect from 1.2.2001 and thereafter, as on today, itstands as follows:"16. Payment of amount on cessation of practice:1) Every advocate who has been a member of the Fund for aperiod of not less than five years shall, on his cessationof practice be paid and amount at the rate specified in theSchedule:1-A) "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(1), every member of the Fund who has completed orcompletes twenty-five years of practice as an advocate onthe date coming into force of the Tamil Nadu AdvocatesWelfare Fund (Amendment) Act, 2000 shall, on completion offive years as a member of the Fund and on his cessation ofpractice, be paid a lumpsum amount of one lakh rupees" (w.e.f. 1.2.2001)Provided that where the Trustee Committee is satisfied thata member of the Fund ceases to practise within a period offive years from the date of his admission as member of Fundas a result of "any permanent physical or mentaldisability" the Trustee Committee may pay the member of theFund an amount at the rate specified in the Schedule: Explanation I:For the purposes of calculating the number of yearsstanding of a member of the Fund for the purpose of thissub-section every four years of practice as an advocatebefore the admission of a member to the Fund shall becounted as one year's standing and every year of practiceover and, above four years before such admission shall becounted equivalent to three months standing and the totalnumber of years of standing so counted shall be added tothe number of years of practice. Explanation- II:1) The period during which a member of the Fund remainedunder suspension shall not be considered for the purpose ofcounting the years of standing. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2) Where a member of the Fund dies before receiving theamount payable under sub-Section (1), his nominees or legalheir, as the case may be shall be paid the amount payableto the deceased member of the Fund. 3) Any person removed from the membership in the Fund undersub-section (5) of Section 15 and re-admitted to the Fundunder sub-section (6) of that section shall not be entitledto payment of any amount from the Fund under this Actduring the period between the date of his removal from themembership in the Fund and the date of re-admission.4) Any member who is suspended by the Bar Council formisconduct under the Advocates Act 1961 (Central Act 25 of1961) shall not be entitled to payment of any amount fromthe Fund under this Act for the period of such suspension.5) Where a member of the Fund dies, his nominee or legalheir, as the case may be, shall be paid an amount of twolakh rupees; Provided that if such member who, before his death, was inreceipt of pension, gratuity or other terminal benefitsfrom any State Government or the Central Government orother authority or employer, his nominee or legal heir, asthe case may be, shall not be entitled for the payment ofthe amount of two lakh rupees under this sub-section. (w.e.f. 1.2.2001)6) Every member or his nominee or legal heir, as the casemay be shall apply for payment out of the Fund to theTrustee Committee in such form, as may be prescribed.7) Where a person who has been paid an amount under sub-sections (1) or (1-A) has been admitted as an advance againunder Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Central Act 25of 1961) desires to be re-admitted to the Fund shall, on anapplication made in the same manner as specified insections (1) or (1-A) as the case may be with interestcalculated at the rate of twelve percent per annum, bereadmitted to the Fund. He shall not be entitled to paymentof any amount from the Fund under this Act, during theperiod between the date of his cessation of practice andthe date of readmission.w.e.f. 15.1.1996"42. Therefore, the change made for the first time is in respectof the payment of a lumpsum which was, of course, Rs.1 Lakh in theinitial stage and subsequently became Rs.2 Lakhs on the death of a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ member of the fund irrespective of the years of membership of thefund and it was in those circumstances, the said benefit of lumpsumis denied to a member of the fund who has enrolled after retirementfrom Government or other services, who is in receipt of pension, gratuity and other terminal benefits. The object for such amendmentis stated as follows:"The Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund Act, 1987 (TamilNadu Act 49 of 1987) has been enacted to provide for theconstitution of a welfare fund for the benefit of advocateson cessation of practice and for matters connectedtherewith or incidental thereto in this State.2. The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu has proposed to payRs.1,00,000/- as death benefit to the legal heirs of theAdvocates, who are members of the Fund irrespective of theperiod of practice and pay upto Rs.50,000/- as a lumpsumbenefit to the members of the Fund on cessation ofpractice. The lumpsum payment as death benefit is of asubstantial amount, which would have to come out of theFund. Persons with prescribed qualifications, who had beenemployed in any State Government or the Central Governmentor other authority or employer and received terminalbenefits also, can get enrolled themselves as advocates andjoin as members of the Fund. Having regard to the purposeof giving relief to advocate members, who have put in anumber of years of practice in the Bar and the limitedresources of the Fund, it is considered necessary toexclude the nominees or legal heirs of such advocatemembers, who had been employed in any State Government orthe Central Government or other authority or employer andreceived the terminal benefits, from the entitlement of thelumpsum payment of the death benefit of Rs.1,00,000/-. Ithas also been proposed to add an Explanation in theSchedule so as to treat any fraction of a year ofmembership of the Fund as a full completed year. With aview to make the Advocate Welfare Fund self-sustaining, theBar Council of Tamil Nadu has also proposed to increase thesubscription from Rs.50/- to Rs.100/- where the standing ofthe advocate at the Bar is less than ten years, fromRs.100/- to Rs.200/- where the standing of the advocate atthe Bar is ten years or more and a life time subscriptionof Rs.10,000/- for the designated senior advocates andRs.2500/- for other advocates. It has further beenproposed to increase the stamp value to be affixed in theVakalathnama from Rs.2/- to Rs.5/- so as to augment thefund. The Government have decided to accept the abovesuggestions of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and to amendthe said Act suitably for the purpose. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#3. The Bill seeks to give effect to the above decision."43. On facts, it is, therefore, clear that not every advocatewho has enrolled with the State Bar Council as per the Advocates Act,1961 would automatically become a member of the Advocates WelfareFund and it is only those advocates who apply to the TrusteeCommittee, on their admission and subject to the payment ofsubscriptions stated above, become members of the Advocates WelfareFund. It is also not in dispute that not only the advocates who haveenrolled with the Bar Council immediately after the completion oftheir Law Degree, but also those who enrolled as advocates afterretiring from Government or other services may become the members ofthe Advocates Welfare Fund. It is only those advocates who havebecome the members of the Advocates Welfare Fund are eligible for thebenefits under the Advocates Welfare Fund, which may be either thepayment of schedule amount on cessation of their practice, as statedabove, or payment of the lumpsum amount as per the impugned proviso.44. It is also not in dispute that any person who gets thebenefit under the schedule payment, on cessation of practice, whichmay be due to his voluntary retirement, would not be eligible for thelumpsum payment on his death, obviously due to the reason that oncessation of practice due to voluntary retirement and on obtainingsuch schedule amount, he ceases to be a member of the fund andultimately, he may cease to be an advocate also as per Section 26-Aof the Advocates Act, 1961. Again, even among the advocates who havejoined in the profession immediately after completion of their LawDegree and devoted their whole life for the profession of law, ifsuch an advocate gets the said lumpsum payment, of course to hisfamily after his demise, he would not be entitled for the schedulepayment in addition to the lumpsum. However, in respect of themembers of the Welfare Fund, who have joined in the profession afterthe retirement, who are in receipt of pension, gratuity and otherterminal benefits, even though they are denied the benefit of lumpsumpayment under the impugned proviso, they are allowed to get theamount either on the cessation of practice, which includes on death, as prescribed under the schedule to the Welfare Fund Act. TheSchedule stipulates the payment based on the years of experience of amember as a member of the Fund. The schedule is as follows:25Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.10000024Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.9600023Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.9200022Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.8800021Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.8400020Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.8000019Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.7600018Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.7200017Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.68000 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 16Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.6400015Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.6000014Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.5600013Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.5200012Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.4800011Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.4400010Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.400009Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.360008Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.320007Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.280006Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.240005Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.200004Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.160003Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.120002Years and above as a member of the fund...Rs.80001Year and above as a member of the fund...Rs.400045. It is needless to state that membership of the Fund of aperson continues as long as his enrollment as an advocate in the BarCouncil continues. 46. On the above said factual undisputable facts, now, it isrelevant to consider the merits of the submissions made by bothsides.47. The pivotal contention which is raised by the respectivelearned counsel and the decision to be arrived at is as to whetherthe classification made under the impugned proviso amounts to a classlegislation or a reasonable classification or, in other words, whether such proviso should be struck down as arbitrary, unreasonableand violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.48. At the cost of repetition, it is to be insisted that asadvocates enrolled under the Advocates Act, 1961, it is no doubt truethat there is no distinction between the advocates. In fact, one ofthe basic objects of the Advocates Act, 1961 is to have theintegration of the bar into a single class of legal practitionersknown as advocates. On the facts of the present case, it is onlyamong the members of the Fund a distinction is drawn between themembers who are the advocates enrolled immediately after their LawDegree and continued to profess law, and the advocates who aftercompletion of their Law Degree have joined in some serviceselsewhere, either in Government or otherwise, and after theirretirement enrolled as Advocates, having possessed, at that time, thefinancial source of retirement benefits, pension, gratuity, etc.,which have been conferred on them, which, no doubt, is earned bythem, as correctly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for thewrit petitioners, for the services rendered to their employer. As https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the members of the Fund, such category of persons, who have enrolledafter retirement, have become the members entitled to the benefit ofpayment as per the schedule.49. It is relevant to point out that when a member of the Fund, whether he becomes an advocate immediately after completing his LawDegree or after retirement from services, on his cessation ofpractice, if the same is by way of retirement before his demise, bothclasses of Advocates are entitled to the benefit under the schedulealone. In cases, where a member of the Fund has taken up theprofession as his only way of avocation, if he dies, his nominee orlegal heir is provided with the lumpsum of Rs.2 Lakhs. In suchevent, as stated earlier, his family would not be entitled to theschedule payment in addition, since cessation of practice includes bydeath, as per Section 26-A of the Advocates Act, 1961. On the otherhand, in respect of the members of the Fund, who have retired fromservices, they are denied the benefit of lumpsum payment, on theground that they have sufficient financial background in the sensethat, admittedly, they have got pensionary benefits, retirementbenefits, gratuity as a lumpsum, etc., and in addition, on theirdemise, for the services rendered to the Government or elsewhere, their family continues to get pension. It is in that aspect, aclassification is sought to be made. In such circumstances, takinginto consideration the said precarious position, we are of theconsidered opinion that the distinction made between the memberadvocates who enrolled and professed law profession from thebeginning, and the advocates who joined law profession afterretirement, viz., after completion of nearly 58 years of their life, for the purpose of conferring lumpsum benefit is certainly based on areasonable ground. This Court can only decide as to whether suchclassification is reasonable or not. When once it is prima faciesatisfied that the basis of classification has a nexus to the objectsought to be achieved, then it cannot be held to be either arbitraryor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When oncesuch classification is reasonable, it is not open to any court tostrike down such law only due to the reason that there are certainimpediments caused to some persons.50. While explaining about the purport and design of Article 14of the Constitution of India, in the light of the legislativeprocess, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court presided over byPatanjali Sastri,C.J., in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75, observed as follows:"17. Even from the point of view of reasonableclassification, I can see no reason why the validity of theAct should not be sustained. As already pointed out, widelatitude must be allowed to a legislature in classifyingpersons and things to be brought under the operation of aspecial law, and such classification need not be based on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion. I cannotshare the view of Das Gupta, J. that the expediency ofspeedier trial is “too vague and indefinite” to be thebasis of a “well de-fined” classification. Legislativejudgment in such matters should not be canvassed by courtsapplying doctrinaire “definite objective tests”. The courtshould not insist in such cases on what Holmes, J. called“delusive exactness” (Truax v. Corrigan, 1921-257 U.S. 312supra). All that the court is expected to see, in dealingwith equal protection claims, is whether the law impugnedis “palpably discriminatory”, and, in considering such aquestion great weight ought to be attached to the fact thata majority of the elected representatives of the people whomade the law did not think so, though that is not, ofcourse, conclusive. They alone know the local conditionsand circumstances which demanded the enactment of such alaw, and it must be remembered that “legislatures areultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of thepeople in quite as great a degree as the Courts” (perHolmes, J. in Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. May, [1880] 101U.S. 22).The Supreme Court, in the said judgment, has made the followingobservation:"56. ..... The difference brought about by a statute may beof such a trivial, unsubstantial and illusory nature thatthat circumstance alone may be regarded as cogent groundfor holding that the statute has not discriminated at alland that no inequality has in fact been created. Thisaspect of the matter apart, if a statute brings aboutinequality in fact and in substance, it will be illogicaland highly undesirable to make the constitutionality ofsuch a statute depend on the degree of the inequality sobrought about. The adoption of such a principle will runcounter to the plain language of Article 14."51. While deciding about the constitutionality of a statute inthe light of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, aConstitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, after referring theearlier judgments regarding the intelligible differentia, in itslandmark judgment in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 has narrated the established principles as follows:"14. The principle enunciated above has been consistentlyadopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions ofthis Court further establish— https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relatesto a single individual if, on account of some specialcircumstances or reasons applicable to him and notapplicable to others, that single individual may be treatedas a class by himself;(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of theconstitutionality of an enactment and the burden is uponhim who attacks it to show that there has been a cleartransgression of the constitutional principles;(c) that it must be presumed that the legislatureunderstands and correctly appreciates the need of its ownpeople, that its laws are directed to problems mademanifest by experience and that its discriminations arebased on adequate grounds;(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees ofharm and may confine its restrictions to those cases wherethe need is deemed to be the clearest;(e) that in order to sustain the presumption ofconstitutionality the court may take into considerationmatters of common knowledge, matters of common report, thehistory of the times and may assume every state of factswhich can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and(f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existingconditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or thesurrounding circumstances brought to the notice of thecourt on which the classification may reasonably beregarded as based, the presumption of constitutionalitycannot be carried to the extent of always holding thatthere must be some undisclosed and un-known reasons forsubjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostileor discriminating legislation."52. In Probhudas Morarjee Rajkotia v. Union of India, AIR 1966SC 1044, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, whileinterpreting Article 14 of the Constitution of India, has held asfollows:"8. ...... It cannot be too strongly emphasized that tomake out a case of denial of the equal protection of thelaws under Art.14 of the Constitution, a plea ofdifferential treatment is by itself not sufficient. Anapplicant pleading that Article 14 has been violated mustmake out that not only he had been treated differently from https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ other but he has been so treated from persons similarlycircumstanced without any reasonable basis, and suchdifferential treatment is unjustifiably made."53.In the subsequent judgment in Western M.P. Electric Power& Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 SC 21, the Supreme Courtheld that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not operateagainst rational classification. The relevant portion is as under:"7. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality amongequals; its aim is to protect persons similarly placedagainst discriminatory treatment. It does not, however, operate against rational classification. A person settingup a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law mustestablish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the differentialtreatment had no reasonable relation to the object soughtto be achieved by the law."54. While discussing about the rights of pensioners to haveequal right to receive the benefits of liberalised pension scheme inthe light of fixing a cutoff date, a Constitutional Bench of theSupreme Court presided over by Y.V.Chandrachud,C.J., in D.S. Nakarav. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, has crystallised the saidconcept of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as follows:"11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonableclassification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that theclassification must be founded on an intelligibledifferentia which distinguishes persons or things that aregrouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia must have a rationalrelation to the objects sought to be achieved by thestatute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R.Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538). The classification may befounded on differential basis according to objects soughtto be achieved but what is implicit in it is that thereought to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between thebasis of classification and object of the statute underconsideration. It is equally well settled by the decisionsof this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination notonly by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.12. After an exhaustive review of almost all decisionsbearing on the question of Article 14, this Court speakingthrough Chandrachud, C.J. in In re Special Courts Bill,1978, AIR 1979 SC 478, restated the settled propositions https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ which emerged from the judgments of this Court undoubtedlyinsofar as they were relevant to the decision on the pointsarising for consideration in that matter. Four of them areapt and relevant for the present purpose and may beextracted. They are: “***(3)The constitutional command to the State to afford equalprotection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by theinvention and application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact orscientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. Thecourts should not insist on delusive exactness or applydoctrinaire tests for determining the validity ofclassification in any given case. Classification isjustified if it is not palpably arbitrary.(4)The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 isnot that the same rules of law should be applicable to allpersons within the Indian territory or that the sameremedies should be made available to them irrespective ofdifferences of circumstances. It only means that allpersons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike bothin privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal lawswould have to be applied to all in the same situation, andthere should be no discrimination between one person andanother if as regards the subject-matter of the legislationtheir position is substantially the same.***(6)The law can make and set apart the classes according tothe needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested byexperience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but theclassification should never be arbitrary, artificial orevasive.(7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must berational, that is to say, it must not only be based on somequalities or characteristics which are to be found in allthe persons grouped together and not in others who are leftout but those qualities or characteristics must have areasonable relation to the object of the legislation. Inorder to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on anintelligible differentia which distinguishes those that aregrouped together from others and (2) that that differentiamust have a rational relation to the object sought to beachieved by the Act. "55. It was again asserted by the Supreme Court in K. Thimmappav. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, SBI, (2001) 2 SCC 259 thatthe classification under Article 14 of the Constitution of India neednot be a scientifically perfect one and it is sufficient if the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ distinction is on just and reasonable relation to the object of thelegislation. The relevant portion is as under:"3. ....... Before we deal with the respective contentionsof the parties it would be appropriate for us to noticethat what Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and notreasonable classification for the purpose of legislation.If the rule-making authority takes care to reasonablyclassify persons for a particular purpose and if it dealsequally with all persons belonging to a well-defined classthen it would not be open to the charge of discrimination. But to pass the test of permissible classification twoconditions must be fulfilled:(a) that the classification must be founded on anintelligible differentia which distinguishes persons orthings which are grouped together from others left out ofthe group; and(b) that the differentia must have a rational relation tothe object sought to be achieved by the statute inquestion. The classification may be founded on different basis andwhat is necessary is that there must be a nexus between thebasis of classification and the object under consideration. Article 14 of the Constitution does not insist that theclassification should be scientifically perfect and a courtwould not interfere unless the alleged classificationresults in apparent inequality. When a law is challenged tobe discriminatory essentially on the ground that it deniesequal treatment or protection, the question fordetermination by court is not whether it has resulted ininequality but whether there is some difference which bearsa just and reasonable relation to the object oflegislation. Mere differentiation does not per se amount todiscrimination within the inhibition of the equalprotection clause. To attract the operation of the clauseit is necessary to show that the selection ordifferentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it doesnot rest on any rational basis having regard to the objectwhich the legislature has in view. If a law deals withmembers of a well-defined class then it is not obnoxiousand it is not open to the charge of denial of equalprotection on the ground that it has no application toother persons. It is for the rule-making authority todetermine what categories of persons would embrace withinthe scope of the rule and merely because some categorieswhich would stand on the same footing as those which arecovered by the rule are left out would not render the ruleor the law enacted in any manner discriminatory and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ violative of Article 14. It is not possible to exhaust thecircumstances or criteria which may afford a reasonablebasis for classification in all cases. It depends on theobject of the legislation, and what it really seeks toachieve."56. In Prafulla Kumar Das v. State of Orissa,(2003) 11 SCC 614,a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, while considering aboutthe relative seniority of direct recruits over mergerists underOrissa Administrative Service Class II (Appointment of OfficersValidation) Amendment Act 1992, held that, while deciding about thevalidity of a legislation, it would be impossible to declare a lawultra vires merely because it would cause hardship, unless a case fordiscrimination or unreasonableness has been made out. The relevantportion is as under:"45. In this case, the petitioners seek benefit to whichthey are not otherwise entitled. The legislature, in ouropinion, has the requisite jurisdiction to pass anappropriate legislation which would do justice to itsemployees. Even otherwise a presumption to that effect hasto be drawn. If a balance is sought to be struck by reasonof the impugned legislation, it would not be permissiblefor this Court to declare it ultra vires only because itmay cause some hardship to the petitioners. A mere hardshipcannot be a ground for striking down a valid legislationunless it is held to be suffering from the vice ofdiscrimination or unreasonableness. A valid piece oflegislation, thus, can be struck down only if it is foundto be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiaand not otherwise. We do not think that in this case, Article 14 of the Constitution is attracted."57. In State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6 SCC 754, whileconsidering the classification rule, the implication of financialconstraint for fixing cut-off date for grant of benefit of increasedquantum of death-cum-retirement gratuity was held to be a validground. The relevant portion reads as under:"26. It is difficult to accede to the argument on behalf ofthe employees that a decision of the CentralGovernment/State Governments to limit the benefits only toemployees, who retire or die on or after 1-4-1995, aftercalculating the financial implications thereon, was eitherirrational or arbitrary. Financial and economicimplications are very relevant and germane for any policydecision touching the administration of the Government, atthe Centre or at the State level. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#58. In Saraswat Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2006)8 SCC 520, while deciding about the constitutional validity of a RentControl Act relating to exclusion of premises from operation of thesaid Act, a similar contention that among the tenants a category havebeen given protection on the basis of economic criteria under theMaharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and the same offends the conceptof equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India was raisedand the Supreme Court has again reiterated the test of validclassification holding that once the classification is based on theintelligible differentia and had nexus to the object sought to beachieved by the statute, the legislative competency of the State toenact a law on economic criteria cannot be interfered as the same isnot unreasonable. The relevant portion is as under:"30. Although, earlier a view had been taken by this Courtthat prescribing such a standard or differentiating betweencategories of tenancies was violative of Article 14 of theConstitution, the subsequent view taken by this Court isthat so long as the classification sought to be made wasbased on an intelligible differentia and had a nexus withthe object sought to be achieved by the statute, the samewould not offend the equality clause contained in Article14 of the Constitution.31. Resultingly, it is quite clear that it is within thelegislative competence of the State to enact laws for theprotection of certain sections of society on the basis ofeconomic criteria and so long as it does not result inunreasonable classification, it is for the legislature todecide whom it should include or exclude from theapplication of such laws."59. While construing the provisions of UCO Bank (Employees')Pension Regulations, 1995, the Supreme Court in UCO Bank v. SanwarMal,(2004) 4 SCC 412, has held that the distinction between"resignation" and "retirement" is permissible and would not offendArticle 14 of the Constitution of India. It was held that thescheme, being self-financing one, constitutes a code by itself and aperson may resign within two days from the date of his appointmentwhereas a person retires only after completion of his services andtherefore, the contribution differs and in that view of the matter, it was held that, for pensionary scheme, the distinction betweenresignation and retirement made under the said Regulations is valid. The operative portion of the said judgment is as under:"The words “resignation” and “retirement” carry differentmeanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at anypoint of time, even on the second day of his appointmentbut in the case of retirement he retires only afterattaining the age of superannuation or in the case of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent thatthere is severance of employment (sic is the same) but inservice jurisprudence both the expressions are understooddifferently. Under the Regulations, the expressions“resignation” and “retirement” have been employed fordifferent purpose and carry different meanings. The PensionScheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is aself-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetarysupport and consequently it constitutes a complete code byitself. The Scheme essentially covers retirees as thecredit balance to their provident fund account is larger ascompared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master-and-servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintainsthe relationship for the purposes of grant of retiralbenefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion ofthe employer whereas retirement is completion of service interms of regulations/rules framed by the Bank. Resignationcan be tendered irrespective of the length of servicewhereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employeehas to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria forsubmitting resignation vis-à-vis voluntary retirement andacceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulationsdisqualify an employee, who has resigned, from claimingpension, the respondent cannot claim membership of thefund. In our view, Regulation 22 provides fordisqualification of employees who have resigned fromservice and for those who have been dismissed or removedfrom service. Hence, we do not find any merit in thearguments advanced on behalf of the respondent thatRegulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonableclassification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitutionby keeping out such class of employees."60. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that theAdvocates Welfare Fund under Section 3 of the Welfare Fund Act alsoincludes the sums collected by way of Advocates Welfare Fund Stampsunder Section 22 of the Welfare Fund Act and as stated above, thevalue of the Stamp, which was Rs.2/- was enhanced to Rs.5/- andsubsequently to Rs.10/-. In case of advocates who practice from thedate they enter into the profession after completion of Law Degree, they are expected to affix the Welfare Fund Stamp in all theVakalathnama as well as memos of appearance and certainly, the amountthat would have been contributed by these advocates would be muchmore than the advocates who have enrolled after their retirement. The fund, which is a self-financing fund, is created by way of ashare from among the enrollment fees, namely 20% from the Bar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Council, sale of the Welfare Fund stamps, grant made by theGovernment as well as other sources, apart from borrowing, investments, etc., in addition to the membership fund and therefore, this being a self-financing scheme, not dependent upon the regularincome from Government or other sources, naturally, the financialsource can be a ground of classification of the advocates for thepurpose of conferring of the benefit of lumpsum payment.61. The judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by the learnedsenior counsel for the contesting respondents in L.I.C. of India v.Consumer Education and Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811 relates tothe term policy by Life Insurance Corporation, which was confinedonly to the salaried class from Government, Semi Government orreputed commercial firms and it was in those circumstances, theSupreme Court has held that confining of the policy under Table 58 toalready covered salaried sections would be unreasonable and arbitraryand would deprive large segments in the rural areas or unorganised orself-employed and the same would be unjust, irrational and unfair. That decision was taken in the context that medical report is acondition precedent for acceptance of a proposal and in suchcircumstances, it is not open to restrict the benefits of term policyonly to the salaried class. However, on the facts of the presentcase, the object of the impugned amendment is only to give lumpsumbenefit to the persons who have devoted their whole life for theprofession among the advocates, while denying it to the persons whohave come to the profession after their retirement.62. Again, in Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. BarCouncil of India, AIR 1995 SC 691, it was held by the Supreme Courtthat the rule of Bar Council of India, which has prevented personswho have crossed 45 years from enrollment as advocates, while inrespect of other persons to revive the same after crossing the age of45 years, was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, on thebasis that it was beyond the rule making power of the Bar Council ofIndia. On the facts of the present case, the legislative competencyof the State Government cannot be questioned.63. One another submission made by the learned senior counselappearing for the contesting respondents is about the seemingcontradiction between Sections 2(a) and 2(i) of the Welfare Fund Actand the impugned amendment. It is relevant to point out that Section2(a) of the Welfare Fund Act, which defines "advocate" for thepurpose of Welfare Fund Act, makes it clear that he must be anadvocate as per Section 17 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and should be amember of the Bar Association or an Advocates Association so as tomake him eligible to become a member of the fund. In fact, Sections13 and 14 of the Welfare Fund Act provide the procedure forrecognition and registration by Bar Council of any association ofadvocates, which includes bar association, and it is only thoseadvocates practicing in any court, who are the members of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ recognized Advocates Association or Bar Association as per Sections13 and 14 of the Welfare Fund Act, who are entitled to be admitted asmembers of the fund, as it is stated in Section 15 of the Act, whichis as follows:"15. Membership in Fund.- (1)Every advocate practicing in any court in the State andbeing a member of a Bar Association or an AdvocatesAssociation may apply within to the Trustee Committee foradmission as a member of the Fund, in such form as may beprescribed.(2) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1) theTrustee Committee shall make such enquiry as it deems fitand either admit the applicant to the Fund or, for reasonsto be recorded in writing, reject the application. Provided that no order rejecting an application shallbe passed unless the applicant has given an opportunity ofbeing heard.(3) Every applicant shall pay an application fee of twohundred rupees along with the application to the account ofTrustee Committee.(4) Every member of the Fund shall pay an annualsubscription to the Fund on or before the 30th June of everyyear or a life-time subscription, as the case may be, atthe following rates, namely:-a)Where the standing of the advocate at theBar is less than ten yearsOne hundred rupeesper annumb)Where the standing of the advocates at theBar is ten years or moreTwo hundred rupeesper annumc)Life-time subscription where the advocateis designated as senior Advocate underSection 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961(Central Act 25 of 1961)Ten thousandrupeesd)Life-time subscription for other AdvocatesTwo thousand andfive hundredrupees(w.e.f. 1-2-2001)(5) Any member of the Fund who fails to remit the annualsubscription for any year before the 30th June of that year https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ shall be liable to be removed from the membership in theFund.(w.e.f.1-2-2001)(6) A person removed from the membership in the Fund undersub-section (5) may be re-admitted to the Fund on paymentof the arrears with the re-admission fee of fifty rupeeswithin six months from the date of removal.(w.e.f. 1-2-2001)(7) Every member of the Fund shall, at the time ofadmission to the membership in the Fund make nominationconferring on one or more of his dependents the right toreceive in the event of his death, any amount payable tothe member under this Act.(8) If a member of the Fund nominates more than one personunder sub-section (7) he shall specify in the nominationthe amount or share payable to each of the nominees.(9) A member of the Fund, may, at any time cancel anomination by sending a notice in writing to the TrusteeCommittee, provided that he sends along with such notice afresh nomination together with a registration fee of fiftyrupees.(w.e.f. 1-2-2001)(10) Every member of the Fund who has requested the removalof his name from the State roll under Section 26-A of theAdvocates Act, 1961 (Central Act 25 of 1961), or who whovoluntarily suspends practice shall within fifteen days ofsuch request or suspension, intimate that fact to theTrustee Committee and if any member of the Fund fails to doso without sufficient reasons, the Trustee Committee mayreduce, in accordance with such principles as may beprescribed, the amount payable to that member under thisAct."64. Under Section 2(i) of the Welfare Fund Act, a "member of theFund" is defined to mean "an advocate admitted to the benefits of theFund and continuing to be a member thereof under the provisions ofthis Act".65. It is true that under the impugned provision, viz.,Explanation II(5) to Section 16 of the Welfare Fund Act, the wordsused are "where a member of the Fund dies" and in the proviso thewords used are "such member". There is no conflict between the twoprovisions. Even though it is clear that among the advocates, whoform a group, there is a sub-division for the purpose of conferring https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the benefit of lumpsum payment, as already discussed earlier, theclassification of the advocates among the advocates is based on areason which is acceptable, as explained above, and in suchcircumstances, there is no question of any harmonious construction orrepugnancy between Sections 2(a) and 2(i) of the Welfare Fund Act andthe impugned amendment. In such circumstances, the contention of thelearned senior counsel for the contesting respondents that thedefinition provision alone should be given effect to, while theproviso has to be struck down, is also not acceptable.66. The judgment relied upon by the learned senior counsel forthe contesting respondents in Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kanwar, AIR 1965SC 834, wherein the Supreme Court, while considering Section 2(d) ofthe Transfer of Property Act, which provides that nothing containedtherein shall be deemed to affect save as provided by Section 57under Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act, any transfer byoperation of law or by or in execution of a decree or order of aCourt of competent jurisdiction; and the saving clause, viz., ChapterIV of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with the mortgage ofimmovable property and charges, which includes Section 100 of theTransfer of Property Act, and therefore, by construing Section 2(d),Section 100 would apply to transfers by operation of law and on theother hand, Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, while statingabout the term "transfer of property" states that it must be a livingperson conveying the property present or future to another livingperson, held that, notwithstanding the terms under Section 5 of theTransfer of Property Act, the auction sale was held as a transfer. The operative portion is as under:"16. In our opinion, the positive provision contained inSection 2(d) must prevail over the definition of “transferof property” prescribed by Section 5. No doubt, the purposeof the definition is to indicate the class of transfers towhich the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act areintended to be applied; but a definition of this kindcannot over-ride the clear and positive direction containedin the specific words used by Section 2(d). As we havealready seen. the result of the saving clause enacted bySection 2(d) is to emphasise the fact that the provisionsof Section 57 and those contained in Chapter IV must applyto transfer by operation of law. Such a positive provisioncannot be made to yield to what may appear to be the effectof the definition prescribed by Section 5; and so, we areinclined to hold that not-withstanding the definitionprescribed by Section 5. the latter part of Section 100must be deemed to include auction sales."67. We do not see any reason to accept the said contention ofthe learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents on thelegislative provisions of the present Act, wherein there is no https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ conflict between the provisions, even though there is aclassification among class of advocates, which, according to us, cannot be said to be unreasonable or discriminatory in its nature.68. That apart, it is true that when compared to other States, wherein it is stated that the retired persons who enrolled asAdvocates are not even permitted to be admitted in the Welfare FundScheme, in the State of Tamil Nadu there is no age restriction foradmission as a Member of the Fund and even the retired employees, whoreceived terminal benefits and pension are entitled to be admitted tothe Welfare Fund for the purpose of getting benefits as per theschedule based on the standing in the bar.69. The learned Judge proceeded on some of the possible factualaspects that some of the advocates, who entered into profession, maybe flourishing and many of the pensioners, who became advocates afterretiring as clerks, etc., may find it extremely difficult to cope upwith the financial constraint and on the basis held that consideringthe financial constraint of the retired people, they should not beexcluded from the purview of the benefit of the Welfare Fund Act. 70. In the circumstances of the case, since what is relevant isabout the constitutionality of the impugned amendment, as to whetherit is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and tofind out as to whether there is intelligible differentia between theobject sought to be achieved and the impugned amendment, we are ofthe view that the impugned order does not lay down the correct legalposition. In the absence of any legislative incompetency on the partof the State Government in making the impugned amendment and on thefacts and circumstances of the case, finding that the object ofconferring the benefit to one group of advocates is with a reason, which cannot be branded as unreasonable, we are of the view that theimpugned amendment does not suffer from constitutional illegality orcannot be declared to be ultra vires to the Constitution.71. What is forbidden by Article 14 of the Constitution of Indiais a class legislation and not a reasonable classification based onintelligible differentia between the object sought to be achieved andclassification made. It is true that there are stray instanceswherein, factually, on both sides a diametrically different situationmay be in existence. It is also true that, while conferring thebenefits to the advocates who have devoted their life from the datethey have completed their law degree, there may be a number ofadvocates who have flourished in their lives financially andotherwise and they are also entitled to lumpsum payment, while amongthe retired employees who have become advocates, many of them may beliving with financial constraint, but that alone is not a ground orcriteria for the purpose of setting aside a law as ultra vires. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#72. It is one thing to say that such of those advocates who havejoined the profession immediately after Law Degree and havesufficient financial means, should not be conferred with the lumpsumpayment in the interest of the large number of new entrants into theprofession, who with fond hope have taken up the profession as theironly source of avocation and ultimately, in the noble profession likethat of advocates, which deals with the problems of others, it ismore as a service and sacrifice, while incidentally earninglivelihood also. It is no doubt the duty of the statutory bodylike the Bar Council to find out the ways and means to distinguishamong them so as to see that the fruits of the Welfare Fund reach thereally deserving persons. Merely because the number of claimsincreased every year, it does not mean that it should thwart thenoble object of continuation of the Advocates Welfare Fund. It iscertainly the duty of the Trustee Committee, rather a statutoryobligation, to see that the funds are created in accordance withSection 3(2) of the Welfare Fund Act. It is of utmost importancefor an elected statutory body like that of the Bar Council to seethat every amount of contribution received as per the said provisionis genuinely used for the benefit of the members concerned in orderto uphold the dignity and decorum of the profession, which depends byand large on the financial status, especially with respect to firstgeneration lawyers, who form a large number of the profession assuch. The Bar Council as well as the Trustee Committee have astatutory and sacred duty to maintain the said prestige and privilegein the interest of everyone by taking positive steps to augment theWelfare Fund.73. In such view of the matter, we are of the view that theimpugned order of the learned Judge has not laid down the correct lawand the same is set aside and the proviso to Explanation II (5) toSection 16 of the Welfare Fund Act is held as valid and the writappeals of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and the State Governmentstand allowed. No costs. Consequently, M.P.Nos.1 and 2 in each ofthe writ appeals are closed. Sd/- Asst. Registrar/True Copy/ Sub. Asst. RegistrarsasiTo:1. The Chairman Bar Council of Tamil Nadu High Court Campus Chennai – 600 104. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#2. The Chairman Trustee Committee Tamil Nadu Advocates Welfare Fund Bar Council of Tamil Nadu Chennai – 600 104.3. The Secretary to Government Law Department Fort St.George Chennai – 600 009.4. The President, Tamil Nadu Advocates Association, M.H.A.A. High Court Buildings, Chennai-600 104.+ 1 c.c. to S. Ramanathan, Advocate. S.R.No.32399.+ 2 c.cs. to Mr. K. Venkatakrishnan, Advocate. S.R.No.32066.+ 1 c.c. to Mr. S. Seshachalam, Advocate. S.R.No.32349.+ 1 c.c. to The Government Pleader. S.R.No.32278.W.A.Nos.823, 824, 826and 829 to 832 of 2007CK(CO)EM/GSK/31.7.09