Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v. Land Acquisition Officer (Power Grid)/Revenue Divisional Officer

1.S.V.Lakshminarayana Chetty2.S.V.Srikanta Gupta.. 1st and 2nd respondents in A.S.Nod.843 and 967 of 2008/ ClaimantK.Ramachandaran.. 1st respondent in A.s.Nos.844 and 968 of 2008/ClaimantS.V.Pandarinath.. 1st respondent in A.s.Nos.845 and 969 of 2008/Claimant1.Chinnappa2.Puttappa.. 1st and 2nd respondents in A.S.Nos.846 and 970 of 2008/ Claimant 1.Chinna Gooniappa2.Venkataraman.. 1st and 2nd respondents in A.s.Nos.847 and 971 of 2008/ ClaimantChinna Gooniappa.. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.848 and 972 of 2008/ClaimantNagaraj.. 1st respondent in A.s.Nos.849 and 973 of 2008/ClaimantVediappan.. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.851 and 975 of 2008/ClaimantNanjamma.. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.852 and 976 of 2008/ClaimantChinna Yuvappa.. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.853 and 977 of 2008/ClaimantSavithri.. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.854 andW/o. Sampath 978 of 2008/ClaimantSampath.. 1st respondent in A.S.No.979 of 2008/ClaimantVenkataramanappa.. 1st respondent in A.s.Nos.894 and 922 of 2009/ClaimantPeria Yuvappa.. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.895 and 923 of 2009/ClaimantPappanna .. 1st respondent in A.S.Nos.896 and 924 of 2009/Claimant https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.Land Acquisition Officer, (Power Grid) and Revenue Divisional Officer, Hosur... 2nd Respondent in A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 842, 844,845,848, 849, 851 to 853, 854 of 2008, 894 to 896 of 2009 and 3rd respondent in A.s.Nos.843,846,847 of 2008The Chief Manager,Power Grid Corporation of India Limited,Hosur... 2nd respondent in 964,965,966,968,969,972, 973, 975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008 and 922 to 924 of 2009 3rd respondent in A.s.Nos.967,970, 971, of 2008A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 849 and 851 to 854 of 2008, 964 to 973,975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008 are preferred under Section 54 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against judgments and decrees madein various LAOPs in LAOP No.13 of 2001, 15/01, 16/01, 17/02, 21/01,22/01, 24/01, 25/01, 27/01, 28/01, 29/01, 31/01, 32/01, 33/01,35/01, 36/01, 37/01, 38/01, 39/01 respectively, dated 04.12.2007 onthe file of the Subordinate Court, Hosur.A.S. Nos.894 to 896 and 922 to 924 of 2009 are preferred underSection 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against judgments anddecrees made in LAOP Nos.26,30 and 40 of 2001, dated 25.04.2008 onthe file of the Subordinate Court, Hosur.For Appellants : Ms.Rita Chandrasekar for M/s.Aiyer and Dolia in A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 849, 851 to 854/2008 and 894 to 896 of 2009 Mr.V.Ravi, Spl. G.P.(AS) in 964 to 973, 975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008 and 922 to 924 of 2009For Respondents: Mr.P.Mani for R-1 in A.S.Nos.836 to 839 of 2008 and for R-1 in A.S.Nos.840 to 842, 844,848 to 854 of 2008 and for RR1 and 2 in A.S.Nos.843, 846 and 847 of 2008 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Mr.V.Ravi, Spl.G.P.(AS) for R2 in A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to 842, 844,845,848, 849, 851 to 853, 854 of 2008 and 894 to 896/2009 for R-3 in A.S.Nos.843,846,847 of 2008 Mr.P.Mani, for R-1 in A.S.Nos.964, 966, 969, 971 to 973, 975, 978 and 979 of 2008 and 922 and 924 of 2009 Ms.Rita Chandrasekar for M/s.Aiyer and Dolia for R-2 in A.S.Nos.964 to 966, 968, 969, 972 to 979/2008 and for R-3 in A.S.Nos.967, 970 and 971/2008COMMON JUDGMENTHeard both sides. There are two sets of appeals in thesebatch of cases. One set of appeals were filed by the LandAcquisition Officer (Power Grid)-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer,Hosur (for short LAO), who is the acquiring authority. The secondset of appeals were filed by the Power Grid Corporation of IndiaLtd., (for short PGCI) represented by its Chief Manager, Hosur,which is the requisitioning body. The table given below will showthe number of LAOPs and the corresponding appeal suit numbersindicating in parenthesis either LAO or PGCI showing the respectiveappeals filed by them and the name of the claimants connected withsuch appeals.Sl.NoClaimant NameA.S.No.LAOP No.Date oforder inLAOP1S.V.NanjundaChettyA.s.No.836 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.982 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.13 of20014/12/072JayaramappaA.S.No.837 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.983 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.15 of2001-do-3SuseelaA.S.No.838 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.984 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.16 of2001-do- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sl.NoClaimant NameA.S.No.LAOP No.Date oforder inLAOP4VenkatesaluA.S.No.839 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.985 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.17 of2001-do5MakkammaAS No.840 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.964 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.21 of2001-do-6HarishAS No.841 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.965 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.22 of2001-do-7RamachandranAS No.842 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.966 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.24 of2001-do-8S.V.Lakshminarayana ChettyS.V.SrikantaGuptaA.S.No.843 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.967 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.25 of2001-do-9K.RamachandaranA.S.No.844 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.968 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.27 of2001-do-10S.V.PandarinathA.S.No.845 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.969 of 2007(LAO)LAOP.28 of2001-do-11ChinnappaPuttappaA.S.No.846 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.970 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.29 of2001 -do-12ChinnaGooliappaVenkataramanA.S.No.847 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.971 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.31 of2001-do-13ChinnaGooliappaA.S.No.848 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.972 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.32 of2001-do- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sl.NoClaimant NameA.S.No.LAOP No.Date oforder inLAOP14NagarajA.s.No.849 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.973 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.33 of2001-do-15VediappanA.S.No.851 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.975 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.35 of2001-do-16NanjammaA.S.No.852 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.976 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.36 of2001-do-17Chinna YuvappaA.S.No.853 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.977 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.37 of2001-do-18SavithriA.S.No.854 of 2008(PGCI)A.S.No.978 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.38 of2001-do-19SampathA.S.No.979 of 2008(LAO)LAOP.39 of2001-do-20VenkataramanappaA.S.No.894 of 2009(PGCI)A.S.No.922 of 2009(LAO)LAOP.26 of200125.04.200821Peria YuvappaA.S.No.895 of 2009(PGCI)A.S.No.923 of 2009(LAO)LAOP.30 of2001-do 22PappannaA.S.No.896 of 2009(PGCI)A.S.No.924 of 2009(LAO)LAOP.40 of2001-do-2.The lands of claimants situated in Nallaganakothapalliand Marudandapalli villages were acquired for the purpose oftransmitting power from NTPC, Thalcher to Kolar, Karnataka and alsoto distribute the Tamil Nadu's share of its power from the Centralpool by establishing 400/220 KV Sub Station in that place. Onrequest made by the PGCI, the acquiring authority published anotification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in theTamil Nadu Gazette, dated 10.12.1997. An extent of 61.41 acres of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ lands were sought to be acquired in Marudandapalli as well asNallaganakothapalli villages coming under Soolagiri Block of HosurTaluk. Enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with by invoking theemergency clause vide G.O.Ms.No.166, Energy Department, dated1.9.1999. Thereafter, following due procedure, the Award No.1 of2000(F) came to be passed on 31.10.2000. The acquiring authorityfixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.31500/- per acre togetherwith other statutory payments. 3.The land owners/claimants herein were aggrieved by thelower rate of compensation. Therefore, they filed their objections.In view of their objections, the mattes were referred fordetermination of the market value of the lands under Section 18 tothe jurisdictional reference court, which in the present case isthe Sub Court, Hosur. The Reference Court registered the referencesas various LAOPs (indicated in the tabular column given in para 1)and recorded evidence. The judgments were pronounced on twodifferent dates, i.e. 04.12.2007 and 25.4.2008. The reference courtby its judgment enhanced the compensation at the rate ofRs.3,50,000/- per acre. Wherever there were standing trees found,they were also given separate compensation. Aggrieved by the same,these appeal suits were filed.4.In the first batch of cases, i.e. in LAOP Nos.13,15,16and 17 of 2001, common evidence was recorded in LAOP No.13 of2001. Before the court below, on behalf of claimants, fourwitnesses were examined as C.W.1 to C.W.4. On their side, twodocuments were filed as Exs.C.1 and C.2. They are two registeredsale deeds, dated 10.9.1999 and 15.10.1999. On the side of theacquiring authority, one V.Chennakesava Babu, the then SubCollector of Hosur was examined as R.W.1. On their side, fourdocuments were filed and they were marked as Exs.R.1 to R.4. On thebasis of these evidences (both oral and documentary) the courtbelow pronounced a common judgment, dated 04.12.2007.5.In the second batch of cases, i.e. in LAOPNos.21,22,24,25,27,28, 29,31 to 39 of 2001 (16 LAOPs), a jointtrial was conducted and evidence was recorded in LAOP No.25 of2001. Before the reference court, on behalf of claimants, fivewitnesses were examined as C.W.1 to C.W.5. On their side, fourdocuments were filed and marked as Exs.C.1 to C.4. Exs.C.1 and C.2are the very same documents relating to sale deeds, dated 10.9.1999and 15.10.1999 recorded in the previous batch of cases. On the sideof the acquiring authority, the very same Chennakesava Babu wasexamined as R.W.1. On their side, the very same documents whichwere filed in the earlier cases, were marked as Exs.R.1 to R.4. Onthe basis of these materials, a common judgment was pronounced on04.12.2007.6.Subsequently, the reference court tried LAOP Nos.26,30and 40 of 2001 jointly. In that case, common evidence was let in inLAOP No.40 of 2001. On the side of claimants, one witness wasexamined as C.W.1 and three documents were filed and marked asExs.C.1 to C.3. Exs.C.1 and C.2 are the sale deeds relied upon in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the earlier batch of cases and Exs.C.3 is the judgment pronouncedin the earlier batch of cases in LAOP No.13 of 2001, dated04.12.2007. On the side of the acquiring authority, the very sameChennakesava Babu was examined as R.W.1 and the very same documentswere filed and marked as Exs.R.1 to R.4. 7.As found from the Award proceedings, acquiring authoritycollected statistical datas from the Sub Registrar Office atSoolagiri for the period from 1.4.1997 to 4.4.2000 which were threeyears before the date of Section 4(1) notification. He hadconsidered as many as 160 sale transactions. Those transactionsrelated to the lands which were classified as dry lands in therevenue records. Out of 160 sale transactions, the authoritydiscarded 74 cases on the plea that those lands were located 1.6Kms. away from the land which are acquired. He also furtherrejected 41 cases as soil, 'Tharam' and classification of thoselands were differing. He had also discarded 31 other cases on theground that they were lease deeds or loan transactions orpartition deeds and hence they are not reliable indicators inarriving at the market value. Further, he rejected 7 other cases onthe ground that either they were considered as thope or covered bygift deeds or wet lands or were sold as house sites. He took SerialNo.116 as the data land and it was in Survey No.346/2A2 covered bysale deed No.1396, dated 8.9.1999. It was claimed that the saidland was 200 meters away from the lands under acquisition and thesoil, tharam and classifications were similar to the lands underacquisition. The said land which was to an extent of one acre andclassified as unirrigated dry land was sold at Rs.35,500/-. Sincethere was a Well, deducting the value for the Well, it wascalculated that the value of the said land would be Rs.31500/- peracre or Rs.77805/- per hectare. This was taken as the basis forarriving at the compensation for the lands acquired from theMarudandapali village. 8.In respect of lands at Nallaganakothapalli village, theauthority considered 114 sale transactions and discarded all ofthem. He found that in 73 cases, the lands were situated beyond 2Kms and in 17 cases, lands were situated 1.6 Kms away and they weresold for exorbitant rate for commercial purpose. In 7 cases, herejected them on the ground that they were wet lands. In 1 case, itwas found that there were trees and Well in the land. In 13 casesit was found they were sold for forming a factory and consideredhighly exorbitant. In 3 cases, it was found to be sold as housesites. Therefore, all the 114 sale transactions the authorityrejected and only adopted the valuation given as data land (markedas Ex.R.4) taken from the other village Marudandapalli. 9.Though the acquiring authority considered that they weredry lands but number of lands under acquisition, i.e. SurveyNos.315/1C2, 315/1F2, 315/2B, 315/1E2, 315/2A, 333/1C, 335/1B,333/2A, 335/1F, 334/1, 334/2A, 334/2B, 335/1C, 335/2, 336/2,337/2A2, 341/3A1, 341/3A2A, 337/2A3, 337/2B3, 338/2A2, 341/3A3,341/3A4, 341/4A and 338/2B, there were standing trees includingMango, Tamarind and Coconut. It was factually wrong on the part of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the acquiring authority to state that some of the data lands wererejected as they were thope or they were sold as house sites. Inany event, the court below considered the evidence let in by bothsides and Exs.C.1 and C.2 on one side and Ex.R.4 sale deed filed bythe acquiring authority on the other side and gave its factualfindings. 10.The then Sub Collector who was examined as R.W.1 in hiscross examination made the following admissions. He agreed thatsome of lands are adjacent to National Highways and the other landsare adjacent to Tar road leading to the village. He also admittedthat in some of lands, there were coconut trees and irrigationfacilities were available. In most of lands, they were havingirrigation facilities and were growing vegetables. In one land,pipe line was found laid to bring water and it had irrigationfacilities. He also feigned ignorance about the existence of aSteel factory adjacent to the land but admitted on the Easternside, there was a Tiles factory. He also admitted that in thestatistical data provided in Ex.R.3, Serial Nos.7,17,29 and 37 werepurchased for commercial purposes and likewise, Serial Nos.45 and82 were also purchased for establishing a factory. He also admittedthat lands were situated in the road leading from Hosur toSoolagiri at a distance of 20 Kms. 11.The reference court held that Ex.C.1, dated 10.9.1989the sale deed between Ramadoss Naidu and Girishbabu found inSl.No.96 in the statistical data was considered by the acquiringauthority, but as to why the said land was not considered as thedata land for the purpose of fixing the compensation, there was nosatisfactory explanation on the side of R.W.1. Though it wascontended that Exs.C.1 and C.2 were exemplars of sale of smallplots, there was no denial about its genuineness or the bonafidenature of those transactions. The court below considered thatEx.C.1 was situated closer to the land which is acquired and it canbe seen from Ex.R.2, topo plan of the village and the sale deedcame into existence six months prior to Section 4(1) notification.In that, the sale consideration was Rs.5 lakhs per acre. Thoughclaimants demanded Rs.20 lakhs per acre, there was no supportingdocument for making such a claim. Therefore, the court below safelyrelied on Ex.C.1 and the fact that the land was acquired for thepurpose of locating a Sub Station by PGCI. The market value of theland was considered as Rs.5 lakhs. Further, the court below heldthat sufficient deduction towards development charges should bemade. Therefore, for the lands which are adjacent to the road,deduction of 25% and those far away from the road, deduction of 30%was to be made towards development charges. In essence, in thefirst set of cases, the rate of compensation was fixed atRs.3,75,000/- per acre and for the second set, it was fixed atRs.3,50,000/- per acre. Since there were fruit bearing trees in theland and also other trees which are useful for other purposes, thecourt below fixed Rs.4000/- towards fruit bearing trees and foryounger trees, Rs.2000/- was fixed. Thus the compensation whichwas determined was directed to be paid along with 30% solatium andadditional compensation at the rate of 12% and also statutory https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ interest payable. The judgments rendered in three batch of cases asset out above is now under challenge in these appeals. 12.Mr.V.Ravi, learned Special Government Pleader (AS)contended that Exs.C.1 and C.2 are not comparable lands and theacquired lands were undeveloped lands. The rate fixed by thereference court was excessive. The compensation fixed by the LAO asper Exs.R.1 to R.4 alone should have been relied upon. Thededuction made towards development charges are more insignificantand deduction of 53% or 65% should have been granted. Thegenuineness of Ex.C.1 and C.2 were also not established.13.Mrs.Rita Chandrasekaran, learned counsel appearing forPGCI, elaborately contended that people of that area were awarethat there was going to be a Sub Station and thus, the land valuewere boosted. Exs.C.1 and C.2 had come into existence only on thebasis of their awareness about the location of the proposed SubStation. She also submitted that Ex.C.1 and Ex.C.2 are exemplars ofsale of small plots of lands and should not form the basis. Shefurther submitted that Exs.C.1 and C.2 were transactions betweenthe family members themselves and should not be made as the basisfor determination of market value. But Ex.R.4 data land alone iscomparable. The finding that it was not agricultural land and werefit to be used as construction of building and factory was notbased upon evidence. 14.In support of her contention, the learned counsel forPGCI relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in MohammadRaofuddin Vs Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2009 (14) SCC367. She relied upon the following passages found in paragraphs 14and 11 from the said judgment which are as follows:"14. Thus, comparable sale instances of similarlands in the neighbourhood at or about the date ofnotification under Section 4(1) of the Act are thebest guide for determination of the market value ofthe land to arrive at a fair estimate of the amountof compensation payable to a landowner.Nevertheless, while ascertaining compensation, it isthe duty of the Court to see that the compensationso determined is just and fair not merely to theindividual whose property has been acquired but alsoto the public which is to pay for it.11. One of the preferred and well-accepted methodsadopted for working out the market value of the landin acquisition cases is the comparable sales method.The comparable sales i.e. the lands sought to becompared must be similar in nature and potentiality.Again, in the absence of sale deeds, the judgmentsand awards passed in respect of acquisition oflands, made in the same village and/orneighbouring villages can be accepted as valid pieceof evidence and provide a sound basis to determine https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the market value of the land after suitableadjustments with regard to positive and negativefactors enumerated in Sections 23 and 24 of the Act.Undoubtedly, an element of some guesswork isinvolved in the entire exercise."15.But in the very same judgment, it must be noted that theSupreme court in paragraph 16 has held that in case of a wellconsidered decision of the reference court, the interference by thehigher court in an appeal is very limited. Hence the followingpassage found in paragraph 16 may be usefully extracted below:"16. The following observations of this Court in FoodCorpn. of India v. Makhan Singh (1992 (3) SCC 67) arequite apposite: (SCC pp.75-76, para 15) “15. This Court as the last court of appeal,will ordinarily not interfere in an awardgranting compensation unless there issomething to show not merely that on thebalance of evidence it is possible to reacha different conclusion, but that thejudgment cannot be supported by reason of awrong application of principle or becausesome important point affecting valuation hasbeen overlooked or misapplied. Besides,generally speaking, the appellate courtinterferes not when the judgment underappeal is not right but only when it isshown to be wrong. See in this connectionDollar Co. v. Collector of Madras (1975 (2)SCC 730)6. Added thereto are other rules ofprudence that the courts do not treat on apar land situated on the frontage havingspecial advantage and the land situated inthe interior undeveloped area, or to comparesmaller plots fetching better price withlarge tracts of land. See in this connectionPeriyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. Stateof Kerala (1991 (4) SCC 195).”Therefore, the scope of interference in such mattersis very limited and it is only in cases where it isfound that the authorities below have either appliedwrong principles or have omitted to take intoconsideration some important point affectingvaluation, that this Court can interfere."16.The learned counsel for PGCI further relied upon thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Land Acquisition Officer v.Karigowda reported in (2010) 5 SCC 708 to justify that the burdenof higher compensation is primarily on the claimants and they hadfailed to discharge their obligation. In this context, she placedreliance upon the following passages found in paragraphs 29 and 32which are as follows: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "29. It is a settled principle of law that the onusto prove entitlement to receive higher compensationis upon the claimants. In Basant Kumar v. Union ofIndia (1996 (11) SCC 542) this Court held that theclaimants are expected to lead cogent and properevidence in support of their claim. Onus primarily ison the claimants, which they can discharge whileplacing and proving on record sale instances and/orsuch other evidences as they deem proper, keeping inmind the method of computation for awarding ofcompensation which they rely upon. In this very case,this Court stated the principles of awardingcompensation and placed the matter beyond ambiguity,while also capsulating the factors regulating thediscretion of the Court while awarding thecompensation. This principle was reiterated by thisCourt even in Gafar v. Moradabad DevelopmentAuthority(2007 (7) SCC 614) and the Court held asunder: (SCC p.620, para 12)“12. As held by this Court in variousdecisions, the burden is on the claimants toestablish that the amounts awarded to themby the Land Acquisition Officer areinadequate and that they are entitled tomore. That burden had to be discharged bythe claimants and only if the initial burdenin that behalf was discharged, the burdenshifted to the State to justify the award.”Thus, the onus being primarily upon the claimants,they are expected to lead evidence to revert thesame, if they so desire. In other words, it cannot besaid that there is no onus whatsoever upon the Statein such reference proceedings. The court cannot losesight of the facts and clear position of documents,that obligation to pay fair compensation is on theState in its absolute terms. Every case has to beexamined on its own facts and the courts are expectedto scrutinise the evidence led by the parties in suchproceedings.32. Where a statutory provision confers rights andalso states mandatory or implied conditions whichwould have to be satisfied before the claim canculminate into a relief, such considerations orconditions are relevant for the purposes ofinterpretation as well. A power conferred by thestatute often contains an express condition for itsexercise and, in absence of, or in addition to theexpress condition, there are also implied conditionsfor exercise of power. Exercise of statutory power inbreach of express or implied conditions will be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ illegal, if the conditions breached are mandatory. This principle, to a large extent, is applicable toexercise of rights arising from beneficiallegislations, when an owner claims benefits understatutory provisions, it is for him to show that whatis contemplated under the conditions attached theretohas been satisfied, particularly when suchlegislative intent is clear from the bare reading ofthe provisions. Like the cases in hand, it is for theclaimants to show that, to award the compensationpayable under the statutory provisions, they havebrought on record evidence to satisfy the criterionand conditions required to be fulfilled for such aclaim."Therefore, she stated that in the present case, the claimants havefailed to justify the enhanced compensation.17.Further, she relied upon the passage found in paragraph46 for the purpose of contending that the purpose of locating thesub station in that land cannot be a ground for enhancedcompensation and that the lands are only fetching the value eitheras agricultural lands or dry lands as indicated in the saidparagraph, which may be usefully extracted below:"46. The second circumstance specified in Section23(1) to be considered by the court in determiningcompensation is the damage sustained by the person onaccount of any standing crops or trees which may beon the land at the time of the Collector’s takingpossession thereof. Even from a reasonablepracticable view it has to be understood that thecompensation which is payable to the claimants is inrelation to the acquired land, the standing crops ortrees and what they earn from the agricultural cropsor fruits or trees on the agricultural land. Toextend the benefit for the purposes of compensation,considering that the fruits grown on the agriculturalland would be converted into jam or any other eatableproducts will not be a relevant consideration withinthe scheme of the Act. The purpose is not to connectthe acquisition to remote factors which may have somebearing or some connection with the agriculturalactivity being carried on, on the land in question.Such an approach by the court is neither permissiblenor prudent, as it would be opposed to thelegislative intent contained under the provisions ofSections 23 and 24 of the Act."18.But, however, the Supreme Court in the very samejudgment in paragraphs 81, 82 and 83 had observed as follows:"81. The above compensation was computed by theSLAO on the basis of the sale instances of thevillages falling within the same circle as well ason the basis of the guidance value maintained in theRegister of the Sub-Registrar of the villages https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ concerned. From the report, it is evident that boththese Villages Sanaba and Pandavapura are located inthe same circle and are practically part of thelarger revenue estate. It was not in dispute beforeus that primarily all these lands were being usedfor cultivating mulberry crop which is the soleagricultural activity. The court has to keep in minda very pertinent equitable principle while awardingcompensation i.e. the court should grant just andfair market value of the land at the time of theacquisition while ensuring that there is no undueenrichment. These are compulsive acquisitions butthe guiding factor for the court is sale instancesof a willing seller and a willing purchaser whiledetermining the compensation payable. To award faircompensation is the obligation of the State anddepending on the facts and circumstances of thecase, the courts may enhance the compensation withinthe framework of law. The sale instances referred toby the Collector in his report are from the samevillages or nearby villages or adjacent villageswhich are a part of the same circle and where theland can easily said to be comparable as the entirechunk of the land was being used for raisingmulberry crop and was acquired for common purpose,that is, the lands were submerged in the watercoming from Hemavathi Dam.82. This Court in Shaji Kuriakose3 (2001 (7) SCC650)13 held that out of the three aforestatedmethods, the courts adopt comparable sales method ofvaluation of land while fixing the market value ofthe acquired land. Comparable sales method ofvaluation of land is preferred than the othermethods such as capitalisation of net income methodor expert opinion method. Comparable sales methodsof valuation is preferred because it furnishes theevidence for determination of the market value ofthe acquired land which a willing purchaser wouldpay for the acquired land if it has been sold inopen market at the time of issue of notificationunder Section 4 of the Act. In Kantaben ManibhaiAmin v. Land Acquisition Officer (1989 (4) SCC 662)this Court also stated that latest sale instancecloser to the date of notification for acquisitionof the land should be taken into consideration.83. It is also an accepted judicial norm that theclaimants can be given the benefit of awardingcompensation on the basis of the genuine saleinstance containing the highest rate, provided ithas been proved in accordance with law and is acomparable instance. Such sale instance must satisfyall the requirements and prerequisites stated in theAct. It should be a bona fide transaction and should https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ also be in reasonable proximity to the date ofnotification under Section 4 of the Act. Since theSLAO had referred to the four sale instances whichwere produced before him and being part of thereference file, they were duly noticed by theReference Court as well as by the High Court. Butthe courts held that it was not appropriate to applysales statistics method in the facts andcircumstances of the case. Admittedly, the claimantsproduced no sale instances. In our view, these saleinstances can be taken into consideration by theCourt and benefit of the highest instance can begranted to the claimants in accordance with law infixing the market value of the acquired land.Whatever benefit accrues to the claimants from therecord produced and proved by the respondents,cannot be denied to them just because they have notproduced evidence by way of sale instances."(Emphasis added)19.Further, in the very same judgment, the Supreme courtalso highlighted the loss of agricultural land and also theconsequent loss of livelihood due to acquisition. In paragraphs 89to 91, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:89. We have two important facts which cannot beignored by the Court. Firstly, that the claimants,by leading definite evidence have shown on recordthat the lands in question are not only lands havingregular source of irrigation through the backwatersbut otherwise are also lands superior to the othergarden lands used for ordinary agriculturalactivities. The fields in question are being usedexclusively for growing mulberry crops. Mulberryleaves are the only and the specified food forcocoons. In other words, the agricultural purposefor which the fields in question are being used is aspecial purpose and the crop so grown is again usedfor a specific commercial purpose to which there isno other alternative. In fact, none was statedbefore us by the learned counsel appearing for theparties. In all these peculiar facts, it cannot bedisputed that some additional benefits have to beprovided in favour of the claimants.90. In the present cases, the claimants have notonly lost their agricultural land but they have alsobeen deprived of seasonal income that was availableto them as a result of sale of mulberry leaves.Deprivation of livelihood is a seriousconsideration. The Court is entitled to apply somekind of reasonable guesswork to balance the equitiesand fix just and fair market value in terms of theparameters specified under Section 23 of the Act.The SLAO has ignored both these aspects firstly https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ providing of annual increase, and secondly, givingsome weightage to the special agricultural purposeand the purpose for which the mulberry crop had tobe utilised. The claimants have not proved andproduced on record sale instances. They have alsonot produced on record any specific evidence tojustify the compensation awarded to them by theReference Court and/or the High Court. In fact,there is hardly any evidence, much less a cogent andimpeccable evidence to support the increase on thebasis of net income capitalisation method.91. It is a settled rudiment of law that thecourt, in given facts and circumstances of the caseand keeping in mind the potentiality and utility ofthe land acquired, can award higher compensation toensure that injustice is not done to the claimantsand they are not deprived of their property withoutgrant of fair compensation. Reference, in thisregard, can be made to the judgment of this Court inLand Acquisition Officer v. Kamadana Ramakrishna Rao(2007 (3) SCC 526). While adopting the average salemethod as the formula for awarding compensation tothe claimants, we are also of the considered viewthat in the peculiar facts and circumstances of thecase and the fact that the land is beingcompulsorily acquired, the claimants should beawarded a higher compensation. The compensation atthe rate of Rs2,30,000 per acre for the wetland andat the rate of Rs1,53,400 per acre for the dry landwould be just and fair compensation and would docomplete justice between the parties. This elementof increase had not been added by the SLAO whichought to have been done."(Emphasis added)20.It is necessary to deal with the contentions raised byappellants. The first contention that deduction towards developmentcharges was on the lower side cannot be accepted. It was held bythe Supreme Court in Kanta Devi v. State of Haryana reported in(2008) 15 SCC 201 that 1/3rd of the market value can be the normalrate though higher deduction is permissible towards developmentcharges. 21.Further, the Supreme court in Nelson Fernandes andothers v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and othersreported in (2007) 9 SCC 447 held that development charge is basedupon the purpose for which land is acquired. In that case, theSupreme Court dealt with the laying of railway lines. In thepresent case, it is only to establish the sub station where towersare put up and transmission lines are made to pass through the substation. The following passage found in paragraph 30 from the saidjudgment may be usefully extracted herebelow: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

30. We are not, however, oblivious of the fact thatnormally 1/3rd deduction of further amount ofcompensation has been directed in some cases.However, the purpose for which the land is acquiredmust also be taken into consideration. In the instantcase, the land was acquired for the construction ofnew BG line for the Konkan Railways. This Court inHasanali Khanbhai & Sons v. State of Gujarat5 and LandAcquisition Officer v. Nookala Rajamallu6 had noticedthat where lands are acquired for specific purposes,deduction by way of development charges ispermissible. In the instant case, acquisition is forlaying a railway line. Therefore, the question ofdevelopment thereof would not arise......"It will not be out of place to note that most of transmission linescarrying on high tension wires are situated right in the midst ofagricultural lands. Therefore, in the present case, the referencecourt fixing 25% to 30% towards development charges is more enough.Hence the contention raised in this regard has to be rejected.22.The second contention that Exs.C.1 and C.2 are exemplarsof sale of small plots also cannot be accepted because foruntenable reasons, the acquiring authority rejected many ofcomparable sales. The court below found on evidence that Exs.C.1and C.2 are the true reflectors of the market rate. 23.The Supreme Court vide its judgment in U.P. StateIndustrial Development Corpn. v. Rishabh Ispat Ltd., reported in(2007) 2 SCC 248 after referring to Section 23 of the LandAcquisition Act permitted the method of comparative sale detailsand the judgment of the reference court in enhancing thecompensation relying upon the sole sale deed as a reliable exemplarwas upheld. All that it requires was only proper application ofprinciples relating to determination of compensation as well as thecorrect appreciation of evidence on record. The following passagefound in paragraph 7 of the said judgment may be extracted below:"7......The Reference Court relied upon a sale deedexecuted on 25-7-1981 which related to the sale of 2bighas of land of Village Habibpur @ Rs21,600 perbigha. This sale deed was executed on 25-7-1981whereas the notification under Section 4 was issuedon 25-8-1981. The Reference Court found thisexemplar to be a reliable piece of evidence andaccordingly determined compensation @ Rs11 per sq.yard for the lands abutting the road and Rs6 for thelands away from the road. The High Court hasaffirmed the finding of the Reference Court. We findno reason to interfere with the finding which isbased on proper appreciation of the evidence onrecord and the proper application of the principles https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ relating to determination of compensation under theAct."24.Further, it has also been held by the Supreme court inRishi Pal Singh v. Meerut Development Authority reported in (2006)3 SCC 205 that exemplar of sale of small plot can be considered fordetermination of the market value when there are no other evidenceavailable. All that it requires in such case was there must beadequate discount. In paragraph 5, the Supreme Court held asfollows:"5. ..... With respect to the first reason, thatis, exemplars of small plots have been taken intoconsideration by the Reference Court, in the firstinstance our attention was invited to some judgmentsof this Court to urge that there is no absolute barto exemplars of small plots being considered providedadequate discount is given in this behalf. Thus thereis no bar in law to exemplars of small plots beingconsidered....."Therefore, the contention that Exs.C.1 and C.2 do not reflectcorrect market value has to be rejected. 25.The contention that it is only an agricultural land andtherefore, it cannot fetch higher value also cannot be accepted. Inthe present case, R.W.1 himself in his evidence admitted that thereare factories around the lands which are sought to be acquired.Further, the purpose of acquisition itself was to install anelectric sub station. It has been held by the Supreme Court videits decision in Sangunthala v. Tahsildar (LA) reported in (2010) 3SCC 661 that potentiality of immediate use including relativeadvantages and facilities available on the acquired land can beconsidered. The following passages found in paragraphs 26 and 34may be usefully extracted below:"26. It should also be taken into consideration thatthe disputed lands were situated near the factorypremises and further were adjoining the main roadwhich connects Tanmag Road. As such the aforesaidlands are potential house sites.34. In view of the admitted case that the landsacquired were potential house sites we do not agreewith the views taken by the High Court whilecalculating the compensation. R-13 and R-15 are thetwo sale deeds containing particulars of the saletransactions held three years prior to the Section 4(1) notification. The Reference Court after closeperusal of the aforesaid documents held that the samedisclose that out of more than 100 sales, a number ofsales in respect of the lands were sold as housesites in Thathaiyangarpatti Village and the adjacentsurvey numbers in Thekkampatty Village were also soldas house sites."26.In the present case, the acquiring authority himself inhis cross examination had admitted the locational advantages of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ lands. In fact, it was surrounded by factories and also abuttingthe land, there is a National Highway going to Bangalore. It isalso seen from the records that many of the comparable lands foundin the statistical data were ignored deliberately to pay thecompensation at the lower rate which was not accepted by thereference court. Excepting the assertion made by R.W.1 that Exs.C.1and C.2 were relied on for the purpose of the case, there is noother evidence produced to show the nature of the transaction. Inthe absence of any proof forthcoming, the statements made in theground of appeals cannot be the basis for rejecting the claim ofrespondents/claimants. 27.It must also be noted that in the very same area, fewyears before acquisitions were made for locating an industrialcomplex by SIPCOT near Hosur and also an housing scheme by TNHB.The acquisitions were done even as early as in the late 1980 andearly 1990. The compensation fixed by a division bench of thiscourt were more than Rs.2000/- and Rs.2500/- per cent. In thepresent case, the compensation fixed was only Rs.3000/- andRs.3500/- per cent depending upon the location and the acquisitionwas after 10 to 15 years. 28.Though the learned Special Government Pleader (AS)attempted to state that these villages are near Hosur which is faraway from the capital of Tamil Nadu i.e. Chennai, but it must benoted that they were very closer to the Metropolitan city ofBangalore (Karnataka State) and the land cost had considerablyappreciated in that area as it was an hour drive to Bangalore City.29.In the light of the above, this court is not inclined tointerfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the referencecourt which are under appeal in a batch of cases. Even in respectof A.S.Nos.895 and 923 of 2009, the LRs have not been brought onrecord. Thus, those appeals are liable to be rejected not only onthe ground of merits but also as having abated. 30.Hence all Appeal Suits will stand dismissed. However,under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties aredirected to bear their own costs. Consequently, connectedmiscellaneous petitions stand closed.31.Even though a common judgment is pronounced in theseappeal suits, it is needless to state that the learned SpecialGovernment Pleader (AS) as well as the counsel for PGCI areentitled to get separate fees in respect of each appeal suit.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrarvvk https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To1. The Subordinate Judge, Hosur.Copy to : The Section Officer, VR Section, High court, Madras2 cc To The Special Government Pleader, SR.58826, 58824, 58823,588163 ccs To M/s.Aiyar & Dolia, Advocate, SR.58016, 58017, 58018 JUDGMENT IN A.S. Nos.836 to 839, 840 to849, 851 to 854, 964 to 973, 975 to 979 and 982 to 985 of 2008, 894 to 896 and 922 to 924 of 2009CK, PKB(CO)RH (14.12.10)