High Court · 2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 06.08.2009CORAM:THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE ARUNA JAGADEESANCrl.OP.Nos.30736 to 30744/2006 Cr.MP.Nos.1 to 1/20061.L.Lakshmanan, Chairman and Managing Director M/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited Chennai-28Petitioner/A1 in Cr.OP.30736/062.L.Ganesan, Vice ChairmanM/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited Chennai-28Petitioner/A2 in Cr.OP.30737/063.K.S.KrisnaswamiPetitioner/A3 in Cr.OP.30738/064.V.Ramachandran, DirectorM/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited Chennai-28Petitioner/A5 in Cr.OP.30739/065.A.Murali Prasad, Director M/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited Chennai-28Petitioner/A6 in Cr.OP.30740/066.R.RaviPetitioner/A7 in Cr.OP.30741/067.S.Nandha GopalPetitioner/A8 in Cr.OP.30742/068.P.S.Rao, President M/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited Chennai-28Petitioner/A9 in Cr.OP.30743/069.D.Bheemsingh MelchisedecGeneral Manager (Operations)M/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited Chennai-28Petitioner/A10 in CrOP.30744/06 VsG.JayapalanRespondent in all Cr.OPsPrayer:- Cr.OP.No.30736/06 is filed to to call for the records andquash the complaint in CC.No.429/2006 on the file of the DistrictMunsif Cum Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur against the Petitioner.The other Criminal Original Petitions are filed for the reliefsas stated therein. For Petitioners:Mr.P.S.Raman, SC for M/s.Gupta & Ravi [Cr.OP.30736 to 30742/06]Mr.A.Ramesh, SC for M/s.Gupta & Ravi [Cr.OP.30743 to 30744/06] https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ For Respondent:Mr.M.RamamoorthyORDER The Petitioners, who are arrayed as A1 to A3 and A5 to A10 inall these Criminal Original Petitions seek to quash the complaint inCC.NO.429/2006 on the file of the District Munsif cum JudicialMagistrate, Ambattur2. The Respondent/complainant has filed the private complaintagainst the Petitioners/A1 to A3 and A5 to A10 and one C.R.Rao,Director of M/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited, who is arrayed as A4,under Section 500 of IPC. The Respondent was working as an Operatorin M/s.Rane Brake Linings Limited (herein after referred to as theCompany) and its Factory is situated at No.30, Ambattur IndustrialEstate, Chennai-58 and the said Company manufactures brake liningsfor all automobiles and trucks, brake blocks for railways and clutchfacings. For the purpose of said manufacture, the Company hasemployed 318 permanent workers and all of them said to have beenrepresented by a Union called M/s.Rane Brake Linings Employees Union(herein after referred to as the Union), in which the Respondent issaid to be the elected General Secretary from the year 1989. 3. It appears from the complaint that the last wage cum workload settlement expired on 3.12.2005 and the complainant as theGeneral Secretary of the Union had submitted a charter of demands on1.12.2005. It is alleged that A9 and A10 had suggested to thecomplainant that unless 150 workmen are sent out on voluntaryretirement scheme, it is not possible to commence the settlementtalks. There was a division among the workmen and the rival Unionhad filed a suit in OS.No.614/2005 against the complainant, seekingfor interim orders, but the same was not granted on the ground thatthe relief prayed for in the interim application and in the suit areone and the same. The said interim application is said to have beenclosed on 28.2.2006 as against which, CMA.Nos.20 and 21/2006 werefiled before the Sub Court, Poonamallee. It is alleged thatthereafter on 28.8.2006, A9 called the complainant to his room andcoerced him to opt for voluntary retirement scheme, stating that theywant only those officer bearers, who would cooperate in reducing theworkmen by voluntary retirement scheme and since the complainant wasnot cooperating with them, he should opt for voluntary retirementscheme and leave the Company. According to the complainant, A10 againcoerced the complainant to opt for voluntary retirement on 28.8.2006and thereafter started creating several problems to the complainant.4. It is also alleged in the complaint that on 4.10.2006 atabout 3.45 p.m., A10 at the instance of A1 to A9 displayed a noticein the notice board of the Company at Plot NO.30, Industrial Estate,Ambattur, Chennai-58, which contained defamatory material as againstthe complainant. The said notice/circular was signed by A10 and inthe said notice/circular it is stated that the concession granted tothe complainant was abused and he along with other section of theemployees had been indulging in the trade union activities of otherCompanies and have taken positions as office bearers in various otherCompanies. It is further alleged in the complaint that the noticehad been read by all the workmen of the company including the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ witnesses 2 to 6 and they informed the complainant about thedefamatory material and told him that a reading of the said noticetend to lower the prestige of the complainant. On the said facts andcircumstances, the Respondent has given the private complainantagainst A1 to A10 for defaming the Respondent/complainant.5. The complaint has been taken cognizance of by the learnedMagistrate and process has been issued against the Petitioners, whichis challenged in these Criminal Original Petitions.6. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned senior counsel for thePetitioners/A1 to A3 and A5 to A9 in Crl.OP.Nos.30736 to 30742/2006contended with all vehemence and force that in an offence underSection 499 of Penal Code punishable under Section 500 of IPC, thePetitioners cannot be made vicariously liable in their capacity asthe Directors of the Company, merely because the notice containingthe alleged imputations was signed by an Officer, A10 of the Company.He would submit that except a bald allegation that the noticecontaining imputations was published at the instance of thePetitioners, as the Directors of the Company, the complaint is bereftof any material particulars and there is no positive allegation toinfer any such instigation on the part of the A1 to A9 for display ofsuch notice as alleged in the complaint and therefore, no offence isattracted as against the Petitioners/A1 to A3 and A5 to A9.7. The learned senior counsel would further submit that thenotice in question was displayed by A10 in his capacity as theEmployer, having lawful authority over the Respondent in the noticeboard of the Company within the premises of the factory forcommunication of the information to the workers of the factoryexplaining the causes leading to the suspension of the Respondentfrom service in order to maintain industrial peace and harmony amongthe workmen of the factory. Apart from the fact that no offencecould be attributed as against A1 to A9 and they cannot be madevicariously liable for the act done by A10, even assuming that thenotice contained imputations against the Respondent, the said conductof A10 would squarely be covered by Exceptions 7 and 9 to Section 499of IPC. He would further submit that the entire object of the noticewas to inform the workmen the reasons behind the withdrawal of theprivilege of 'duty off' granted to the office bearers of the Unionand explain the causes behind the suspension of the Respondent, whowas till then the General Secretary of the Union. In the said viewof the matter, as an Employer, A10 was entitled to take such actionsas are necessary for preventing any disturbance of industrial peaceand harmony in the factory premises and it cannot be construed asdefamatory so as to attract Section 499 of IPC.8. The learned senior counsel would further submit that theallegations contained in the complaint are of the offences under ageneral statute and vicarious liability can be fastened only byreason of a provision of a special statute and not otherwise. It ishis contention that even under a special statue, when the vicariouscriminal liability is fastened on a person on the premise that he wasin charge of the affairs of the Company and responsible to it, allthe ingredients laid down under the statute must be fulfilled. Insupport of his contention, he would place reliance on the decision of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in the case of R.Kalyani Vs.Janak C.Mehta [2008-14-Scale-85].9. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to theobservations made by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case ofTGL Groundnut Corporation and others Vs. The Agricultural MarketCommittee, Adono and another [1985-XXIV-MLJ-608], while dealing withRule 70(2) of the AP [Agricultural Produce and Livestcok] MarketRules, 1969, wherein the partners of the Firm were prosecuted for noncompliance of the said Rule, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh hasheld that the liability cannot be extended to the partners of theFirm. The relevant paragraph is extracted below:-"On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is clear from thewords "whoever commits" that a person is made personallyliable for an offence committed under the Act and theliability cannot be extended to any other person merely byvirtue of any office or position he holds in a company orfirm. In order to extend the liability for an offencecommitted under the Act to any individual, it has to bespecifically averred in the petition of complaint thatparticular person is personally guilty of any act ofcommission or omission which tantamount to an offencepunishable under the Act."10. On the other hand, Mr.M.Ramamoorthy, learned counsel forthe Respondent would submit that it is not the case of thecomplainant that the Petitioners are vicariously liable for the actof A10 and it is their case that all the accused had taken a decisionjointly to malign the complainant and that the joint involvement ofthe Petitioners/accused in the publication could be proved only atthe time of trial. He would contend that the Petitioners cannotinvoke the jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 of Code ofCriminal Procedure as other remedies such as filing of dischargepetition is available to them before the lower court.11. The said submissions of the learned counsel for theRespondent does not merit acceptance, as the position of law on thispoint is well settled by a recently pronounced judgement of theHonourable Supreme Court rendered in the case of Keki HormusjiGharda and others Vs. Mehervan Rustom Irani and another [2009-6-SCC-475], wherein it is held as under:-"17. The Penal Code, 1860 save and except in some matters doesnot contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of aperson. Commission of an offence by raising a legal fiction orby creating a vicarious liability in terms of the provisions ofa statute must be expressly stated. The Managing Director ofthe Directors of the Company, thus, cannot be said to havecommitted an offence only because they are holders of offices.The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in issuing summonswithout taking into consideration this aspect of the matter.The Managing Director and the Directors of the Company shouldnot have been summoned only because some allegations were madeagainst the Company."In the same decision, regarding the availability of other remedy offiling an application for discharge, it is held thus:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "19. Even as regards the availability of the remedy of filingan application for discharge, the same would not mean thatalthough the allegations made in the complaint petition evenif given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety,do not disclose an offence or it is found to be otherwise anabuse of the process of the court, still the High Court wouldrefuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction underSection 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure."As regards the availability of the remedy of filing an applicationfor discharge to answer the contention of the Respondent in thepresent case, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that the samewould not mean that although the allegations made in the complaintpetition even if given face value and taken to be correct in itsentirety, do not disclose an offence or it is found to be otherwisean abuse of process of the court, still the High Court would refuseto exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Codeof Criminal Procedure. The Honourable Supreme Court has made areference to one of its earlier decisions rendered in the case ofPepsi Food Limited Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate [1998-5-SCC-749]in that regard.12. In the instant case, on a perusal of the complaint, therelevant allegations against the Petitioners/Accused are that A10 atthe instance of A1 to A9 created several problems to the complainantand that on 4.10.2006 at about 3.45 p.m., A10 at the instance of A1to A9, had displayed a notice in the notice board of the Company,containing defamatory matters as against the complainant. Except thesaid allegations, there is no specific allegation as to how and whenhe had come to know that A1 to A9 had instigated A10 to publish sucha notice and what is the specific act done by the Petitioners inbringing such a notice in order to make out an offence under Section499 of IPC punishable under Section 500 of IPC. 13. Indisputably, A4 had died even before filing of thecomplaint i.e. on 1.10.1999 and A3, A7 and A8 are said to haveresigned and got relieved from the Directorship and that apartsurprisingly, the non Executive Director and a Senior Advocate byname V.Ramachandran has been arrayed as A5 to have instigted A10 inthe commission of the alleged act without any basis. Very rightly ascontended by the learned senior counsel for the Petitioners, it is aclassic example where there is clear abuse of process of the court.14. In the case of Punjab National Bank and others Vs.Surendra Prasad Sinha [1993-1-Supp-SCC-499], the Honourable SupremeCourt has come down heavily on the vindictive practice of theparties, who file the private complaint as vendetta to harass thepersons needlessly and cautioned the Magistracy to take all relevantfacts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process.It is held thus:-"6. It is also salutary to note that judicial processshould not be an instrument of oppression or needlessharassment. The complaint was laid impleading theChairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and ahost of officers. There lies responsibility and duly onthe Magistracy to find whether the concerned accusedshould be legally responsible for the offence charged https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability orcreates offence against the juristic person or thepersons impleaded then only process would be issued. Atthat stage the court would be circumspect and judiciousin exercising discretion and should take all the relevantfacts and circumstances into consideration before issuingprocess lest it would be an instrument in the hands ofthe private complaint as vendetta to harass the personsneedlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice andmaintenance of law and order in the society are the primeobjects of criminal justice but it would not be the meansto wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any anglewe find that the Respondent had abused the process andlaid complaint against all the appellants without anyprima facie case to harass them for vendetta."15. On a perusal of the allegations made in the complaint, Iam of the considered view that no case has been made out as againstthe Petitioners and hence, making the Petitioners to face trial oreven to approach the trial court for further proceedings would not bein the interest of justice.16. It is now well settled that the High Court in exercise ofits inherent power conferred under Section 482 of Code of CriminalProcedure may quash the criminal proceedings when the allegationsmade in the complaint petition, even if they are taken on their facevalue and accepted in their entirety, does not disclose anycognizable offence. Some of the principles, which could be analysedfor invoking the said jurisdiction, have been laid down in the caseof Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Limited [2006-6-SCC-736],wherein it is stated that a complaint may also be quashed where it isa clear abuse of process of the court, when the criminal proceedingsis found to have been initiated with mala fide/malign for wreckingvengeance or to cause harm or where the allegations are absurd andinherently improbable. Taking note of the allegations made in thecomplaint and the same being made against the dead person and otheraccused who have no connection with the affairs of the Company, itcan be said without any doubt that it a clear case of abuse ofprocess of the court.17. Mr.A.Ramesh, learned senior counsel for the petitionersin Crl.OP.Nos.30743 and 30744/2006 urged before this court that thecomplainant was the employee of the Company and in his capacity asGeneral Secretary of the Union, he has been initiating variousproceedings against the Company and its Directors and consequent tocertain acts and misconduct committed by him, he was placed undersuspension by the Management pending enquiry and the notice inquestion was displayed for the information of the workmen of thefactory, explaining the causes leading to his suspension from servicemainly in order to maintain industrial peace and harmony and toprevent any industrial unrest among the workmen of the factoryarising out of the suspension of the Respondent. So according to thelearned senior counsel, the impugned notice dated 4.10.2006 wouldsquarely be covered by Exceptions 7 and 9 to Section 499 of IPC.18. The learned senior counsel would further submit that theRespondent was removed from the post of General Secretary of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Union of the employees of the Company and the suit was filed by therival employees of the Union to restrain him from functioning as theGeneral Secretary, which was dismissed by the court below, but thesame was allowed in the criminal revision preferred by the rivalclaimants. He would submit that it would be evident from the conductof the Respondent that he has chosen to invoke the provisions ofSection 499 of Penal Code only to settle the scores with themanagement on the premise that the management was supporting therival Union. He would submit that the notice in question has onlyreiterated the accusations made in the charge memo leading to thesuspension of the Respondent and he would urge that a charge sheet oran order of suspension issued to a workman can be displayed in thenotice board for the information of the workmen and there is noallegation that such display would have the effect of harming thereputation of the Respondent. He would further contend that anyaction taken by the Management in exercise of its right of managingdisciplinary control over the workman of a factory premises can neverbe construed as an imputation of defamatory character, so as toattract the offence under Section 499 of IPC.19. It is not in dispute that the notice in question was putup by A10 in his capacity as the Employer having lawful authorityover the Respondent. On a perusal of the notice, it is seen that theManagement has explained the reasons behind the withdrawal ofprivilege of "duty off" granted to the office bearers of the Unionand the reasons behind the suspension of the Respondent, who was tillthen the General Secretary of the Union. The Respondent raised anindustrial dispute as against his suspension and the same is pendingbefore the authorities concerned. For better analyzation of thefacts, the material allegation in the impugned complaint has beenextracted below:-",jdpilna 3/10/2006 k; njjpahfpa new;W bjhHpw;r';fj;jpd; bghJr;brayhsh; jpU/b$aghyd; (tpy;iy vz;/117) Kw;gfy; Rkhh; 11/30 kzpastpy;rPUil mzpahky; bjhHpw;rhiyf;Fs; te;J c&hg; g;nshUf;Fs; m';Fk; ,';Fk; Rw;wpj; jphpe;J gzpbra;J bfhz;oUe;j gzpahsh;fspd; ntiyf;F ,iza{w Vw;gLj;Jk; tpjkhf Tl;lk; Tl;o ngrpa[s;shh;/ mjid mwpe;Jeph;thfj;jpd; mjpfhhpfs; c&hg; g;nshUf;Fs; mthplk; mJ gw;wpnfl;lnghJ jhk; ntiyf;F te;jpUg;gjhf mth; gjpy; mspj;jpUf;fpd;whh;/rPUil mzpahky; c&hg; 1 g;nshUf;Fs; te;jnjhL jkf;Fhpa gphptpy; vd;Wxh;f myhl;bkd;l bgw;Wf;bfhs;shkYk; ntiy bra;ahkYk; eph;thfj;jplk;Kiwahd mDkjp bgwhky; gpw gzpahsh;fis miHj;J Tl;lk; nghl;Lngrp ,ila{W Vw;gLj;Jtija[k; Rl;o fhl;o epWtd mjpfhhpfs; mtiutpdpta nghJ mth; mjpfhhpfsplk; jfuhW bra;a[k; tpjkhft[k; rPUilmzpe;J ntiy bra;a ntz;Lk; vd;W ve;j xg;g;ejj;jpy; brhy;yp ,Uf;fpd;wJ vd;Wk; ehd; Md; L:l;oapy; ,Uf;nfd; vJf;F xh;fmyhl;bkd; th';fDk; vd;Wk; fyfk; tpistpf;Fk; nehf;fj;njhLthf;Fthjhk bra;Js;shh;/ nkYk; kdpj tsj;Jiwapy; Kjepiy nkyhshpd;miwf;F te;J mkh;e;J bfhz;L. mtiu ghh;f;f ghitahsh; te;Jfhj;Jf;bfhz;L ,Uf;fpwhh; vd;W brhd;dgpwFk; To mtuJ miwiatpl;L btspnaw kWj;J mog;gil fz;zpak; Tl ,y;yhky; nkw;go egh;ele;J bfhz;L ,Uf;fpd;whh;/"20. According to the complainant, the above said allegationsare defamatory in nature intended to defame him. It appears that thecomplainant has also published various notices containing allegations https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ against the management, which has been referred to in the impugnednotice displayed in the notice board. The main contention of thePetitioners is at the risk of repetition that the entire object ofthe notice was to convey to the workmen the reasons behind thewithdrawal of privilege of 'duty off' granted to the office bearersand to explain the causes behind the suspension of the Respondent inorder to exercise their right of maintaining disciplinary controlover the workmen of the factory and to prevent any unrest among theworkmen due to the withdrawal of the privilege given to the officebearers of the Union. So, it is contended by the Petitioners that theaction of the Petitioners squarely come under Exception 7 and 9 toSection 499 of IPC, as the Petitioners acted in good faith for theprotection of interest of the workmen and the factory for the publicgood. 21. On going through the details and the particularsmentioned in the notice in question and the private complaint filedby the Respondent, there can be no doubt that the steps taken by theManagement was in the interest of the management and the workmen andif the management had not taken such steps, it would meet utterfailure in management of its affairs and would lose the disciplinarycontrol over the workmen. The narration made in the notice are basedon the information received by the management and as a result of theproceedings initiated in the civil forum and also before theAssistant Commissioner of Labour. In my view, the management hasacted in a justified manner both in its interest and the workmen whomay act detrimental to the Company in order to warn the workmen tomaintain discipline and smooth working of the factory. Therefore, thePetitioners were within their rights to prevent the improper conductof the Respondent and the Petitioners had lawful authority to dealwith the subject matter of the complaint and take proceedings againstthe persons in their own interest, even if it is said that the saidaction of the management directly or by its consequences be injuriousor painful to the persons against whom such action has been taken. 22. Exceptions 7 and 9 to Section 499 of IPC is nothing morethan a reproduction of the cannon or guiding principle which wascited by Lord Campbell, CJ and the Honourable Supreme Court in KanwalLal [AIR-1963-SC-1317] has cited a passage from the judgement of LordCampbell, CJ, and observed: "A communication made bona fide upon anysubject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or inreference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a personhaving a corresponding interest or duty, although, it containscriminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderousand actionable."23. In the case of O.N.Kajuria Vs. The State of Maharastra[1981-Crl.LJ-Bombay-1729], which arose on facts that the complaintunder Section 500 of IPC was filed by the Branch Manager of the Bankon the basis of public notice issued by the Bank Managementintimating the public that the complainant was believed to beinvolved in criminal case, for which he had been suspended and was nomore authorised to deal in any way on behalf of the bank, the BombayHigh Court has held that issue of process on facts and circumstanceswas unwarranted as public notice did not make out even a prima faciecase apart from the fact that the notice was issued by the Managementin public interest and for public good and quashed the entireproceedings. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

24. Exceptions 7 and 9 to Section 499 of IPC clearlyindicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith anaccusation against any person to any of those who have lawfulauthority over that person with respect to the subject matter ofaccusation for the protection of the interests of the person makingit or of any other person or for the public good. On a perusal of theallegations made in the complaint, I am satisfied that no case ofdefamation has been made out as against the Petitioners. 25. The learned counsel for the Respondent would contend, bymaking a reference to the guidelines stated in the case of State ofHaryana Vs. Bhajan Lal [1992-AIR-SCW-237] and the decision reportedin Union of India Vs. Prakash P.Hinduja and another [AIR-2003-SC-2612] that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry as to thereliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the complaintand the proceedings cannot be quashed invoking power under Section482 of Code of Criminal Procedure.26. The legal position is well settled in Pepsi Food LimitedVs. Special Judicial Magistrate [1998-5-SCC-749] referred to above,wherein it is held thus:-"27. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is aserious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motionas a matter of course. It is not that the complainanthas to bring only two witnesses to support hisallegations in the complaint to have the criminal lawset into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoningthe accused must reflect that he has applied his mind tothe facts of the case and the law applicable thereto.He has to examine the nature of allegations made in thecomplaint and the evidence both oral and documentary insupport thereof and would that be sufficient for thecomplainant to succeed in bringing charge home to theaccused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silentspectator at the time of recording of preliminaryevidence before summoning of the accused. TheMagistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidencebrought on record and may even himself put questions tothe complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers tofind out the truthfulness of the allegations orotherwise and then examine if any offence is prima faciecommitted by all or any of the accused."27. In this case as already discussed above, the allegationsmade in the complaint as against the Petitioners does not constitutean offence under Section 499 of IPC and that apart, the Exceptions 7and 9 to Section 499 of IPC are squarely applicable to the facts ofthis case. Hence, in my considered opinion, it is a fit case, wherethis court can exercise its power under Section 482 of Code ofCriminal Procedure to quash the complaint in CC.No.429/2006 in orderto curb the illegal proceedings being carried on by the court belowto render justice. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

28. In the result, the impugned complaint is quashed andthese Criminal Original Petitions are allowed. No costs.Consequently, the connected MPs are closed. Srcm Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarTo:1.The District Munsif Cum Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur2.The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras + 1 cc to M/s. Gupta & Rani, Advocate, SR No.36440+ 1 cc to Mr. M. Ramamoorthi, Advocate, SR No.36058Order inCrl.OP.Nos.30736 to 30744/2006KM(CO)SR/17.8.2009